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The Reciprocal Relationship between Immigration Policy and the Immigrant Experience in the United States

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The Reciprocal Relationship between Immigration Policy and the Immigrant Experience in the United States

Abstract
This paper examines the relationship between US immigration policy and immigration experience through a constructivist perspective in order to gain a more complete understanding of the implications of this relationship. I analyze US immigration policy through a constructivist international relations perspective to provide an understanding of how the US has historically represented itself and how US norms, values, and interests change over time. My research shows that constructivism is the best international relations approach to explain how the domestic experiences of immigrants affect and are affected by US immigration policy because all aspects of international and domestic experiences are shaped by the social construction of reality. To further explore the relationship between immigration policy and lived experience, I present the case study of contemporary Chinese immigrants and Chinese Americans who reside in the Chicagoland area as evidence of the reciprocal relationship between US immigration policy and racialized immigration experiences.

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LAKE FOREST COLLEGE

Senior Thesis

The Reciprocal Relationship between Immigration Policy and the Immigrant Experience in the United States

by

Lisa Ledvora

April 15, 2016

The report of the investigation undertaken as a Senior Thesis, to carry two courses of credit in the Department of Sociology and Anthropology and the International Relations Program

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Abstract

This paper examines the relationship between US immigration policy and immigration experience through a constructivist perspective in order to gain a more complete understanding of the implications of this relationship. I analyze US immigration policy through a constructivist international relations perspective to provide an understanding of how the US has historically represented itself and how US norms, values, and interests change over time. My research shows that constructivism is the best international relations approach to explain how the domestic experiences of immigrants affect and are affected by US immigration policy because all aspects of international and domestic experiences are shaped by the social construction of reality. To further explore the relationship between immigration policy and lived experience, I present the case study of contemporary Chinese immigrants and Chinese Americans who reside in the Chicagoland area as evidence of the reciprocal relationship between US immigration policy and racialized immigration experiences.
Dedication

To immigrants and descendants of immigrants who represent multiple cultural identities throughout their daily experiences
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Chapter One

Introduction

On February 20 of 1998 in Nagano, Japan, two American women stood atop the Olympic podium, having just earned the coveted gold and silver medals in the women’s figure skating event. Both Tara Lipinski and Michelle Kwan represented the United States of America as they received their gold and silver medals, respectively. However, back home in the United States, the figure skater of Chinese descent was seemingly portrayed in the media as being less American than Lipinski. Soon after the women won their Olympic medals, news website MSNBC posted an article with the headline, “American Beats Out Kwan,” suggesting that Kwan was not an American despite her place of birth and residence being in California. After realizing the poor wording of the headline, MSNBC took down the article and apologized for the error, but the damage was done as the article was already sent out to 85,000 subscribers of the site’s News Alert service (Sorensen 1998). Michelle Kwan’s experience of being seen as a foreigner in the US despite her American citizenship was made public in 1998 because of her celebrity status. Other Americans go through similar experiences in contemporary society, but most go unnoticed.

While it might not seem like the phrasing of one news headline would have much significance on a larger scale, the implications of the headline have great significance in the study of race relations in the United States. Explaining this significance, law professor Frank Wu states, “By implying that Kwan was a foreigner who had been defeated by an ‘American,’ the headline in effect announced that an Asian American had been defeated by a white American in a racialized contest” (Wu 2007). Identifying racial identity as the indicator of difference between the two women, Wu continues, “If two
white Americans compete against each other in a sporting event – say, rivals Nancy Kerrigan and Tonya Harding – it would be preposterous for the result to be described as one of them defeated by an ‘American.’ If Kwan won, it also would be unlikely for the victory to be described as ‘American beats out Lipinski’ or ‘Asian beats out white’” (Wu 2007). Kwan is just as American as Lipinski (if “Americanness” could be measured). She just does not look like mainstream white American society, so she is seen as a foreigner or as not completely American. This example shows how the racial identity of a person can mark her as so different from mainstream white American society that she becomes an outsider in the mind of others. In this way, it characterizes the many racialized life experiences of Asian Americans in the United States. In this paper, I discuss the contemporary experiences of Chinese immigrants and Chinese Americans to develop an understanding of how the race of immigrants and their descendants, such as Michelle Kwan, influence their life experiences and shape how they are perceived in the United States. I also address how these experiences and perceptions interact with US immigration policy.

It is important to understand how people from one immigrant group are confronted by the cultural, social, and racial construction of the state to which they immigrate and how their experiences are shaped by that construction. This is because that same cultural, racial, and social construction informs how national immigration policy is produced, which in turn, affects the lives of those who want to and those who do immigrate to the nation-state. While the experiences of Chinese immigrants and Chinese Americans may seem like a narrow focus, I contend that we can use the Chinese experience of immigration to the US as a case study to better understand the challenges that immigrants face and therefore, to better inform immigration policy. The ways in which perceptions of immigrant groups are socially constructed by the nations to which
they immigrate affect more than their daily lives. The social construction also influences how members of any given country see immigrants and immigration, which in turn contributes to foreign policy decisions related to immigration. Additionally, the social construction of the international society shapes immigration policies, which influence the lived experiences of immigrants and contribute to the domestic social construction. Because of this reciprocal relationship, the consequences of immigration policies for the lived experiences of immigrants need to be examined more robustly within the field of international relations.

Immigration is an international relations concern, but as a subject matter, immigration is not regularly addressed in existing literature through various approaches to international relations theory. Constructivism is the only international relations perspective that has sufficient scope to cover all factors that influence immigration in practice. In contrast with other international relations perspectives, the constructivist approach considers how the social construction of the domestic experiences of immigrants affects immigration policy and how immigration policy, in turn, affects the lives of immigrants and their descendants and the social construction of a given country. To illustrate how this cycle of influence plays out in reality, I examine how Chinese immigrants throughout US history have been greatly affected by changing, socially constructed, immigration policies and how the history of Chinese immigration to the United States (and more specifically, to Chicago) is shaped by those policies. I then analyze how the historical implementation of US immigration policies supported the formation of a racialized social construction of the society in which immigrants and the native-born population live. I show that this social construction has affected the lived experiences of contemporary Chinese immigrants and as well as the development of US immigration policy. These analyses show that the effects of a racialized social
construction of immigration policy on the life experiences of immigrants and their descendants needs to be considered when immigration is examined through a constructivist lens in order for international relations to adequately reflect the immigrant experience and society’s social construction.

This paper is divided into five main chapters that together unravel the complexities of my argument regarding immigration policy and the racialized life experiences of Chinese immigrants and Chinese Americans. In the following chapter (Chapter Two), I describe the history of US immigration policy through the lens of international relations with a focus on the perspective of constructivism in order to support the argument that the constructivism is the only international relations perspective that adequately accounts for the interaction between immigrants’ racialized life experiences and immigration policy. Constructivism accounts for this interaction through its incorporation of the changing social construction of reality. In Chapter Three, I explain how US immigration policies throughout history and other factors caused the Chinese community of the Chicagoland area to be as it is today. Through this chapter, I describe how the historical implementation of US immigration policies supported the formation of a racialized social construction of US society. In Chapter Four, I explain how the racialized social construction of the United States (which both informs immigration policy and is informed by immigration policy) has caused the perception that some immigrants are unassimilable in the United States. This perception contrasts with reality, in which immigrants are largely assimilable. I argue that despite immigrants’ ability to assimilate in the United States, the racialized social construction of reality limits some immigrants’ ability to be accepted by mainstream society. In Chapter Six, I use a case study of the life experiences of Chinese immigrants and Chinese Americans who currently reside in the Chicagoland area as evidence to support the claim that although
Chinese immigrants can assimilate into US society, their racial and ethnic identity has caused them to only be partially accepted by mainstream white America. Thus, the lived immigrant experience is shaped by the social construction of reality, which also shapes the relations between countries and US immigration policy. In turn, the relations between counties and US immigration policy influence the racialized social construction and therefore the lived experience of immigrants and their descendants. In the final chapter (Chapter Seven), I conclude this paper by bringing together the ideas presented in the preceding chapters and providing suggestions for further research.
Chapter Two

US Immigration Policy and International Relations

When examining the history of immigration to the United States, it is important to understand the circumstances surrounding individuals’ choice to leave their homes and move to the US as well as the social experience of immigrants and descendants in their new home. Conversely, it is also important to understand how immigration is shaped by the governmental policies that aim to control, limit, or encourage the settling of foreigners within national boundaries. Because immigration policies, as set by the nation-state, have great effects on immigration practices, examination of the context of the country-level perspective of immigration from a broader, international standpoint can provide new insights about the relationship between immigration experiences and immigration policy. However, “Immigration politics is not static” (Freeman 1994, 11). Policies regarding immigration have been in flux since the founding of the United States: “It is obvious, of course, that the politics of immigration in liberal democracies fluctuates, that its salience ebbs and flows, and that it exhibits a tendency to go through predictable cycles” (Freeman 1995, 886). Policy fluctuation has occurred throughout history because the US government has changed its perspective on who is allowed into the US, and for which reasons, many times. Changing political viewpoints of policymakers, constructed societal norms and values, and the change in position of the US in relation to other global powers have influenced those reasons for which people are allowed into the US or are restricted from entering. While the United States government has not purposefully expressed a single ideological international relations perspective, each written immigration policy reflects the predominant attitudes of the country regarding the costs and benefits of immigration. Unlike other features of international relations, where a
governing ideology might drive policy, immigration is often complicated by other social components. As a consequence, although each particular moment in US immigration policy history might appear to conform to a specific perspective of international relations, US immigration policies historically have changed in response to changing societal ideas, interests, and norms. Not only do policies affect immigration practices and societal attitudes but also, societal attitudes, domestic interests, and immigration experiences reciprocally affect policies.

Because constructivism is a non-predictive approach to international relations that explores how shared meanings and rules, social identities and values, norms, ideas, and interests affect international relations decisions and actions, it is the most valuable perspective for understanding US immigration policy. Constructivists do not assume there exists a shared meaning of any given idea, identity, interest, or action because shared meaning is socially constructed and emerges based on interactions of actors. Constructivists examine how individual and group ideas, identities, and interests shape decisions of policymakers and international actors. Constructivism is reflected in US immigration policies throughout history that appear to have been shaped by social discourse and changing public attitudes or ideas.

Other international relations theories also offer valid perspectives of US immigration policy. These theories are limited in scope, however, because they fail to account for the socially constructed ideas, interests, identities, and norms of the state. On the other hand, the constructivist international relations perspective does consider these socially constructed components of the state. To demonstrate this idea, I explain in this chapter how various major immigration policies implemented throughout US history reflect the constructivist international relations perspective. Thus, even though immigration is rarely seen as an international relations concern (Meyers 2000, 1264), this
analysis will show that immigration policies have international relations consequences. Analyzing US immigration policy through the constructivist perspective provides an understanding of how the US has historically represented itself on an international scale and how US norms, values, and interests change over time.

To understand why constructivism is unique as an international relations perspective in its ability to encompass the complexities of immigration and immigration policy, it is first necessary to discuss the basic characteristics of the distinctive international relations perspectives of classical realism, structural realism, neoliberalism, and liberalism. Classical realists focus on several basic principles. Nation-states are the primary actors in an anarchical global environment where there is no central government and each state has some level of material power. States are relatively rational actors that seek and use power to maintain or improve their position in the world (in relation to other state actors) and as a means of achieving national security objectives. Structural realism (also known as neorealism) follows similar principles as classical realism, but the two forms of realism are different in some ways. Both theories view states as primary actors in an anarchical global system. With regards to the important concept of power, classical realists view power as the end objective while neorealists view power as a means to the end objective of security for state survival. Paul Viotti and Mark Kauppi explain that for structural realists, anarchy “requires states to engage in competitive behavior as opposed to classical realist Hans Morgenthau’s emphasis on human nature and the drive for power causing security competition” (Viotti and Kauppi 2012, 63). Thus, structural realism emphasizes relative power of states, such as with regards to economic competitiveness, in comparison with classical realism, which emphasizes absolute power.

International relations neoliberalism and neorealism differ greatly. Realists focus on power and competition, but liberalism works to explain how “international
cooperation or collaboration becomes possible” (Viotti and Kauppi 2012, 129).

Neoliberalism developed as a response to neorealism’s limitations. Neorealists examine international relations under the assumption that states are the main global actors, but neoliberal institutionalists assert that in reality, states function within a system that includes intergovernmental or nongovernmental organizations, international regimes (such as institutionalized rules), and international conventions (Viotti and Kauppi 2012, 147). Neoliberal institutionalism explores how various international institutions help shape cooperative state behavior through working with states’ shared national interests.

United States immigration policy primarily reflects constructivism because the principles that guide realism, structural realism, and neoliberalism do not incorporate the importance of socially constructed meanings, interests, and ideas.

Constructivism is reflected in changing US immigration policy, but liberal theory also considers both US foreign policy and international relations. Liberal theory of state power and policy (not to be confused with international relations neoliberalism) incorporates the pluralistic model of foreign policy decision making which “attributes decisions to bargaining conducted among domestic sources” (Mingst and Arreguín-Toft 2014, 159). Therefore, liberal theory argues that the interests and concerns of the domestic population of a state influence the decisions of state policymakers in foreign policy. Given that the United States society is diverse and pluralistic in nature, a wide range of interests and concerns guides policymakers’ decisions, which in turn affect international relations realities. For example, liberal theory is reflected in real practices, as evident by the ability of US interest groups (including ethnic lobbies, corporations, unions, etc.) to affect immigration policies. Thus, liberal theory is included in this chapter’s analysis of US immigration policies.

Components of all the described theories, approaches, and perspectives of
international relations can be identified in various aspects of US policies regarding immigration, but constructivism is the only approach that is expressed by all major US immigration policies through history. Because immigration is rarely seen as a concern of international relations, the main theories for understanding international relations do not take into account all the elements that shape the interactions between states. In the following analysis, I identify how constructivism is expressed within various historical and contemporary US immigration policies. I also show how even though elements of other international relations perspectives are reflected in aspects of US immigration policy, constructivism is the international relations approach that best allows us to understand how US immigration policy is influenced by changing ideas, values, and norms. I am limiting this analysis to significant immigration policies from the late nineteenth century through the early twenty-first century that affect who is allowed into the United States, who is kept out, and who is allowed to become a citizen of the United States. Appendix D includes a table that chronologically identifies the US immigration policies discussed in this chapter (Table 1). I will begin my analysis with the beginning of the history of immigration to the United States. Within each section of this chapter, I first describe relevant US immigration policies then explain how those policies reflect constructivism.

**Unrestricted Immigration Era**

In the early days of the United States, immigrants were largely unrestricted from entering the country. Early immigrants to the United States came in search of opportunity and freedom. Because the US as a state lacked power and security on the international scale, more people were needed in order to increase the country’s material power. An increase in material power was desired because material power provides for national
security. Classical realists argue that because nation-states exist in an anarchical international environment in which each state has material capabilities and there is no principal global government, national power is important to have in order to maintain state security. According to this perspective, since “survival depends on a state’s material capabilities and its alliances with other states” (Lebow 2013, 61), states aim to protect themselves through the maximization of power. Classical international relations realist Hans Morgenthau describes the many elements of national power: geography, natural resources, industrial capacity, military preparedness, and population, among others. With regards to the connection between immigration and power, Morgenthau asserts that the drastic population increase that occurred in the US between 1824 and 1924, due to unrestricted immigration, allowed the US to become more powerful: “Free immigration from 1824 and, more particularly, from 1874 to 1924 is mainly responsible for the abundance of manpower which has meant so much for the national power of the United States in war and peace” (Morgenthau 1967, 119). From this perspective, the immigrants that arrived in these early stages of the nation’s development contributed to the state’s rise in power. Hypothesizing, Morgenthau continues, “Without this immigration, it is unlikely that the population of the United States would amount to more than half of what it actually is today. In consequence, the national power of the United States would be inferior to what the 214 million people make it today [in 1948]” (Morgenthau 1967, 119). Population is not the only element of national power and thus, unrestricted immigration in the 1800s is not the only factor that helped the US develop into a great nation. Nonetheless, “a nation cannot be of the first rank without a population sufficiently large to create and apply the material implements of national power” (Morgenthau 1967, 120). Morgenthau’s argument connecting population to power demonstrates that immigration influences national power. Accordingly, the nineteenth century period of generally
unrestricted immigration in the United States expresses a key principle of the classical realist theory of international relations.

Although classical realism is expressed in Morgenthau’s analysis of the early population increase in the United States (due to unrestricted immigration), analyzing the same era through a constructivism lens allows for a more robust understanding of core international relations concepts. While other theorists view reality and elements of international relations as absolutes, constructivists see reality as “a project under constant construction” (Flockhart 2012, 82). For example, unlike realists and other international relations theorists, constructivists do not view material (power) structures as fixed aspects of international relations. Instead, power relations are a byproduct of institutionalized ideas regarding power. Constructivists focus on the idea that international relations are influenced by intersubjective and institutionalized norms, rules, beliefs, ideas, and identities of and within states. Constructivists place emphasis on “the power of ideas and the importance of interpretive understandings of ‘the world out there’” (Viotti and Kauppi 2012, 278). Constructivists see states and international organizations as international relations actors, and they “view international structure in terms of a social structure infused with ideational factors to include norms, rules, and law” (Viotti and Kauppi 2012, 278). So, according to this perspective, the people in charge of states, the government, construct perceived state reality, and the popular opinions (ideas) of the general population of the state inform governmental actions. Thus, perceived reality is influenced by the ideas of the people within a population.

Constructivists argue that even the most basic principles of other international relations theories, including classical realism, are socially constructed and therefore, subject to change based on the identities and interests of states and institutionalized collective knowledge of those within the system of analysis. International relations
concepts are meaningless without shared knowledge, norms, beliefs, and identities. For example, with regards to the important international relations concept of power, classical realists assume states desire material power and act according to that desire. “Power is the core concept for realists” and can be measured through an examination of a state’s material capabilities (Viotti and Kauppi 2012, 52-53). Constructivists maintain, however, that the meaning of power is mutually constituted by state actors. State actors only act according to a desire for power because of an established collective understanding of material power as a desirable, measurable concept. Power is thus a social construct because its “shape and form is imbued with social values, norms, and assumptions” (Fierke 2013, 189). Realist Hans Morgenthau accepts that population is a component of material power, and thus, unrestricted immigration to the US helped the United States rise in power. According to the constructivist perspective, however, his idea of power and its importance for a state’s development is based on a subjective understanding of the meaning of power, an understanding that “may build on the basic material of human nature, but [takes a] specific historical, cultural, and political [form that is] a product of human interaction in a social world” (Fierke 2013, 189). Morgenthau’s perspective on the connection between immigration and material power exemplifies the constructivist approach to international relations because his realist perspective is based on a shared understanding of the meaning and implications of power within the international system. Morgenthau asserts that the population increase that occurred in the US during the era of generally unrestricted immigration allowed for the US to rise in power in a system wherein material power is a central shaping factor of international political interactions. Constructivists argue that everything about this system is based on shared meanings and ideas, and Morgenthau’s realist perspective reflects one established understanding of the system. The era of unrestricted immigration to the United States can therefore be
understood from a constructivist approach to international relations.

**Exclusion Era**

Unrestricted immigration practices were halted in the late 1800s as the period of exclusion commenced. California, as well as other parts of the US, began to experience an economic depression in the late 1800s. In this era, a significant percentage of the total US Chinese population was living in California, and many were willing to work for low wages (Motomura 2006, 16-17). Difficult economic times fueled anti-Chinese public sentiments in California that were transformed into federal law during the period of exclusion: “To many workers, the depression of the 1870s was due entirely to the competition of the Chinese. Exclusion of the Chinese became the supposed remedy for economic injustice and imbalance” (Hing 2004, 31). Thus, Congress began to make “selective” immigration the official US policy in the 1880s (Salyer 1995, 1). The Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 (and its renewal in 1892) symbolizes the selective character of US immigration policy during the exclusion period, but other policies were also enacted to restrict certain people from coming to America. For example, the Immigration Act of 1875 (Page Law or Asian Exclusion Act) banned criminals from immigrating to the US and “made bringing to the US or contracting forced Asian laborers a felony” (Pew Research Center 2015). The 1891 Immigration Act further banned “those who have a contagious disease and polygamists” from entering the United States. This policy also established authorization for the deportation of “any unauthorized immigrants or those who could be excluded from migration based on previous legislation” (Pew Research Center 2015). In 1903, anarchists, political extremists, beggars, and importers of prostitutes were banned from coming to America. In 1907, “‘imbeciles,’ ‘feeble-minded’ persons, individuals afflicted by a physical or mental disability that might impede their
ability to earn a living, those with tuberculosis, children not accompanied by their parents, and individuals who admit to having committed a crime of ‘moral turpitude’” were barred (Ewing 2012, 4). Later, the Immigration Act of 1917 banned immigration from most Asian countries (except Japan and the US colony of the Philippines) and established a literacy requirement for immigrants over the age of 16 (Pew Research Center 2015). Notwithstanding these limitations, by 1920, foreign-born residents of the US contributed to a record high 13% of the national population (Pew Research Center 2015, 18).

The immigrant population in the US continued to grow despite the continuation of the exclusion era policies. Even after the passage of the 1943 Magnuson Act (also known as the Chinese Exclusion Repeal Act) and the 1952 Immigration and Nationality Act, which eliminated race as a reason for prohibiting a person’s immigration and naturalization in the US, the exclusion era continued. For example, the selective nature of the exclusion period was later expressed with nationality quotas, limiting the number of immigrants with origins in various parts of the world. The national origins quota system was established through several policy enactments. Starting with the passage of the 1921 Emergency Quota Act, numerical limits on immigration were placed on nations (exempting countries in the western hemisphere). Although the national quotas changed between 1921 and 1965, the exclusionary system guided immigration practices until the passage of the 1965 Amendments to the Immigration and Nationality Act (Pew Research Center 2015).

The exclusion period of US immigration policy history reflects the societal protectionist or nativist ideals that dominated public sentiment from the 1870s to 1960s. Because the socioeconomic realities of the US between 1882 and 1965 and popular opinion about Chinese immigrants during the exclusion era so heavily informed state
values, beliefs, norms, and practices, constructivism is the most useful perspective for understanding the international relations approach to immigration during this time period. Exclusionary policies created and accepted were results of popular ideas about immigrants. For example, many Chinese immigrants who came to California in search of gold in the 1800s were discriminated against and even lynched by unemployed white laborers who wanted to “purge the Chinese” out of the labor force (Pfaelzer 2008, 63). After the depression of the 1870s caused the national economy to collapse and forced many laborers to lose their jobs, “anti-Chinese rage took hold across the country” (Pfaelzer 2008, 65). Many white Americans “blamed the Chinese for the national economic plight and vowed to force timberman, farmers, and ranchers to replace all Chinese workers with unemployed white men” (Pfaelzer 2008, 66). This anti-Chinese sentiment was converted into state and federal laws that restricted Chinese immigrants from entering the US and limited those already in the US from maintaining their economic status. Expressing the connection between the ideas of the general population and state practice, Rogers Brubaker, writing for The International Migration Review, identifies the conventional view of immigration policymaking in Western liberal democracies as being “highly restrictive” and “driven by populist politicians seeking electoral advantage by appealing to the latent or manifest xenophobia of a disgruntled citizenry” (Brubaker 1995, 903). While US immigration policy has not always been “highly restrictive,” Brubaker’s interpretation of immigration policymaking appropriately describes the exclusion period of US immigration policy history.

During this time, ideas surrounding domestic economic factors and social status of immigrants shaped policymaking. Popular nativist and protectionist ideas transformed into state policy as policymakers adopted the perspectives of the ‘disgruntled citizenry.’ Exclusionary policies were passed because of “the economic interests of white
workingmen in California and elsewhere in the West [and] the important factor of racial prejudice” (Daniels 2002, 271). With the specific case of Chinese laborers, “nativists perceived Chinese as a racial and cultural as well as an economic threat” because of their willingness to work hard for low wages (Salyer 1995, 10). During a time when the US was becoming a superpower in the international arena, nativists saw many immigrants as “incapable of being assimilated into the American way of life and, consequently, they would pose a serious threat to American institutions” (Salyer 1995, 11). Because nativist ideas regarding immigrants and immigration between 1882 and 1965 highly influenced US state policy, this exclusionary era of US immigration history can be understood through the constructivist approach to international relations.

**Modern Era**

Although early US immigration policy history through the middle of the twentieth century can be divided into two discrete periods, immigration policies enacted throughout modern US history do not as simply fit into chronological categories. Instead, the policies can be separated by distinct descriptive categories: preference system policies, forgiveness policies, refugee policies, and national security and competitiveness policies. Policies that fit in these four categories do not progress chronologically, but instead overlap in time of passage. As previously noted, Appendix D includes a table that chronologically identifies the US immigration policies discussed in this chapter (Table 1). In this section, I first provide an overview of the preference system policies and after, explain how constructivism can be used to understand those policies. I use the same methodology to explore how constructivism is reflected in forgiveness, refugee, and national security and competitiveness policies.
Preference System Policies

The 1960s were a time of great transformation for the United States and the rest of the world. This decade saw much social and political change: from the continuation of the Cultural Revolution in China, the Vietnam War, and the Cold War, to the social centrality and political consequences of the Civil Rights Movement in the United States. With regards to US immigration, 1965 was a particularly transformative year. Prior to this time, the national origins quota system, as previously defined, dominated US immigration policy. By 1965, however, “many Americans regarded the national-origins system as on a par with deliberate segregation, contrary to the spirit of the Constitution, and few were prepared to defend it explicitly” (Zolberg 2007, 30). A noteworthy opponent of the national origins system was John F. Kennedy, who articulates his perspective in A Nation of Immigrants: “Immigration policy should be generous; it should be fair; it should be flexible. With such a policy we can turn to the world, and to our past, with clean hands and a clear conscience. Such a policy would be but a reaffirmation of old principles” (Kennedy 2008 [1964], 50). The change in US values and beliefs regarding immigration was first reflected in the 1952 Immigration and Nationality Act, and later in the 1965 Amendments to the Immigration and Nationality Act, which was signed into law at the base of the Statue of Liberty. A major development contained within the 1965 law was the creation of a seven-category preference system, which replaced the national origin quotas. The 1965 policy placed limits of 20,000 people per country allowed to enter the US annually from Eastern Hemisphere countries, but it also “provided for the unlimited admission of children, parents, and spouses of American citizens, thereby allowing for considerable immigration beyond the ceiling” (Zolberg 2007, 30). These changes reflect the US desire to present itself to the rest of the world as a model of freedom to rival the Soviet Union’s communism. Attempting to fulfill this
desire, family reunification became an important goal of immigration as evidenced by the first two immigrant preference categories listed in the 1965 policy. The ideological transformation in immigration policy that is reflected in the adoption of the preference system policies represents a shift in the social construction of immigration that is best understood through the constructivist lens.

Constructivism can also be used to understand the preference system policies that favored skilled working immigrants. Encouraging skilled workers to come to the US presented itself as a goal of immigration policy as evidenced by one of the immigrant preference categories of the 1952 Act, which was amended in 1965: “Visas shall next be made available… to qualified immigrants who are members of the professions, or who because of their exceptional ability in the sciences or the arts will substantially benefit prospectively the national economy, cultural interests, or welfare of the United States” (79 Stat. 913 (1965)). Additionally, immigrants from the Western Hemisphere were initially exempted from the preference system. Then, in 1976, the 1965 Immigration and Nationality Act was amended so that the cap on number of immigrants allowed from all individual countries applied to Western Hemisphere countries as well. This new cap essentially limited the number of unskilled workers from entering the US from Mexico and South America, contributing to evidence that the neorealist international relations perspective was maintained throughout the late 1900s. These policy changes demonstrate how the social value of skilled workers in a time of intense global competition influenced immigration policy, supporting an interpretation of the policies through constructivism.

Amendments were again made in 1978 to combine the separate Eastern and Western Hemisphere caps into one worldwide limit of 290,000 immigrants allowed in the US annually (Congressional Budget Office 2006, 1). Although these amendments to the Immigration and Nationality Act allowed for higher numbers of immigrants to enter the
US, the “authors did not anticipate a significant increase in annual admissions… It therefore came as a surprise that legal admissions soon increased by half, from 3.3 million in the 1960s to 4.5 million in the following decade” (Zolberg 2007, 31). While policies provided the opportunity for European Americans to reunify their families in the US, “the admissions allowed to labor procurement provided unprecedented opportunities for Asians in particular, and these newcomers created new family networks” (Zolberg 2007, 31). Even though policymakers “did not predict that Asian immigration would reach such high levels,” Asian and Mexican immigrants “represented over 80 percent of all immigrants” in the 1970s and 1980s (Hing 2004, 100). Immigrants from Asia were permitted to enter the US in unprecedented numbers thanks to the demand for their labor, and then, the family reunification aspect of the preference system policies allowed for their families to reassemble in the new country. Thus, the increased importance placed on skilled labor within the social construction of immigration greatly influenced immigration policy and resulted in the opportunity for an unprecedented number of Asian immigrants to enter the United States. These policy changes that stemmed from changes in societal values and the social construction of immigration exemplify the importance of constructivism as an international perspective for gaining a more robust understanding of immigration.

As immigration increased into the 1980s, new policies that complemented the constructivist perspective were enacted. These policies provided undocumented immigrants residing in the US with opportunities to become legal residents. The most noteworthy is the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA), which “granted a pathway to permanent residency to unauthorized immigrant workers who lived in the US since 1982 or worked in certain agricultural jobs” and created a new visa for temporary, seasonal agricultural workers (Pew Research Center 2015). Approximately 2.7 million
people were granted legal permanent resident status” as a result of the 1986 IRCA (Pew Research Center 2015). Subsequently, the Reagan administration decided minor children of parents legalized under the 1986 IRCA should be protected from deportation. Later, the George H.W. Bush administration determined that all spouses and unmarried children of those legalized under the 1986 IRCA “could apply for permission to remain in the country and receive work permits” (Pew Research Center 2015). In 1990, the last preference system policy of the century was created, which raised the overall annual immigration cap to 700,000 people during 1992 through 1994, and lowered the cap to 675,000 people beginning in 1995 (Pew Research Center 2015). This Immigration Act of 1990 further revised the preference system categories, allocating 480,000 family-sponsored visas, 140,000 employment-based visas, and 55,000 “diversity immigrant” visas annually (Pew Research Center 2015). While new visas were created for highly skilled temporary workers and seasonal, non-agricultural workers, new grounds for exclusion and deportation were also created (Pew Research Center 2015). The Immigration Act of 1990 was the last policy to be enacted regarding the preference system, but the preference system categories are still enforced today. This reaffirms the significance of the constructivist perspective of international relations in current US immigration policy. While family reunification values have gained more prominence since the 1900s, US immigration policies have also encouraged more skilled workers to enter the US and contribute to the US economy. The following table (which is also included in Appendix D) briefly describes the major categories that have been guiding immigration allowances in the US throughout the early 2000s and the number of total admissions from each category in example year 2004, as provided by the 2006 Congressional Budget Office paper entitled “Immigration Policy in the United States” (Congressional Budget Office 2006, 6-9).
Table 2. Major US Preference System Immigration Categories and Corresponding Number of Admissions in Example Year 2004

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Who Qualifies for Category</th>
<th>Number of 2004 Admissions per Category</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Immediate relatives of US citizens</td>
<td>Spouses and unmarried children (under 21 years old) of US citizens, parents of US citizens ages 21 and older</td>
<td>406,074</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family-based immigration: first preference</td>
<td>Unmarried adult (ages 21 and older) children of US citizens</td>
<td>26,380</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family-based immigration: second preference</td>
<td>Spouses and dependent children of legal permanent residents (LPRs), unmarried children of LPRs</td>
<td>93,609</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family-based immigration: third preference</td>
<td>Married children of US citizens</td>
<td>28,695</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family-based immigration: fourth preference</td>
<td>Siblings of adult US citizens</td>
<td>65,671</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Family-based immigration subtotal:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>214,355</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment-based immigration: first preference</td>
<td>Priority workers: individuals with extraordinary ability in arts, athletics, business, education, or sciences; outstanding professors, researchers; certain multinational executives and managers</td>
<td>31,291</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment-based immigration: second preference</td>
<td>Professionals who hold advanced degrees or are considered to have exceptional ability</td>
<td>32,534</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment-based immigration: third preference</td>
<td>Skilled workers with at least 2 years of training/experience in labor sectors deemed to have shortages and professionals with college degrees; unskilled workers in labor sectors deemed to have shortages</td>
<td>85,969</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment-based immigration: fourth preference</td>
<td>Special immigrants: ministers, other religious workers, certain foreign nationals employed by the US government abroad, and others</td>
<td>5,407</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment-based immigration: fifth preference</td>
<td>Employment-creation investors who commit at least $1 million to the development of at least 10 new jobs</td>
<td>129</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Employment-based immigration subtotal:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>155,330</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refugees*</td>
<td>Aliens who have been granted refugee status in the US because of the risk of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution</td>
<td>50,084</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asylum-seekers*</td>
<td>Aliens who have been granted asylum status in the US because of the risk of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution</td>
<td>10,016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diversity program</td>
<td>Citizens of foreign nations with historically low levels of admission to the US; applicants must have a high school education (or the equivalent) or at least 2 years of training/experience in an occupation</td>
<td>61,013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>Various classes of immigrants, such as Amerasians, parolees, certain Central Americans, Cubans, and Haitians adjusting to LPR status, and certain people granted LPR status following removal proceedings</td>
<td>49,270</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Overall Admissions:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>946,142</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Refugees must apply for admission at an overseas facility and can enter the US only after their application is approved. Asylum-seekers apply for admission when already in the US or at a port of entry.

Constructivism is expressed within the US categories of immigration preference that developed after World War II. During a time of escalated Cold War fears throughout the late twentieth century, skilled workers from all over the world were encouraged to immigrate to the US through the occupational preference system categories. The United States desired the skilled labor of these immigrants in order to economically and scientifically compete with the Soviet Union. The United States also wanted skilled immigrants to help provide for the security of the US relative to its Cold War enemy. The Cold War social construction of reality, wherein the US was an enemy and competitor of the Soviet Union, can be explained through the constructivism approach to international relations, which can be used to understand US immigration policy changes made during this time. Constructivists argue that the “dominant intersubjective understanding and social relationship of the Soviet Union and the United States during the Cold War was that of enemies” (Viotti and Kauppi 2012, 288). United States citizens, representatives, and policymakers perceived anti-Soviet and anti-communism values as critical elements of the national identity of the United States. This socially constructed identity affected how Americans perceived “their roles in the world” and how the US acted in the world (Viotti and Kauppi 2012, 288). The United States Cold War identity was defined by its adversarial beliefs and values. Similarly, the Cold War identity of the Soviet Union was defined by its adversarial relationship with the United States. Thus, both identities are mutually constituted, reflecting the constructivist approach to international relations identities.

The socially constructed identity of the United States, in relation to the Soviet Union, helped shape the occupational preference system policies created during the Cold War. These preference system policies of the 1960s through 1990s included provisions that helped the US gain power and security relative to its perceived Cold War adversary
through encouraging skilled workers to enter the US. As previously discussed, the occupational preference category made its first appearance in US immigration policy with the 1952 Immigration and Nationality Act (which was later amended in 1965 and so forth). With this law, policymakers encouraged skilled workers to enter the US in order to boost the economy, interests, and welfare of the country. The 1952 law declares that visas shall be made available to “qualified quota immigrants whose services are determined by the Attorney General to be needed urgently in the United States because of high education, technical training, specialized experience, or exceptional ability” because such immigrants are “substantially beneficial prospectively to the national economy, cultural interests, or welfare of the United States” (66 Stat. 178 (1952)). These immigrations were so highly valued that the law also allowed qualified skilled immigrants’ spouses and children to accompany them in the United States (66 Stat. 178, (1952)). Skilled immigrants and their families were welcomed in the US after the end of World War II because as the country “was building up its own capabilities in science and engineering… the United States feared it was falling behind [the Soviet Union] in scientific achievement (Martin 2011, 197). For example, following the 1957 launch of the Soviet Union’s Sputnik, the world’s first artificial satellite, the US feared it was scientifically falling behind its Space Race rival. With the hope that skilled immigrants would benefit the country as a whole through advancing the fields of science and engineering, in 1965, policymakers amended the 1952 Immigration and Nationality Act to allow immigrants with skills “needed urgently” to enter the US (66 Stat. 178 (1952)). The US encouraged “immigration in an attempt to overcome demographic inferiority vis-à-vis potential enemies” (Meyers 2000, 1264-1265). Thus, policymakers aimed to increase the country’s scientific and economic capabilities relative to the perceived Soviet Union enemy through encouraging skilled workers to immigrate to the United States. Because of the
mutually constructed Cold War identities of the US and the Soviet Union, the US began to set immigration policies that reflect this new social construction of the value of skilled immigrants, demonstrating the importance of a constructivist perspective for understanding these policy changes.

In contrast to encouraging immigration, some twentieth-century preference system policies reflected the socially constructed understanding of immigrants as perceived economic threats, similar to the exclusionary policies enacted in the late 1800s. This social construction and the policies that stemmed from it influenced the US to pursue the restriction of another particular group of immigrants: Mexican immigrants. Exclusionary citizens in the 1950s “complained about undocumented workers coming across the United States-Mexican border” in order to take “jobs from US citizens” (Hing 2004, 98). Because the southern neighbor of the United States was seen “as the leading source of legal and unauthorized immigration, Mexico became a central concern” (Zolberg 2007, 31), causing policymakers to begin limiting immigration from the Western Hemisphere with the 1965 Amendments. As the Mexican economy began to weaken in the 1970s and further worsen in the 1980s, “northward migration became attractive to an increasing number of Mexicans (Martin 2011, 198). In the 1970s, the restrictions placed on Western Hemisphere immigrants did not satisfy US citizens as they started to see Mexican immigrants as an economic threat, so “Congress enacted legislation in 1976 curtailing Mexican migration even more” (Hing 2004 98). These Western Hemisphere restrictive preference policies were enacted because US laborers began to perceive Mexican immigrants as a threat to their occupations and economic status. Similar to the societal context of the passage of the 1882 Chinese Exclusion Act, societal construction of immigrants as economic threats during the second half of the twentieth century influenced the passage of US immigration policies that aimed to limit
Mexican immigration to the United States. Although Mexican immigration to the US was once perceived more positively, as popular opinion of Mexican laborers in the US became more negative because some people increasingly viewed immigrants as threatening to their economic security, US immigration policy began to shift in order to limit the immigration of individuals from Mexico. As the US represented itself as a great power in the international system, many Americans saw Mexican immigrants as a threat to their way of life. Because these nativist ideas influenced the establishment of several restrictive policies, the constructivist approach to international relations should be used to examine those preference system policies. This is similar to how the earlier exclusionary era of US immigration history can be understood through constructivism.

The constructivist approach to international relations is additionally reflected in the preference system policies’ categories that provide for family reunification. As previously mentioned, constructivism is an international relations perspective that focuses on ideas, norm, and normative understandings of the world. Constructivists see social reality as subjective and changeable, and they emphasize “the social dimensions of international relations, and [demonstrate] the importance of norms rules, and language at this level” (Fierke 2013, 189). Constructivists view the family reunification elements of the preference system in US immigration policies as evidence of a changing society. Prior to the second half of the twentieth century, the US established numerous exclusionary policies that kept families separated by land, water, and citizenship and visa status, but the 1952 Immigration and Nationality Act (along with its later amendments) gave family members of US citizens of permanent legal residents priority in the immigration process. Consequently, “the US once again turned into a nation of immigrants, but now one that uniquely mirrored humanity as a whole” (Zolberg 2007, 31). Beginning in 1965, children, spouses, and parents of US citizens were exempted from the preference system: “The
immediate relatives… who are otherwise qualified for admission as immigrants shall be admitted as such, without regard to the numerical limitations in this Act” (79 Stat. 911 (1965)). This alteration in allowances for immediate family members of US citizens signaled a shift in governmental interests regarding family unification. The new system of family reunification allowances drastically changed the construction of US society and the state’s immigration identity. The subjective understanding of the identity of the US as a “nation of immigrants” is reflected in the preference system policies allowing for family reunification. Thus, the family reunification component of US immigration policy is another example of how the constructivist approach to international relations is applicable to the preference system policies and integral to understanding US immigration policy. With the family reunification values translated into law, “The inclusion of brothers and sisters as well as adult children and their spouses within the family reunion system produced a ‘chain’ effect, as the in-laws initiated the formation of new networks of blood relatives” (Zolberg 2007, 31).

While families continued to be reunited in the US, policymakers in 1990 introduced a new preference category for immigration: “diversity immigrants.” This category provided visas to immigrants from “low-admission states” and from “low-admission regions,” meaning immigrants from areas of the world that typically do not generate large numbers of people who immigrate to the United States (104 Stat. 4998 (1990)). This policy also reflects a change in values and beliefs of the United States because it allows for immigrants to enter the US who would not otherwise qualify under established preference system categories, representing a new importance placed on the value of diversity. Although “diversity immigrants” have to show “a firm commitment for [sic] employment in the United States” (104 Stat. 5000 (1990)), which would reflect the international relations theory of realism, the creation of this new preference category
more dominantly expresses constructivism because the policy illustrates a fundamental change in US beliefs regarding who should be allowed into the country. Before, during the Exclusion Era, many prospective immigrants were banned from seeking opportunity in the US and sharing their culture with US citizens, but the “diversity immigrant” category opened up the system to new types of immigrants and expressed the new belief that the US can benefit from embracing diversity. The US government might have had other motives for creating this preference category beyond providing the country with more diversity (e.g. economic motives), but regardless of the motives, the introduction of the “diversity immigrant” category marks a fundamental change in the social construction of immigration. The 1990 creation of the “diversity immigrant” preference category and the late twentieth-century policy emphasis on family reunification reflect changes in norms, values, and beliefs of the US population and changes in the construction of society. Because these changes affected immigration law, these aspects of the preference system immigration policies of the twentieth century express the international relations perspective of constructivism.

Constructivism is not only reflected in immigration laws regarding who is allowed to enter the US, but also in late twentieth-century laws that reflected changed values regarding the attainment of citizenship. The 1986 Immigration and Reform and Control Act “granted a pathway to permanent residency to unauthorized immigrant workers who lived in the US since 1982 or worked in certain agricultural jobs” (Pew Research Center 2015). This forgiveness or amnesty policy was followed in 1987 by a policy that declared, “minor children of parents who were legalized under the 1986 law should be protected from deportation” (Pew Research Center 2015). Then, the Immigration Act of 1990 formalized that “all spouses and unmarried children of people who were legalized under the 1986 law could apply for permission to remain in the
country and receive work permits” (Pew Research Center 2015). Although the new policies did not regulate which types of immigrants were allowed to enter the country, these pathways to permanent residence laws are types of preference system policies. As such, they created a new system of preference for immigrants already in the country to obtain permanent resident status (an important step towards attaining naturalized citizen status). The 1986 law acknowledged immigrants who had lived in the US since 1982 as a preference for permanent residency status, and subsequent laws listed immediate relatives of those immigrants as a preference for such a status. These amnesty laws represent constructivism because they demonstrate a changing norm in the US regarding being American. The laws essentially forgave those who came to the US without authorization earlier in the century because the idea that immigrants who have lived in the US for several years are Americans had gained more popularity in political and social strata. This shift in social values that is expressed in the amnesty policies of the 1980s shows how the constructivist approach of international relations applies to these aspects of the US immigration policies of the late 1900s.

Refugee Policies

Concurrently with the establishment and amendment of the preference system policies, US policymakers created laws regarding the resettlement of global refugees. These refugee policies also reflect constructivism. The US boasts a proud history of allowing people of humanitarian concern to enter the country, but “its incorporation into US law has been a long, slow process” because the distinction between refugees and other immigrants “was not important as a matter of immigration policy” throughout most of US history (Haines 2007, 56). This distinction became important after World War II as the identity of the US shifted. Refugee policies began to emerge during the Cold War,
showing that the “ideological reaction against communism [was] the backbone of the US refugee program” throughout the mid to late 1900s (Haines 2007, 57). The first of several refugee policies was enacted in 1948, following the end of World War II and after the failure of the US to admit thousands of Jewish refugees before and during the war. The Displaced Persons Act of 1948 (and its 1950 amendments) enabled over 400,000 people (mostly from Europe) to enter the US outside of the quota system (Hing 2004, 234). The next refugee policy was enacted in 1953. This Refugee Relief Act “authorized special non-quota visas for more than 200,000 refugees and allowed these immigrants to become permanent residents” (Pew Research Center 2015). Hungarians, Chinese, and Cuban people fleeing crisis in their homelands primarily benefited from new policies regarding refugee resettlement (Hing 2004, 235-236) because at this point in US history, “a refugee was defined as a person fleeing ‘from a Communist-dominated country or area, or from any country within the general area of the Middle East’” (Teitelbaum 1984, 430). As the 1960s civil rights movement captured the people’s attention domestically, “the United States also became more active internationally in setting out human rights standards (Martin 2011, 220). For example, President John F. Kennedy helped create and pass a program “to provide medical care, financial aid, help with education and resettlement, and child welfare services for Cuban refugees” after Fidel Castro’s 1959 rise to power (Pew Research Center 2015). This program was formalized in the 1962 Migration and Refugee Assistance Act, which “assisted individuals in the Western Hemisphere fleeing ‘persecution or fear of persecution on account of race, religion or political opinion’” (Pew Research Center 2015). After the collapse of Southeast Asian “American-supported governments in the spring of 1975,” refugees from Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam were resettled in the United States (Haines 2007, 57). Thus, the 1975 Indochina Migration and Refugee Assistance Act was enacted. Under refugee laws of the 1950s through 1970s,
“about 1.5 million people” were admitted to the US by 1980 (Haines 2007, 57).

Beyond the 1970s, new refugee policies were created that were “enormously important” for the US as a world actor (Hing 2004, 238). The Refugee Act of 1980 reflected the commitment of the United States to conform with the practices established in the 1969 United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees (Hing 2004, 238). The 1980 Act essentially “standardized federally-supported resettlement services for all refugees admitted to the United States” and “incorporates the definition of ‘refugee’ used in the U.N. Refugee Convention and provides for regular and emergency admission of refugees of all nationalities” (Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration 2015). The 1980 Refugee Act also removed refugees from the preference system policies, and subsequently reduced the annual preference visas allocations to 270,000 but expanded the annual refugee admissions (Pew Research Center 2015). Laws were later created, in accordance with the 1980 Refugee Act, to include deportation relief and admission into the US based on individuals’ region of origin. For example, Chinese nationals were protected from deportation from the US after the Tiananmen Square protests of 1989. Many Central Americans and Haitians were protected in various ways with the passage of the 1997 Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central American Relief Act and the 1998 Haitian Refugee Immigration Fairness Act (Pew Research Center 2015). Additionally, the previously described Immigration Act of 1990 “authorized the attorney general to grant ‘temporary protected status’ (TPS) to nationals of countries suffering from armed conflicts, natural disasters or ‘other extraordinary and temporary conditions’” (Pew Research Center 2015). The Temporary Protected Status was a novel classification for immigrants and demonstrates both the changing political and social conditions abroad and an evolution in immigration ideology. The policies of the 1980s and 1990 along with earlier refugee policies reflect the constructivist international relations approach because
the policies are evidence of the nation’s changing identity through acceptance of international norms, customs, ideas, and institutions.

The US immigration policies of the late twentieth century regarding refugees, as previously described, reflect the influence of social constructs on policy formation, and therefore exemplify the importance of constructivism in understanding immigration. As the US identity as a democratic great power clashed with the Soviet Union identity as a communist great power during the Cold War, the creation of US refugee policies advanced the ideological dichotomy. The refugee policies were established in response “to the Hungarian refugees after the failed uprising there in 1956, to Cuban refugees after Fidel Castro’s rise to power [in 1959], to smaller numbers of refugees from a variety of other communist countries (e.g., Czechoslovakia, China), to Jewish refugees from the Soviet Union, and to refugees from Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam after the collapse of their American-supported governments in the spring of 1975” (Haines 2007, 57). The US perceived these refugees to be fleeing communism as the US ideologically fought to oppose communism. As the US identity became defined as anti-communism, the admission of refugees fleeing communism into the US had the support of people “who viewed [the refugees] as important witnesses to the virtues of democracy and capitalism—and the corresponding evils of totalitarianism and communism” (Haines 2007, 57). The socially constructed identity of the US as a virtuous capitalist democracy is reflected in the US refugee policies. These policies allowed for individuals fleeing countries or regions governed by political systems ideologically opposed to the political and economic identity of the United States to become members of the perceived more virtuous US society. The ideological identity clash between US democracy and Soviet Union communism resulted in the creation of the twentieth century US refugee policies. Because the social value placed on these two countries’ mutually constituted and
dichotomous identities had such a pronounced influence on the US immigration policies regarding refugees, the constructivist approach to international relations is essential to understanding these US refugee policies.

**National Security and Competitiveness Policies**

Although the Cold War came to an end in the 1990s, the threats of terrorism and weakened border security were becoming more prominent, and US immigration policy re-established its commitment to the protection of national security against perceived threats. The 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act imposed “sanctions on employers who knowingly hire unauthorized workers and [increased] border enforcement” (as it also created previously described opportunities for undocumented US immigrants to become permanent legal residents) (Pew Research Center 2015). As Americans became more concerned about immigrants coming from Mexico taking US jobs and bringing weapons or drugs into the country during the end of the twentieth century, the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act was created. This 1996 law increased “enforcement at the border and in the interior, including mandates to build fences at the highest incidence areas of the Southwest border” (Pew Research Center 2015). Further attempting to protect the security of the country, the 1996 Act also established and revised “measures for worksite enforcement, to remove criminal and other deportable aliens and to tighten admissions eligibility requirements” (Pew Research Center 2015). The emphases of immigration policies enacted during the 1990s were on national security along the US border and workplace immigrant authorization. Policymakers further attempted to increase national security with the 2002 Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act. This law was established in response to a new national fear of terrorism caused by the 9/11 terrorist attacks. The 2002 Act
“requires an electronic data system be used to make available information relevant to admissions and removability of immigrants” to allow for better communication between governmental departments concerned with immigration and security (e.g. the Immigration and Naturalization Service and State Department) and “mandates implementation of a visa entry-exit data system” to make entry into and exit out of the US more secure (Pew Research Center 2015). Another 2002 law was implemented in response to the 9/11 terrorist attacks: the Homeland Security Act. This law “transfers nearly all the functions of the US Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) to the new Department of Homeland Security (DHS), which includes US Customs and Border Protection (CBP), US Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and US Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS)” (Pew Research Center 2015). This transfer of power shows that immigration in the US is now seen as a security issue with rules that must be properly enforced by agencies best able to provide for the nation’s safety. In 2006, the perceived need for more secure borders to decrease the threat of terrorism was expressed in the Secure Fence Act. As the name suggests, this 2006 law mandated the construction of a fence along the Southwest border between the United States and Mexico. The 700-mile long double-layered fence is not yet fully constructed, but the increases in staffing and technology at the Southwest border that the 2006 Act also mandated were provided (Pew Research Center 2015). From the 1986 increase in border enforcement to the 2006 mandate to build a fence, constructivism is reflected in US immigration policies, as national security again becomes a primary concern of policymakers. The importance of the constructivist approach to international relations will be discussed later in this section.

While many post-9/11 initiatives were created to keep potentially dangerous immigrants out of the country, in the year before the terrorist attacks, Congress and President Clinton approved a bill to again increase the immigration of specialized
workers to the United States. This 2000 American Competitiveness in the Twenty-First Century Act (AC21) allowed for more highly skilled or highly educated immigrants to enter the US in order to help the US remain technologically competitive with the rest of the world. For example, the 2000 AC21 temporarily (fiscal year 2001 through fiscal year 2003) increased the annual number of immigrants allowed into the US on H-1B visas (visas for foreign workers in specialty occupations or specialized fields) from 115,000 people to 195,000 people (114 Stat. 1251 (2000)). Explained by a Senator who co-sponsored the legislation, the 2000 AC21 was passed in response to worker shortages in the high-tech and skilled labor industries of the United States that have caused the US to lose opportunities to foreign competitors (Alvarez 2000). Basically, the “bill’s immediate goal is to help high-tech companies recruit employees” in order to enhance American industries’ competitiveness with foreign companies, but “other foreign workers who receive the special visas include architects, engineers, university professors and even distinguished fashion models” (Alvarez 2000). The AC21 of 2000 reflects the constructivist approach to international relations because of its emphasis on the importance of social values that support US competitiveness and technological prowess in comparison with other countries.

Many immigration policies of the late twentieth century and early twenty-first century reflect the international relations perspective of constructivism because their focus on national security and competitiveness reflects a change in socially constructed identity of the US and the developing socially constructed fear of terrorism. The policies that provide for an increase in border security express the perceived need to improve the nation’s national security. With the end of the Cold War and the beginning of the US War on Terror, terrorism developed into the predominant adversary of the United States, despite its non-state identity. Terrorism replaced the mutually constituted position of the
Soviet Union as the enemy of the United States. In order to ensure the security of the state, US policymakers increased the state’s military and security capabilities, especially along the Southwest border. Immigration from the south was restricted in order to protect the US against the threat of terror. Aspects of the 1986, 1996, 2002, and 2006 laws regarding border security enhancements all reflect the constructivist perspective with regards to socially constructed ideas and identities. As K. M. Fierke explains, “a constructivist approach to the War on Terror [explores] how identities, actions, and human suffering are constructed through a process of interaction” (Fierke 2013, 199).

Terrorism developed into the enemy of the US in the post-Cold War era because the idea that the country should fear the threat of the non-state concept grew in societal acceptance, especially after many people were personally affected by the events of 9/11. The identity of the US became “mutually constituted around a stark difference between good and evil” (Fierke 2013, 199-200). Terrorism was perceived to be of potential harm to the United States identity as a secure nation. As a result, US immigration policies developed in attempt to limit the possibility of terrorists infiltrating the country. The enactment of US national security policies was the US response to the perceived need to increase the state’s military and security capabilities in order to protect the nation against the threat of terrorism. The identity of the US shaped its national security interests, resulting in the policies relating to immigration that aim to increase national security. The threat of terrorism became a social fact, or a constructed conceptualization of reality that exists “because of the meaning and value attributed to [it]” (Fierke 2013, 192). The identity of the US as well as ideas and social facts regarding the threat of terrorism influenced the creation of the US national security policies of the post-Cold War era. Thus, constructivism is consistently expressed in those US immigration policies.

The 2000 American Competitiveness in the Twenty-First Century Act (AC21)
also reflects constructivism. The 2000 AC21 reflects the need for the US to gain economic power in order to compete with the rising power of China. With the socially constructed understanding that technology is a significant element of a nation’s power and a nation needs a certain amount of power in order to ensure its power position in the world, it followed that policymakers in 2000 would want to encourage foreign workers from specialized industries (especially from high-tech industries) to come to the US and increase the material capabilities of the United States. The 2000 AC21 was enacted to enable the US to gain material capabilities in order for the nation to remain powerful in relation to the increasing economic Chinese power. China’s opposing economic power identity caused the US to encourage the admission of specialized skilled immigrants into the country. This reflects constructivism because the policies were influenced by socially constructed ideas regarding economic power and the mutually constituted identities of the US and China. The 2000 AC21 thus reflects the economic interests of the US as determined by the socially constructed identity of the US, in accordance with the constructivist approach to international relations.

**Alternative Explanations: Evidence and Limitations**

Examining the history of US immigration policies through the constructivist approach to international relations provides for an understanding of how the US represented itself internationally and how evolving ideas, values, interests, and identities influence US immigration policy. Many of the US immigration policies discussed in this chapter can be examined through other perspectives, including liberal theory and the predominant international relations theories of neorealism (structural realism) and neoliberalism (neoliberal institutionalism). Although liberal theory, neorealism, and neoliberalism offer valid perspectives of various aspects of US immigration policy, only
constructivism accounts for the influence of social construction on US immigration policies throughout history. In this section, I explore US immigration policy through alternative theoretical perspectives and discuss the limitations of these alternative explanations.

**Domestic Pluralism and Liberal Theory**

Throughout history, various organizations or groups in the US have tried to influence governmental policymaking in a way that reflects their distinctive interests, rather than perceived national interests. Ethnic interests groups (also known as ethnic lobby groups) are examples of such organizations that work to influence policy, often foreign policy, in the United States to serve their organizational interests. These interests usually involve US relations with the origin country of each ethnic group. Ethnic group activism “heightens the democratic dilemma” because it reflects the “struggle to reconcile the promulgation of rational national interests with its democratic responsibilities” (Watanabe 2006, 2). While ethnic group activism reflects the pluralistic identity of US society, groups sometimes work to advance competing interests that do not promulgate established national interests. Ethnic group activists are considered to be members of a diaspora. The term diaspora has multiple definitions, but for the purposes of this paper, a US diaspora is a group of people living in the US from an original, shared home country that feel an connection to their home country and people of similar migration backgrounds. This definition is derived from using the diaspora research of Robin Cohen and Yossi Shain as a guide (Cohen 1997, Shain 1994). Cohen and Shain identify several diasporic groups in the United States that have affected foreign policy, including Jews, Greek, Irish, Cuban, Arab, Korean, African, Armenian, Chinese, and Mexican. Some scholars, such as Samuel Huntington, see diasporic ethnic group activism
as a danger to “American identity and unity” (Huntington 1997, 34) because “diasporas can influence the actions and policies of their host country and co-opt its resources and influence to serve the interests of their homeland” (Huntington 1997, 39). Others, such as Yossi Shain, see ethnic group activism as a neutral product of the diversity, multiculturalism, and political structure of the United States: “In the era of multiculturalism…diasporic elites are less and less inhibited by charges of disloyalty and promoting ancestral identities among their constituents… A diaspora’s ability to play a serious foreign policy roles is a consequence of the US liberal-democratic ethos… as well as the expanded recognition of ethnic diversity” (Shain 1994, 812-813). Despite their opposing positions regarding the effect of ethnic group activism, both Huntington and Shain recognized that ethnic groups influence the constructed identities and interests of the United States. Ethnic interest groups have played a role in informing US foreign policy throughout history, which has in turn affected relations between the US and other countries.

Diasporic ethnic interests groups in the US have influenced international relations in various ways throughout US history. One of the primary ways in which diasporic interest groups affect international relations is their influence on the promotion of their homeland’s independence. For example, “one of the most serious diasporic contributions to a homeland’s independence in [the twentieth century] was made by both Czech and Slovak Americans who played a pivotal role in the dissolution of the Hapsburg Empire and the creation of modern Czechoslovakia in 1918” (Shain 1994, 818). The actions of Czech and Slovak groups in the US provided material assistance for the domestic conflict and “lobbied forcefully both the President and Congress on behalf of Czechs’ and Slovaks’ liberation. These efforts were particularly effective following the American entry into the war” (Shain 1994, 818). Ethnic group interests have affected US foreign
policy throughout history, but “the ability of US diasporas to affect American foreign policy toward their homeland has grown (and is likely to expand) because of the greater complexity in distinguishing between America’s friends and foes after the collapse of communism” (Shain 1994, 812). Accordingly, “in light of the collapse of the Soviet bloc, [Fidel] Castro’s increasing isolation, and the deterioration of the Cuban economy, Cuban-Americans have intensified their [lobbying activity aimed to unseat Castro]” (Shain 1994, 827-828). Both of these examples show how ethnic interest groups in the US can influence US foreign policy, which affects international relations.

The existence of these ethnic interest groups and their influence on US foreign policy reflects liberal theory. Liberal theory of state power and policy is a domestic theory that contributes to the understanding of foreign policy by highlighting how individuals and the ideas and ideals they espouse (such as human rights, liberty, and democracy), social forces (capitalism, markets), and political institutions (democracy, representation) can have direct effects on foreign relations (Doyle 2012, 54). Liberal theorists assert that decisions made by policymakers and foreign relations representatives will reflect “diverse social interests and strategies” of a state (Mingst and Arreguin-Toft 2014, 160). This standpoint reflects a pluralist model of foreign policy decision-making, which accepts that interest groups within a country can influence the decisions made by leaders of that country. Because liberal theorists view diverse societal interests and strategies as influential components of foreign policy decisions, liberal theory is reflected in policies that are influenced by ethnic interest group activists.

When discussing the effect of ethnic interest group lobbying on US policies, most researchers focus on how the ethnic group interests affect the official position of the US with regards to situations occurring abroad. Nonetheless, there have been several US immigration policies created that favor one or more groups of people over others. Though
one can examine US policies regarding refugees from a constructivist lens, those same policies can be seen through a liberal theorist lens. Ethnic interest groups desire better immigration conditions for their ethnic kin, so likely for policy decisions that provide better conditions favoring their group. For example, the Immigration Act of 1990 included a provision allowing the attorney to grant Temporary Protected Status (TPS) to individuals of countries suffering from “armed conflicts, natural disasters or ‘other extraordinary and temporary conditions’” (Pew Research Center 2015). This provision especially helped immigrants from Central America who were fleeing their home during revolutionary and counterrevolutionary conflict to become legal permanent residents of the United States. Jack Martin, Director of Special Projects at the Federation for American Immigration Reform, writes that “because of lobbying by both domestic [interest] groups and foreign governments, [the Temporary Protected Status provision] has been consistently renewed long after the end of any justification for such status” (Martin 2010, 2). While Martin’s report is clearly biased against lobby groups and humanitarian programs, Martin does correctly identify the power of lobby groups to influence US immigration policy and the relations between countries. Ethnic interest groups can both influence US immigration policies and foreign policies directed toward other countries that do not involve immigration. This influence reflects liberal theory of state power and policy.

Beyond ethnic interest groups, other groups have had an effect on US immigration policy throughout history. As previously discussed, during the era of exclusion, economic depression and anti-Chinese public sentiment in California led to the creation of the 1882 Chinese Exclusion Act. In the late twentieth century, Mexican immigrants were perceived as a threat to American laborers, and US immigration policies were enacted that limited the number of immigrants admitted to the US from Mexico. In
both contexts, American nativists laborers were able to influence the establishment of US immigration policies that advanced their personal interests. While not identifiable as ethnic lobby groups, the nativist workers acted as interest groups similar to the ethnic interest groups who influenced US foreign policy.

The effect of interest group activism on US foreign policy clearly reflects liberal theory, but constructivism is also expressed. The identity of the US as a pluralistic country allows for various interests groups to further their distinctive interests. The shared understanding of US society as consisting of groups with competing desires and needs has provided interest groups with the legitimate platforms necessary for the advancement of their interests. National identity, which influences international actions, “can stem from any number of sources,” including “broad cultural aspects of a society” and domestic constructions of “race, gender, nationality, religions, or ideologies” (Viotti and Kauppi 2012, 288). Thus, while liberal theory asserts the diverse social interests that influence state policy decisions, constructivists argue that the overarching pluralistic identity of the state allows for the liberal theory assertion to be valid. As such, liberal theory ideas regarding the influence of interests groups within a pluralistic society work within the constructivist approach to international relations.

Refugee Policies and Neoliberalism

Neoliberal theorists would argue that the US refugee policies of the late 1900s reflect neoliberalism (neoliberal institutionalism) because the policies conform to international customs and treaties. Liberal international theorists attempt to explain “the conditions under which international cooperation or collaboration becomes possible [with a focus on] democratic peace theory, integration, interdependence, regime theory, neoliberal institutionalism, or the ways and means of global governance” (Viotti and
Kauppi 2012, 129). International relations liberalism is guided by four key principles and one mission. First, states as well as non-state actors can have substantial influence in global politics (Viotti and Kauppi 2012, 129). Second, various forms interdependence among states and non-state actors can have a moderating effect on the behavior of states (Viotti and Kauppi 2012, 130). Third, while military and security issues matter on the global stage, so do other issues (e.g. economic, social, and environmental matters) (Viotti and Kauppi 2012, 130). Fourth, unlike realists, liberals assert, “factors at the state-society and individual levels of analysis affect international relations and outcomes” (Viotti and Kauppi 2012, 130). The key task of liberal international relations theorists is to “discover under what conditions international collaboration, if not peace, might be achieved” (Viotti and Kauppi 2012, 130). One of the most famous international relations liberals is Immanuel Kant, who argued “the best way to ensure progress toward peace is to encourage the growth of republics that manifest the popular will” because republics are more likely than monarchies and empires to follow international law and work toward collaborative peace” (Viotti and Kauppi 2012, 134).

From liberalism came neoliberalism in the twentieth century as international organizations (such as the League of Nations, United Nations, and International Monetary Fund) gained support and acceptance and other developments allowed for more international cooperation. Neoliberalism is often called neoliberal institutionalism because as a variant of liberal theory, neoliberalism “focuses on the role international institutions play in obtaining international collective outcomes” (Sterling-Folker 2013, 115). Neoliberals examine how states’ shared self-interests can be used to obtain cooperative results with the acknowledgement that “great powers can have more influence over international negotiations and their outcome” than other actors (Sterling-Folker 2013, 121). As a post-World War II “great power,” the United States was in a
position to influence other international actors within the system of global governance that emerged (e.g. United Nations). In perceived cooperation with the international community, the US enacted refugee immigration policies that reflected an acceptance of global norms and customs regarding displaced persons and individuals fearing persecution from their home country. Although the United States did not sign the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, language contained within US immigration policy of the time reflects a similar commitment to refugee protection as described in the 1951 Convention. For example, the 1951 Convention defines a refugee as any “person who is outside his or her country of nationality or habitual residence; has a well-founded fear of being persecuted because of his or her race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion; and is unable or unwilling to avail him or herself of the protection of that country, or to return there, for fear of persecution” (UN High Commissioner for Refugees 2011, 3). While the US did not define refugee the same way as did the UN Convention until later in the century, the language used in the 1962 Migration and Refugee Assistance Act did protect individuals “fleeing ‘persecution or fear of persecution on account of race, religion or political opinion’” (Pew Research Center 2015). This Act demonstrated a similar commitment to protecting people from persecution as expressed in the 1951 UN Convention. Although early US refugee policy favored the admission of people fleeing Communist counties due to social views of communism (Cold War fears), the US ratified the 1967 Protocol to the United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and began to adjust its immigration policies to reflect acceptance of this international norm. Thus, “US law was changed in 1980 to conform to the less ideological definitions of international law” (Teitelbaum 1984, 430). Because US immigration policies regarding refugees adhere to international norms, the neoliberal emphasis on collaboration in order to advance peace is
expressed.

The US refugee policies of the twentieth century follow international customs or norms because as a great power, the US wanted to show its commitment to human rights protection, as established by international conventions. The US refugee immigration policies reflect an adherence to international law and the goal of peace through collaboration, but as with liberal theory and interest group activism, constructivism offers an overarching explanation for why the United States followed international customs or norms. Connecting interest and identity, K. M. Fierke explains, “Neither identity nor interests can be detached from a world of social meaning… Identity as a liberal democracy cannot be detached from an interest in complying with human rights norms” (Fierke 2013, 191). The US enacted refugee policies that comply with international human rights norms, but the US only perceived those norms as important because of its mutually constituted identity as a great power and liberal democracy. The United States created refugee policies that reflect international human rights norms as a way to oppose communism. Compliance with international norms is a characteristic of a great liberal democracy. The norms reflect shared liberal democratic principles, as evidenced by the liberal democratic identities of those countries that develop and follow the norms. Liberal democratic state actors mutually constitute the meanings and importance of the human rights norms. In complying with those international human rights norms by developing the previously discussed refugee policies, the US represented itself as a liberal democracy. The identity of the United States and other countries that established the human rights norms influenced the creation of US refugee policies. Neoliberal ideas are themselves mutually constituted understandings of the world. Thus, constructivism is needed to more fully understand the neoliberal perspective of US refugee policies. Although neoliberal institutionalism can be seen as expressed in US refugee policies,
emerging ideologies relevant to international relations theory can be better understood through the more inclusive constructivist approach.

**Neorealism and National Security, Competitiveness, Occupational Preference Policies**

Neorealists would argue that various elements of US immigration policies reflect ideas and interests follow neorealist principles. Neorealism (or structural realism) is the international relations theory that focuses on states’ material power in an anarchical international system: “In a world where threats loom large, realists argue that states are compelled to seek power in order to ensure their own security” (Schmidt 2012, 191). Accordingly, a state’s ability to survive in the anarchical world depends on the strength of its national security. Recalling that the realist goal is state survival, increases in national security measures could reflect neorealism: “The core objective of foreign policy is to ensure the survival of the state. For realists, the fundamental national interest of all states is national security” (Schmidt 2012, 191). Therefore, neorealism could be reflected in twentieth century US immigration policies that aim to increase the country’s national security.

Neorealists define power “in terms of capabilities, and calculate this on the basis of the sum total of national attributes, including size of population and territory, wealth, and military strength” (Schmidt 2012, 193). Power is material, and can be measured, according to neorealists. National material power can also be increased through advances in technology, including “technology of modern warfare transportation and communications” (Morgenthau 1967, 113). Skilled workers provide for a country’s technological advancements, which allows for the country to be more economically competitive with other countries. Therefore, the creation of US immigration policies that encouraged skilled workers to enter the US could reflect neorealist principles. By
accepting skilled workers through the occupational preference system policies and competitiveness policies of the late twentieth century, the US increased its relative economic competitiveness in order to advance its global position of power. Populations “constitute, most obviously, assets and liabilities in relation to the mustering of military power,” but an increase in skilled labor due to immigration preferences also provides for gains in power outside of the military (Zolberg 1981, 11). The neorealist (or structural realist) international relations theory is also evidenced in the occupational preferences for immigration that were established throughout late twentieth century and the 2000 American Competitiveness in the Twenty-First Century Act (AC21).

Although the occupational preference system and competitiveness policies could reflect neorealism, examining the modern era policies through the constructivism perspective provides for a more comprehensive understanding of why the US enacted such policies. Neorealism is a limited theory because it assumes material power is the most important source of influence in international affairs (because power provides for national security, which ensures state survival). Constructivists do not deny the relevance of power in international relations, but they see power as a subjective, socially constructed idea rather than through a single, assumed objective reality. Neorealists emphasize core concepts (e.g. anarchy, power, and rationality), but assume that they have a singular shared meaning while constructivists argue that such concepts are mutually constituted social facts. Neorealism functions through assumed meanings of material objects, but constructivism asserts, “It is human design and intent that shapes the material object into one with a specific meaning and use within a context, where specific identities and interests are at stake” (Fierke 2013, 192). Thus, US immigration policies that were established based on US power and national security objectives may reflect neorealism but can be understood through constructivism. This is because US power and security
interests were provided for through policies according to some collective understanding of those concepts. The US interest in maintaining its power position in the world was applied to US immigration policies only because the power position was accepted as nationally significant. United States immigration policies aimed to enhance national security because of the shared understanding that maintenance of national security is an important function of the government. Thus, although elements of various modern US immigration policies reflect aspects of neorealism, examining the policies through constructivism better provides for a more complete understanding of US identity, ideas, and interests.

Conclusion

Many US immigration policies reflect the constructivist approach to international relations because of their expression of socially constructed ideas, identities, and interests. Although policies enacted during the twentieth century and early 2000s appear to reflect neorealism or neoliberalism, neither of these theories provide for a robust understanding of US immigration policy from an international relations perspective. United States immigration policies change in accordance with differing political viewpoints of those in power, adaptive societal norms and values, and the change in position of the US in relation with other global powers. Thus, the best international relations perspective to adequately cover the entire history of US immigration policy is constructivism. Because immigration policy is largely seen as a domestic issue, affected by domestic actors, societal norms and values, and changing perspectives of policymakers, one cannot ignore the individual level of analysis when trying to determine which factors influence immigration policies. Since the individual level of analysis seems to trump the state or system levels of analysis, constructivism is the one international
relations perspective that is expressed throughout the entire history of US immigration law.

Immigration functions as a foreign relations issue although it is typically seen as only a domestic concern. International relations theory needs to consider immigration because immigration is a global phenomenon with international implications. Domestic social and economic realities influence international relations through immigration policies. Constructivism and liberal theory do address individual-level concerns and are therefore reflected in US immigration policies, but other international relations perspectives do not take individual-level concerns into account. Thus, to fully understand immigration policies, one must look to the lived experiences of those who influence policies and those affected by policies. United States society is constructed by US immigration policy while US immigration policy is conversely influenced by the social and ideological construction of US society. In summary, there are clear social constructions of international relations and domestic reality that shape US immigration policy, rendering the constructivist perspective an integral component of understanding immigration. To better understand how US immigration policy constructs US society, one must explore how ethnic groups and individuals are affected by the policies. Therefore, in the next chapter, I discuss the history of Chinese immigration to the United States to show how one group of immigrants is affected by some of the immigration policies examined in this chapter.
Chapter Three

History of Chinese Immigration to the US and to Chicago

People have been coming to the US from around the world for centuries but as demonstrated in the previous chapter, as much as immigration policies have allowed people to enter the United States, the exclusion and discrimination of various groups of immigrants based on race and nationality has restricted various groups of people from coming to the United States. This allowance and restriction of people shapes the ethnic and racial composition of this country. Because of its effect on the composition of the country, immigration is a controversial political issue today. But this is not the first time in history that Americans have placed such an importance on the topic. John F. Kennedy wrote about the importance of immigration, declaring, “Every American who ever lived, with the exception of one group, was either an immigrant himself, or a descendant of immigrants” (Kennedy 2008 [1964], 2). There is no less truth to this statement now than there was when Kennedy wrote the words, yet many nativist Americans continue to believe that immigration is damaging the United States culture and society.

Americans of the late nineteenth century similarly regarded immigration as destructive to society, but primarily limited those negative sentiments to a specific group of immigrants: Chinese laborers. Nativist sentiments became public policy in 1882 with the passage of the first Chinese Exclusion Act. In order to understand the context in which this exclusionary act was established and why it matters even today, one must explore deeper into the history of Chinese immigration to the United States. Knowing the historical context of Chinese immigration to the United States allows for a better understanding of the contemporary lives of Chinese immigrants and Chinese Americans in the Chicagoland area. Considering the historical context of public sentiment towards
Chinese immigrants and political policies regarding their exclusion in the United States demonstrates how history shapes current experiences.

**Chinese Immigration to the United States**

Chinese individuals came to the United States long before the 1882 Chinese Exclusion Act was passed and continued to arrive despite their systematic exclusion. From the founding of the United States through the beginning of the California Gold Rush, Chinese interaction with the United States primarily involved trade. As Paul Watanabe states, “Asian immigration to the United States has been significantly influenced by the nature of relations between the United States and Asian counties” (Watanabe 2006, 6). When economic Sino-American relations were good, trade was possible between the two countries, and correspondingly, immigration occurred. The Gold Rush that began in 1848 brought a multitude of different peoples to the West Coast, including the Chinese. From 1848 through 1882, immigration to the United States was largely unrestricted and free. During this period of unrestricted immigration, Americans began to discriminate against the Chinese living in the United States. Anti-Chinese public sentiment led to the passage of the Chinese Exclusion Act. The period of exclusion based on the race and nationality of the Chinese immigrants lasted from 1882 through the passage of the Magnuson Act (Chinese Exclusion Repeal Act) of 1943. The end of World War II influenced the next stage of Chinese immigration to the United States and the introduction of new immigration legislation. With the passage of the 1965 Act to Amend the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, the most recent phase of Chinese immigration began. American public sentiment towards individuals of Chinese descent has changed drastically since the 1800s along with policies that regulate immigration. Nonetheless, the Chinese American communities in the United States have been shaped
by the historical context of Chinese immigration.

Initially, trade routes brought the Chinese to North America, and in the late 1700s, the presence of Chinese nationals in mainland United States was first recorded. In 1785, three Chinese sailors arrived in Baltimore “as part of an abandoned interracial shipping crew” (Tong 2003, 1). Regarding the arrival of Chinese to the West Coast, navigator and fur trader John Meares detailed his 1788 voyage from China to the northwest coast of America on his ships that were crewed by “Europeans and China-men, with a larger proportion of the former” (Bronson and Ho 2006). Meares discusses the usefulness of employing Chinese crewmen in his records: “they have generally been esteemed an [sic] hardy, and industrious… they live on fish and rice, and, requiring low wages, it was a matter also of economical consideration to employ them” (Bronson and Ho 2006).

Having been satisfied with the services of the Chinese crewmen, Meares adds, “if hereafter trading posts should be established on the American coast, a colony of these men would be a very valuable acquisition” (Bronson and Ho 2006). Thus, the first movements of individuals from China to the United States were defined by male laborers willing to work hard for low wages. At that point in time, the Chinese men who traveled to the United States had no intention of staying in the United States. Defending this assertion, Stanford sociologist Mary Roberts Coolidge wrote that the Chinese of the 1700s and 1800s “are not, as compared with European peoples, an emigrating nation” because “religion and family ties hold them to the land of their birth” (Coolidge 1909, 15). Even though Chinese men moved to the United States to work, their wives and families were typically left behind in China. This practice “guaranteed that husbands would not forget their kinsfolk in China, would send remittances, and eventually would return to China” (Tong 2013, 26). Close ties with family members who remained in China were also maintained through visits home and investments in homeland enterprises.
Trade between China and the United States continued through the nineteenth century, aided by hard working Chinese men willing to leave their hometowns for extended periods of time in exchange for low wages.

While many Chinese traveled to “Gold Mountain” during the mid-nineteenth century hoping to “strike fortunes in the gold mines of the proverbial Mei Guo [United States]” (Tong 2003, 19), the poor living conditions of their hometowns offered more reasons to make the long journey to California. Until the 1912 establishment of the Republic of China, the nation was ruled over imperially, with the Qing Dynasty as the last period of imperial rule. Throughout the 1800s, China was faced with troubles such as political corruption, high taxes, famine, mass public dissatisfaction, high levels of poverty, and rebellion (Tong 2013, 14). Additionally, several regions of China, especially in the southeastern Guangdong province, experienced unsustainable population growth and an overabundance of cheap imported goods (Tong 2013, 20). Because of these internal problems and external invasions, “both migration and emigration became viable, even necessary possibilities” (Tong 2013, 17). After the 1844 Treaty of Wanghia, “which opened China to American trade and missionary activity” (Martin 2011, 92), word spread through China, specifically along the Pearl River Delta region, of the United States as an opportune destination for Chinese contract laborers seeking to provide their families with economic stability.

By 1849, hundreds of Chinese men resided in San Francisco. Even though some fruitlessly immigrated in search of gold, many Chinese became “merchants involved in trade with China or were proprietors of small retail operations, including restaurants, groceries, and other establishments” (Martin 2011, 93). Despite the 1862 Anti-Coolie Bill and the 1885 Alien Contract Labor law (Foran Act), Chinese men also arrived to the United States as “coolie” contract laborers (Young 2014, 46). The “coolies” were traded,
auctioned off, and arguably treated as slave labor in spite of their free wage laborer status (Young 2014, Martin 2011, 95). Chinese “coolies” initially worked in the mining areas of California until work on the transcontinental railroad began (Ling 2012, 16). The Chinese were a main contributing power to the 1869 completion of the transcontinental railroad’s construction, but afterwards, a large number of Chinese workers “joined a floating workforce in California” (Martin 2011, 95). While their husbands worked in the United States, Chinese wives were expected to stay home in China and take care of the children, the in-laws, and the home (some becoming breadwinners for their families), causing a gender disparity problem for the Chinese communities in the United States (Tong 2013, 26).

**Economic Tension and the Discrimination of Chinese Workers**

When the economic recession of the 1870s hit California and wages decreased, disgruntled white workers perceived the Chinese workers as the cause of their economic troubles. Economic tension and lingering racism led to negative sentiment and discrimination towards Chinese immigrants. Consequently, for the first time in history, legislation was passed “barring a whole nationality from immigrating to the United States” (Martin 2011, 96). The 1882 Chinese Exclusion Act was later renewed indefinitely (Tong 2013, 60). As previously outlined, other groups or categories of people were also barred from entering the US during the Exclusion Era, but “Despite the growing list of legal reasons for exclusion, apart from Chinese workers very few persons were excluded before World War I and even fewer were deported, while the numbers of immigrants admitted steadily increased” (Daniels 2004, 25). As US citizens accepted the exclusion of Chinese immigrants, discrimination and violence against the Chinese already in the US continued. For example, throughout 1884 and 1885, many Chinese
immigrants were “driven out of town, hamlets, and cities” in California and along the West Coast and expelled from their jobs (Pfaelzer 2008, 261). Additionally, throughout the late nineteenth century, white Americans burned down the homes and small businesses of many Chinese immigrants and even killed hundreds of Chinese individuals (Pfaelzer 2008, 261-265). Because the Chinese communities all over the United States (including San Francisco, Denver, New York, Milwaukee, and Chicago) faced discrimination and increasing incidents of violence, various Chinese community groups were established, such as the Chinese Consolidated Benevolent Association and Chinese Equal Rights League. These groups, along with others, aimed to protect the legal rights of Chinese Americans and provide other forms of aid to the Chinese communities (Tong 2013, 59). As the Great Depression era saw high levels of unemployment, Americans continued to express nativist attitudes. Because of sustained racist attitudes and negative perceptions of the Chinese, Chinese individuals were barred from becoming United States citizens until the passage of the Magnuson Act of 1943. Although sixty-one years of legal exclusion was repealed, this legislation “ignored the major immigration problem of Chinese Americans, the reunification of Chinese American families” as President Roosevelt’s Public Law 199 only allowed for 105 “persons of the Chinese race” to enter the United States annually through visa control (Daniels 2004, 92-93, Pfaelzer 2008, 346).

The Second World War transformed American society and changed how Americans viewed the world, but discrimination against the Chinese persisted. Racism and discrimination continued to limit the postwar occupational advancement of Chinese Americans: “Chinese Americans in the 1950s still routinely complained about occupational advancement stymied because of racism” (Tong 2013, 106). Immigration policy also changed, but not necessarily for the better. For example, the 1952 McCarran-
Walter Immigration and Nationality Act established the new Chinese entrance quota as 205 persons rather than 105 persons, but since the Act retained the national origins system and “discriminated against potential immigrants of Asian ancestry,” this legislation “perpetuated the legacy of restriction and expressed isolationist nationalism” (Tong 2013, 112). During the decades following the end of World War II, United States immigration policy discussion focused on the placement of displaced persons and refugees, which explains why the 1952 legislation was “highly symbolic” but “mostly cosmetic because the quotas assigned to Asian countries were relatively small” (Martin 2011, 179). Even though the Exclusion Act was repealed and immigration legislation was passed after World War II, the Chinese American immigrant community was not profoundly transformed until 1965.

John F. Kennedy’s presidential administration of the 1960s provided for immigration reform that more significantly affected Chinese Americans. As an opponent of the quota system based on nationality, President Kennedy approved of amendments to the Immigration and Nationality Acts, which President Lyndon B. Johnson later signed into law. These 1965 Amendments “eliminated the national origins quotas and exclusions that had restricted immigration from certain countries and regions” (Martin 2011, 183). Largely consistent with the 1952 immigration laws, immigrants coming to the United States after 1965 sponsored by family members or employers were still preferred over non-sponsored immigrants. However, the new amendments “changed the employment categories and opened the door for a sizable increase in family reunification visas” (Martin 2011, 183). The 1952 Act gave priority to skilled workers whose services were urgently needed in the United States while the 1965 Amendments allowed for both skilled and unskilled workers in occupations that required more employees (Barkan 1996, 117). The 1965 Amendments allowed for the greatest growth in immigration in the
family categories and helped to solve the Chinese gender disparity problem in the United States. Chinese family associations in the United States grew as “most of the new Chinese immigrants after 1968 came as nuclear families” (Tong 2013, 138). Furthermore, the law caused a “shift in permanent immigration from its largely European roots… to a largely Asian and Latin American composition” (Martin 2011, 183-184).

The Changing Chinese Population

Since the mid-twentieth century, the overall number of Chinese people in the United States has increased, and the basic composition of the Chinese American community has changed. According to US census data, there was a 67.4 percent increase in the Chinese population in the United States from 1950 to 1960, and male dominance dropped from 65.5 percent to 57.4 percent (Tong 2013, 134). Correspondingly, US census data indicates that the population of Chinese individuals in the US increased from about 237,000 in 1960 to over 2,400,000 in 2000 (Daniels 2004, 148). The following table illustrates the Chinese population increase from 1960 to 2000. The largest Chinese population increase occurred during the 1980s and 1990s, which is a result of the US immigration policy changes that were enacted during that interval of time.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number of Chinese Individuals in the US</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>237,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>436,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>812,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>1,645,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>2,433,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


In addition to immigration reform of the 1960s, the passage of the 1990 Immigration Act and immigration reform of the 1980s affected which Chinese individuals were most
likely to come to the United States. Today, the United States gives preference to immigrating entrepreneurs and investors (as skilled workers), and incoming capital is sought by American commercial, financial, or industrial markets (Tong 2013, 139). The 1990 Immigration Act doubled the yearly number of skill-based visas and “marked 10,000 of them for those willing to invest at least $1 million in a new business that employed at least ten workers” because of the United States economic recession of the early 1980s (Tong 2013, 140). In addition, the 1990 law allowed for a “diversity visa” which was given to 40,000 people from all over the world based on an annual lottery system (Barkan 1996, 185).

With the large influx of immigrants of the 1990s, nativist Americans have returned to the attitude that foreign-born people are taking their jobs, but have developed a different attitude towards Asian Americans. Although nativists continue to fear the loss of jobs to immigrants, “most recent studies indicated that competition with native-born workers has occurred in some places, but, overall, there was no adverse impact on jobs or wages except for low-skilled workers living in areas to which many immigrants come (such as Miami and south Texas)” (Barkan 1996, 188). Though many new immigrants that arrived in the United States in the 1980s through present are refugees and asylum seekers seeking protection (Martin 2011, 249) and skilled and educated workers, countless Americans still see many immigrant populations as only public beneficiaries or welfare recipients (Martin 2011, 268).

While Americans have been discriminating against poor immigrants throughout the history of the United States, today, Asian Americans are labeled as a “model minority” mainly due to the high educational achievement of numerous Chinese Americans, but this bias ignores “the fact that large numbers of Chinese Americans, most of them recent immigrants, live in poverty and are poorly educated” (Daniels 2004, 158-
With regards to employment in white-collar jobs, the percentage of native-born Chinese in such occupations in 1990 was higher than that of the white population – 77 percent compared with 59 percent. Foreign-born Chinese, however, “do not enjoy the same advantage. They occupy a bipolar occupational structure, with workers clustered either in professional or managerial occupations or in low-paying service-sector jobs” (Tong 2013, 144). Historian Benson Tong attributes this bipolarity to the fact that Chinese immigrant educational structure is also bipolar: “31 percent of the adult immigrants from mainland China in 1990 had college degrees, but 16 percent had less than a fifth-grade education” (Tong 2013, 144).

Furthermore, the employment profile of Chinese in the United States is rooted in immigration policy as a result of the preference for “members of the professions or those with exceptional ability in the sciences and the arts” that offered educated, skilled Chinese with no relatives in the United States the opportunity to enter the United States population (Tong 2013, 144). Because the privileged Chinese of the post-1945 era “do not fit the typical portrait of the ‘good’ immigrant, who is poor and grateful to be in the land of opportunity and who moves through the expected stages of incorporation and economic and geographic mobility” (Tong 2013, 154), discrimination against Chinese Americans and negative outsider perceptions of the Chinese has continued to be expressed in the United States. Throughout US history, this discrimination and negative public sentiment has caused the Chinese to develop a group consciousness, organize politically and socially, and develop ethnic communities welcoming of Chinese within the United States. As explained by sociologist Dina Okamoto, “The racial segregation patterns in local labor markets reflected the fact that Asian ethnic groups were segregated from whites, [which] contributed to the development of strong ethnic communities and organizations” (Okamoto 2014, 5). This Chinese groupness that resulted from
discrimination led to the establishment of Chinatowns throughout the United States. Chinatowns, or districts with populations of predominantly Chinese origin within any non-Chinese town or city, developed as Chinese immigrants moved to live nearby each other. The Chinatown in Chicago is one example of an ethnic community that was established as a result of discrimination in other regions of the country.

**Chinese in Chicago**

As urbanization, the development of the railroad, the great California earthquake of 1906, and the negative driving forces of discrimination and violence against the Chinese brought the Chinese to Chicago as early as the 1870s, business opportunities and an accepting social environment sustained the region’s Chinese population growth. Most early Chinese immigrants in Chicago were Taishanese, a coastal people from China’s southern Guangdong province. These immigrants maintained their transnational connections by sending remittances home and making economic investments from overseas (Ling 2012, 22-23). The Chinese move to Chicago started with the Moy family in the mid-1870s. Since brothers Moy Dong Chow, Moy Dong Hoy (Sam Moy), and Moy Dong Yee arrived, “men of the Moy surname have dominated the Chicago migrant community” (McKeown 2001, 199). The Moy Family Association remains a prominent national and transnational organization today (Lee 2015).

As Chicago became the world’s largest railroad hub, the growing Chinese community benefited from Chicago’s “advantageous location and its ability to receive, process, market, and ship goods” (Ling 2012, 27). After facing economic discrimination and anti-Chinese violence on the west coast of the United States, Chinese workers found the social climate of Chicago to be much more warm and welcoming (Ling 2012, 30-31). For example, Moy Dong Chow, a Chinese immigrant who arrived in Chicago before the
turn of the twentieth century, “recalled his earlier encounters with the Chicagoans: ‘They never asked me whether or not I ate rats and snakes. They seemed to believe that we also had souls to save, and these souls were worth saving. The Chicagoans found us a peculiar people to be sure, but liked to mix with us.’” (Ling 2012, 31-32). Word spread about Chicago’s accommodating reception, and the redistribution of the Chinese immigrant population began. From the 1870s to the 1890s, the population of Chinese in Chicago “increased to nearly six hundred, according to the US census, although the local estimate was two thousand” (Ling 2012, 34).

Chicago’s early Chinese community soon gained the attention of Christian missionaries who saw it as their obligation to introduce the Gospel to the Chinese. The Baptist Church offered English classes to the Chinese in order to bring the community to Sunday school programs (Ling 2012, 32). Similarly, the Chinese Christian Union Church (established in 1903) and Pui Tak Christian School in today’s Chicago Chinatown offer many educational programs to newly arrived immigrants in order to help them learn English, adapt to life in the United States, and to become acquainted with the Gospel (Lee 2015). Christian groups’ early promotion of Christian ideals through educational training (including Chinese school for children) and recreational activities has continued to present-day Chinatown (Ling 2012, 155, Lee 2015).

The early Chinese residents of Chicago opened many different types of businesses. By the late 1880s, “the Chinese operated twelve grocery stores, three chop suey houses, and other businesses in the Chinatown district,” but hand laundries rapidly developed into the most popular Chinese-run business because “laundry was the easiest to operate as it required limited skills and very little capital” (Ling 2012, 33). Many early Chinese residents lived in their laundries and restaurants, catering to both white and Chinese clientele, only coming to Chinatown to socialize, gamble, and have a good meal.
until the relocating of Chinatown in 1912 to the location it occupies still today (McKeown 2001, 51-52). The 1912 move to 22\textsuperscript{nd} Street in the Armour Square area was initially met with unfriendliness as Italian immigrants who had already settled there made fun of the Chinese and their choice in clothing (Ling 2012, 54). However, over the next few decades, “the businesses and residents of Chinatown became more exclusively Chinese,” and Chinese restaurants began to sell Chinese food as they do today rather than American/Western dishes (McKeown 2001, 52). Chinatown was redesigned during the 1930s Great Depression “to attract larger numbers of white clientele” and small, take-out chop suey shops replaced bigger restaurants (McKeown 2001, 52). By the 1930s, the Chinese operated over 150 establishments near Wentworth Avenue and West 22\textsuperscript{nd} Street, and besides restaurants and laundries, “the majority of businesses were grocery stores, retailing and wholesaling goods imported from China” (Ling 2012, 60).

As the Chinese population in Chicago grew, the Chinese community changed. United States census data, Ameredia data, and American Community Survey data estimate the progression of the Chinese population in Chicago from one person in 1870 to over 43,000 people in 2009 (Ling 2012, 50). The following table illustrates how the population of Chinese individuals in Chicago has changed from 1870 to 2009.
### Table 4: Chinese Population in Chicago, 1870-2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number of Chinese Individuals in Chicago</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1870</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1880</td>
<td>172</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1890</td>
<td>584</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1900</td>
<td>1,179</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1910</td>
<td>1,778</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920</td>
<td>2,353</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>2,757</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>2,018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>3,334</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>5,082</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>9,357</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>13,638</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>22,295</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000*</td>
<td>34,370</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009*</td>
<td>43,227</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Figures do not include Taiwanese individuals.

Responding to the this population growth, Chinese community organizations such as the family associations (e.g. Moy Family Association), the Chinese Consolidated Benevolent Association (CCBA), religious groups, etc. developed “to meet the social, economic, and legal needs of the Chinese immigrants” (Ling 2012, 170). Men were the principal members of these groups and organizations due to the gender disparity problem caused by earlier immigration policies that favored laborers and merchants. However, some Chinese women were able to become part of the Chicago community. Although anti-Chinese immigration policies prohibited the vast majority of Chinese women from coming to the United States to reunite with their male family members, women who did make it to Chicago were “comparatively liberated and exercised more control over their households” than their counterparts overseas (Ling 2012, 120). Also, Chinese immigrant women found that their role in American became that of a co-provider for the nuclear
family (Ling 2012, 122-123). While several organizations excluded Chinese women (such as the Chinese Six Companies and On Leong Merchants and Laborers Association), the Chinese Women’s Club was established in 1937 (Ling 2012, 138, 168). Women were also included in the activities organized by the eight Chinese family associations in Chicago (Ling 2012, 146).

Throughout the late 1900s as new Chinese immigrants arrived in Chicago and second- and third-generation Chinese Americans matured, Chinatown businesses changed and the Chinese population dispersed into the suburbs. Hand laundry businesses remained of vital importance to the Chinese throughout the history of Chinese in Chicago because they enabled the Chinese “to move around in search for better economic opportunities” (Ling 2012, 81). However, by 1960, only half of the 430 laundries that had existed in Chinatown in 1950 remained in operation because of technological advancements in the industry (Tong 2003, 107). As laundry operators turned to the restaurant industry and restaurant owners became more innovative in Chinatown, the 1950s housing boom influenced middle-class Chinese Americans to move to the suburbs, where many Chinese Americans live today (Tong 2003, 107). Nationwide suburbanization, federally funded highway building, and new public housing led to the disappearance of at least twelve Chinatowns in the United States (Tong 2003, 108). These changes also affected Chicago’s Chinatown in a variety of ways, but fortunately, the historical ethnic community survived to today. Benson Tong explains that the suburbanization of Chinese middle-class Americans parallels the larger white migration,

But because of residual prejudice and for pragmatic and emotional reasons, many Chinese Americans—as did some other ethnic groups—reclustered in the neighborhoods adjacent to old Chinatowns. As a result, uptown Chinese could continue to maintain networks of kin and compatriots and in so doing could
preserve and transmit to the next generation ethnic values, behaviors, family patterns, gender roles, food preferences, and sociopolitical choices. The poorest Chinese, who made up part of the early downtown populace, however, remained in the core area of Chinatowns. (Tong 2003, 117)

As a result, Chicago’s Chinese community is not confined to the Chinatown region, but is spread across Chicago’s suburban areas and throughout the city of Chicago. Chinese kinship networks and other groups and organizations continue to connect Chinese Americans to each other in and around Chicago while Chicago’s Chinatown remains important to many Chinese Americans. The character of Chicago’s Chinese community and the culture of the individuals within have been shaped by the history of Chinese immigration to the United States and to Chicago. As the contemporary Chinese community has been shaped by the history of Chinese immigration, changing US immigration policy has shaped that history of immigration. Completing the cycle of influences created by the social construction of international and US domestic reality, in the next chapters, I explore how the racialized social construction of contemporary US society (that has developed through exclusionary immigration policies and discriminatory attitudes) affects the life experiences of immigrants, including Chinese immigrants.
Chapter Four
Assimilation, Identity, and Acceptance

Fifty years ago, immigration policy in the United States drastically changed due to the passage of the 1965 Amendments to the Immigration and Nationality Act. With national origins quotas rules lifted, more immigrants from societies traditionally made up of people of color were able to enter the United States and later become naturalized citizens. Since 1965, “nearly 59 million immigrants have arrived in the United States, pushing the country’s foreign-born share to a near record 14%” (Pew Research Center 2015). Immigrants from this new period in immigration policy and their children continue to contribute to the population growth of the US and the restructuring of its racial and ethnic demographic organization.

Although immigrants and their descendants provide such a large share of the US population, they are still often considered strangers on American land. During the long period of exclusion in US history (from the 1870s arguably through 1965), countless people who considered themselves to be Americans were not granted, or even eligible, for citizenship. Thousands of women, Chinese, African-Americans, and others were legally restricted from the benefits of citizenship well into the twentieth century. The discriminatory restrictions that barred people from becoming US citizens were gradually eliminated throughout the twentieth century. An immigration control system developed into the contemporary process of obtaining citizenship through naturalization. This was an alternative approach to previous restrictive policies. This new system provides immigration priority to the relatives of United States citizens and legal permanent residents as well as immigrants with skills that could “substantially benefit prospectively the national economy, cultural interests, or welfare of the United States” (79 Stat. 913
Once foreigners move to the United States and meet the eligibility requirements of citizenship, they may take the Naturalization Test to become naturalized citizens. Once they have finalized the process of naturalization by declaring their *Oath of Allegiance* during a Naturalization Ceremony, newly naturalized citizens are eligible to receive all the benefits of citizenship automatically granted to people born in the United States. These benefits include the right to vote in state and federal elections and the right to hold a US passport (Gjelten 2015, 329). Thus, contemporary US immigration policies provide foreigners with paths to attain citizenship status equal to native-born, birthright citizens. Throughout the process of becoming naturalized, immigrants are encouraged, or mandated, to assimilate into American society by learning English, becoming employed, and learning US history and government facts (civics). Although naturalized citizens are granted the same political rights as other American citizens, some groups of immigrants are not provided with the same social, economic, and educational opportunities as their birthright citizen counterparts, regardless of their attempts to assimilate. Mainly, non-white immigrants, even after becoming naturalized citizens and assimilating into American culture, are prevented from full inclusion in American society because of their ethnic and/or racial identities. In this chapter, I explore how the racialized social construction of the United States (which both influences immigration policy and is influenced by immigration policy) affects how immigrants are seen as unassimilable in the United States even though many are assimilating into US society. Despite immigrants’ ability to assimilate in the United States, the racialized social construction of the country limits non-white immigrants’ ability to be accepted by mainstream society.

Before considering how the racialized social construction of the United States hinders the ability of non-white immigrants and their descendants to become completely accepted by mainstream society, I would like to explain my use of the terms “white” and
“non-white” here and throughout the rest of this paper. It would not usually be appropriate to use such “catch-all” terms to identify large racial and ethnic groups of people. However, I have chosen to use these terms here because the contemporary and historical racialized social construction of the United States causes a division between white ethnics and people of color in terms of the societal consequences related to whiteness. White ethnics and immigrants are perceived differently than people of color in the United States, which has significant consequences in the following discussion of perceived and actual assimilability. I am defining whites as those people contemporarily categorized as white in society (e.g. on governmental forms where one must check a box next to one’s racial identity) and non-whites as Asian people, black people, brown people, Hispanics, and Latinos. I recognize the meaning of “whiteness” has changed throughout US history, which is why I am using the contemporary societal categorization of white and non-white. Therefore, I am categorizing some people (such as Italians, Irish, Polish, and Jewish people) who were once considered non-white ethnics in the US as white ethnics because that is how they are commonly identified today. Explaining the changing evolution of the meaning of whiteness, American historian Eric Foner states, “Only the mobilization for World War II and the confrontation with Nazism [purged] Americanism of the language of race. No longer identified as members of distinct ‘races,’ Italians, Poles, Jews, and the other new immigrants became hyphenated ethnics or, to put it another way, merged into a general category of white Americans” (Foner 1998, 91). Even though the “dark-skinned Italians and the eastern European Jews who came in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries didn’t look very white to the fair-skinned Americans who were here then… the same people we now call white – Italians, Jews, Irish – were seen as another race at the time. Not black or Asian, it’s true, but an alien other, a race apart, although one that didn’t have a clearly defined name” (Rubin 1998,
Lillian Rubin further discusses the experience of Irish ethnics to show that their contemporary inclusion in the white racial category was not always the case: “Not only during the [period of great Irish immigration] but for a long time afterward as well, the US Census Bureau counted the Irish as a distinct and separate group, much as it does today with the category it labels ‘Hispanic’” (Rubin 1998, 93). Karen Sacks similarly describes the historical Jewish experiences that changed how others perceived their whiteness. Jews became white as they became part of middle-class America: “Jews’ and other white ethnics’ upward mobility was the result of programs that allowed [them] to float on a rising economic tide” (Sacks 1998, 111). In fact, for most immigrants, whether or not others perceived them as white depended largely on their socioeconomic class. Sacks explains, “the belief in European races took root most deeply among the wealthy US-born Protestant elite, who feared a hostile and seemingly unassimilable working class” (Sacks 1998, 101). Thus, even though the racial identification of ethnic immigrant groups changes over time, being perceived by others as either white or non-white continues to come with various societal consequences related to assimilation. Identifying people as either white or non-white may not be appropriate in every discussion, but based on the implications of each identity in terms of perceived assimilability, using the terms “white” and “non-white” to describe groups of people makes sense within this chapter.

Although scholars do not agree on how to best describe the assimilation process, most would generally accept that immigrants adopt some aspects of their host society to some extent in order to become a member of that society. Many scholars use a classic sociological definition of assimilation in their writing about immigration: “Assimilation is a process of interpenetration and fusion in which persons and groups acquire the memories, sentiments, and attitudes of other persons or groups, and, by sharing their
experience and history, are incorporated with them in a common cultural life” (Park and Burgess 1921, 735). This “incorporation” happens gradually over time, as immigrants adopt more and more features of the mainstream culture into their daily lives. Assimilation is associated with the idea that aspects of immigrants’ ethnic backgrounds become less significant to them as they spend more time with an ethnic majority group: “As ethnic origins become less and less relevant in relation to the members of another ethnic group (typically, but not necessarily, the ethnic majority group),” individuals less frequently perceive themselves in terms of ethnic categories (Alba and Nee 2007, 130-131). However, throughout US history, “not all groups [of immigrants] were equally welcomed as potential members of [society]” (King 2000, 19). No matter how much non-white immigrants try to “Americanize” themselves, they are limited by their racial or ethnic identities.

Immigrants who have become or want to become American citizens are expected to strive to assimilate into mainstream American society. They are expected to adopt various “American” values or characteristics in order to fully integrate themselves in American society. For a long time, “it often was implicitly assumed that assimilation would occur more or less automatically. Immigrants will become Americans simply because they are in America” (Huntington 2004, 200). Consequently, “past worries about the assimilation of immigrants have proved unfounded” (Huntington 1997, 33). However, that assumption was held during the period of US history in which the majority of immigrants coming to the US were white and from European countries. In a predominantly white society, white immigrants can more easily blend in and assimilate into a culture that is similar to their own, as opposed to non-white immigrants who come from drastically different backgrounds. Recently, with the majority of immigrants coming to the US from Asia and Latin America, assimilation “is likely to be slower, less
complete, and different from the assimilation of earlier immigrants” (Huntington 2004, 185). Here, Huntington accepts that because recently, the majority of immigrants are coming from countries where the populations are predominantly non-white, it will take longer for these non-white immigrants to assimilate into the US population. Nevertheless, the assumption still stands that assimilation of immigrants in the US will occur eventually. Thus, while the ethnic and racial construction of US society and the ethnicity and race of the majority of immigrants have changed, many native-born people still want immigrants to quickly assimilate into the mainstream culture because ethnic diversity “is seen as a divisive force, a threat to societal unity” (Lambert and Taylor 1990, 10).

Articulating how this threat to society can be perceived as being caused by immigrants, social anthropologist Verena Stolcke explains, “The ‘problem’ is not ‘us’ versus ‘them.’ ‘We’ are the measure of the good life which ‘they’ are threatening to undermine, and this is so because ‘they’ are foreigners and culturally ‘different.’” Even though immigrants are not at fault, “‘they’ are effectively made into the scapegoats for ‘our’ socioeconomic problems” (Stolcke 1995, 3). If they can assimilate into American culture and become more like “us,” immigrants are less likely to be seen as “them” or as problems.

Furthermore, “the successful integration of immigrants and their children contributes to the nation’s economic vitality and its vibrant and ever-changing culture” (National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine 2015, 1-1). Thus, immigrants are expected to assimilate into mainstream society.

The expectation of immigrants in the US to strive for assimilation is demonstrated by the country’s eligibility requirements for naturalization. Citizenship is a central marker of “assimilation of an immigrant into American society” (Smith and Edmonston 1997, 382), and in order for most immigrants to become naturalized citizens, they are required to meet various requirements. These requirements correspond with ways in which
scholars measure assimilation. Jacob L. Vigdor, Associate Professor of Public Policy Studies and Economics at Duke University, developed a quantitative index that helps measure immigrant assimilation in the United States. Published in a 2008 report for The Manhattan Institute, Vigdor quantifies three areas of assimilation: economic assimilation (e.g. employment and educational attainment), cultural assimilation (e.g. English language ability) and civic assimilation (e.g. citizenship status) (Vigdor 2008, 2-3). While not all of Vigdor’s factors of assimilation are directly incorporated into the American eligibility requirements for naturalization, all three areas of assimilation are accounted for, which shows that American society expects immigrants to work towards assimilation before and after they become naturalized citizens. For example, while immigrants applying for naturalization are not required to be employed or to have attained a certain level of education, most are required to pay an application fee of $680 (Wernick 2012) and all are required to provide information about their education and employment history (US Citizenship and Immigration Services 2013). These aspects of the application process are evidence of the expectation for immigrants to be economically assimilated into US society before they become naturalized citizens. Additionally, the expectation that immigrants should be culturally assimilated is demonstrated by the requirement for most naturalization applicants to demonstrate their ability “to read, write, and speak basic English” and demonstrate their “basic knowledge of US history and government” by passing both an English and a civics test (US Citizenship and Immigration Services 2013). Lastly with regards to civic assimilation, “immigrants’ formal participation in American society” is expected (Vigdor 2008, 4). Vigdor measures civic assimilation primarily by considering immigrants’ naturalized citizenship status because naturalization represents immigrants’ commitment to civic assimilation. While this factor of assimilation cannot be included as an eligibility requirement for naturalization because
naturalization is Vigdor’s measurement of civic assimilation, it is evident that immigrants, especially immigrants who have resided in the US for a long period of time, are expected to civically assimilate into society through becoming naturalized citizens because that process represents their acceptance of American society. As Tom Gjelten explains, immigrants’ naturalization shows their commitment to “embrace the American ideology” and “fulfill their civic responsibilities” (Gjelten 2015, 331). Thus, using Jacob L. Vigdor’s measurements of immigrant assimilation in the US and the eligibility requirements for naturalization, it is clear that immigrants are expected by the US government and society to attempt to become assimilated into American society.

Despite the popular belief that immigrants do not try to become integrated into US society, evidence shows that contemporary immigrants are assimilating into US society over time. In recent years, anti-immigration sentiments became more popularized, and were defended by the belief that “most immigrants don’t want to assimilate” by adopting “our values” anymore (Guo 2015). Republican candidates campaigning throughout the 2016 Presidential election have taken advantage of this immigrant assimilation anxiety, but in actuality, “most immigrants to America are assimilating as their forebears did” (“Those Assimilating Immigrants” 2015). This claim is backed by a study conducted by a panel of researchers working with the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. Findings from this study are published in a 2015 report, edited by Mary C. Waters and Marisa Gerstein Pineau, titled *The Integration of Immigrants into American Society*. The panel of researchers came to eighteen formal conclusions regarding integration, and to summarize the findings, they wrote, “Overall, the panel found that current immigrants and their descendants are integrating into US society” (National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine 2015, Sum-2). Continuing to summarize the findings, the panel stated, “Across all measurable outcomes,
integration increases over time, with immigrants becoming more like the native-born with more time in the country, and with the second and third generations becoming more like other native-born Americans than their parents were” (National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine 2015, Sum-2). To begin with the topic of education, the panel found “strong intergenerational progress in education attainment” (National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine 2015, Sum-2). To support this claim, the researchers wrote, “Over a quarter of the foreign-born now have a college education or more, and they contribute a great deal to the US scientific and technical workforce. These immigrants’ children also do exceptionally well educationally and typically attain the top tiers of the occupational distribution” (National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine 2015, Sum-3). Concerning employment statistics, the panel found that immigrant men have found more success than immigrant women. Summarizing immigrant men’s experiences, they “have higher employment rates than the second and higher generations. This employment advantage is especially dramatic among the least educated immigrants, who are much more likely to be employed than comparably educated native born men, indicating that they are filling an important niche in our economy” (National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine 2015, Sum-3). For “second+ generation men, the trajectories vary by ethnicity and race,” but they generally integrate with the native-born population (National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine 2015, Sum-3). The researchers found immigrant women have a “substantially lower employment rate” than native-born women, but “employment rates for second and higher generation women [move] towards parity with the general native-born population, regardless of race” (National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine 2015, Sum-3). Since for both men and women, the researchers found that over time or generations, immigrants’ employment rates become more comparable to those of
the native-born population, the claim that immigrants are working to assimilate into American society is supported. With regards to the occupations of immigrants, “the occupational distributions of the first and second generations reveal a picture of intergenerational improvement… likely to continue as the baby boom cohorts complete their retirement over the next two decades” (National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine 2015, Sum-3-Sum-4). The results of the study show that immigrants are integrating into US society over time with regards to education, employment, and occupational distribution. Also, while many Americans fear that immigrants bring with them higher rates of crime, evidence shows that an “increased prevalence of immigrants is associated with lower crime rates… Cities and neighborhoods with greater concentrations of immigrants have much lower rates of crime and violence than comparable nonimmigrant neighborhoods.” (National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine 2015, Sum-6). While it can be argued that the difference in crime rates between immigrants and native-born populations does not demonstrate immigrants’ progress towards assimilation into the general population, that difference can show immigrants’ assimilation into the law-abiding population of US society.

Immigrants are assimilating into US society despite nativist beliefs, and evidence shows that the main concern of many nativists – language integration – need not be a concern at all. Many Americans worry that immigrants are not proficient enough at speaking and understanding English despite the fact that most immigrants must pass an English test in order to become naturalized citizens. Symbolizing this worry, several attempts have been made in recent US history to encourage the use of English over any other language. For example, “in 1986 an initiative was passed declaring English [California’s] official language” (Ong 1996, 741). However, “the concern, voiced at
times in hysterical tones in the public debate about immigration, that the volume of immigration threatens the status of English is misplaced” (Alba and Nee 2003, 220). This is because even though “about 85 percent of the foreign-born population speaks a language other than English at home” (National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine 2015, Sum-4), “whatever the regularity of mother-tongue use, some proficiency in English generally is apparent among immigrants who have resided in the United States for more than a few years, and English proficiency attains a high level among their US-born children” (Alba and Nee 2003, 220). As stated in the 2015 National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine report, “There is evidence that [language] integration is happening as rapidly or faster now than it did for the earlier waves of mainly European immigrants in the 20th century” (National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine 2015, Sum-5). For instance, “today, many immigrants arrive already speaking English as a first or second language. Currently, about 50 percent of the foreign-born in surveys report they speak English ‘very well’ or “well,” while less than 10 percent say they speak English ‘not at all’ (National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine 2015, Sum-5). Immigrants in the US are more fluent in English than in the past and even though “languages define the very core of ethnic identity” (Lambert and Taylor 1990, 15), immigrants of “the second+ generations are generally acquiring English and losing their ancestors’ language… with English monolingualism usually occurring within three generations” (National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine 2015, Sum-5). Language integration is a significant factor of assimilation, and thus, because most contemporary immigrants are English-proficient or become English-proficient over time, the claim that immigrants are assimilated into US society is supported.

Regardless of some immigrants’ abilities to assimilate into mainstream US
society, their racial and ethnic identities limit their acceptance in society. White immigrants can choose to be ethnic or not and can choose how much their ethnic identity affects their daily lives. However, non-white Americans (naturalized citizens and native-born citizens alike) and non-white immigrants do not have that choice because their outward appearance, which does not easily blend in with the white majority’s appearance, causes many white Americans to see them as outsiders. Throughout US history, “once immigrants arrived in the country, whatever their national origin or race, they were ideologically positioned within the hegemonic bipolar white-black model of American society” (Ong 1996, 742). Immigrants who are able to blend in with the predominantly white US culture are more likely to be accepted by the white majority than those who are not able to blend in as well. Lambert and Taylor argue that in contemporary society, “much of the resistance to immigration [is] based on a fear of eroding the country’s traditionally white” culture (Lambert and Taylor 1990, 11). To prevent the erosion of the country’s traditionally white culture, “the regents of the University of California system recently banned affirmative-action programs in admissions and hiring” (Ong 1996, 741). Ong contends that attempts like this one “to make all immigrants adhere to standardized, ‘color-blind’ norms are in fact attempts to discriminate among them, separating out the desirable from the undesirable citizens according to some racial and cultural calculus,” with which white citizens are deemed desirable and non-whites are deemed undesirable (Ong 1996, 741).

Returning to the study conducted by a panel of researchers at the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, the panel found that “patterns of immigrant integration are shaped by race. While there is evidence of integration and improvement in socioeconomic outcomes for blacks, Latinos, and Asians, their perceived race still matters, even after controlling for all their other characteristics” (National
Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine 2015, Sum-8). Explaining how race shapes immigrant’s integration into US society, the researchers stated, “Black immigrants and their descendants are integrating with native-born non-Hispanic whites at the slowest rate. Asian immigrants and their descendants are integrating with native-born non-Hispanic whites most quickly, and Latinos are in between” (National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine 2015, Sum-8). The researchers then identified racial discrimination as one way that race shapes integration, and documented that they “found some evidence of racial discrimination against Latinos” and other ethnic groups (National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine 2015, Sum-8). For example, “earnings assimilation [which is determined not by immigrants’ desire to assimilate, but by employers’ perception of their employees] is considerably slower for Hispanic (predominately Mexican) immigrants than for other immigrants” and Asian Americans “tend to earn somewhat less than third+ generation non-Hispanic whites with the same level of education” (National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine 2015, Sum-3). The reported example of the wage gap between similarly educated whites and non-whites demonstrates one way in which non-white immigrants are not accepted within US society despite their assimilation.

Additionally, in the professional world, Asian Americans have a difficult time being promoted into managerial positions from technical positions than white Americans due to a “glass ceiling barrier” (Woo 2000, 146). From the early 1970s to the late 1990s, Deborah Woo studied a “highly prestigious government research organization, a diverse workplace employing a large number of scientists and engineers,” referred to as XYZ Aerospace to maintain the organization’s anonymity (Woo 2000, 19). Woo found that many Asian Americans employees of XYZ Aerospace would like to be promoted to managerial positions, however, “between 1971 and 1984 there were no high-ranking
Asian American managers” at the company and in 1999, “XYZ had no Asian Americans at the senior executive level” (Woo 2000, 153). After investigating possible explanations for the existence of a glass ceiling barrier at XYZ Aerospace, Woo found that such a barrier involves “subtle biases, sometimes imperceptible or ineffable, quietly or unconsciously reproduced. Some are embedded into the routines or practices of institutions, others reflected in attitudinal orientations, which over time chisel racially contoured outcomes into the workplace experience, even when there is no discriminatory intent” (Woo 2000, 15). Because non-white immigrants and their descendants are continuously seen as foreigners rather than assimilated individuals, they face subtle discrimination, which is evidence of their inability to be accepted in the workplace. Plainly stated, “immigrants from East Asia [are] subject to even more widespread and systematic racism because of the color of their skin” than the southern and eastern European immigrants who were once looked down upon” (Alba and Nee 2003, 69). Even later descendants of non-white immigrants (native-born citizens) are faced with discrimination because of their racial identity: even though “the descendants of the early Chinese and Japanese immigration may be third-, fourth-, and even fifth-generation Americans, they continue to be seen and treated as other, as perpetual foreigners” (Alba and Nee 2003, 70). Because they cannot easily blend in with the majority WASP (white, Anglo-Saxon Protestant) population, non-white immigrants are perpetually perceived as outsiders in American society, regardless of their educational attainment, economic standing, or citizenship status. The perpetuity of racism “experienced by these nonwhite immigrant groups— and the Asian phenotype— rules out the full scope of assimilation that has resulted in the ‘twilight of ethnicity’ for European Americans” (Alba and Nee 2003, 70). Explaining the “twilight of ethnicity” position of European Americans that describes a decline in the consequence of ethnicity for the lived experiences of European
Americans, Douglas S. Massey asserts that white immigrants’ “expressions of ethnic identity are no longer perceived as threats to national unity. On the contrary, the use of ethnic labels [e.g. Italian American] has become a way of identifying oneself as American,” which “proves how far assimilation has come” rather than “signaling a lack of assimilation” (Massey 1995, 641). The outward appearance of Asian Americans has prevented them from achieving the “twilight of ethnicity” position of European Americans because of racism.

Non-white immigrants are not fully accepted in American society because of racism and racial discrimination despite claims made by supporters of the model minority myth. The phrase “model minority” emerged in 1966 when two articles were published (entitled “Success Story, Japanese-American Style” and “Success of One Minority Group in the US”) that praised ability of Asian Americans to find economic success “with no aid from anyone else” in contrast with the experiences of “poor African Americans” (Lee and Zhou 2015, 11). The phrase basically refers to Asian Americans who “persisted and overcame extreme hardship and racial discrimination to achieve extraordinary success, surpassing even US-born whites” (Lee and Zhou 2015, 11). However, in recent years, researchers such as Jennifer Lee and Min Zhou have shown that this model minority idea is a myth. Among other critiques, Lee and Zhou argue, “the model minority construct has been strategically deployed to dismiss the significance of race and racial discrimination in determining the life chances of ethnoracial minorities” and “it pits Asian Americans against other ethnoracial minority groups” such as African Americans and Latino Americans (Lee and Zhou 2015, 11-12). Proponents of the model minority myth deny that racial discrimination influences Asian Americans, but in this chapter and the next, I show that racial discrimination and racial biases do, in fact, negatively affect the lives of Asian Americans. Nevertheless, “progress in reducing racial discrimination and
disparities in socioeconomic outcomes in the United States will improve the outcomes for the native-born and immigrants alike” (National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine 2015, Sum-8). Because immigrants’ racial and ethnic identities affect how Americans perceives them, and there is a history of white dominance in the US, non-white immigrants are limited in their capacity to be welcomed in mainstream American society.

In contrast with the experiences of non-white immigrant groups, white immigrant groups, after assimilating into American society, are able to maintain some of their cultural traditions or practices without being excluded from mainstream society. As Herbert J. Gans explains, among the later generations of European immigrants, a new kind of ethnic expression occurs, “which emphasizes concern with identity, with the feeling of being Jewish or Italian, etc. Since ethnic identity needs are neither intense nor frequent in this generation… they resort to the use of ethnic symbols. As a result, ethnicity may be turning into symbolic ethnicity… which could persist for generations” (Gans 1979, 193). Gans is describing a type of culture maintenance process that is known as symbolic ethnicity (sometimes known as symbolic identity) by sociologists.

Immigrants can express symbolic ethnicity through maintaining certain elements of their ethnic identity while abandoning other elements in order to be fully integrated into their new homeland. Gans studied later generations of Catholic and Jewish immigrants in the US to come to the conclusion that many European Americans can continue a “nostalgic allegiance to the culture of the immigrant generation, or that of the old country; a love for and a pride in a tradition that can be felt without having to be incorporated into everyday behavior” (Gans 1979, 204). These later generations of immigrants can direct their nostalgic feelings “at a generalized tradition, or at specific ones” through the creation of symbolic traditions that do not interfere with “their roles and positions in local and
national hierarchical social structures” (Gans 1979, 204-205).

For example, Jews have “abstracted rites of passage and holidays out of the traditional religion and given them greater importance, such as the bar mitzvah and bas mitzvah” (Gans 1979, 205). Gans defends that the choice to transform rites of passage and holidays into aspects of symbolic ethnicity is logical because they are “ceremonial, thus symbolic to begin with; equally importantly, they do not take much time, do not upset the everyday routine, and also become an occasion for reassembling on a regular basis family members who are rarely seen” (Gans 1979, 205). Other examples of expressions of symbolic ethnicity are Saint Patrick’s Day celebrations for Irish Americans, a family of Italians making a visit to a bakery in Little Italy, and descendants of Polish immigrants joining in a Polish folk dance troupe in the United States. Expressions of symbolic ethnicity do not get in the way of European Americans’ progress towards assimilation because they do not shape their lives on a regular basis, but rather, act more like leisure-time activities. Symbolic ethnicity provides immigrants with a connection to an ethnic group without excluding them from the wider, national society. Mary C. Waters further describes this symbolic ethnicity: “For later-generation white ethnics, ethnicity is not something that influences their lives unless they want it to. In the world of work and school and neighborhood, individuals do not have to admit to being ethnic unless they choose to. Ethnicity has become a subjective identity, invoked at will by the individual” (Waters 1990, 7). Waters specifically uses the phrase “white ethnics” because “the option of identifying as ethnic… exists for all white Americans, and further choice of which ethnicity to choose is available to some of them” (Waters 1990, 19), but “for the ways in which ethnicity is flexible and symbolic and voluntary for white middle-class Americans are the very ways in which it is not so for non-white and Hispanic Americans” (Waters 1990, 156). Symbolic ethnicity provides white immigrants with the
ability to assimilate into American society while still maintaining aspects of their ethnic cultures, but non-white and Hispanic immigrants do not have this option of symbolic ethnicity in contemporary America. Ethnicity is not voluntary for members of racial minorities because their “lives are strongly influenced by their race or national origin regardless of how much they may choose not to identify themselves in terms of their ancestries” (Waters 2006, 139). Many non-white immigrants, regardless of their assimilation progress, cannot be fully integrated into American society and maintain aspects of their ethnicity in the same way that white immigrants can because non-white immigrants do not presently have the same option of symbolic ethnicity.

Non-white individuals in the United States cannot benefit from symbolic ethnicity because they suffer from experiencing what sociologist W. E. B. Du Bois coined as “double consciousness.” Du Bois discussed the lives of Black Americans in his 1903 collection of essays entitled The Souls of Black Folk. Introducing the concept of double consciousness, he wrote that United States society “yields [Black Americans] no true self-consciousness, but only lets [them] see [themselves] through the revelation of the other world. It is a peculiar sensation, this double-consciousness, this sense of always looking at one’s self through the eyes of others, of measuring one’s soul by the tape of a world that looks on in amused contempt and pity” (Du Bois 1903, 3). Non-white individuals in the US continuously understand their identities from two perspectives: their internal understanding of themselves and a perspective based on how others see them. In a racialized society, as individuals from minority ethnic groups, including Black Americans and diasporic communities, look at themselves “through the eyes of others,” they experience an internal struggle: “One ever feels his two-ness, —an American, a Negro; two souls, two thoughts, two unreconciled striving; two warring ideals in one dark body, whose dogged strength alone keeps it from being torn asunder” (Du Bois 1903, 3).
The internal struggle resulting from experiencing double consciousness forces non-white individuals to be constantly aware of their race and their other differences from white society, preventing them from being able to hide their backgrounds through symbolic ethnicity practices. This constant awareness of being racially different than mainstream society members is felt both by non-whites themselves as well as whites because race is an outward characteristic.

While Du Bois discussed double consciousness through the example of Black Americans in post-reconstruction era United States, the concept parallels the internal identity struggles of contemporary immigrants in the United States. Using a Black American as an example, Du Bois explained, “He simply wishes to make it possible for a man to be both a Negro and an American, without being cursed and spit upon by his fellows, without having the doors of Opportunity closed roughly in his face” (Du Bois 1903, 4). Du Bois asserted that Black Americans found it difficult to balance the two elements of their cultural identity. Similarly, “an immigrant enters her new country with one set of selves. These are then overwritten and refracted by her peers, neighbors, colleagues, and authorities in the new culture, and this experience shapes her consciousness, subjectivity, and sense of identity” (Lobban 2013, 556). Although the US portrays itself as a melting pot of cultures and identities, “this melting pot cultural ideal is a myth [and] blending in is complicated by the fact that certain attributes of race, class, and religion are privileged” (Lobban 2013, 557) as well as outwardly impossible to disguise or hide. The social construction of the US creates an environment wherein the double consciousness of non-white immigrants in the US limits their ability to express their dual identities through symbolic ethnicity. Despite non-white individuals’ desire to maintain and express both their American identity and culture and their ethnic identity and culture, the racialized social construction of reality in the US limits their ability to do
so. White individuals in the US can express their cultural identities without being seen as outsiders in the country through the expression of symbolic ethnicity. In contrast, non-white individuals do not benefit from symbolic ethnicity because their race produces a double consciousness that is outwardly apparent to themselves and others.

After living in the US for numerous years, many immigrants become naturalized citizens and assimilate into American society. However, non-white immigrants’ racial identity and ethnic background continue to act as a barrier to full acceptance in society despite their citizenship status and assimilation. Although many Asian Americans are prevented from full inclusion because of their ethnic identity, some scholars argue that “Asian values” are so “similar to the Protestant Ethic” and encouraging of “behavior similar to that of the white middle class” that Asian Americans have been able to attain equal status in the US as white Americans (Nee and Sanders 1988, 77). However, while numerous contemporary Asian Americans have made great educational and occupational achievements, which would provide evidence to support the claim that they have gained parity with white Americans, many Asian immigrants and Asian Americans continue to face discrimination based on their racial or ethnic identity. Although the US immigration laws that excluded Asians, especially Chinese, from immigrating to the US have been repealed over fifty years ago, contemporary Asian immigrants and descendants of Asian immigrants still feel the effects of racial discrimination caused by such US immigration laws. The unfortunate legacy of the exclusionary US immigration policies is evident today in the life experiences of contemporary Asian immigrants and Asian Americans that are shaped by the racialized social construction of the United States. These experiences are generally not taken into account when international relations theorists study the interactions between countries and when policymakers create laws that affect those international interactions. The previously discussed constructivist approach,
however, allows for an examination of how the social construction of the US and the international society influences international relations and US immigration policies. In the next chapter, I explore the consequences of the interaction between the racialized social construction of immigrants and US immigration policy on the lived experiences of immigrants. Using data I collected from interviews with Chinese immigrants and Chinese Americans, I support the claim that the racial identity of Asian immigrants and Asian Americans prevents them from being completely accepted in the US despite their ability to assimilate into mainstream society.
Chapter Five

Contemporary Chinese Immigrants and Chinese Americans

Although immigrant populations in the United States progress towards assimilation, race acts as an obstacle to complete acceptance in our society. The contemporary experience of the Chinese community in the Chicagoland area exemplifies this struggle. Through anthropological research, I have found that Chinese immigrants and descendants face challenges throughout the process of integration into mainstream US society due to their physical appearance and cultural practices. Race and identity act as obstacles to complete acceptance in our society, as evidenced by how one sample of immigrants perceive their life experiences in the United States. This chapter explains how the experiences of the Chinese American and Chinese immigrant population in the Chicagoland area support the claim that immigrants’ perceived racial identity negatively influences their experiences in the United States and limits their ability to become fully accepted by US society.

I began by conducting background literature research regarding the history of the Chinese population in and around Chicago and conducting informal research in Chicago’s Chinatown. My preliminary literature research helped me understand how the Chinese population came to be as it is in the Chicagoland area. I spoke with several leaders and staff members of various nonprofit organizations in Chinatown to gain general knowledge about the community and how it has changed since the early 1900s. I also learned about issues that are important to the Chinese community of Chicago, such as maintaining a safe and clean outdoor environment (Tu 2015). I was introduced to general differences between new immigrants from China and those who have resided in the US for many years (e.g. language use preferences) and the changing population of
Chinatown. For example, I was told that Chinatown used to mainly consist of immigrants who spoke Cantonese (from Hong Kong or southern mainland China) but now Mandarin speakers make up much of the population, which has changed community dynamics (Lee 2015). While this background research taught me a lot about the historical and contemporary Chinese community of Chicago, I wanted to better understand the perspective of individuals of Chinese descent who live in Chicago as well as the suburban areas around Chicago. While several historians and sociologists have conducted research about Chicago’s Chinatown and the Chicago Chinatown community in the past, the contemporary Chinese immigrant and Chinese American community in and around Chicago has not been recently studied using qualitative methods.

I conducted formal interviews with Chinese immigrants and Chinese Americans who reside in and around Chicago to see how their identities and cultures have shaped their life experiences. I was able to interview thirty people of Chinese descent from Chicago and its suburbs. I asked these interview participants many questions about their cultural and religious practices, their use of English and Chinese languages, their education, their community involvement, their viewpoints surrounding their own ethnic identities, their perception of China, their opinions regarding media representation of Chinese people and China, their families’ immigration history, and their overall their experiences as immigrants or Chinese Americans in the United States and Illinois in order to discover how their culture, identity, and immigration experiences affect their lives or their attitudes and opinions. While the results of my study cannot be generalized to the entire Chinese population in and around Chicago, the results present evidence of various trends or patterns within the participant sample. Among other trends, my case study findings do provide data to support my claim that immigrants’ cultural and racial identities affect their ability to be completely integrated into US society.
Methodology: What I Did

I used qualitative research methods to study the experiences of Chinese immigrants and Chinese Americans who reside in the Chicagoland area. Specifically, I interviewed participants, allowing members of my sample to provide individual answers to a set of short-answer and open-ended questions that I asked all participants. Conducting private, one-on-one interviews allowed me to understand the experiences of Chinese immigrants and Chinese Americans on an individual level and see how participants’ unique heritages, immigration history, upbringing, and other circumstances affected them similarly and differently.

I conducted qualitative long-form interviews between October 2015 and December 2015. I initially recruited participants through utilizing my own social networks to find Chicagoland residents of Chinese descent willing to volunteer to be interviewed. I used snowball sampling to recruit later participants. This method of sampling involves asking present or previous interview participants to help recruit future participants from among their own social networks. At the end of each interview, I asked participants to pass along my contact information to other people they know of Chinese descent who live in or around Chicago. With the help of my expanding network of participants, I was able to successfully conduct these formal interviews with volunteers of Chinese descent who live in the Chicagoland area.

I was unable to formally interview many immigrants who currently reside in Chicago’s Chinatown (though two people I talked to currently live in the community), and the extent of qualitative research is further limited by my elementary Chinese language skills. I am learning Chinese, but I have not reached the level, yet, that would allow me to conduct interviews in any language other than English. Thus, in order to
participate in my research, volunteers were required to speak and understand English. My background research interviews with Chinatown organizational staff members helped me gain general knowledge about the Chinatown community without having to conduct formal interviews with non-English speakers. Nonetheless, the results of my research are limited to the sample of people of Chinese descent with whom I conducted formal interviews. Every immigrant has unique experiences in the United States, and while there may be similarities among those experiences, my research solely focuses on the experiences of the sample of people I interviewed. This limitation provides opportunity for further research regarding the Chinese community of the Chicagoland area, other regions of the United States, and of the entire country.

Each interview conducted involved a multi-step process. First, I introduced potential volunteers to the subject of my research and provided them with an Informed Consent Agreement (Appendix B) that I created so to make sure each participant understood their rights as research subjects. All participants consented to their interview being audio recorded and/or consented to written notes being taken during the interview. Participants that elected to be interviewed over the phone emailed me scanned copies of their signed Consent Agreements before the agreed upon interview time and date.

Whether the participant chose to have the interview conducted in person or over the phone, the next step in the process was to assign the participant a pseudonym to protect his/her identity throughout the interview and throughout the rest of my research process. Participants, if mentioned in this paper, will be identified by their assigned pseudonym. See Appendix C included in this document for a complete explanation of the pseudonym assignment system I used throughout my research. Once the preliminary steps were completed, participants were given time to raise any concerns or ask any questions, and if they agreed to continue, I proceeded to ask the interview questions that I
prepared. The complete protocol that I used for each interview, including all the questions I asked participants, is included in this document as Appendix A.

After the interviews were completed and participants indicated they would allow audio recordings or written notes of their interviews to be transcribed, I created transcriptions of the interviews and labeled them using the assigned pseudonyms. Additionally, I organized participants’ responses to the short-answer interview questions in a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet in order to simply keep track of participants’ demographic information and discover trends in participants’ responses.

The questions I asked during the interviews that produced short responses and the questions that prompted longer, open-ended discussions all provided me with key information regarding the experiences of the Chinese immigrant and Chinese American community in the Chicagoland area. However, not every question I asked participants will be discussed in this document. I asked participants a wide range of questions because at the beginning of my research, I had not yet identified which social and cultural factors most drastically shaped the experiences of Chinese immigrants and Chinese Americans in Illinois. After conducting all thirty interviews, I was able to identity several patterns or trends based on participants’ answers to some of the questions but other questions did not provide such constructive results. I will not be discussing responses to questions that were not as helpful in identifying trends within the sample of people I interviewed. For example, I asked participants if they had ever lived anywhere else besides their birthplace and their current residence to see if history of residence in other countries or states in the US had any effect on individuals’ life experiences, but because this question did not provide patterned responses, it will not be part of my data analysis. I also asked participants about their hobbies, community involvement, attitudes towards China, and opinions or perceptions regarding other related topics, but these questions will not be
included in my data analysis because the responses given did not follow any observable trends regarding how these factors influence individuals' life experiences. Although I will not be discussing every question I asked participants, many of the questions I am leaving out did generate interesting responses. Thus, these questions and the responses they prompt could be utilized in future research related to the experiences and perceptions of first- and second-generation immigrants in the United States. Questions that did generate answers which I will discuss focus on participants’ immigration history, language use, education, cultural practices, perspective of their ethnic or cultural identity, positive or negative experiences connected to their identity, and perceptions of stereotypes.

The Participants: Responses to Short-Answer Questions

Various short-answer questions from my interviews provide background information about the research participants that aids the conceptualization of the population sample. My sample consisted of seventeen adult males and thirteen adult females. With regards to age, the youngest participant was twenty years old while the oldest participant was seventy years old at the time of their interviews in late 2015. The participants ranged in ages, as noted in Table 5, with a slight predominance of people born in the 1960s.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Decade</th>
<th>Number of Participants Born in Each Decade</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1940s</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950s</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960s</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970s</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980s</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990s</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Interviews conducted by Lisa Ledvora, 2015.
Eleven participants were born in the United States as second-generation immigrants (as opposed to third- or fourth-generation). Of those eleven second-generation immigrants who know when their parents first entered the United States, the year of arrival of their parents to the US varied (two came before 1945, two came between 1945 and 1965, and three came between 1966 and 1990). Four participants indicated that they do not know exactly when their parents arrived in the United States and three second-generation participants indicated that they only know that their parents immigrated when they were young, around twenty years old. The following table shows the generational classification of the interview participants.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Generational Classification</th>
<th>Number of Participants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>First-generation</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.5-generation</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second-generation</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Interviews conducted by Lisa Ledvora, 2015.

Nineteen participants were born in countries other than the United States. Eight of those nineteen came to the US from mainland China, six immigrated from Hong Kong, four are from Taiwan, and one was born in Canada. Given their counties of birth, some scholars would consider all nineteen participants who immigrated to the United States first-generation immigrants. However, many contemporary scholars argue that a “1.5-generation” immigration classification exists and better describes immigrants who immigrated at a young age and spent most of their childhoods in the United States.

Sociologist Nazli Kibria of Boston University defines 1.5-generation immigrants as children of immigrants “raised in the United States since the age of twelve or earlier” (Kibria 2002, 189). In agreement with Kibria, sociologist Pyong Gap Min of Queens College and the Graduate Center of the City University of New York defines the 1.5-
generation as “those children who were born in their parental countries and immigrated at early ages, usually 12 or before” (Min 2002, 3). Kibria and Min distinguish first-generation immigrants from 1.5-generation immigrants because the life experiences and perceptions of immigrants who came to the US later in life can be very different than those of immigrants who came to the US as young children. Therefore, I will also use the 1.5-generation classification to describe interview participants who came to the US before they reached twelve years of age. Accordingly, eight of the non-US born people I interviewed are 1.5-generation immigrants while eleven of the participants are first-generation immigrants. Of the nineteen participants who were born outside the United States, ten immigrated between 1966 and 1990, four individuals immigrated between 1990 and 2001, and five immigrated after 2001. All eight 1.5-generation immigrants immigrated with their immediate family members to the United States.

Some, but not all of the Chinese immigrants, became naturalized US citizens. Of the eleven first-generation immigrants interviewed, seven indicated that they have already, are in the process of, or plan to go through the United States citizenship naturalization process. All eight of the 1.5-generation immigrants already completed the naturalization process and have become US citizens. Thus, including the individuals who were born in the United States, twenty-six participants in total are US citizens, plan to become naturalized US citizens, or are in the process of becoming US citizens. Of the four first-generation participants who are not US citizens, three have not yet decided if they want to remain in the US or return home eventually while one participant indicated that he is a Canadian citizen so he is not worried about his immigration status (Woolf 2015). The following tables shows how many participants of each generational group are US citizens or in the process of naturalization.
### Table 9. Citizenship Status of Participants by Generational Grouping

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Generational Classification</th>
<th>Number of Participants</th>
<th>Number of Current Citizens or Participants in the Process of Naturalization</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>First-generation</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.5-generation</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second-generation</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Interviews conducted by Lisa Ledvora, 2015.

Beyond their immigration status, the thirty participants vary in occupation choice, location of residence, relationship status, and highest level of education attained (all as of the time of each interview). Twenty-six participants have full-time jobs, and four are current college students. The majority of the participants live in Chicago suburbs (to the north, south, and west), but several live in the city: twenty-three in the suburbs and seven in the city. Of the seven Chicago residents, two participants live in Chinatown. At the time of the interviews, eleven participants were single, two were dating or in long-term relationships, thirteen were married, two were widowed, and two were divorced. Of the seventeen married, divorced, or widowed participants, sixteen individuals have at least one child while one individual does not have children. None of the single, dating, or in a long-term relationship participants have any children. Including both the students and all the employed participants, seven individuals have some college experience and/or an associate degree. Five participants earned a bachelor’s degree as their highest level of education, and eighteen participants have some post-graduate experience or a post-graduate degree (including a master’s degree, PhD, law degree, medical degree, and seminary degree). Based on basic demographic question responses, the thirty individuals interviewed compose a diverse group of participants.

With respect to short-answer questions focused on language and religious beliefs,
responses given were also varied. Eleven of the thirty people interviewed identify as Christian, to varying degrees of devotion and to different sects (e.g. Evangelical and Protestant). One participant indicated he practices Buddhism. Six of the thirty participants indicated that they are agnostic while seven indicated that they identify as spiritual, but non-religious. One participant indicated he has no clear religious beliefs at the moment. The remaining four participants do not identify with any type of religion or spirituality. The research participants accept an assortment of religious or spiritual beliefs.

All the Chinese immigrants and Chinese Americans interviewed are fluent English speakers, but they all also indicated that they have some degree of fluency with at least one Chinese language and/or dialect. Eleven participants know and understand Mandarin, the Chinese dialect that is considered standard Chinese and is the official language of mainland China and Taiwan. Seven participants know and understand Cantonese, the type of Chinese commonly spoken in southern mainland China (e.g. Guangdong Province) as well as in Hong Kong. Four participants know and understand a local Chinese dialect, although not all four speak the same local dialect. Three participants have some degree of fluency with both Mandarin and Cantonese while four participants speak Mandarin and at least one local Chinese dialect. One participant knows and understands Mandarin, Cantonese, and a local Chinese dialect. Examples of some of the local dialects spoken by at least one of the interview participants are Shanghainese (the dialect popularly spoken in Shanghai, a Wu dialect variety) and Taishanese (the dialect popularly spoken in parts of Guangdong Province, a Yue variety). The following table lists the Chinese language(s) spoken and understood by the participants.
Table 7. Languages Spoken and Understood by Participants

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Language(s)</th>
<th>Number of Participants with some Level of Fluency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mandarin</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cantonese</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Chinese dialect</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mandarin and Cantonese</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mandarin and local dialect</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mandarin, Cantonese, and local dialect</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Interviews conducted by Lisa Ledvora, 2015.

Although all thirty interview participants are bilingual or multilingual, twenty participants only use English in their home. Five participants only speak Chinese (one of the many varieties) at home. Five participants use a mix of both English and Chinese (one of the varieties) in their homes. Thus, twenty-five out of thirty (about 83%) participants at least sometimes speak English in their homes. The following table shows how many participants use English, Chinese, or both English and Chinese in their homes.

Table 8. Participant Language Use at Home

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Language(s)</th>
<th>Number of Participants with some Level of Fluency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Only English</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Only Chinese</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>English and Chinese</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Interviews conducted by Lisa Ledvora, 2015.

Outside of their homes (e.g. in their communities and workplaces), all thirty participants use English at least sometimes. Only five participants indicated that they speak both English and Chinese outside of their homes. Therefore, English is the dominant language of this sample of Chinese immigrants and Chinese Americans in the Chicagoland area.

Continuing to use a dialect of Chinese is one way that participants indicated they
stay connected to their Chinese heritage. Those who know the dialect of Chinese that their grandparents and other family members speak are better able to stay connected to their older family members in the US and in China. Additionally, some participants remained connected to their Chinese culture through preparing and/or eating Chinese-style meals at home and visiting Chicago’s Chinatown. While five participants stated that they rarely or never eat Chinese-style meals at home, the other twenty-five Chinese immigrants and Chinese Americans state that they cook or eat Chinese-style meals between once per week to everyday. Several participants, including some who rarely or never eat Chinese-style meals at home, wish they had time or were better able to cook Chinese-style meals, and at least five participants indicated that one of their favorite aspects of being Chinese or Chinese American is the food. The participants also enjoy Chinese-style meals when they visit Chicago’s Chinatown. Including the two participants who live in Chinatown, twenty-seven participants indicated that they eat at a restaurant or go grocery shopping when they visit Chinatown. Some participants visit Chinatown over twenty times a year, but others, especially participants who live in the suburbs, rarely visit Chinatown. Several participants visit relatives who live in Chinatown, but others indicated that driving into the city to visit the region is too time-consuming for them to do frequently. Along with spending time with their families, many participants noted that they stay connected to their culture through eating Chinese-style food at home and in restaurants and visiting Chicago’s Chinatown. Based on participants’ varied responses to various short-answer questions related to their heritage, age, occupation, education, immigration history, location of residence, language use, and cultural practices, it is evident that the Chinese American and Chinese immigrant community of the Chicagoland area is quite diverse.
Economically, Culturally, and Civically Assimilated

Even though the group of participants is quite diverse, their responses indicate that these Chinese immigrants and Chinese Americans are assimilated into US society. In the previous chapter of this paper, I outlined studies that demonstrate how some immigrants groups are assimilating into American society, but are still being excluded from mainstream society because of their race or cultural practices. The Chinese and Chinese American participants of my research provide further evidence for this argument. Here I will show how the participants are assimilated and later, I will show that although the participants of my research meet the criteria of assimilation, they continue to be considered outsiders by other members of US society. As mentioned in the previous chapter of this paper, Jacob L. Vigdor developed an index that quantifies measures of assimilation and came up with three areas of assimilation: economic assimilation (e.g. employment and educational attainment), cultural assimilation (e.g. English language ability) and civic assimilation (e.g. citizenship status) (Vigdor 2008, 2-3).

Based on Vigdor’s criteria for assimilation, the majority of my research participants have assimilated into US society. All thirty participants have some college experience while eighteen participants received or will soon receive a post-graduate degree in a variety of fields. All the participants who are not current college students are employed and have long-term careers (or had, if retired). Based on participants’ educational attainment and employment, the sample group is economically assimilated. As for cultural assimilation, all thirty participants speak English fluently. Twenty participants only use English in their home and five participants use a mix of both English and Chinese at home. Thus, twenty-five out of thirty (about 83%) participants at least sometimes speak English in their homes. Outside of their homes, all thirty participants use English at least sometimes. Because English is the dominant language of
this sample of Chinese immigrants and Chinese Americans, they have successfully culturally assimilated into US society (according to Vigdor’s assimilation criteria). With regards to civic assimilation, all but four participants are US citizens or are in the process of becoming US citizens. Thus, over 85% of participants meet the requirements of civic assimilation. Beyond Vigdor’s quantifiable measure of assimilation, the participants demonstrated their desire to be members of US society in other ways. Many participants discussed a desire to blend or fit in with mainstream US society, and while most participants want to maintain some of their Chinese cultural practices through generations, they also want their (real or hypothetical) children to feel comfortable living in mainstream American society. Based on qualitative and quantitative measures of assimilation, the sample of Chinese immigrants and Chinese Americans who participated in my research are assimilated into US society.

Although each interview participant uniquely embodies his/her cultural/ethnic identity, the group as a whole is assimilated into US society. In the next section, I will discuss some other trends and patterns I discovered and how they support the argument that immigrants’ perceived identity influences their experiences in the United States and limits their ability to become fully accepted by US society.

**General Trends: Identities, Expectations, and other Challenges**

While the thirty Chinese immigrants and Chinese Americans interviewed stay connected to their culture and heritage through language, food, and family time, they define their cultural/ethnic identity in different ways. Of the thirty participants, nineteen identify themselves as Chinese American, or a variation of Chinese American. Examples of variations are Taiwanese American, American-born Chinese, or both Chinese American and Chinese identities. Seven participants, all first-generation immigrants,
identify themselves as Chinese. The other four first-generation immigrants identify as American, Asian American, or Taiwanese American. Of the four participants (from all three generations of immigrants) who identify as neither Chinese nor Chinese American (or its variations), one identifies as American (second-generation), one identifies as Taiwanese (1.5-generation), and two identify as Asian American (first- and 1.5-generation). Several participants also mentioned that how they identify themselves verbally depends on with whom they are talking. For example, Richard Jackson (pseudonym) identifies as Chinese American when in Chinatown but as Asian American throughout the rest of Chicago. While the majority of first-generation participants identified ethnically/culturally with their country of birth, most 1.5- and second-generation participants identified as both Chinese and American. The following table lists the ethnic/cultural self-identifications of the participants, based on their responses.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Identifications</th>
<th>Number of Participants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chinese American</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>American</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian American</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taiwanese</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Interviews conducted by Lisa Ledvora, 2015.

Earlier in this chapter, I showed how the participants meet the quantitative criteria of assimilation. Beyond that, the responses to the ethnic/cultural self-identification reveal that the majority of participants see themselves as (at least partly) American. Twenty-two participants view themselves as American in some way. Therefore, the group of participants is both quantitatively assimilated into US society and see themselves as members of US society.

After asking participants to describe their ethnic identities, for the participants
who identify as both Chinese and American, I asked them which part of their identity is more relevant or significant in their daily lives. I asked this question to all self-identified Chinese Americans, American-born Chinese, Taiwanese Americans, and Asian Americans to see if the participants feel more connected to being Chinese (or Taiwanese or Asian) or feel more connected to the American part of their identity. Of the twenty-one participants asked which part of their self-described identity is more relevant or significant, nine responded with American, six responded with Chinese, two responded with both, and two responded with Asian. For one Chinese American who indicated that her Chinese identity is more relevant than her American identity, the Chinese part of her identity is only more relevant than the American part when “filling out official forms when we need to check the box to describe our nationality” (Nadine 2015). This response indicates that she regularly feels more American than Chinese, but other people (such as the government) see her Chinese heritage as more significant than her US citizenship. Similarly, one different Chinese American participant who views her Chinese identity as the more significant part of her Chinese American identity explained her choice based on how others perceive her: “[The Chineseness] stands out more. It’s the first thing others see about me, the first thing that comes to their minds” (Holdstock 2015). Holdstock’s response reflects the theory of double consciousness as described by W. E. B. Du Bois because her understanding of her identity is directly related to how others perceive her. One Chinese American declined to answer this question about which identity is more relevant, but another participant responded, “Whichever part stands out more… It depends on where I am. I’m more American in China but more Chinese in America” (Gordon Jones 2015). Again, the response provided by Jones reflects the theory of double consciousness because his perception of his identity is constructed through how others see him. The majority of participants indicated that one part of their identity is more
significant in their lives than the other part of their identity, but as a whole, they do not
dominantly feel more connected to either part of their identity or the other. Their sense of
double consciousness shows how the social construction of immigrants affects how
immigrants view themselves.

After indicating how the individuals identify themselves culturally/ethnically, I
asked them how they think other people in the US would or do describe their
ethnic/cultural identity to find out if participants describe themselves the same way that
other people describe them. Most participants, when asked this question, provided an
anecdotal story about how someone they met for the first time incorrectly assumed their
ethnic identity. Of the thirty participants, only eight gave the same answer for how they
identify themselves ethnically and for how others would identify them. For example, four
participants who describe themselves as Chinese also said that other people in the US
would describe them as Chinese. However, all twenty-two other participants gave
different answers for the two identity questions. Seven participants who describe
themselves as Chinese American or a variation incorporating both nationalities left out
the American part of their identity when asked how others describe them. For instance,
several second-generation immigrant participants who identify as Chinese American
indicated that others describe them only as Chinese. By leaving out the American part of
their identity, the descriptions suggest that they are perceived as foreigners rather than
Americans despite the fact that the second-generation immigrant participants were born
in the United States. As one self-described Chinese American who is thought to be only
Chinese by others explains, “People easily identify me as different from others… They
would see me as an outsider based on my looks” (Bradbury 2015). Another participant
plainly stated, “My appearance keeps me from being American” to explain why his
responses for how others perceive his identity left out the American part (Wilson 2015).
Additionally, eight participants’ responses for how others perceive their identity were broader than how they perceive their own identity. For example, several self-identified Chinese or Chinese Americans indicated that others perceive them as Asian or Asian American, respectively. One participant explained why she provided a different answer for how she identifies herself and for how others identify her: “Some people might categorize all Asians as Asians and not realize that you can be from a certain area in China, but China is not all of Asia” (Miller 2015). These responses reflect the idea that many Americans cannot distinguish between people of various Asian ethnic origins so they group together all the distinctive identities into one “catch-all” identification (Asian/Asian American). Sociologists and race theorists Michael Omi and Howard Winant argue that this “catch-all” identification is constructed through a “racially based process” since “the majority of Americans cannot tell the difference between members of [the various ethnically Asian groups]” (Omi and Winant 1986, 24). This “racially based process” of categorization is similar to the racial identifications of blacks, Native Americans, and Latin Americans; regardless of the ethnic differences among subgroups within the groups, subgroups are aggregated into racially based groups (Omi and Winant 1986, 23-24).

In addition to the participants who provided broader responses to the “how would others describe your ethnic/cultural identity?” question than their self-described identities or left out the “American” part of their self-described identity, several other types of responses were provided. Three participants provided both broader answers and answers that leave out the American part of their identity for the question that asks how others perceive their identity as compared to their answers for how they describe their own identity. They see themselves as Chinese/Taiwanese Americans but indicate that others only see them as Asians. Of the remaining four participants, one American-born Chinese
participant left out the Chinese part of his identity when describing how others see him and one Chinese participant said that people do not care about his identity. In response to the same question, two participants (one self-described Chinese and one Chinese American) described times in which they were mistakenly identified as Japanese, Mexican, Hispanic, Korean, and Filipino when first talking with a new acquaintance. The majority of the participants identify themselves differently than how they are usually identified by others, and many participants provided answers that leave out the American part of their identity to the question pertaining to how other people perceive them. This provides evidence for the idea that people in the US do not see Chinese Americans as Chinese Americans see themselves. The participants that included “American” as part of their identification perceive themselves to be part of the American society, but they have been, at times, perceived as foreigners or outsiders instead of Americans because of their physical appearance.

The participants’ appearances affect how others identify them, and because other people see them differently than how they describe themselves, the participants are caught between two identities with two different associated cultural practices, values, societal expectations. Many participants acknowledge that their balancing of identities and cultures significantly affects their lives. This is evident in the responses for the question “What does being [Chinese] mean to you?” For this question, I replaced the word “Chinese” with however each participant identified himself/herself in the question discussed earlier regarding participants’ ethnic/cultural identity. For example, I asked one self-identified Chinese American, “What does being Chinese American mean to you?” He responded, “That enables me to be a citizen of this country, able to use my bicultural identity… to add to what this country should be, a pluralistic society” (Tolkien 2015). Another Chinese American participant explained that being Chinese is about “how you
go about socializing with other people… [The cultural differences] are more pronounced when you’re with people who are not a part of your culture. You have to sort of blend in” (Acheson 2015). A few participants referred to this desire to blend in with two different types of groups, Chinese people and people of “mainstream US culture,” and act more Chinese when with Chinese people but more Western when “surrounded by more people of the mainstream, white culture” (Gordon Jones 2015). Matthew Jones articulated the desire to blend in with the mainstream, white culture in the context of being in school: “I would go to school with a lot of white kids… I developed a tough skin and learned social norms, like how to talk and dress [to fit in]… You had to figure out you’re different than everyone else. I didn’t like to be different when I was younger” (Matthew Jones 2015). These responses show that the social construction of how immigrants are perceived influenced how the participants perceived themselves and how they interacted with other people in the US.

While many participants expressed desires to fit in with people who are not of Chinese descent, some talked about how that can be difficult. Ien Ang, a professor of Cultural Studies at the University of Western Sydney, communicates how it can be difficult for someone who looks Asian to fit in with a predominately white population through an explanation of her own feelings growing up as an “overseas Chinese” who looks Chinese but does not speak Chinese (Ang 1992, 3). She writes, “I didn’t want to be Chinese. To be sure, this is the kind of denial which is the inner drive underpinning the urge toward assimilation… [There is] among many members of minority populations themselves a certain desire to assimilate, a longing for fitting in rather than standing out” (Ang 1992, 8). Because she does not speak Chinese but looks Chinese, Ang experiences tension between her two identities that makes it difficult for her to be accepted as either Western or as Chinese. Conveying how one may not be able to successfully blend in with
both cultures, one Chinese participant of my research explained, “I grew up in Hong Kong so I don’t know if the Chinese here consider myself Chinese enough. Americans see me as Chinese but Chinese see me as American. I kind of lost my identity actually” (Caldwell 2015). This explanation demonstrates that being caught between two cultures can have a negative effect on one’s life. Balancing two cultures is a struggle for many Chinese Americans because of expectations that are associated with each part of the identity and differing values of each identity (Ford 2015). Because many Americans expect people of Chinese descent to act in certain ways based on stereotypes and physical appearance, if Chinese people are not able to fulfill those roles that society prescribes for them, they may feel culturally “lost” in their life experiences.

Other participants emphasized that because they are usually seen as more Chinese than American by other people based on how they look or act, they are negatively affected by US stereotypes of Chinese people and racist ideologies. Instead of discussing trying to balance two cultures, some participants more readily talked about how stereotypes about Chinese people negatively influenced their lives because of their physical appearance or other aspects of their identity that distinguish them as Chinese. Some participants experienced bullying in school because of their appearance. Others expressed how their identity causes people to treat them according to societal expectations or stereotypes.

Some participants discussed how the were treated poorly in elementary, middle, or high school because of their physical appearance. Introducing the topic, one Chinese American participant expressed how being Chinese shapes how she sees the world and how the world sees her: “[Being Chinese] influences the way that I exist in society. It affects how people perceive me and how I am viewed. It is definitely not something I can leave behind simply based on how I look… It is sometimes a struggle” (Rhodes 2015).
For Ophelia Rhodes, living in between two cultural identities can be a struggle because of the expectations that are placed on her from both cultures to conform to societal stereotypes. During her interview, Rhodes also recalled being Othered in middle school and high school for not fitting in with the white students. By “Othered,” I mean that Rhodes indicated she was mentally classified by other students as an individual who does not completely belong in the group, in a way that made her feel less respected than white students. She discussed how even though “kids knew about racism,” she still received “many off-hand comments meant to be funny… and Othering questions like, ‘Why are your eyes so small?’ It’s something that I remember very well” (Rhodes 2015). When asked about challenges or obstacles they have faced due to their identity, many other participants recalled similar instances of being bullied or Othered in school and explained how being the only Asian (or one of very few Asians) in their school caused them to be seen as different or as outsiders (Rhodes 2015, Acheson 2015, Du Bois 2015, Matthew Jones 2015, Pynchon 2015, Nabokov 2015). Wanda Acheson explained how in her elementary school where she was the only Chinese child, “people [saw her] as different. Kids didn’t really understand because they’ve never had a Chinese friend” (Acheson 2015). Continuing, Acheson stated, “It was harder for me in school [than in my professional life]… Kids would call you names, like ‘Chink,’ and if you don’t feel secure with who you were, you felt like you were being bullied” (Acheson 2015). Nadine Du Bois described her childhood experiences with bullying similarly: “In school, children tended to avoid me because I was different. It was hard to make friends… In the beginning, there was hardship and meanness from other children, but it improved after high school when I started to make more friends [as] the Chinese population grew and [became] more accepted” (Du Bois 2015). Most middle school and high school children want to fit in and be accepted by their peers, but based on the responses, looking
physically different than their peers acted as an obstacle to being accepted by other children in school. Many participants described being bullied in school because they looked different than their classmates, which demonstrates how the racialized social construction of immigrants affects their lived experiences.

In addition to being treated poorly by other children when they were younger, some participants have had negative experiences in their adult life because they are “different” from others. Chinese American participant Phillippe Kennedy briefly discussed how he was bullied and stereotyped while serving in the military. His fellow servicemen asked Kennedy to show them karate moves even though he does not know karate (Kennedy 2015). Additionally, several participants described times in which they were stereotyped or treated as an outsider in their professional work environments (Greene 2015, Butler 2015, Mailer 2015, Card 2015). For example, Taiwanese participant Jerry Butler described a time when his coworkers thought he was strange for bringing Chinese food to work for lunch. He justified their “disgusted” reactions to seeing and smelling his homemade Chinese leftovers by saying, “I’m the only Asian [at my work] so there are a lot of cultural things they aren’t aware of” (Butler 2015). Butler then identified being not treated well by his coworkers as one of the biggest challenges he faced as a person of Chinese descent, but over time, the coworkers and Butler have “grown closer and feel more comfortable [together] now” (Butler 2015). Participants generally expressed that they think positive changes in how they are treated by others happen over time as people get to know them better. However, they still distinctively recall times when their ethnic identity negatively set them apart from surrounding people.

Participants interviewed expressed being negatively affected by their physical embodiment of their ethnic identity. Several participants recognize that their appearance sets them apart from many other Americans because their distinctive appearance is
associated with various expectations or assumptions. Speaking of one assumption in a relatively neutral tone, one Chinese American participant described how people treat her differently when they hear her speak fluent English for the first time. Maria Holdstock explained how people see her more positively when they realize she is not a recent immigrant (she came to the US in the 1960s): “Sometimes if I don’t say anything, the first thing that comes in [other people’s] heads is that I just came from China or something, but then as soon as I talk, they see that I blend in with the culture and think, ‘It’s easier to deal with you’” (Holdstock 2015). Before Holdstock can show people that she can “blend in with the culture” by speaking English well, she knows that people assume she is a recent immigrant who cannot speak English and that it might be difficult to work with her. Expressing the same idea, participant Michael McCarthy stated, “Before people know me, they look at how I appear and they assume that I’m fresh off the boat. [It’s the] same with any minority group: if you look different, then [others] don’t know what to expect” (McCarthy 2015). While McCarthy and Holdstock do not explicitly show how they were negatively affected by other people’s assumptions about their life experiences based on the way they talk, they do make the connection between how they are treated and how well they can speak English, believing that if they do not speak English very well, they would be treated worse by other people.

With regards to the association between how people talk and how others treat them, several participants identified their accent as being a challenge in their lives. Chinese participant Michael Jackson discussed how his accent makes him feel self-conscious. He expressed how his accent has caused him to experience difficulty in dating and in his work as a researcher because people do not accept him (Michael Jackson 2015). Participant Arthur Wilson also stated, “People don't accept me for who I am… People are ignorant, have biases, and pick on my accent” (Wilson 2015). While both men
speak English fluently, others have perceived them as outsiders and treated them accordingly because their English does not sound like the English that is spoken by many Americans. Contrasting with Jackson and Wilson’s experience, one second-generation Chinese American participant who lives in Chinatown described how her lack of an “Asian accent” causes people to assume she is white when she, Danielle Mailer, speaks with them over the phone. Then, when Mailer meets with them in person, those with whom she only spoke over the phone previously are surprised that she is Chinese, according to her physical appearance (Mailer 2015). Mailer does not view this situation as either positive or negative, but she expressed how she finds it strange that her voice makes people think she is white even when that mistake happens as she discusses issues pertaining exclusively to Chinatown (Mailer 2015). One’s accent or voice is not part of one’s physical appearance but nonetheless, several participants experience racial discrimination based on how they speak and its association with foreignness. Because the participants experience double consciousness, they are constantly aware of how they speak and how others might perceive them based on their accent.

Many participants claim that other characteristics or expectations associated with being Chinese (or Asian) negatively affect their lives. Participant Matthew Jones directly stated, “I have dealt with racism in my life,” (Matthew Jones 2015) while other participants referenced racism through examples of how they are treated differently than white people. For example, Nadine Du Bois discussed how she feels uncomfortable in situations where she is the only Asian person in a large group of people because “Asian females are viewed as exotic… I get odd stares when we travel through small towns” (Du Bois 2015). Participant Franklin Wright explained that because “people recognize [him] as something different,” “it might be a little harder to connect with white people” (Wright 2015). Whether participants were bullied in school for looking different than their peers,
seen as an outsider in their workplace, or treated poorly because of their accents of physical appearance, it is clear that racism and discrimination are significant aspects of the lives of the thirty Chinese immigrants and Chinese Americans that I interviewed. Thus, even though Asian Americans are seen as the “model minority” in popular culture, they are not fully accepted by mainstream US society because of the social construction of immigrants in the United States.

**Stereotypes**

The “model minority” stereotype of Asian Americans caused many of the Chinese and Chinese American participants to have experiences that negatively affected their lives. While many social scientists have recently argued that the “model minority” identification of Asian Americans is a myth (Lee and Zhou 2015, Pan 2015, Askarinam 2015, Shen 2016), the stereotypes that are associated with being the so-called “model minority” are still felt by people of Chinese descent. Sociologist Nazli Kibria defines model minority as “a minority group that is primed for socioeconomic advancement and success [due to] their cultural predispositions, in particular a strong work ethic and an emphasis on education” (Kibria 2002, 131). Asian Americans are seen as the model minority in the United States, but the model minority stereotype adds to Asian Americans’ “experience of racial marginality in the dominant society” (Kibria 2002, 132). Kibria came to this conclusion through interviewing sixty-four second-generation Chinese and Korean Americans from 1992 to 1997 (Kibria 2002, 18). Kibria’s research suggests that the social construction of Asian immigrants and Asian Americans in the US influences their lived experiences.

Similarly, of the thirty Chinese and Chinese American participants of my research, twenty-seven participants mentioned at least one negative experience in their
lives that was caused by stereotypes about people of Asian or Chinese descent. Chinese American participant Paula Turner discussed how she has experienced being stereotyped in her life: “People expect you to act a certain way, expect you to work hard without promotion” (Turner 2015). Turner also described how a “bamboo ceiling” exists in American professional environment, where employers “expect you [Asians] to work hard without promotion” (Turner 2015). This bamboo ceiling phenomenon is referred to in the last chapter as a “glass ceiling barrier” by researcher Deborah Woo (Woo 2000, 146).

Although the participants of my study and those of Woo’s study refer to the phenomenon with different names, they are talking about the same situation where Asian Americans are not often promoted to managerial positions from technical positions within a company because they are expected to work without promotion (Woo 2000, 152).

Commenting on the same idea, Chinese participant Peter Caldwell stated, “We’re being suppressed in how far we can go in the business world… it’s harder for us to get a promotion [because we are expected to work hard and accept our current positions]” (Caldwell 2015). While Turner and Caldwell attribute the lack of promotions of Asian Americans in the US to stereotypes about how Asian Americans are hard workers and do not complain, participant Valeria Card asserts that Chinese are not treated fairly in professional workplaces because of stereotypical perceptions surrounding Asian Americans’ attitudes. Card explained, “When working in a corporate environment, people think Chinese only care about themselves and aren’t good team players” (Card 2015). This stereotype of Chinese people, if accepted as true, would negatively affect how Chinese employees or prospective employees are treated in the workplace. Employers would not want to hire people perceived as bad “team players” or promote people who “only care about themselves.” Thus, socially constructed model minority stereotypes act as a disadvantage for people of Chinese descent in the workplace.
Outside of the workplace, other participants expressed feeling negatively affected by Asian stereotypes. Participant Mindy Cheever talked about how the expectations that come with being Chinese can be frustrating, especially if the expectations do not correspond with one’s actually capabilities or what one actually wants (Cheever 2015). Cheever, Turner, and other participants feel as though people expect them to be smarter and work harder than people who are not Asian. Participants feel that they are negatively affected by the model minority expectations to be smarter, work harder, and perform various tasks better than people who are not Asian. Several participants born in the 1990s discussed how they felt disadvantaged in college admission processes due to model minority stereotypes. Erika Roth and Kyle Pynchon mentioned that because of the expectation for Asians to be smart and hard-working, college admission and scholarship standards are higher for them than for people who are not Asian. Pynchon stated, “Everyone assumes you’re a genius at math and science,” which makes applying to college competitive and stressful (Pynchon 2015). Focusing more on scholarships, Roth talked about how there are not a lot of financial aid resources available for Chinese immigrants and Chinese Americans, especially for those who do not meet the standards imposed on them by stereotypes (Roth 2015). Roth states that because of stereotypes, Chinese immigrants applying for financial aid and scholarships are expected to perform better academically than other minorities in order to receive these resources (Roth 2015). Speaking more broadly, Chinatown resident Richard Jackson discussed how Chinese immigrants are seen as the model minority by the US government. Because of the expectations associated with that identification, many Chinese immigrants do not receive the government help they need to survive (Richard Jackson 2015). From his position as a Chinatown resident, Jackson sees that recent Chinese immigrants who do not fit the model minority stereotype (e.g. do not speak English, do not have a college education,
etc.) are disadvantaged by the stereotype. The government largely ignores their needs because Chinese immigrants and Chinese Americans are treated as a socioeconomically successful group rather than as individuals with a variety of needs (Richard Jackson 2015). Many participants describe how model minority stereotypes have a negative effect on their lives because of the expectations associated with their ethnic identity.

Although the majority of the participants who mentioned stereotypes talked about the expectations and assumptions societally associated with being Asian negatively or as a challenge in their lives, some participants viewed the stereotypes as an advantage for themselves or others. Three first-generation immigrant participants and one second-generation participant mentioned how the model minority stereotypes can help or have helped them in professional settings. For example, in addition to talking about struggles he has faced due to his accent, Arthur Wilson commented, “People think I’m industrious, hard working, and smart” (Wilson 2015). Wilson did not mention a time when this positive aspect of the stereotype directly affected him, but spoke in general about how the model minority stereotype can initially benefit people of Chinese descent in the workplace as employers assume Chinese employees are always working hard (Wilson 2015). Participant Nana Bach also claimed that the Asian stereotypes can initially be beneficial to people of Chinese descent because prospective employers assume that all Chinese are hard working and reliable, and thus, would be better employees than other people. (Bach 2015). Furthermore, participant Peter Caldwell maintained that even though Chinese people might have a more difficult time than others with regards to being promoted at work, Asian stereotypes can be advantageous for people of Chinese descent in the American society. This is because while other minority groups are generally perceived negatively by the white majority, Asian people are see as “intellectual and not really trouble makers” (Caldwell 2015). Being seen as people who do not cause trouble
benefits Chinese Americans because as they are rarely viewed as criminals by society, they are less likely to be accused of committing crimes (Caldwell 2015). Participant Bert Bradbury affirmed this belief by saying that because Asians are seen as “more polite, studious, and not causing a lot of ruckus” (Bradbury 2015). Thus, because of some of these more positive stereotypes, some participants felt that people of Chinese descent face less prejudice from the white majority than other racial minority groups. From these perceptions, it is evident that the participants hold different views regarding how model minority stereotypes affect their lives. However, it is also clear that people of Chinese descent recognize that the existing racial stereotypes cause others to make assumptions about Chinese immigrants and Chinese Americans and act upon those assumptions in ways that can either harm or help them.

**Assimilated but not Accepted**

The racial stereotypes that exist in the United States and constantly affect the lives of people of Chinese descent support the idea that Chinese immigrants and Chinese Americans are not completely accepted in mainstream society, no matter how they try to fit in with the white majority. Sociologists Omi and Winant explain that racial stereotypes are an enduring aspect of society: “The continuing persistence of racial ideology suggests that these racial myths and stereotypes cannot be exposed as such in the popular imagination. They are [too integral] to the maintenance of US social order… The presence of a system of racial meanings and stereotypes, of racial ideology, seems to be a permanent feature of US culture” (Omi and Winant 1986, 63). Differing racial ideologies are featured throughout the history of the United States as guiding causes of the Civil Rights Movement, periods of racial exclusion in immigration policy, discrimination in the public education system, and many other historical narratives. In contemporary
society, differing racial ideologies continue to guide the maintenance of US social order. Racial stereotypes so clearly affect the experiences of Chinese and Chinese American participants of my research because people of color cannot escape the assumptions people make about them based on their ethnic and racial identity. Omi and Winant describe why racial stereotypes persist in the US throughout time: “One of the first things we notice about people when we first meet them (along with their sex) is their race. We utilize race to provide clues about who a person is” (Omi and Winant 1986, 62). Our race is part of our physical identity and is used to make assumptions about the people we meet or see, whether those assumptions are made subconsciously or consciously. Continuing, Omi and Winant explain, “In US society, then, a kind of ‘racial etiquette’ exists, a set of interpretative codes and racial meanings which operate in the interactions of daily life. Rules shaped by our perception of race in a comprehensively racial society determine the ‘presentation of self,’ distinctions of status, and appropriate means of conduct” (Omi and Winant 1986, 62). Racial stereotypes influence how one interacts with other people on a regular basis and shape one’s perceptions of others in our contemporary racialized society. These stereotypes that people use to categorize others into a mental schema, which help them to understand the world, contribute to the formation of a racialized social construction of immigrants and their descendants that continuously affects their daily lives. This is evident in the lives of the thirty Chinese and Chinese Americans whom I interviewed. Most of the participants, despite identifying themselves as Americas, are seen by others as foreigners, as part of a large group of people who do not look like mainstream white Americans. People of Chinese descent are thus treated differently than white Americans because of their racial identity, demonstrating that the racialized social construction that predominates US society affects immigrants and their descendants on a daily basis. Regardless of their assimilation into US society, Chinese
and Chinese Americans are perceived by others based on a set of racial stereotypes and assumptions that may benefit them or may disadvantage them throughout their interactions with others. As sociologist Kibria explains, “Race is a basic reference scheme, one that offers commonsense and taken-for-granted assumptions about the person encountered – what she is like, how he is likely to behave, and so forth. Race, then, is part of the social terrain of identity – the backdrop of opportunities and constraints against which individuals negotiate their affiliations with others and their understandings of themselves” (Kibria 2002, 67). Race is an inescapable part of one’s identity that shapes how one exists in the world and is an integral part of the social construction of immigrants and their descendants.

Because of the prevalence of racial stereotypes and perceptions guided by assumptions about what Asian people are like, Chinese and Chinese Americans are not completely accepted in US society despite their progress towards assimilation. I showed earlier in this chapter that the group of participants I interviewed meet the quantitative criteria of assimilation. They are economically assimilated because of their high educational attainment and employment status, they are culturally assimilated because of their use of English as their dominant language, and they are civically assimilated due to their US citizenship status or progress towards naturalization. Additionally, the majority of the participants perceive themselves to be assimilated based on their responses to the question regarding their ethnic/cultural self-identification that included “American” as part of their identity.

Although the participants have assimilated, they are not always fully accepted by other Americans and at times, continue to feel like outsiders in the United States. Chinese and Chinese Americans look different than the typical, white American. Because they do not look like mainstream white society members, they do not have the option to maintain
their ethnic and cultural Chinese identity through symbolic ethnicity as do white immigrants. As explained in the previous chapter of this paper, symbolic ethnicity refers to the idea that white immigrants can continue to feel connected to their home country and culture through use of symbolic traditions that do not interfere with their everyday lives (Gans 1979, 204-205). The participants in my research do not have the option to limit the maintenance of their culture to symbolic ethnicity practices because they do not look like people of the predominantly white US culture. Some participants engage in activities that reflect some maintenance of their culture through symbolic ethnicity practices, such as those who continue to serve and/or eat Chinese-style meals at home or celebrate Chinese holidays with their family. However, as soon as those participants leave their homes, they are no longer able to continue symbolic ethnicity practices of without being “othered” by people around them. Illustrating this limitation, participant Jerry Butler discussed being seen as an outsider in his workplace for bring “disgusting” Chinese food to work to eat for lunch (Butler 2015). Chinese and Chinese Americans can engage in symbolic ethnicity practices without being seen as outsiders of the predominantly white US culture as long as they conduct those practices in their homes or in predominantly Chinese settings, such as in Chinatown.

In contrast, Richard Alba and Victor Nee argue, “symbolic ethnicity increasingly characterizes Asian ethnics” (Alba and Nee 2003, 95). They assert that Asian Americans “enjoy ethnic cuisine when they like, and observe ethnic rituals and holidays… Asian ethnics are closer to the experience of symbolic ethnicity of white ethnics than is commonly acknowledged” (Alba and Nee 2003, 95). My research shows that some Chinese immigrants and Chinese Americans do enjoy eating their ethnic cuisine and some do observe aspects of Chinese holidays, however, the participants of my research only engage in these symbolic ethnicity practices within their homes or in Chinatown.
Although Chinese immigrants and Chinese Americans can freely maintain aspects of their ethnic or cultural identity in private or with other people of Chinese descent, when they bring their ethnic practice out in the open, in public, some experience being “othered” or seen as foreigners, such as when participant Jerry Butler brings his Chinese leftovers to work for lunch. Contradictory to the viewpoint of Alba and Nee, the ethnic and racial identity of the participants of my research does affect their daily lives. The Chinese and Chinese Americans are not able to escape the judgments, assumptions, and stereotypes associated with being Asian because of their physical appearance. Therefore, unlike white Americans, they do not have the option of symbolic ethnicity and are continuously affected by a racialized social construction.

Similarly opposing the perspective of Alba and Lee, Nazli Kibria asserts that because of the limitation on their ability to engage in symbolic ethnicity practices, Asian Americans are in an ethnic bind, “a powerful if ambivalent and at times uncertain sense that ethnic identity was for them not a voluntary matter, at least not in the same was that it was for such European-origin groups such as Italian Americans and Irish Americans” (Kibria 2002, 68). In Kibria’s research with second-generation Asian Americans, she found, “informants worked to achieve some measure of ethnic options – to gain control over the dynamics of their identity,” but were largely unable to do so (Kibria 2002, 68). Being ethnically and racially Chinese is not a voluntary aspect of one’s identity, and thus, symbolic ethnicity does not characterize Chinese ethnics. Ien Ang explains her perspective on the involuntariness of being Chinese as she describes one of her life experiences: “This experience in itself then was a sign of inescapability of my own Chineseness, inscribed as it was on the very surface of my body… The ‘corporeal malediction’ of Chineseness, of course, relates to the more general ‘fact of yellowness,’ characterized amongst others by those famous ‘slanted eyes’” (Ang 1992, 8). Even
though the participants of my research and other immigrants try to blend in with mainstream American society, they cannot escape the struggle of existing in a state of double consciousness and in a society defined by its racialized social construction. Because Chinese and Chinese American participants are seen as outsiders or foreigners when they attempt to maintain their cultural identity through symbolic ethnicity practices in mainstream white US society, it is evident that Chinese and Chinese Americans are not always accepted in mainstream US society as many white immigrants are, regardless of their ability to assimilate into US society. This lack of acceptance stems from the pervasiveness of the racialized social construction of US society.

**Case Study Conclusion**

By examining the experiences of thirty Chinese immigrants and Chinese Americans who reside in the Chicagoland area, we are given a glimpse into the lives of immigrants of color in the United States. Even though each person’s experience is unique, the results of my qualitative research show that being accepted by mainstream white America is largely reliant on one’s ethic and racial identity. Being an immigrant in general comes with many challenges, and fitting in with contemporary society can be difficult for anyone, regardless of citizenship status or ethnic identity. While my research focuses on the experiences of a particular sample of people in the United States, I am not arguing that anyone outside that sample does not face similar challenges. Illuminating the struggles of one group of people does not reduce or trivialize the struggles of others. Instead, showing how one group of people experience life helps to provide a foundation from which to continue work toward understanding the perspectives of people different than ourselves.

This case study provides insight into the lived experiences of immigrants and their
descendants. We can see how the racialized construction of US society, which was developed through historical US immigration policies, can negatively affect the lives of immigrants and their descendants. The negative experiences of the participants in my study resulted from the racialized construction of immigrants, which is formed from stereotypes of those around them. This racialized social construction both influences and is influenced by discriminatory US immigration policies of the past through a reciprocal relationship. Immigration policies created from a racialized social construction affect the life experiences of immigrants and native-born people. The lived experiences of people as influenced by the pervasive racialized construction affect their attitudes towards immigrants and their descendants, and in turn affect how immigration policies develop. Even though the lives of immigrants and their descendants affect immigration policies, and these policies influence relations between countries, international relations perspectives do not generally take those experiences into account.
Chapter Six

Conclusion: The Reciprocal Relationship through Constructivism

The relationship between international relations, US immigration policy, and the lived experiences of immigrants and their descendants in the US is complicated. The racialized social construction of US society influences US immigration policy as well as relations between countries. Furthermore, the mutually constituted relations between the US and other countries influence US immigration policies, which drastically affect immigration practice and the life experiences of immigrants and native-born US citizens. How US society and international society are socially constructed informs all elements of immigration. This cycle of reciprocal influence between a racialized social construction, immigration policy, international relations and the lives of immigrants and their descendants can be seen through an examination of the experiences of Chinese Americans and Chinese immigrants in Chicago, the history of Chinese immigration to the United States, and US immigration policies that influence the immigration practices of that population. The research that I have presented in this paper demonstrates the connection between the elements of the reciprocity in this immigration cycle of influence.

Although this paper shows the connection between the social construction of international relations, immigration policies, and the lived experiences of immigrants, I have limited my research in ways that provides for suggestions for future research. I limited my international relations and immigration policy analysis to US policies and major perspectives of international relations. Thus, future researchers can expand my analysis to the study of other countries’ immigration policies and can look into how immigration policies reflect constructivism and other international relations perspectives. Additionally, I limited my research of the lived experiences of immigrants and their
descendants to thirty Chinese immigrants and Chinese Americans who reside in the Chicagoland area. The trends that I found in their experiences, based on responses to interview questions, cannot be generalized to the entire population of immigrants in the United States. Therefore, future researchers can use interview questions like the ones I created and quantitative methods of research to see how other immigrant groups are affected by their host countries’ immigration policies. Additionally, my interviews were conducted in English due to my limited Chinese language skills, which eliminated many Chicago Chinatown residents from my sample. Future researchers could conduct case studies similar to mine (in English or other languages) with different immigrants groups in different locations to see how other individuals are affected by US immigration policies and the racialized construction of US society. My research could be expanded and transformed in a variety of ways to provide more information on how the reciprocal cycle of immigration influences, as guided by social construction, affects international relations, immigration policies, and the lived experiences of immigrants.

Although my research combines elements that are generally not perceived as connected, it is important to examine the reciprocity between immigration policy and the lived immigrant experience through a wide conceptual framework in order to gain a more complete understanding of the implications of this relationship. Although immigration is a matter of international relations, it is not regularly discussed in existing literature through various approaches to international relations theory. It can be difficult to see the connection between immigration policies and subsequent international relations implications, but the constructivist approach provides for that connection. Constructivism asserts that the mutually constituted social construction of identities, norms, and interests influences nation-states’ interactions. The relationship between social construction and countries’ actions borrows from the sociological conceptualization of the social
construction of reality. Not only does the social construction of the international society greatly influence nation-state interactions, but on a more contained scale, the social construction of domestic reality greatly influences the interactions among individuals, groups, and communities. The international social construction of society affects US immigration policies, which affect the lives of immigrants and their descendants and how others perceive them. Those perceptions of immigrants and their descendants by other people conversely reinforce the social construction of society, which influences international relations. Each element of immigration, from the international relations perspective to the lived experience of immigrants, is interrelated through the social construction of reality.
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Tu, Sharyne Moy. 2015. Interview by Lisa Ledvora. Conducted 19 October.


Appendix A: Interview Protocol

Date:

Participant (Pseudonym):

**Preliminary Introduction Script (to be read to all informants):**
This interview is part of my year-long senior thesis research project for Sociology and Anthropology and International Relations majors at Lake Forest College (LFC) in Lake Forest, Illinois. I, Lisa Ledvora, am leading this project, and it is being supervised by Professor Holly Swyers and Professor James Marquardt. The goal of this project is to understand the cultural, social, and international experiences of Chinese Americans who reside in the Chicagoland area. My research focuses on how and why Chinese immigrants in the Chicagoland area maintain their cultural practices, especially the use of their heritage language. I also hope to gain an understanding of what influences immigrants’ decisions and attitudes related to the maintenance of their cultural practices and the passing of the culture on to future generations.

I have included a number of demographic questions, short-answer questions, and open-ended questions in this interview. You may choose to answer as many of these questions as you like, even if that means none of them.

At any time during this interview, you can choose not to answer a question or decide you no longer wish to continue. Just let me know and we will stop.

**Pre-Interview Permission and Written Consent Script:**
Before we get into the interview itself, I need to check with you about a couple of things.
1) At this point, are you willing to continue?

2) Because I will be keeping a transcript of this interview for my research, I need to make sure you know exactly what you are getting into. *I am now giving you an Informed Consent Agreement for you to read through.* The written consent form lets you know more about your participation in this study than what I have already mentioned. The Agreement also contains information about the types of questions that will be asked during the interview, the risks associated with participation in this study, the ways in which I am protecting your confidentiality, your right to withdraw from this study, and who you can contact regarding this study and your rights as a participant. Please read through the document and let me know if you have any questions. Once you have read the Agreement, please let me know if you wish to withdraw from the study or continue to the interview.

*Wait for participant to read the Agreement, ask questions, sign or decline to sign the Consent Form, and acknowledge that he/she is ready to move on. If participant declines to sign the Consent Form, thank him/her for his/her time, do not ask any further questions or continue. If participant filled out the Consent Form, continue with this script.*

Thank you. Now we can move on.
3) To protect your identity, I will assign you a pseudonym. I am the only person who will be able to connect your real name to this interview, and I am keeping the information only in case I need to follow up with you in the future. Once I have completed the data collection part of my research, I will destroy the one document file that connects your actual name to your pseudonym. Is this okay?

4) This project will culminate in the writing of an undergraduate thesis paper. It is possible that I will want to use some of your quotations from this interview to illustrate trends that I observe in the results of many interviews. At the end of this interview, we will return to the Consent Form so you can decide how your interview responses will be used. Is that okay?

5) Your assigned pseudonym is _______________________________. Is this okay?

6) Do you have any questions before we move on to the interview?

Preliminary Introduction (continued):

Thank you. I will now ask you the interview questions that I have prepared.

Demographic and Short-Answer Section:

The following is the demographic and short-answer section of this interview. If you decide you do not want to answer any question, just say, “pass” and we'll move on to the next question.

1) Where were you born?
2) In which city/town/area do you currently live?
3) How would you describe your current place of residence: a rural, small town, suburban, or urban environment?
4) Have you ever lived anywhere else besides your birthplace and your current residence?
   a. If yes, where and for how long in each location?
   b. If no, how long have you lived in your current residence?
5) Where were your parents born?
   a. If interviewee’s parents were born in the United States, where were your grandparents born?
   b. If interviewee is a first-generation immigrant, when did you move to the United States?
   c. If interviewee is NOT a first-generation immigrant, when did your parents or grandparents move to the United States?
6) If interviewee was NOT born in the United States, have you already or do you plan to go through the United States citizenship naturalization process?
7) In which year were you born?
8) What is your current occupation?
9) What is your current relationship status?
   a. Choose one: single, dating, married, widowed, divorced, long-term relationship, partnered, other (describe).
10) Do you have any children?
a. If yes, how old is each child?

11) How many people live in your current household?
12) How is each person related to you?
   a. If interviewee’s parents do not live with him/her, where do your parents live?

13) Do you speak and understand any language other than English?
   a. If yes, which language(s)?
   b. If yes, when and how did you learn the language(s)?
   c. If yes, which language do you primarily use at home?
   d. If yes, which language do you primarily use outside your home?
   e. If no, do your parents speak any language other than English? If yes, which language(s)?

14) Have you ever visited China (after you immigrated to the US, if first-generation)?
   a. If yes, when and where did you visit? Why did you make the visit(s)?
   b. If no, do you plan to visit China?

15) What is your highest level of education achieved?
16) Which types of schools did you attend?
   a. Choose all that apply: public, private, boarding, home, religious (which denomination?), Montessori, international, trade/vocational, single sex (male or female?), co-ed, other (describe).

17) Have you ever attended school in China?
   a. If yes, for how long did you attend school in China?
   b. If yes, which level and type of school?

18) How do you identify yourself religiously or spiritually?
19) How do you practice your religion or spirituality (e.g. attend services, read a religious text, etc.)?
20) Are you affiliated with any community groups (e.g. religious groups, cultural groups, etc.)?
   a. If yes, which groups?

21) What are some hobbies or activities in which you participate?
22) If interviewee does not live in Chinatown, how often do you visit Chicago’s Chinatown? What do you typically do while in Chinatown?
23) How often do you serve and/or eat Chinese-style meals at home?
24) If interviewee is a first-generation immigrant, do you stay in contact with friends and family members who live in China? If so, how?
25) How would you describe your ethnic/cultural identity?
   a. [Do you consider yourself Chinese/Asian/American/etc.??]
26) How do you think other people in the US would describe your ethnic/cultural identity?
27) [On a regular basis, is your ethnic or national identity more relevant/significant?]
28) What does being Chinese mean to you?
29) What is your favorite aspect of being Chinese in the United States?
30) What are some challenges or obstacles you face as a Chinese American?

Open-Ended Question Section:
Thank you for your answers. The next section is more open-ended. I have several questions that I am asking everyone, and after that, we can have a more free-
ranging discussion if you wish. This section can be as short or long as you want it to be. You may answer the questions in whatever way you see fit. I am not looking for any specific answers.

1) How do you think your Chinese culture and heritage has impacted your life in Illinois?

For interviewees with children:
2a) How have you raised your children with respect to learning the Chinese language? What traditions or cultural practices are important for you to emphasize to your children? [Possible follow-up: How important is it to you for your children to learn Chinese (language)?]
3a) What are your hopes or aspirations for your child(ren) and his/her/their future (with regards to careers, educational achievement, family life, economic status, etc.)?

For interviewees without children:
2b) If you were to have children, how would you raise them with respect to learning the Chinese language? What traditions or cultural practices would be important for you to emphasize to your children?
3b) What are your hopes and aspirations for your future? OR If you were to have children, what would be your hopes or aspirations for them and their future (with regards to careers, educational achievement, family life, economic status, etc.)?

If interviewee is a first-generation immigrant:
4a) How do you feel about your home country? OR What are your attitudes towards China?
5a) Why did you choose to leave your home country and come here?
6a) How would you describe your overall experience as an immigrant in Illinois?

If interviewee is a second- or third-generation immigrant:
4b) How do you feel about China [of Hong Kong or Taiwan]? OR What are your attitudes towards China?
5b) How do you think your parents/grandparents adapted to living in this country?
6b) How would you describe your overall experience as a Chinese American?

7) What do you think about how Chinese are stereotypically portrayed in the media?
8) How do you think what goes on in China affects how people in the US see you?

Post-Interview Questions (Use of Quotations Consent Script):
Now that we have completed this interview, I need to ask you how widely the results may be shared. Let’s go back to the Consent Form that you signed earlier. Please read through the Post Interview Consent for the Use of Quotations section, and let me know if you have any questions.

Wait for questions. If none or after questions are answered, continue.

Please initial next to one of the listed options regarding the use of your interview...
responses. Remember that any use of your responses, to whatever extent you allow, will never be connected to your actual name. Only your assigned pseudonym will be used for quoted responses.

*Thank the interviewee for his/her time and remind him/her that I can be contacted with any questions or concerns in the future via the contact information provided on the Informed Consent Agreement document.*
Appendix B: Informed Consent Agreement

Informed Consent Agreement

Please read this consent agreement carefully before you decide to participate in the study.

Purpose of the research: This interview is part of a year-long senior thesis research project for Sociology and Anthropology and International Relations majors at Lake Forest College (LFC) in Lake Forest, Illinois. I, Lisa Ledvora, am leading this project, and it is being supervised by Professor Holly Swyers and Professor James Marquardt. The goal of this project is to understand the cultural, social, and international experiences of Chinese Americans who reside in the Chicagoland area. My research focuses on how and why Chinese immigrants in the Chicagoland area maintain their cultural practices, especially the use of their heritage language. I also hope to gain an understanding of what influences immigrants’ decisions and attitudes related to the maintenance of their cultural practices and the passing of the culture on to future generations.

Your participation: As part of this study, you will participate in an interview with me, Lisa Ledvora. You will first answer demographic and short-answer questions about your culture, language, residence history, birthplace, education, family, occupation, relationship status, household, birth year, religious beliefs, hobbies, community involvement, cultural practices, and parents’ residence history and birthplace. Then we will have a more open discussion guided by several open-ended questions focused on your language use, your cultural practices and heritage, your experiences in the Chicagoland area, the cultural education of the next generation, media representation of Chinese Americans, your perceptions of China, and your thoughts about the process of immigrating to the United States. You do not have to answer every question. You can skip whichever questions you want, and you can withdraw from the study at any time.

Time required: This interview will require between 20 minutes and 2 hours of your time, depending on how many of the questions you choose to answer.

Confidentiality: The information that you give in this study will be handled confidentially. You will be assigned a pseudonym. The list connecting your actual name and contact information to your pseudonym will be stored in a separate file from the transcriptions and any audio recordings of your interview. The two files will be stored in separate password-protected data storage accounts. When the research is completed and the interview responses have been analyzed, the list containing identifying information will be destroyed. Any audio recording of the interview and your signed Consent Form will be securely kept in a locked file box. Your actual name will not be used in any report or presentation.

Risks: The primary risks for most participants are embarrassment if confidentiality is accidentally breached or the voluntary recollection of unpleasant memories. To minimize the risk of embarrassment, you have the option to review the interview transcription and strike any statements from all records. While the risks of participation in this study are minimal, the risk of identification during the data collection process remains. For some participants, the accidental disclosure of current undocumented immigration status is a risk. To minimize this risk, any mention of current undocumented immigration status will be stricken from any audio recordings, notes taken, and the transcriptions of the
interview. When the research is completed and the interview responses have been analyzed, the list containing identifying information will be destroyed.

**Benefits:** There are no direct benefits to you for participating in this research. Your participation in this research will provide insight into the experience of Chinese immigrants in the Chicagoland area.

**Voluntary participation:** Your participation in this study is completely voluntary.

**Right to withdraw from the study:** You have the right to withdraw from the interview at any time without penalty. If I am audio recording the interview, and you decide to withdraw, the audio recording will be destroyed.

**How to withdraw from the study:** At any point throughout the interview or after the interview is completed, you can withdraw from the study. If you want to withdraw from the study while the interview is being conducted, tell me that you wish to stop the interview and withdraw from the study. No further questions will be asked of you, and I will destroy any audio recording done so far as well as any notes taken during the interview. After withdrawing, you will not be contacted further for this study. At the end of the interview, I will ask you a question about how widely the results of the interview may be shared. At that point, you can choose how you want your interview responses to be used, or you can withdraw from the study. If you choose to withdraw from the study at the end of the interview, tell me you want to withdraw, and I will destroy any audio recording done as well as any notes taken during the interview. You will not be contacted further. At any point after the interview is completed, you can withdraw from the study. To withdraw at any later point, contact me via the contact information provided below and tell me you wish to withdraw. If you withdraw from the study, I will destroy the audio recording done so far as well as any notes taken during the interview. You will not be contacted further for this study and the results of your interview will not be included in the study in any way.

**If you have any questions about the study, please feel free to contact:**

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Lake Forest, IL 60045  
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Email address: ledvoralalakeforest.edu

Dr. Holly Swyers (faculty advisor)  
Lake Forest College  
Department of Sociology and Anthropology  
555 N. Sheridan Road  
Lake Forest, IL 60045  
Telephone: 847-735-5252  
Email address: swyerslakeforest.edu

**If you have any questions about your rights as a research participant, please feel free to contact the co-chairs of the Human Subjects Review Committee:**

Dr. Sergio Guglielmi, guglielm@lakeforest.edu (847-735-5260)  
Dr. Naomi Wentworth, wentwortlakeforest.edu (847-735-5256)

You may keep this document for your records.  
Please fill out the attached consent form and return it to me.
Consent to Audio-Record Interview

Initial one of the following to indicate your choice:

__________ I agree to this interview being audio recorded.

__________ I do not agree to this interview being audio recorded, but I agree to written notes being taken during this interview.

__________ I do not agree to this interview being audio recorded, and I do not agree to written notes being taken during this interview.

Participation Consent

I have read this form and the research study has been explained to me. I have been given the opportunity to ask questions and my questions have been answered. If I have additional questions, I have been told whom to contact. I agree to participate in the research study described in the attached Informed Consent Agreement. I understand that after the interview is conducted, I will give further written consent about how my interview response quotations can be shared.

________________________
Participant’s Name (printed)

________________________
Participant’s Signature

Date

Post Interview Consent for the Use of Quotations

Do not complete the rest of this form until instructed to do so at the conclusion of the interview.

May I save the results of this interview, and may I quote it in presentations and publications? Please initial one of the following to indicate your choice:

__________ Yes, the interview may be saved and it is okay for you to quote it.

__________ Yes, the interview may be saved, but it may not be quoted.

__________ I would prefer that only the demographic section of this interview be saved. Please do not share any other part of this interview in any way.

__________ I have changed my mind about this interview. Please destroy it and do not share it with anyone in any way.

__________ Yes, the interview may be saved, but I want to be contacted for permission before any part of it is quoted. I agree to use an electronic signature to consent to any future use of interview response quotations. Here is how I want to be contacted:

________________________

__________ I would like to see a complete transcript of my interview before I make any decisions about how it can be used. I agree to the transcription of this interview being sent to me electronically. I will then decide about how it can be used. I agree to use an electronic signature to consent to any future use of any aspects of this interview. Here is how I want to be contacted:
Appendix C: Pseudonym Assignment System Explanation

This pseudonym assignment system was developed by Holly Swyers.

Every person interviewed must be assigned a pseudonym. That pseudonym will include a first name and a surname drawn from the lists on the following pages. Other pseudonyms will not be used, especially not ones suggested by interviewees.

After the interview is conducted, I will make sure the participant’s real name and contact information do not appear anywhere on the transcript. The participant’s real name and contact information will be secured in a password protected file on Dropbox in the event that a participant needs to be contacted again. All other links between the participant’s real identity and the interview and pseudonym will be destroyed.

In the event that the participant mentions other people by name in his/her interview, these names will also need to be disguised. I will use Holly Swyer’s system for renaming. Below is a list of male, female, and unisex names. The first time a person names someone else, I will change the name to the first name on the gender appropriate list. The second person will be renamed with the next name, etc. This means that I may end up with several mentions of “Mary” and several mentions of “John.”

Example:
Lisa Ledvora (real name)
I have two brothers and a sister: Scotty, Jimmy, and Laura. My mother’s name is Beth (all real names).

As recorded in the interview transcript and quoted in the final paper:
Arlene Nabokov (pseudonym)
I have two brothers and a sister: John, James, and Mary. My mother’s name is Emma (all pseudonyms).

Names for people mentioned in interviews

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Unisex (for use when you really aren't sure)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mary</td>
<td>John</td>
<td>Blaine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emma</td>
<td>James</td>
<td>Sage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elizabeth</td>
<td>Charles</td>
<td>Sydney</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minnie</td>
<td>George</td>
<td>Drew</td>
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<tr>
<td>Margaret</td>
<td>Joseph</td>
<td>Montana</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alice</td>
<td>Robert</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sarah</td>
<td>Harry</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clara</td>
<td>David</td>
<td>***Names drawn from popular names in 1880s plus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ella</td>
<td>Louis</td>
<td>Unisex names found via Google search</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cora</td>
<td>Raymond</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### First Names for Participant Pseudonyms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Alex</th>
<th>Dorian</th>
<th>Hermione</th>
<th>Karen</th>
<th>Otto</th>
<th>Sebastien</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Arlene</td>
<td>Dolly</td>
<td>Harvey</td>
<td>Kyle</td>
<td>Ophelia</td>
<td>Sally</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alberto</td>
<td>Danny</td>
<td>Helene</td>
<td>Kate</td>
<td>Oscar</td>
<td>Sam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Andrea</td>
<td>Earl</td>
<td>Humberto</td>
<td>Lisa</td>
<td>Olga</td>
<td>Tomas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arthur</td>
<td>Emily</td>
<td>Hanna</td>
<td>Lee</td>
<td>Omar</td>
<td>Tammy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ana</td>
<td>Ernesto</td>
<td>Henri</td>
<td>Leslie</td>
<td>Odette</td>
<td>Tony</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bonnie</td>
<td>Erin</td>
<td>Igor</td>
<td>Lorenzo</td>
<td>Paula</td>
<td>Tanya</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bret</td>
<td>Edouard</td>
<td>Irene</td>
<td>Laura</td>
<td>Phillippe</td>
<td>Teddy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beryl</td>
<td>Erika</td>
<td>Isaac</td>
<td>Larry</td>
<td>Patty</td>
<td>Teresa</td>
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<td>Barry</td>
<td>Fiona</td>
<td>Ingrid</td>
<td>Matthew</td>
<td>Pablo</td>
<td>Virginie</td>
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<td>Bertha</td>
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<td>Isais</td>
<td>Maria</td>
<td>Paulette</td>
<td>Vince</td>
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<td>Bill</td>
<td>Florence</td>
<td>Ida</td>
<td>Michael</td>
<td>Peter</td>
<td>Valerie</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colin</td>
<td>Fernand</td>
<td>Julia</td>
<td>Melissa</td>
<td>Richard</td>
<td>Van</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cindy</td>
<td>Fay</td>
<td>Jose</td>
<td>Marco</td>
<td>Rina</td>
<td>Vicky</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chris</td>
<td>Fred</td>
<td>Joyce</td>
<td>Mindy</td>
<td>Rafael</td>
<td>Victor</td>
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<td>Chantal</td>
<td>Gaston</td>
<td>Jerry</td>
<td>Nicole</td>
<td>Rebekah</td>
<td>Walter</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cristobal</td>
<td>Gert</td>
<td>Josephine</td>
<td>Nate</td>
<td>Rene</td>
<td>Whitney</td>
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<tr>
<td>Claudette</td>
<td>Gordon</td>
<td>Joaquin</td>
<td>Nadine</td>
<td>Rose</td>
<td>William</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Danielle</td>
<td>Gabrielle</td>
<td>Karl</td>
<td>Nestor</td>
<td>Shary</td>
<td>Wendy</td>
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<td>Don</td>
<td>Gonzalo</td>
<td>Katia</td>
<td>Nana</td>
<td>Sean</td>
<td>Wilfred</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Debby</td>
<td>Grace</td>
<td>Kirk</td>
<td>Nicholas</td>
<td>Sandy</td>
<td>Wanda</td>
</tr>
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</table>

### Last Names for Participant Pseudonyms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nabokov</th>
<th>Anderson</th>
<th>Jones</th>
<th>Bowles</th>
<th>Jackson</th>
<th>Mencken</th>
<th>Rhodes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Steinbeck</td>
<td>Baldwin</td>
<td>Spark</td>
<td>Holdstock</td>
<td>Spillane</td>
<td>Niebuhr</td>
<td>Strachey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dreiser</td>
<td>Conrad</td>
<td>Bennett</td>
<td>Pynchon</td>
<td>Salinger</td>
<td>Medawar</td>
<td>Popper</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orwell</td>
<td>Dickey</td>
<td>Naipaul</td>
<td>Cather</td>
<td>Morrison</td>
<td>White</td>
<td>Dinesen</td>
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<tr>
<td>Fitzgerald</td>
<td>Dos Passos</td>
<td>Beerbohm</td>
<td>Styron</td>
<td>Windling</td>
<td>Eliot</td>
<td>Einstein</td>
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<tr>
<td>Faulkner</td>
<td>Farrell</td>
<td>Burgess</td>
<td>Donleavy</td>
<td>Gadis</td>
<td>Turner</td>
<td>Twain</td>
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<tr>
<td>Heller</td>
<td>Ford</td>
<td>Maugham</td>
<td>Tarkington</td>
<td>Card</td>
<td>Foote</td>
<td>Toynbee</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Cheever</td>
<td>Cain</td>
<td>Irving</td>
<td>Keynes</td>
<td>Needham</td>
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<td>Golding</td>
<td>Sterne</td>
<td>De Lint</td>
<td>O'Connor</td>
<td>Strunk</td>
<td>Churchill</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lowry</td>
<td>Greene</td>
<td>Kipling</td>
<td>McCarthy</td>
<td>Lovecraft</td>
<td>Stein</td>
<td>Terkel</td>
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<td>Rhys</td>
<td>O'Brien</td>
<td>Washington</td>
<td>Moore</td>
<td>Capote</td>
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<td>Woolf</td>
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<td>Doctorow</td>
<td>Heinlein</td>
<td>Mitchell</td>
<td>Abrams</td>
<td>Liebling</td>
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<tr>
<td>Wright</td>
<td>Kerouac</td>
<td>Kennedy</td>
<td>Bradbury</td>
<td>Tolkien</td>
<td>Du Bois</td>
<td>Mumford</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vonnegut</td>
<td>Mailer</td>
<td>Rushdie</td>
<td>Clancy</td>
<td>Hubbard</td>
<td>Gombrich</td>
<td>Lippman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>McCullers</td>
<td>Miller</td>
<td>London</td>
<td>King</td>
<td>Herbert</td>
<td>Wilson</td>
<td>Yates</td>
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<tr>
<td>Graves</td>
<td>Powell</td>
<td>Bowen</td>
<td>Kesey</td>
<td>Schaefer</td>
<td>Gould</td>
<td>Trilling</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ellison</td>
<td>Roth</td>
<td>Caldwell</td>
<td>Burroughs</td>
<td>Rand</td>
<td>Thompson</td>
<td>Kuhn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Koestler</td>
<td>Waugh</td>
<td>Hughes</td>
<td>Davies</td>
<td>Shute</td>
<td>Tuchman</td>
<td>Galbraith</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O'Hara</td>
<td>Wharton</td>
<td>Murdoch</td>
<td>Pirsig</td>
<td>Carson</td>
<td>Dewey</td>
<td>Hacking</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lawrence</td>
<td>Wilder</td>
<td>West</td>
<td>Bach</td>
<td>Atwood</td>
<td>Berlin</td>
<td>Acheson</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

***First names are from the National Hurricane Center Atlantic tropical cyclone names, 2010-2015. Surnames are taken from authors in the Modern Library’s 100 Best lists.***
Appendix D: Figures and Tables

Table 1. Major US Immigration Policies, 1875-2006

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Policy</th>
<th>Section of Explanation in Chapter Two</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1875</td>
<td>Asian Exclusion Act (Page Law)</td>
<td>Exclusion Era</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1882</td>
<td>Chinese Exclusion Act</td>
<td>Exclusion Era</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1891</td>
<td>1891 Immigration Act</td>
<td>Exclusion Era</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1892</td>
<td>Chinese Exclusion Act Renewal</td>
<td>Exclusion Era</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1903</td>
<td>Immigration Act of 1903</td>
<td>Exclusion Era</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1907</td>
<td>Immigration Act of 1907</td>
<td>Exclusion Era</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1917</td>
<td>Immigration Act of 1917</td>
<td>Exclusion Era</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1921</td>
<td>Emergency Quota Act</td>
<td>Exclusion Era</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1943</td>
<td>Magnuson Act (Chinese Exclusion Repeal Act)</td>
<td>Exclusion Era</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1948</td>
<td>Displaced Persons Act</td>
<td>Refugee Policies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1952</td>
<td>1952 Immigration and Nationality Act</td>
<td>Exclusion Era, Preference System Policies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>Refugee Relief Act</td>
<td>Refugee Policies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>Migration and Refugee Assistance Act</td>
<td>Refugee Policies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>Amendments to the Immigration and Nationality Act</td>
<td>Preference System Policies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>Indochina Migration and Refugee Assistance Act</td>
<td>Refugee Policies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>Amendments to the Immigration and Nationality Act</td>
<td>Preference System Policies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>Amendments to the Immigration and Nationality Act</td>
<td>Preference System Policies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA)</td>
<td>Preference System Policies, National Security and Competitiveness Policies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>Immigration Act of 1990</td>
<td>Preference System Policies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act</td>
<td>National Security and Competitiveness Policies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central American Relief Act</td>
<td>Refugee Policies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>Haitian Refugee Immigration Fairness Act</td>
<td>Refugee Policies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>American Competitiveness in the Twenty-First Century Act (AC21)</td>
<td>National Security and Competitiveness Policies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act</td>
<td>National Security and Competitiveness Policies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>Homeland Security Act</td>
<td>National Security and Competitiveness Policies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>Secure Fence Act</td>
<td>National Security and Competitiveness Policies</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 2. Major US Preference System Immigration Categories and Corresponding Number of Admissions in Example Year 2004

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Who Qualifies for Category</th>
<th>Number of 2004 Admissions per Category</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Immediate relatives of US citizens</td>
<td>Spouses and unmarried children (under 21 years old) of US citizens, parents of US citizens ages 21 and older</td>
<td>406,074</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family-based immigration: first preference</td>
<td>Unmarried adult (ages 21 and older) children of US citizens</td>
<td>26,380</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family-based immigration: second preference</td>
<td>Spouses and dependent children of legal permanent residents (LPRs), unmarried children of LPRs</td>
<td>93,609</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family-based immigration: third preference</td>
<td>Married children of US citizens</td>
<td>28,695</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family-based immigration: fourth preference</td>
<td>Siblings of adult US citizens</td>
<td>65,671</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Family-based immigration subtotal:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>214,355</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment-based immigration: first preference</td>
<td>Priority workers: individuals with extraordinary ability in arts, athletics, business, education, or sciences; outstanding professors, researchers; certain multinational executives and managers</td>
<td>31,291</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment-based immigration: second preference</td>
<td>Professionals who hold advanced degrees or are considered to have exceptional ability</td>
<td>32,534</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment-based immigration: third preference</td>
<td>Skilled workers with at least 2 years of training/experience in labor sectors deemed to have shortages and professionals with college degrees; unskilled workers in labor sectors deemed to have shortages</td>
<td>85,969</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment-based immigration: fourth preference</td>
<td>Special immigrants: ministers, other religious workers, certain foreign nationals employed by the US government abroad, and others</td>
<td>5,407</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment-based immigration: fifth preference</td>
<td>Employment-creation investors who commit at least $1 million to the development of at least 10 new jobs</td>
<td>129</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Employment-based immigration subtotal:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>155,330</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refugees*</td>
<td>Aliens who have been granted refugee status in the US because of the risk of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution</td>
<td>50,084</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asylum-seekers*</td>
<td>Aliens who have been granted asylum status in the US because of the risk of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution</td>
<td>10,016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diversity program</td>
<td>Citizens of foreign nations with historically low levels of admission to the US; applicants must have a high school education (or the equivalent) or at least 2 years of training/experience in an occupation</td>
<td>61,013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>Various classes of immigrants, such as Amerasians, parolees, certain Central Americans, Cubans, and Haitians adjusting to LPR status, and certain people granted LPR status following removal proceedings</td>
<td>49,270</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Overall Admissions:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>946,142</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Refugees must apply for admission at an overseas facility and can enter the US only after their application is approved. Asylum-seekers apply for admission when already in the US or at a port of entry.

### Table 3: Chinese Population in the United States, 1960-2000

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number of Chinese Individuals in the US</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>237,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>436,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>812,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>1,645,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>2,433,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


### Table 4: Chinese Population in Chicago, 1870-2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number of Chinese Individuals in Chicago</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1870</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1880</td>
<td>172</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1890</td>
<td>584</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1900</td>
<td>1,179</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1910</td>
<td>1,778</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920</td>
<td>2,353</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>2,757</td>
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<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>2,018</td>
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<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>3,334</td>
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<td>1960</td>
<td>5,082</td>
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<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>9,357</td>
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<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>13,638</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>22,295</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000*</td>
<td>34,370</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009*</td>
<td>43,227</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Figures do not include Taiwanese individuals.


### Table 5. Age of Participants (Organized by Decade of Birth)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Decade</th>
<th>Number of Participants Born in Each Decade</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1940s</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950s</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960s</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970s</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980s</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990s</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Interviews conducted by Lisa Ledvora, 2015.
Table 6. Generational Classification of Participants

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Generational Classification</th>
<th>Number of Participants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>First-generation</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.5-generation</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second-generation</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Interviews conducted by Lisa Ledvora, 2015.

Table 7. Languages Spoken and Understood by Participants

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Language(s)</th>
<th>Number of Participants with some Level of Fluency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mandarin</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cantonese</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Chinese dialect</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mandarin and Cantonese</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mandarin and local dialect</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mandarin, Cantonese, and local dialect</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Interviews conducted by Lisa Ledvora, 2015.

Table 8. Participant Language Use at Home

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Language(s)</th>
<th>Number of Participants with some Level of Fluency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Only English</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Only Chinese</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>English and Chinese</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Interviews conducted by Lisa Ledvora, 2015.

Table 9. Citizenship Status of Participants by Generational Grouping

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Generational Classification</th>
<th>Number of Participants</th>
<th>Number of Current Citizens or Participants in the Process of Naturalization</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>First-generation</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.5-generation</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second-generation</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Interviews conducted by Lisa Ledvora, 2015.
Table 10. Ethnic/Cultural Self-Identification of Participants

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Identifications</th>
<th>Number of Participants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chinese American</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>American</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian American</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taiwanese</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Interviews conducted by Lisa Ledvora, 2015.