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# Expansive and Complex Pathways to World Society: The Global Connections of Kenyan Environmental Organizations and Their Support for Climate Change Scripts

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## **Expansive and Complex Pathways to World Society: The Global Connections of Kenyan Environmental Organizations and Their Support for Climate Change Scripts**

### **ABSTRACT**

The global diffusion of scripts by international non-governmental organizations is well established by world society literature as a key component of globalization. However, most of the literature measures a single type of connection – membership in an INGO. Through a case study of Kenyan environmental organizations, this article expands our understanding by both investigating the diverse pathways connecting global and domestic organizations, and the alignment of particular global actors with particular climate change scripts. The results show that Kenyan environmental organizations are connected to world society not only through INGO membership, but also through funding sources and trainings. Additionally, the actors spreading scripts extends beyond universal INGOs to include international development aid organizations, foreign state-sponsored development agencies, and UN agencies. Lastly, the results show that different types of global actors support different types of scripts. This contributes to a better understanding of both the expansiveness and the complexity of world society.

World society theory, which has been a key contributor to the sociological study of transnational cultural diffusion, provides strong evidence that cultural scripts defining actors and their appropriate action are increasingly created and propagated by global-level actors, primarily INGOs and intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) (Frank, Hironaka and Schofer 2000; Meyer, Boli, Thomas et al. 1997). Rather than overtly coercive, the spread of world culture is said to be voluntary, rational, and reaching all corners of the globe with little regard for continued variation in national levels of political, economic, and military power (Boli and Thomas 1999a; Lechner and Boli 2005).

The majority of this research has relied on data from the extensive volumes of the Yearbook of International Organizations and counted membership in universal INGOs as a direct or proxy measure for a connection to world society. Additionally, most existing research has thus far analyzed the links to world society through a single type of connection – membership in an

INGO. The research presented here asks, if we look more closely at the interaction between domestic actors and the diffusers of global scripts, are the pathways to world culture more diverse and the scripts promoted more expansive? How does the picture of world society and globalization change if we consider other globalizers – international development aid organizations, foreign state-sponsored development agencies, and UN agencies – that act in much the same way as world society’s INGOs by generating and promoting scripts (seen as universal) for domestic actors around the world? I explore this question through a case study of the field of Kenyan environmental organizations and their adoption of global climate change policy scripts.

The diffusion of scripts regarding the proper action to address global climate are complex but have broadly emerged into two conflicting sets of policies: one, argues that collective action by *all* nations, in the form of drastic reduction in greenhouse gas emissions, is necessary and politically rational; the other, a set of scripts that points to the greatly varied national contributions to climate change emissions, calls for developing nations to be excluded from reductions, and proposes financial transfers for the negative consequences that have emerged due to the Western-caused problem of climate change. I will refer to these as the “reductions for all” script and the “climate justice” script, both of which are elaborated later in the paper.

Through multinomial logistic regression analysis I find that the types of transnational actors interacting with Kenyan environmental organizations extends beyond universal INGOs in important ways and that particular types of transnational actors align with Kenyan environmental organizations that adopt particular global climate change scripts.

## **THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK**

World society theorists have documented the expansion of the cultural element of globalization, arguing that global-level actors create, promote, and enact normative rules and that participation in this process by states and domestic actors is rationalistic, voluntary, and mutually beneficial rather than based on the particular political, social, or economic differences among nation-states (Lechner and Boli 2005). INGOs operate at the global level, influencing not only the actions of nation-states, but also civil society actors, social movement organizations, and individuals throughout the world. In modern society, INGOs define actors, the actions they should take, and the taken-for-granted ways of doing things (Lechner and Boli 2005; Meyer et al. 1997). Looking particularly at environmental INGOs, Wapner (1996) argues that much of their transformative power is directed toward the normative change of individuals and communities. In fact, it is argued that world society actors generate the very emergence of the field of domestic environmental organizations in developing nations (Longhofer and Schofer 2010; Schofer and Longhofer 2011).

Analysis of the global structure of world society shows that transnational ties are in fact greatly stratified (Beckfield 2003; Beckfield 2008; Hughes, Peterson, Harrison et al. 2009). The degree of stratification among nations' world society connections is greater than the stratification of global income inequality among nations. This evidence points to a transnational process wrought with competition and conflict dominated by INGOs and actors from core, wealthy, western nations. If this is the case, what does that world society influence look like on the ground?

### *INGOs, Membership, and Scripts*

The picture of global processes most often presented in world society research is a single type of global actor, INGOs, connected to states and domestic actors through a single pathway, membership, most often promoting a single script that is subsequently adopted by nations or domestic actors. I argue in more detail below that while the evidence is convincing, each of these concepts needs further investigation.

Prominent world society research narrowly defines INGOs as the limited field of transnational organizations that have members with full voting rights, originating from at least three countries, and are open to all with no single nation holding a majority of memberships. Funding sources of the INGO must also represent an international rather than nation-specific character. The primary source of INGO data for studies of world society is the annual *Yearbook of International Organizations* published by the Union of International Associations (UIA). Within the yearbook, organizations are coded into different types and Boli and Thomas (1999b) include all INGOs in the yearbook categorized as universal, intercontinental or regional. This specific categorization excludes internationally focused foundations, policy centers, religious bodies, or research institutes. Has this focus on a particular field of narrowly defined INGOs caused world society research to miss the impacts of other transnational actors that act in much the same way but with potentially different outcomes? Even if this group of narrowly defined INGOs is seen as a proxy measure for more diverse connections to global processes, excluding other actors may be missing important relations within the process. Additionally, by not including other similar actors, the processes of globalization may seem more limited than they actually are.

Many other transnational actors fail to meet the specific requirements of ‘universal’ INGOs, but engage in many of the same types of action and can be equally influential in the spread of models and scripts throughout the world. State-sponsored aid agencies, such as the United States Agency for International Aid (USAID), work around the globe engaged in standard-setting and script-defining actions: funding projects, providing technical assistance, and training individuals and groups. International development aid organizations and foundations promote specific actions for specific actors in the same normative, script-defining manner as universal INGOs. However, distinct from world society’s measure of universal INGOs, most international development aid INGOs are not open, membership-based, democratic organizations. Similarly, national development agencies are not open to direct democratic participation as they lack the influence of voting members. However, state-sponsored development agencies are generally accountable to elected officials of the state. While state-sponsored development agencies primary goals are often rooted in the advancement of nation-specific policy interests, they are involved in universal norm-defining activities similar to INGOs.

Examples of recent research that have used the strictly defined measure of membership in INGOs to indicate ties to world society include: Frank and McEneaney’s (1999) examination of the presence of same-sex social movements and the liberalization of state same-sex policies in nations throughout the world; Frank, Hironaka, and Schofer’s (2000) research on the global spread of specific environmental policies; Roberts’ (2009) study of the global diffusion of family planning programs; Longhauser and Schofer’s (2010) examination of the global diffusion of environmental voluntary associations; and Frank, Robinson, and Olesen’s (2011) tracking the spread of environmental education in universities throughout the globe, among several other

studies. I argue that it is necessary to evaluate the actions of all actors who behave similarly or risk missing some of the dynamics of the process. I do so below.

Additionally, it is not only the type of actors, but also the type of *connections* to global level actors that requires further analysis. At the individual level, exposure to scripts may come through education, mass media, and even employment (Heger Boyle, McMorris and Gomez 2002). For domestic organizations, transnational actors influence the spread of policy scripts through advocacy campaigns and funding (Bartley 2007; Keck and Sikkink 1998; Minkoff 1999). International development aid NGOs such as Care and Oxfam work throughout the world funding particular projects. While grants are open for application to a broad field of actors, the boundaries defining grants guide domestic actors (local NGOs) in particular directions and toward particular scripts. Internationally focused foundations (also not included in most world society INGO counts), such as the Ford Foundation and the Rockefeller Foundation, fund projects throughout the world. In 2010, the Ford Foundation distributed over 1500 grants worth more than \$450 million from its offices in ten regions (Ford Foundation 2011).

Recent world society literature has begun to acknowledge some of these concerns and that, regarding actors that play a role in the diffusion of global scripts, INGOs are “only the tip of the iceberg” (Frank et al. 2011:569). Some recent studies have added actors like the World Bank and pathways such as official development assistance to the sources of script diffusion (Schofer and Longhofer 2011). International development aid NGOs, foundations, and foreign state-sponsored aid agencies all influence domestic level actors across the world through the allocation of funding. Which issues, organizations, and projects these transnational actors decide to fund influences the models that are legitimated, adopted, and diffuse in domestic settings. While the proposals for funding are written by local actors, funding agendas of the transnational

organizations steer local organizations toward particular issues (Michael 2004; Tvedt 2002; Vogel 2006). For a complete picture of the global processes of script diffusion, these additional types of actors and pathways should be included in analyses. Below, I explore the process of globalization with this more inclusive view of global-level actors.

In addition to predominantly measuring a single type of global-level actor (INGOs) and type of connection (membership), the implicit assumption of world society research is that a tie to the field of INGOs yields the same result – adoption of *the* script that is being promoted. In Frank, Hironaka, and Schofer (2000), the singular script – measured as an outcome variable – resulted in the formation of national parks and protected areas, adoption of environmental impact assessment laws, and the formation of national environmental ministries. Frank and McEneaney's (1999) examination of the liberalization of state same-sex laws utilizes a scale of specific policies. While a scale captures more depth in the degree of policy adoption, it continues to miss any competition from alternative models in the diffusion process. Measuring the script *after* it has been adopted misses any potential conflict among both transnational and local actors and competing scripts.

Some of the current critiques of world society theory argue that it only looks at cultural scripts *after* they are readily diffused. Analysis of stages of diffusion rather than their end-point “suggests that the process of *creating and institutionalizing* new norms may be quite different from the process of *adhering* to new norms that have already been widely accepted” (Keck and Sikkink 1998:211, emphasis added). The diffusion process is potentially a very different process of globalization, one in which actors are engaged in a competitive promotion of widely different models, policies, and scripts.

From a more critical perspective, the norms that are spread by transnational actors may reflect an ideology emanating from a “particular”, rather than “universal” culture as predicted by world society theory. Transnational civil society is seen by some as a tool to promote a hegemonic neoliberal agenda with primarily Eurocentric values (Munck 2002; Petras 1997). In this respect “global civil society” should not be understood as a homogenous group of actors all promoting “progressive” values (Munck 2002). In fact, some even argue that NGOs have done little more than direct popular local resistance to global capitalist imperialism into local micro-projects that fail to question the root source of on-going structural inequality (Petras and Veltmeyer 2001). World society scripts are critiqued as often being promoted from afar, removed from the specifics of the site of their final impact, and having negative (even if unintended) consequences (Brown, Brown and Desposato 2002; Hearn 1998). Reflecting the imbalances of power on the global stage, the local actors have had their voices confined to the local arena as more powerful ‘elite’ INGOs have become the de facto voice for those directly affected by impoverished conditions (Batliwala 2002). INGOs may not actually serve as the neutral advocates pictured in the public imagination because in many countries the civil society sector is dominated by either government funding or revenue from fees for service rather than private individual giving (Wang 2006). Domestic NGOs may not see the scripts and models promoted by INGOs as universal, but rather carrying a particular agenda – whether it is Western values or models that benefit the current capitalist system.

While clearly demonstrating the power of ties to INGOs, has much of world society research focused too narrowly on one particular type of actor – INGOs, and one particular type of connection to transnational actors – membership? When additional types of transnational actors are considered in global processes, how might it change the understanding of the spread of

scripts? Do different types of connections to world society foster similar script adoption? Do different types of transnational actors support competing scripts? In order to have a more thorough picture of global processes, I argue that the full range of transnational actors that act in much the same way as specifically defined INGOs, should be considered. I do that in this paper through a case study of Kenyan environmental NGOs, the diversity of transnational actors that support them, and the support for competing policy scripts regarding global climate change.

## **CONTEXT**

Below I provide background information on the global debate around climate change policy and describe the rationale behind the choices of Kenyan environmental organizations and climate change as a case study to analyze the diverse pathways and actors of global cultural diffusion.

### *Kenya as Case Study*

While the macro structure of world society has been mapped (see Beckfield 2003; Beckfield 2008; Hughes, Peterson, Harrison, and Paxton 2009), closer investigation through case studies can reveal more details of the process – the interactions and influence. While the focus has been on global-level actors, “of greater importance for the operations and effects of world culture...are the national and local organizations and institutions in which world-cultural elements are embedded” (Lechner and Boli 2005:235). Beckfield (2003) encourages more “narrative and case-based approaches [to] be exploited in pursuit of” questions of cultural conflict within world society (419). In order to explore the research questions addressed here I chose to look more closely at a single nation, Kenya. This allowed for the collection of data on a wide field of domestic environmental NGOs and their relationships with transnational actors.

Kenya was chosen due to its status as a developing, non-core nation of the global South, its level of connection to world society, and its relatively free and strong domestic civil society.

### *Environmental NGOs and Climate Change*

Environmental organizations broadly and the issue of climate change in particular were selected for this research because of their truly global nature (Frank 1997). The substantive topic for this study needed to be one where actors in nearly all countries and at both the local and global level were involved or had the opportunity to be involved. Climate change is undoubtedly this type of issue.

While states are a frequent subject of world society research, Boli (1999) refers to the “penetrative” authority of INGOs that has “direct effects...on non-state individuals and organizations, shaping their worldviews, values, commitments, and action” (272). Particular to global climate change negotiations, Roberts (2011) argues that in order to break the stalemate among nations at the global level of negotiations, civil society organizations may need to form “broad coalitions... to do the essential bargaining and firmly bring proposed solutions to their states to agree” (9). Additionally, civil society organizations have provided a social and cultural space for scientific and expert knowledge about climate change to diffuse to the general public (Jamison 2010). While domestic organizations are unable to frequently participate directly in UN negotiations, they may utilize connections to INGOs to get their policy concerns heard within UNFCCC negotiations (Chawla 2009). Domestic NGOs are key targets and recipients of world society and subsequently the focus of this study.

### *North-South Conflict in Global Climate Change Policy*

While IGOs and INGOs are currently involved in an effort to organize a response to global climate change, the process has been and continues to be riddled with conflict among various transnational actors and competing policy scripts. The macro analysis of global warming politics is steeped in a global North-South divide derived from the inequality of the levels of emissions, the consequences of climate change, and the geo-political negotiating power between nation-states (Gupta 1997; Linner and Jacob 2005; Muller 2002; Roberts and Parks 2006). The UNFCCC treaty addresses inequality between actors, albeit vaguely, stating that nations should act "...in accordance with their common but *differentiated* responsibilities and respective capabilities and their social and economic conditions" (UNFCCC 1992:1, emphasis added). Industrialized countries have tended to emphasize the *common* responsibilities of all nations while developing nations have tended to place more emphasis on the *differentiated* responsibilities among nations (Baumert, Bhandari and Kete 1999). The climate negotiations "take place in the context of an ongoing development crisis and what the global South perceives as a pattern of Northern callousness and opportunism in matters of international political economy" (Roberts and Parks 2006:23).

Because of the different views between states of the North and South, the nations of the Global South often negotiate collectively as the Group of 77, commonly known as the G77 (Kasa, Gullberg and Heggelund 2008). The G77, founded in 1964, currently represents 133 developing nations and contains sub-groups within the organization including the African states, Alliance of Small-Island States (AOSIS), and the Least Developed Countries. During the global negotiating meetings of 2009 the unity of the G77 began to show signs of internal differences. Brazil, South Africa, India, and China (BASIC) failed to support others in the G77 in negotiating a new legally

binding treaty that also included ambitious emission reduction commitments from the developing, yet rapidly-growing BASIC nations (Vihma 2010). The BASIC nations continued to prioritize their path of rapid development and maintained the dichotomous distinction between developed and developing countries established in the Kyoto Protocol. The greatest pressure from within the G77 came from AOSIS, whose nations are literally disappearing under rising sea levels. AOSIS called for drastic emissions reductions from every nation without regard to differentiated responsibilities. At the same time the Africa Group within the G77 focused more on adaptation, technology transfer, and finance (Masters 2014). In some respects a division among nations of the Global South emerged between those fearful of arrested development from emissions reductions and those fearful of the immediate detrimental consequences of climate change emissions produced by all.

While these divisions may have emerged, the G77 plus China continue to work in a unified manner, as evident in the collective statement they released just weeks after the 2009 negotiations stating their dissatisfaction with both the negotiating process and the substantive outcome (Mohamad 2009). The nations of the Global South remain held together by a common view of the “inadequacy of Northern action on climate change, ... [a] collective sense of an ‘unjust world order’, ... [and a] trust deficit towards developing countries” (Vihma 2010:8-9). Even after the 2009 COP meeting, nations of the Global South see that “the value of the G77 and China is in ‘solidarity’, or the ability to present a collective voice from the South” (Masters 2014:3).

Nations of the global South have collectively argued that any climate agreement should include: emissions reductions based on the historic and current contributions of nations, significant financial compensation by developed nations for mitigating the effects in poor

communities of developing nations, and directly connecting climate change and sustainable development (Linner and Jacob 2005; Sokona and Denton 2001). Nations of the South hold the position that the North should not only bear the brunt of the commitments to reduce emissions, but that they should also incur the costs of addressing the damages of climate change (Anand 2004). The South argues that it “should be awarded compensation and at the very least assistance to overcome the additional challenges that adopting policies for mitigating and/or adapting to global warming would present to them” (Pettit 2004:103). Speaking on behalf of the G77 in the opening statement of the COP 13 meeting in Bali in 2007, Pakistan’s Ambassador, Attiya Mahmood, argued that among the most pressing gaps in the treaty negotiations were commitments of hundreds of billions of financial resources to developing countries to address adaptation in developing nations (Mahmood). Additionally, the South is resistant to emissions reduction commitments occurring through clean development mechanisms (CDMs) or a market based carbon-trading system. The South argues that these options allow the North to use their advantage in financial resources to simply “buy its way out of altering its unsustainable consumption patterns by trading carbon credits with the South” (Pettit 2004:103). In 2008, at the UNFCCC COP 14 meeting in Poznan, Poland, the ambassador to Antigua and Barbuda, Diann Black-Layne, speaking on behalf of the G77 called for, “...a clear plan of action on how developed countries intend to meet their commitments and how developing countries will be assisted in meeting the adaptation needs and undertaking voluntary mitigation aspirations and access the required technology and finance to do so” (Black-Layne 2008).

### *The African Position*

Just as the diverse nations of the global South broadly support similar climate policies at the global level, the nations of the African Union (AU) have developed a common policy position. In 2009, the “Nairobi Declaration on the African Process for Combating Climate Change” emerged as the common negotiating position for African nations. The key provisions of the document call for: drastic emissions reductions by developed nations, new and adequate compensation for African nations in the form of grants and technology for economic losses, and for African nations mitigation efforts to be voluntary. African heads of state called for a common position that “gives Africa an opportunity to demand compensation for damages caused by global warming” to the tune of at least \$67 billion a year by 2020 to support adaptation and \$200 billion for mitigation efforts (African Union 2009:1).

### *Climate Justice*

The ideals of climate justice have emerged from the thousands of social movements advocating for global justice, environmental justice, and ecological debt while challenging environmental racism and neo-liberal economic globalization (Goodman 2009). According to a report by the Mary Robinson Foundation – Climate Justice, “the term ‘climate justice’ is first said to have been used in academic literature by Edith Brown Weiss (1989) and in political discourse by US indigenous activist Tom Goldtooth in 1995” (Mary Robinson Foundation - Climate Justice 2013:12). The idea of climate justice began to gain ground in 2000 when the first Climate Justice Summit was held parallel to the UNFCCC meeting (Karliner 2000). The summit was organized by the US corporate watchdog group CorpWatch. In 2002 a coalition of organizations known as the International Climate Justice Network released the *Bali Principles of Climate Justice*. Among

the principles, it calls for the “victims of climate change...to receive full compensation, restoration and reparation for the loss of land, livelihood and other damages” (International Climate Justice Network 2002). The International Climate Justice Network includes international organizations such as Friends of the Earth International, Greenpeace International and Third World Network, as well as organizations from the Global South such as, Oilwatch Africa, National Fishworkers Forum from India, and Indigenous Information Network from Kenya.

In 2007 at the UNFCCC meeting in Bali, actors from climate justice movements were visible participants, influencing the issues and emboldening developing nations (Ott, Sterk and Watanabe 2008). It was here that a coalition known as *Climate Justice Now!* was formed and proposed “huge financial transfers from North to South based on historical responsibility and ecological debt for adaptation and mitigation” (Climate Justice Now! 2007). By the much-anticipated 2009 COP 15 in Copenhagen, the climate justice movement was a prominent voice (Tokar 2010). During the parallel summit to COP 16 in 2010, the coalition of participating organizations demanded that the North “begin urgent reparations of their historical, ecological, climate, and social debts” (South-South Summit on Climate Justice and Finance 2010).

Certainly climate change has become a global issue through the processes predicted by world society: rationalization and attempted universalization by global level actors promoting models and scripts for nation-states, organizations, and individuals to adopt. However, the process has been filled with conflict and competition, demonstrating great diversity in the number of scripts being propagated by global actors. Climate justice has become defined as *the* script appropriate for actors of the global South. Therefore we would expect that Kenyan environmental NGOs have adopted the climate justice script as the global climate change policy prescription.

## **DATA AND METHODS**

### *Sample of Kenyan Environmental NGOs*

In order to assess the global connections of and policy diffusion among Kenyan civil society actors, in-person interviews were conducted with directors of 75 Kenyan environmental NGOs (KENGOs) during 2010. The sample was selected from a database of NGOs officially registered with the Kenyan NGO Co-ordination Board, a government entity. NGOs were coded as environmental based on a key word search of terms listed in the organizations' self-described objectives within the database. From the initial national population of 369 organizations, all 233 organizations located in the top population centers of Kenya were selected. These include the capital and most populated city, Nairobi, and the next four most populated cities: Mombasa, Kisumu, Nakuru, and Eldoret. This geographically disperse selection ensured a diversity of organizations and did not limit the effects measured to only those in Nairobi, which likely have an advantage over those outside of Nairobi due to the population, material and communication resources, and exposure to transnational actors. The sample also accounted for logistical challenges of conducting in-person interviews in more rural and remote communities that often lack access to reliable public transportation, secure accommodation, and modern communication.

In addition to the official NGO database of the NGO Coordination Bureau I utilized the then newly published 2010 directory of NGOs published by the NGO Council, a non-state NGO advocacy body in Kenya. This directory was acquired within days of my arrival in Kenya during an interview with the director of the NGO Council. I also made an effort to build a snowball sample by inquiring with each KENGO at the end of each interview if they knew of other organizations that I should interview. However, this process did not result in any additional

KENGOs beyond what was already in either the database or the directory. This reassured me of the thoroughness of my sample.

Of the population of 233 KENGOs in these regions, 103 had active contact information (phone or email) and I was able to contact and arrange interviews with 75 of these. See Appendix A for some descriptive data of these organizations. Only two organizations that were contacted declined to participate and did not provide a reason. In-person interviews with executive directors or environmental program directors were semi-structured with some close-ended survey-like questions and other open-ended questions. On average, the interviews lasted 90 minutes, they took place in a location of the interviewees choice, usually their office or a nearby coffee shop, and were conducted in English, one of two official languages of Kenya. The interviews were audio recorded and later transcribed. For this particular analysis, close-ended questions were entered into a database and quantitative analysis was conducted using STATA 12. Four cases were dropped from the sample due to missing data, resulting in a final sample of 71 KENGOs.

#### *Measuring KENGOs' Support for Climate Policy Scripts*

To measure support for global policy scripts, organizational directors of KENGOs were asked to rank, in order of importance, five statements reflecting the policy debate within the current global climate change negotiations. The items were as follows:

- All countries must reduce their greenhouse gas emissions drastically by 2020.
- Emissions reductions should be based on the historical amount of emissions produced by each nation.

- Developed, industrialized nations should compensate developing countries for the damage caused by global climate change.
- Emissions reductions should be accomplished through an economic market-based mechanism like carbon trading.
- New, cleaner, alternative sources of energy must be developed.

These five items capture the essential debates that have divided the North and South in climate global negotiations. The North, negotiating for *all* nations (developed and developing) to commit to emissions reductions, with these emissions reductions being accomplished through market based carbon trading and the promotion of new, cleaner sources of energy. The global South and the African Union, have focused their policy negotiations more on the North's historical responsibility for greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, the subsequent need for drastic reductions to come specifically from nations of the North, and a particular focus on the need for financial transfers from the North to the South to compensate for the harm caused by climate change.

Kenya participates in the global negotiations as part of the Africa Group, whose position was outlined above. In particular, the third item in the scale, calling for financial compensation, reflects the ideals of equity-based climate justice and is expected to emerge as a top priority among KENGOs. Subsequently, I would expect the other policy statements, especially those calling for emissions reductions for all or market-based carbon trading, to be ranked lower.

Unlike a dichotomous measure, forcing the prioritization of these policy statements measures the strength of subjects' feelings and reflects the reality of negotiations where actors have to decide which elements are most important to them and which they are willing to subject

to compromise. In order to analyze the most important preferences among KENGOs I focused on the top two ranked items on the five-item scale – considering an item ranked as either one or two as among the actors’ top priorities. I then coded the responses into a typology based on similar sequencing of priorities, which also aligned with competing global scripts.

Specifically, those KENGOs that ranked “Emissions reductions through a market-based mechanism” and “new, cleaner, alternative source of energy” as some combination of their first and second policy preferences were coded as a “carbon market/clean energy” policy preference. Those organizations that prioritized “developed, industrialized nations should compensate developing countries” as either their first or second policy priority were coded as a “climate justice” policy preference. Those that prioritized “all countries must reduce their greenhouse gas emissions drastically by 2020” as either their first or second policy were coded as a “emissions reductions for all” policy preference. This coding method accounted for 93% of the sequence of responses. Additional combinations were coded as “other”.

### *Measuring Connection to World Culture*

In order to analyze the relationship between KENGOs and transnational actors I collected three dichotomous measures. The first measure draws from traditional world society measures, membership in a universal INGO: Does the organization, its director, or any of the board members hold membership in an INGO? The second measure is the 2009 sources of funding for each KENGO: Which actors do they receive funding from and if they are transnational actors, specifically what type of actors are they? INGOs? State-sponsored aid agencies? International development NGOs? UN agencies? The final measure of connection to world culture is

participation in trainings or conferences. Has the KENGO participated in trainings or attended conferences sponsored by transnational actors?

Additionally, variables are introduced to test for the influence of the location of each KENGO's main office (Nairobi or not) and the founding year of each organization. KENGOs based in Nairobi may have easier access to resources, information, and transnational actors that connect them to global policy scripts. While attempting to account for this access through the membership, funding, and trainings variables, there may be indirect flows of information that these variables miss. Control for the founding year of the organization is set at 2006, the median founding year of the sampled KENGOs. More recently founded KENGOs may be more susceptible to adopting the climate justice policy preference because of the growing exposure of the debate relative to early years of the global climate policy debate that was focused on mitigation of emissions by industrialized nations and lacked the same level of participation by developing nations.

In order to analyze the relationship between KENGOs' policy preferences (a nominal variable) I utilize multinomial logit models (MNLM) of KENGOs' global climate policy preferences on different types of transnational connection and specific types of funders. The MNLM is most effective when the dependent variable cannot be rank ordered (Long 1997). Interpreting coefficients from these models through odds ratios compares the relationship of independent variables on the various combinations of categories of the dependent variable, holding all other variables constant. In this case, it compares the factor change in odds of a KENGO choosing one of the global climate scripts relative to the other scripts based on the types of connections to different transnational actors.

## RESULTS

### *Script Preferences of KENGOs*

The distribution of global climate change policy priorities of KENGOs is reported in Table 1 below. Based on existing global policy debate, the expectation is that the climate justice script would be the dominant script adopted by KENGOs. However, the climate justice script was prioritized by only 30 of the 71 KENGOs or just 42%. The emissions reduction for all policy script is most associated with the position of the global North and was expected to be one of the least prioritized scripts by KENGOs. Surprisingly, this script was prioritized by 38% of the total sample of KENGOs. This is nearly equal to the level of support for climate justice. The third policy preference group to emerge was “carbon market/clean energy” KENGOs. This script was chosen by nine KENGOs, or 13% of the total sample. Five KENGOs did not fit into any pattern of policy prioritization.

**Table 1: Frequency Distribution of Global Climate Change Policy Script Adoption by Kenyan Environmental NGOs**

<b>Policy script</b>	<b>n</b>	<b>%</b>
Climate Justice	30	42
Emissions Reductions for All	27	38
Carbon Market / Clean energy	9	13
Other	5	7
Total	71	100

These results show that the adoption of global policy scripts by KENGOs is diverse and far from unified. Counter to much of the existing world society literature showing a single script diffusing to actors connected to INGOs, conflicting and competing scripts are evident.

Additionally, even if the policy division between the global North and South were taken into account, the expectation would be that actors in Kenya would adopt the climate justice script. Instead, we see that no single script has yet to gain adoption by a majority of Kenyan civil

society actors and the emissions reduction for all script receives near equal levels of support as the climate justice script.

### *Ties to Transnational Actors*

Table 2 below shows the percentages of KENGOs with various types of connections to specific types of transnational actors. Considering all the types of transnational connections – INGO membership, attending conferences or trainings hosted by transnational actors, and receiving funding from a transnational actor – 87% of KENGOs had some form of connection to transnational actors. If the measurement of KENGO’s connection to global processes was limited just to INGO membership, then only 28% percent of the sample would appear to have a connection or been exposed to world society actors and scripts.

**Table 2: Frequency Distribution of Transnational Connections among the sample of KENGOs**

	<b>n</b>	<b>%</b>
Any Type of Transnational Connection <sup>a</sup>	62	87
INGO membership <sup>b</sup>	20	28
Trainings or conferences	39	55
<b>Funding sources (2009) among the total sample of KENGOs<sup>c</sup>:</b>		
From any type of transnational actor	32	45
From International Development Aid NGOs / foundations	25	35
From State-sponsored aid agencies / embassies	14	20
From UN agencies	12	17
From INGOs <sup>b</sup>	9	13
Has <i>never</i> received any type of transnational funding	32	45

Notes: <sup>a</sup> INGO membership, attended conferences or trainings hosted by transnational actors, or funding. <sup>b</sup> As defined by previous world society research, <sup>c</sup> These categories are not exclusive, KENGOs could have received funding from multiple categories of actors.

Just over half of the KENGOs have been exposed to transnational organizations and scripts through the attendance of trainings or conferences – higher than the rate of INGO memberships. The receipt of funds in 2009 from any type of transnational actor generated a connection between transnational actors and 45% of KENGOs. When delineated more specifically, the predominant funders of KENGOs are international development aid NGOs and foundations, providing some level of funding in 2009 to 35% of the KENGOs. Funding from foreign state-sponsored aid agencies and embassies served as a tie to transnational processes for 20% of the KENGOs in the sample. The UN, primarily but not exclusively through UNEP, was tied to 17% of the KENGOs by serving as a funding source. Only 13% of the KENGOs were connected to universal membership INGOs through the receipt of funds. Examples of INGOs that provided funds to KENGOs included the Nature Conservancy, East Africa Wildlife Society, and International Union for Conservation of Nature. Just under half, 45%, of the KENGOs had not received any level of funding from any type of transnational actor in the lifespan of the organization. The predominant connection to universal membership INGOs is in fact membership, however funding and conferences serve as more predominant sources of connection to and interaction with a broader set of global actors.

While there is evidence of a variety of connections to a broader collection of transnational, script-promoting actors, do particular connections to specific types of transnational actors align with particular climate change policy preferences of KENGOs? Table 3 below shows the results of multinomial logistic regression models of KENGOs policy preferences and their connections to transnational actors through multiple pathways.

**Table 3: Select Output from Multinomial Logistic Regression (MLR) of KENGO Global Climate Policy Preference on Connection to Transnational Actors Through Multiple Pathways (n=71)**

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4	
	Climate Justice vs. Emissions Reductions for All	Carbon Market/ Clean Energy vs. Emissions Reductions for All						
Member of an INGO	.02 (.58)	-.39 (.91)					-.26 (.66)	-.21 (1.02)
Attended a conference or training hosted by transnational actor			.62 (.55)	-.77 (.81)			-.05 (.68)	-.67 (.98)
Received transnational funding					1.55** -.57	-.39 (.91)	1.69* (.67)	.29 (1.04)
Founded prior to 2006							-.25 (.59)	-1.07 (.93)
Headquartered in Nairobi							.45 (.61)	.98 (.91)
LR Chi Squared	.42		3.96		10.46		16.45	
P > Chi Squared	.94		.27		.02*		.35	
Pseudo R Squared	.003		.02		.06		.09	
BIC	-101.36		-104.9		-111.4		-49.19	
AIC	2.58		2.53		2.44		2.81	

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. \*p < .05 \*\*p < .01 (two-tailed).

I begin with basic models testing the individual types of connections to world society actors (membership, conference or training, and funding) and the influence on the policy script preference. The results of both Model 1 and 2 show that neither membership in an INGO nor attending conferences or trainings hosted by transnational actors is significantly associated with any specific climate change policy preferences. The likelihood of an KENGO supporting one global climate change policy over another is not influenced by either holding a membership in or attending conferences or trainings by any type of transnational actor. Model 3, testing the relationship between the receipt of funding alone and specific global climate change policy preferences shows that funding from transnational actors is significantly ( $p < .01$ ) aligned with KENGO's global climate change policy preferences. In this case, connection to any type of transnational actors through funding positively influences the likelihood of a KENGO being aligned with the climate justice policy preference rather than the emissions reductions for all policy preference, but funding has no significant effect on the likelihood of a KENGO being aligned with the carbon market/clean energy script preference. In Model 4, the full model tests all three of the types of transnational connections, along with the KENGO being founded prior to 2006 and being headquartered in Nairobi. With a probability of .35 (far from being below the standard of .05) of obtaining the LR test statistic of 16.45 the fit of the model is not significant and fails to reject the null hypothesis that the regression variables are different from zero. Funding from transnational actors is the only variable that gains significance in any of the models regarding influence on climate change script preference.

Calculating odds ratios from the MLR results makes interpretation of the multiple comparisons among the elements of the dependent variable easier (Long 1997). Table 4 below

displays the odds ratios comparing select climate change script preferences of KENGOs and the receipt of funding from all types of transnational actors. The odds of preferring the climate justice policy script relative to the emissions reductions for all policy script is 4.75 times greater for KENGOs that received funding from a transnational actor in 2009. The odds of preferring the climate justice policy script relative to the carbon market/clean energy policy script is 7.00 times greater for KENGOs that received funding from a transnational actor in 2009. The odds of preferring emissions reductions for all over carbon market/clean energy policies are not altered in a statistically significantly manner by the receipt of funding.

**Table 4: Select Odds Ratios Derived from Multinomial Logistic Regression (MLR) of KENGO Policy Preference on Connection to Transnational Actors Through Funding (n=71)**

	Climate Justice vs. Emissions Reductions for All	Climate Justice vs. Carbon Market / Clean Energy	Emissions Reductions for All vs. Carbon Market / Clean Energy
Received transnational funding	4.75**	7.00*	1.47

Notes: \*p < .05 \*\*p < .01 (two-tailed).

While the cross sections nature of this data is unable to indicate that funding from transnational organizations *causes* KENGOs to favor climate justice policies over emissions reductions for all policies, it does indicate that transnational mechanisms other than INGO membership are configured with particular global policy preferences. Funding from transnational organizations is flowing more often to those KENGOs that favor climate justice policies compared to those that favor emissions reductions for all or a carbon market/clean energy

policies. Based on these results – that funding is a significant transnational connection that aligns with a particular global script. Questions remain regarding the more specific types of transnational actors. The previous results in Table 2 above indicated that KENGOs receive funds from different types of global actors. While these different actors act in a similar fashion – generating and promoting normative scripts transnationally – the differences among them, particularly foreign state-sponsored aid agencies direct ties to nation states, may result in the support of different policies. The analysis of this potential difference follows.

Select odds ratios from a Multinomial Logistic Regression of the policy preferences of KENGOs on the *specific* types of funding sources are displayed in Table 5 below. The results show that there are important and significant differences between the types of actors. The statistically significant difference is between the climate justice script compared to the emissions reductions for all script. The odds of favoring the climate justice policy script relative to the odds of favoring the emissions reductions for all script are 6.71 times higher for KENGOs that have received funding from an international development NGO, holding all other funding variables constant. By aligning with the climate justice script, KENGOs clearly increase their chances of receiving funding from international development NGOs.

**Table 5: Select Odds Ratios Derived from Multinomial Logistic Regression (MLR) of KENGO Policy Preference on Connection to Transnational Actors Through Specific Funding Sources (n=71)**

type of funding organization	Climate Justice vs. Emissions Reductions for All	Emissions Reductions for All vs. Climate Justice
INGO	6.10	0.16
International Development Aid NGO	6.71*	0.15*
UN Agency	8.19	0.12
Foreign State-Sponsored Development Agency	0.02**	58.27**

Notes: \*p < .05 \*\*p < .01 (two-tailed). Other policy preference comparisons output not shown due to no significant outcomes.

Funding from a foreign state-sponsored developed agency also shows a significant relationship, but a negative one regarding preference for the climate justice script. The odds of selecting the emissions reductions for all climate policy script relative to the climate justice policy script are 58.27 times greater for KENGOs that have received funding from a foreign state-sponsored developed aid agency, holding all other sources of funding constant. These findings show that different types of transnational actors are supporting KENGOs that favor very different global policy scripts regarding climate change.

## CONCLUSION

World society theory has provided an abundance of evidence of the spread of cultural scripts and models around the globe. Numerous studies indicate the increase in global social processes of universal INGOs developing and propagating normative rules and policies. These powerful scripts are argued to be voluntarily and rationally adopted throughout the world, particularly by nations well embedded in world society. Membership in INGOs and/or IGOs has been the

primary way that world society research has determined the level of embeddedness or connection to world society with INGOs being defined as a very specific type of actor.

The case study presented here provides a closer examination of the relationship between domestic and global level actors and shows a world with more diverse pathways to connections amongst them. INGO membership should not be seen as a direct or even proxy measure for all transnational connections. In fact, in this study INGO membership is the least frequently taken pathway to a connection with norm-generating transnational actors. Trainings and conferences serve as the most frequent type of connection, with just over half of the KENGOs participating in such events hosted by transnational actors. Experts and influential global organizations expose domestic actors to best practices, standards, and methods during prevalent trainings and conferences that may last just an afternoon or up to a week. Future research should improve measures of the influence of trainings and conferences by looking more closely at the frequency and substantive value that they hold for spreading globally produced scripts to domestic actors.

Connection to transnational actors through funding is also a pathway that has been overlooked in previous research that proves significant in the relationships investigated here. This evidence reinforces world society theory's larger argument that global level social organizing is an influential force on national and domestic level actors, but importantly adds an additional avenue for connections among these actors. Funding from global-level actors is often a key part of their particular programmatic agenda and subsequently goes to the applicant organization that can best adopt and implement that agenda. Resource scarcity in developing nations such as Kenya places great pressure on civil society organizations to obtain grants in order to survive. Funding then can serve as an avenue for global actors to transmit particular policies, issues, and/or methods.

Further investigation of the types of connections that have been explored here will contribute to a greater understanding of ongoing global processes. While INGO membership counts and network modeling show a great and persistent inequality in the levels of participation in world society between advanced industrialized nations and developing nations, expanding the types of connections, especially funding, may present a different picture of the global structure of world society, one that is even more penetrating than is currently evident in existing literature.

In addition to more diverse connections to world society, this national case study shows that different types of connections may support different scripts. In Kenya, a tie to transnational actors through funding is the only type of connection that shows a significant relationship to the specific policy preferences held by the domestic actors. Membership in an INGO is not significantly associated with the adoption of any specific climate change script by KENGOs. Instead, what is evident is that particular policy preferences of KENGOs increase the likelihood of receiving funds from either international development aid NGOs or foreign state development agencies. Funding from international development aid NGOs is much more likely to go to KENGOs that favor a climate justice policy script, while funding from foreign state-sponsored development agencies is much more likely to flow to KENGOs that favor the emissions reductions for all script. This is far from a unified set of global actors promoting a single script. Rather, state-associated actors are more likely to fund KENGOs that support the policy script that is most associated with the policies promoted by the North in global climate change negotiations, while non-state, human development actors (international development NGOs) are more likely to fund the financial-transfer, justice-based policies favored by the South. This points to more contention and competition within world society than has been explored to date in most literature.

Subsequently, the types of actors, types of connections between them, and the scripts being promoted within the global-domestic social processes are more diverse and contentious when viewed more closely. These results expand rather than contradict existing research of the diffusion of scripts measured *after* a single script has successfully diffused across much of the world and has been adopted by nations. The evidence here presents a more complex, varied, and competitive process that begins to point toward the exercise of power within world society.

Specific to the results presented here, further research is needed that investigates whether funding serves as a causal mechanism for script adoption versus funders supporting organizations that already align with the policy script they wish to promote. More broadly, future research needs to analyze the *active* process of script formulation, as well as diffusion in the midst of the process. Post-diffusion analysis may be missing important elements of the social processes involved in the emergence of a dominant global script.

While world society literature acknowledges that the global spread of scripts and norms is a “messy arena of contention,” full of “misunderstanding, uncertainty, strategic mobilization, and struggle” (Lechner and Boli 2005:239), more research needs to specify the manner and consequence of this struggle. The case study presented here contributes to illuminating the details of a contentious global process. This has potential implications for our understanding of the levels of participation in world society, how and which scripts become widely diffused (and which do not), and how global level forces continue to impact domestic actors.

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## APPENDIX A

The field of environmental NGOs in Kenya is focused on five main issue areas: forestry, climate change, waste management/recycling, watershed/wetlands protection, and environmental education. Forestry issues such as forest preservation, expansion, and recovery dominate the issue-focus of the field of KENGOs. Forest-related concerns are part of 63 percent of the KENGOs programming. Forests play a key role in Kenya's ecosystem but also its economy and the day-to-day survival of many. Forests cover 6.2 percent of the land in Kenya, but only 20 percent of that remains primary or old growth forest. Since 1990, Kenya is estimated to have lost 186,000 hectares, or 5 percent of its total forest cover<sup>1</sup>. Meanwhile according to the UN's Food and Agriculture Organization, the export value of forest products from Kenya has risen from around \$4 million USD in 1990 to \$34 million USD in 2009. According to a 2005 report from the Kenya Export Processing Zones Authority, only about 6 percent of Kenya's forests are protected but 75 percent of the domestic energy of Kenya comes from wood and charcoal.<sup>2</sup> The depletion of forests in Kenya is matter of real concern for the field of KENGOs.

Waste management (including recycling and sanitation) is an issue-focus for 20 percent of the KENGOs. This includes basic garbage pick-up and litter prevention. But it also includes concerns about toxic electronic waste in a garbage dump located in the middle of the Dandora neighborhood of Nairobi, recycling and/or eliminating ubiquitous "disposable" plastic bags, and increasing the number of formal sanitation facilities (contained latrines) to prevent the contamination of lakes, water sources, and densely populated urban slums. The lack of formal government services to sufficiently address waste and sanitation in Kenya leaves many KENGOs to address the issues at a community level.

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<sup>1</sup> <http://rainforests.mongabay.com/20kenya.htm>


<sup>2</sup> "Wood and Wood Products – Kenya 2005" [www.epzakenya.com/UserFiles/File/kenyawood.pdf](http://www.epzakenya.com/UserFiles/File/kenyawood.pdf)

Twenty percent of KENGOs reported including environmental education as a focus of their programming. This primarily includes environmental education programs targeting school children, but also broad community education programs to prevent wildlife poaching, raise awareness of the importance of biodiversity in Kenya and particular regions, and general conservation. Wetlands and watershed protection are addressed by 17 percent of the KENGOs. Less than 10 percent of the KENGOs identified broad sustainable development or sustainable agriculture issues as part of their focus. More environmental issues may be rooted in Kenyan organizations focused on specific development issues rather than environmental issues. Other issues that were identified by less than 5 percent of the KENGOs include wildlife protection, preservation of biodiversity, environmental justice, and industrial pollution, among others. The issue-focus of KENGOs is quite stable over time with 81 percent of the organizations reporting that they continue to focus on similar issues to those that inspired the founding of the organization.

Three quarters of KENGOs (76 percent) attribute their activities and issue-foci to climate change related activities. With so many organizations focused on forestry related issues, the application of a climate change related frame is an easy one. Forests serve as “carbon sinks”, absorbing carbon dioxide and have been identified globally as a key element in combating global warming. At the global policy level, nations of the South have been focused on the inclusion of adaptation issues alongside mitigation issues. Mitigation issues focus on the reduction of greenhouse gases emitted into the atmosphere. In the nations of the global North this means cleaner coal fired power plants, higher fuel efficiency vehicles, and the increase of alternative energy sources such as solar and wind. In nations of the global South this means preventing further deforestation. Adaptation issues focus on how people can adapt to the current and

emerging negative impacts of climate change. In Kenya this translates into such things as drought resistant crops and rainwater harvesting. Despite the South’s advocacy for adaptation issues at the global level, 87 percent of the KENGOs that attribute their activities to climate change related issues are involved in mitigation activities – primarily forest preservation, expansion, and the prevention of further deforestation. Only 15 percent of the KENGOs that address climate change are involved in adaptation activities. Policy advocacy regarding climate change was part of the efforts to tackle the issue of 17 percent of the KENGOs.

While the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) was established in 1992, the field of Kenyan environmental organizations has only recently begun to include climate change in their repertoire of issues. The figure below documents the rapidly growing inclusion of climate change among KENGOs’ efforts. The mean year that KENGOs reported beginning to address climate change is 2006, with only three reporting involvement prior to 2000 and 37 percent of them beginning to address the issue in either 2009 or 2010.



**Number of KENGOs Addressing Climate Change 1988-2009**

## APPENDIX B

Are Nairobi-based KENGOs any different from the rest of the field? Nairobi was home to an estimated 3.1 million people in 2009. The second largest city, Mombasa, has an estimated population of 915,000, and the third largest city, Nakuru, has an estimated population of just 286,000<sup>3</sup>. Nairobi has greater transportation and communication infrastructure, is home to UNEP and most international NGOs that work in Kenya, and is the nation's political capital. Below, I report some of the apparent differences between KENGOs based in Nairobi and those based in the other top four population centers.

The human capital of the directors of KENGOs based in Nairobi is slightly higher when measured by formal education. Nearly all (98 percent) of the directors of Nairobi-based KENGOs hold university degrees compared to 81 percent of those based outside of Nairobi. However, both sets of directors remain much more highly educated than the general population. Additionally, a higher percentage of Nairobi based directors (67 percent) had traveled overseas compared to their counterparts outside of the capital (52 percent).

The issue-focus among the KENGOs varies noticeably only regarding the rates of those focused on forestry. KENGOs based outside of Nairobi focused on forestry at a higher rate (70 percent vs. 58 percent), but address climate change (78 percent vs. 74 percent), environmental education (22 percent vs. 19 percent), waste management (19 percent vs. 21 percent) and watershed/wetlands protection (15 percent vs. 19 percent) at similar rates to KENGOs based in Nairobi. When addressing climate change, organizations within and outside of Nairobi address mitigation and adaptation issues at similar rates, but Nairobi based organizations engage in climate change advocacy more frequently (23 percent) than their counterparts (9 percent).

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
<sup>3</sup> <http://www.citypopulation.de/Kenya.html>

Some of the activities or tactics, as well as the target and reach of the organizations vary by KENGO location. KENGOs outside of Nairobi reported participating in a protest or strike more often (26 percent) than those in Nairobi (12 percent). However, KENGOs outside of Nairobi limited the target of their broad efforts to the people and not the government much more frequently (70 percent) than those in Nairobi (44 percent). The range of their work reflected a similar community-rootedness of KENGOs outside of Nairobi with 85 percent of them working in communities only within their province, while 42 percent of those based in Nairobi reach communities beyond their province or even nationwide.<sup>4</sup>

The budgets of KENGOs appear to favor those based in Nairobi. The figure below shows only a slightly higher percentage of Nairobi-based KENGOs in the highest bracket, but also in the lowest bracket. Greater differences are seen in the middle ranges with 14 percent of KENGOs based in Nairobi reporting in the \$25,000 - \$50,000 range and no KENGOs based outside of Nairobi reporting that range. The results (not show here) of a multinomial logistic regression of KENGO location and the budget ranges shows no statistically significant impact.

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<sup>4</sup> It should be noted that the geographical boundaries of the Nairobi province are much smaller compared to some others, making it easier for KENGOs based in Nairobi to also claim that their work extends to any of its neighboring three provinces compared to a KENGO based in the Rift Valley province which covers over 170,000 square kilometers running the entire north-south length of the country. Additionally, due to incredibly sparse road networks and other basic infrastructure in the northern half of the country, KENGOs reporting to work “nation-wide” should be interpreted with some caution.



**KENGOs Reported Budgets 2009 by Location**

While KENGO location did not reflect great difference in the rates of having an office solely for the organization, higher rates of KENGOs in Nairobi reported running the KENGO out of their homes, having a computer, and slightly more access to the Internet on their computers. While not stark, the differences between organizations based in Nairobi and outside of Nairobi are sufficient enough to warrant consideration of their impact on other variables.