LAKE FOREST COLLEGE

Senior Thesis

From Ankara to Brussels: (De)Constructing Turkey in the European Union

by

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The report of the investigation undertaking as a Senior Thesis, to carry two courses of credit in the International Relations Program

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Abstract

Critical constructivism provides for a comprehensive analysis of the process of socialization of states on their way into European Union. The analysis of the historical patterns of enmity and mistrust as they pertain to the relationship between EU and Turkey provides for an insightful account explaining its repetitive stagnation. This research concludes that the relationship between EU and Turkey is fragile due to the discoursive practice of othering, the raison d’être of which rests on historical-identitarian social constructions. Since this practice goes both ways, and is most visible in political discourse in particular instances (such as the refugee crisis), the relationship must be studied not by using a comprehensive theory of international politics. Rather, it must be studied by using a theoretical method that seeks to explain the relationship not in its totality (hence not predicting its course) but rather seeks to understand it by examining its contingencies.
To my family, for without their undying support nothing would be quite as possible.

To my professors, for their intellectual guidance and inspiration is life-affirming. To Derya, because she’s badass.
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Table of Contents

Introduction to Senior Undergraduate Research Thesis .......................................................... 1

Chapter 1. History of Relations Between the EU and Turkey ............................................. 18

Chapter 2. Current Situation .................................................................................................. 43

Chapter 3. Constructivism and IR: EU-Turkey Relationship is What Agents Make of It 57

Chapter 4. Issues ................................................................................................................... 86

Subchapter 1. Turkey, EU, and the Construction of Identities ........................................... 86

Subchapter 2. Public Opinion ............................................................................................... 102

Subchapter 3. Refugee Crisis: A New Frontier in the Relationship? ................................. 131

Subchapter 4. Cyprus: Identity, Security, and the EU-Turkey Relationship .................... 146

Chapter 5. Perspectives for Future ....................................................................................... 177

Conclusion ............................................................................................................................ 182

Works Cited .......................................................................................................................... 185

Appendices ........................................................................................................................... 198
Introduction to Senior Undergraduate Research Thesis

1. Introduction

The topic of this thesis is the relationship between European Union and the Republic of Turkey. It aims to investigate the relationship through the lens of an approach in international relations that is called constructivism. This thesis is a work in EU integration. As the EU integration is a process of adjustment of social, political, and economic policies/ways of one sovereign state with a system of 28 states, I maintain that it has to be studied continuously through a prism of social theory of international politics. This comes primarily because EU integration is a unique example of the modern history of international politics where multiple sovereign states are conjoining in a process of social, political, and economic integration.

This thesis asks a question of what constitutes the social background of the relationship between EU and Turkey. It further inquires how that social background influences the state of play between the two. In order to come to a satisfying answer, this thesis aims to provide an account of Turkish politics, the constitution of Turkish and European identities as they pertain to each other, as well as the global context in which this relationship is set (i.e. the refugee crisis or the Cyprus issue). The main argument of this thesis is two-fold. In the first instance, it states that because Turkey and EU are social players who have had a formed negative intersubjective image of each other due to history of engaging in the process of othering (see below), their relationship has been the one of relative mistrust and misunderstanding (see chapter “Constructivism and IR: EU-Turkey Relationship is What Agents Make of It”). Consequently, there is a specific logic of appropriateness (refer to the chapter “Constructivism and IR: EU-Turkey Relationship is What Agents Make of It”), which operates between these two actors that is an essential
element of the relationship. That logic of appropriateness (re)produces the intersubjective knowledge held between EU and Turkey, thus creating identities that differentiate between Turkey as a (non)European actor in one instance and EU as a union of European states which share a common experience of Turkey (Müftüler-Baç and Stivachtis, 17). In the second instance, this thesis claims that because of the first argument, all the issue-areas in which Turkey and EU are cooperating (e.g. the refugee crisis) will be used in the context of the mutually constituted intersubjective knowledge and the meaning that knowledge produced in their relationship. This means that the established knowledge and experience of Europe with Turkey, and vice versa, affects the integration of Turkey in a European society of states\(^1\), and their relationship, across a wide range of issue-areas. The refugee crisis (see chapter “Refugee Crisis: A New Frontier?”), for example, is one of the areas where this research establishes that the intersubjective image of Turkey and EU influences the process and the outcome of the negotiations.

At the outset, this research identifies three reasons for why the relationship between the EU and Turkey is stagnating. Although conceptually, these three issues are broad, they are necessary to frame the thesis and its conclusions. These three reasons are as follows: Turkish political volatility, the identity construction between Europe and Turkey, and the global context. They are presented below.

2. Relationship and Its Discontents

Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, the current President and the former PM of the Republic of Turkey, declared 2014 to be the year of the EU integration (Commission Report 2014, 3).

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\(^1\) Hedley Bull states that a society of states exists when a group of states that are conscious of certain common interests and values join in a society in a way that they conceive themselves to be bound by a common's of rules in relation to one another, and share a working of common institutions (Bull, 13).
To the scholar of EU-Turkey relations, this statement might seem ironic because, given the power of hindsight, one can notice that almost every year in EU-Turkey relations has been the year of (failed) EU integrations. According to Erdoğan’s statement, Turkey is willing to push forward more arduously to join the European Union, a block of twenty-eight member states engaged in an almost-political and economic union. However, since 2014, not much has been done to improve the state of play in the relationship, so Turkey finds itself in a position of frustration with the EU, and the EU finds itself ruminating whether to allow Turkey to even continue being a candidate for membership. The reasons for this are multiple, but I will argue that they are all connected to the larger issue of identity, which truly creates an atmosphere of utter mistrust and non-solidarity between the two.

The first issue, as outlined above, is the issue of Turkish political volatility. In this sense, President Erdoğan wanted to voice his commitment to the European Union not only as a dedication to the Kemalist dream of integrating Europe into the West, but also as his own commitment to portraying his politics as not subversive but constructive (we will discuss this later in the research). President Erdoğan came out as a product of a long-running synthesis of an openly religious politician with the pro-EU and pro-secularism stances. That synthesis changed the Turkish political constellation and decreased the secular influence of the Turkish military while at the same time opting for a western discourse of multi-culturalism and religious representation in order to open the public sphere to more religious influence (albeit not successfully as will be shown in later chapters). Turkish military traditionally served as a sort of a panopticon engaged in monitoring and controlling the Turkish government for decades before the rise of the AKP (Bogdani, 151). The long-established exercise of power by the military has kept the
Kemalist political legacy at the forefront of Turkish political life with four coups orchestrated in 1960, 1971, 1980 and 1997 (Bogdani, 151) (See chapter “Turkey, EU and the Construction of Identities”). By exercising its power of protecting the secular constitution from the rise of Islamist parties, the military contributed to the volatility of Turkish politics and Turkish society, and has delayed the EU integration process multiple times. The AKP (the Justice and Development Party) is seen as a direct threat to Turkey’s Kemalist legacy, but it is also seen as the key modernizer of a country that has stagnated for too long in the late 20th century. The AKP came after the collapse of Bulent Ecevit’s government due to the 2001 “Turkish Economic Crash” and naturally brought with it an atmosphere of refreshment, but also an atmosphere of tension. The party won every Turkish national election after 2002 by running on the pro-EU platform which combined promise of reforms, eradication of corruption, creation of jobs, and, most importantly, propagating public religiosity as crucial ideological components aimed at distinguishing AKP from other parties in Turkey.

AKP’s ideology stems from the decades of Islamic political activity within Turkey, starting in the 50s with the founding of the Islamic-oriented Democratic Party and Adnan Menderes’s premiership of Turkey, which lasted for almost ten years, from 1950 to 1960 (Bogdani, 151). Parties running on an Islamic platform held office many times throughout Turkish political history but were always successfully quenched by the military. However, their ideology always managed to remain within political and public sphere of Turkey. The culmination of the struggle between secularist and religious cleavages in Turkey came in the 1996 with the election of Neçmettin Erbakan of the Islamist Welfare Party as the PM. The demise of Erbakan’s government changed the Islamic political landscape in Turkey as
well as the secular one. After the “post-modern coup” of 1997, through which Erbakan’s government was pressured to resign under threats of coup d’état, Turkey was left in a political conundrum. The period after the “post-modern coup” helped the Islamic political ideology to reorganize and with that change its template from anti-EU to pro-EU, and thereby garner more acceptance from Europe (Dismorr, 44). This is where the AKP came in; organized from the remnants of the Welfare Party, it surprised the world by winning its first election in 2002 in a landslide victory (Bogdani, 151). On the other hand, the secularist political option (parties such as CHP) have become increasingly more national and disillusioned with what the EU has to offer for Turkey. Dismorr concludes:

Although the reforms had widespread support in Parliament and among the public, contradictory forces were at work below the surface. Traditionalists with strong nationalistic sentiments feared or mistrusted the EU’s real intentions. They stood against the reformists, who increasingly lobbied for one, single thing: a date for Turkey (Dismorr, 57).

Those years between 1997 and 2001 proved to be crucial not only for the Islamist political re-orientation in Turkey but also for Turkish European integration. The customs union ratified in 1996 paved the way for the invitation of Turkey to become an EU candidate after the Helsinki Summit of 1999 and finally created an atmosphere of EU-Turkish cooperation. Turkey reluctantly accepted the invitation (due to the Cyprus issue, see Chapter 4 “Issues”, sub-chapter d “Cyprus: Identity, Security, and the EU-Turkey Relationship”) and the negotiations started in 2005, a bit late given the fact that Turkey already waited for six years. Unfortunately, since 2005, not much was achieved on Turkish path towards the EU although many things changed within Turkey and within the EU. Apart from the issue of Turkish domestic political volatility, there are many human rights issues Turkey faces that are either the direct result of this political instability or are simply the result of Turkey being in a place it is, bordering Iraq, Iran, Syria, and the Caucasus
region. In 2005, this cocktail of issues, combined with French and Dutch rejection of the EU Constitution (see chapter 4 “Issues”, “Public Opinion”, section 1), signified the enlargement fatigue in the EU and slowed down the reforms in Turkey as well as incentives from Europe (Dismorr, 65). The fatigue lasts even today, in 2016, with Juncker’s Commission openly advocating no enlargement during its mandate which lasts until 2019 (Juncker, 12). The latest enlargement happened in 2013 when the Republic of Croatia became a member.

The second reason for the stagnation is, unsurprisingly, the construction of identities of Europe and Turkey. Here, I am referring to the Europe as a discursive construct which is a part of what Stuart Hall names “the West” (Hall and Gieben, 197). In that sense, Europe as a discursive construct is perceived as modern, secular and technologically advanced, but also Christian which has serious repercussions on how Europeans view, and “other”, Islam (Hall and Gieben, 186). Turkey is a country of almost eighty million people, more than 90% of whom are Muslims. This influences the way EU perceives the role of Turkey in its neighborhood (and within its own political system). Turkish bid for EU membership is a test which directly challenges the discourse of “the West” in Europe and as such makes the divisions over Turkish membership even deeper. Even though the EU block is mainly divided on pro-Turkey and against-Turkey membership, both sides have entrenched political positions.

The “against” side is politically stronger due to fact that it plays the cultural argument which the general European populace supports and because it is followed by the strongest party in the EU, the European People’s Party (please refer to chapter 4 “Issues”, Public Opinion, section 1). EU, per more Demo-Christian politicians such as Sarkozy or
Merkel, is a cultural concept, a union of European states and of implicitly Christian history (see chapter 4 “Issues”, Public Opinion, section 1). This idea of Europe as a Christian nation was further publicized with the now infamous statement of Pope Benedict XVI that Europe is a cultural continent and a continent of Christian history (Bogdani, 78). The idea of the EU as a “Christian Club” is making it harder for Turkey to be perceived as a rightful candidate for the membership. Although the EU and its members reject the “Christian Club” classification, it is a constant reminder that EU needs to work more on its openness to Muslim societies, and its relationship with Turkey is a perfect chance to demonstrate that (Akçapar, 4).

On the other hand, the “pro” side argues that Turkish history is inextricably linked to Europe and has influenced Europe for centuries, and that therefore Turkey has the right to join and participate in the EU. Representatives of this block are governments of UK, the Netherlands, and Spain. They emphasize the modernization and secularization Turkey underwent in the past 80 years as a part of Kemalist policies of moving Turkey to the West as a crucial reason for why Turkey is western, and European (see chapter 4 “Issues”). This internal division makes the Turkish bid for the EU membership immanently more difficult as the approval of membership of any country to the EU rests on the principle of unanimity of its members. Currently, the divide in the EU has been exacerbated by the geo-political issues of immigration, Syrian Civil War, and the attempted coup d’état in Turkey. EU’s internal conflict stands as an example of a complex relationship EU and Europe have not only with Turkey, but also with Islam. The historical and social dimensions of Europe-Islam relations are crucial to understanding Euro-Turkish relations and as such will be investigated in this research.
The final reason for the stagnation in relations is the global context. In the introductory statement, I said that 2014 was marked as the “Year of the EU” in Turkey, but we are currently in 2017 and the process remains stalled, if not exacerbated. Turkey opened 14 out of 33 negotiation chapters in 12 years since accession negotiations started and has only completed the Science and Research chapter so far (Commission Report 2015, 86). This only serves as an example of how slow and essentially painful the negotiation process is. The EU today is significantly different than EU twelve years ago, and has many existential challenges which make it less willing to focus on enlargement (such as the sovereign debt crisis or the issue of Brexit). Unfortunately, it is hard to ascertain in which way these recent developments will influence the relationship between EU and Turkey. In addition to all of the aforementioned issues, the long-standing issue of the Cyprus crisis is looming over EU-Turkey relations. The Cyprus issue combines EU, Turkey, Greece, and Cyprus, in an uncanny cacophony of divergent interests, perceived identities as well as normative roles players have towards each other. It is of great importance to understand the issue of Cyprus as it relates to the functioning of the relationship between the EU and Turkey.

This thesis will focus on the three aforementioned issues (Turkish political volatility, the identity construction of Europe and Turkey, and the global context) when analyzing the relationship between the EU and Turkey. However, there are many complex social and political dimensions arising from the relationship between the EU and Turkey that revert us to issues beyond the ones mentioned earlier in this chapter. Will the EU be able to accept Turkey? Will Turkey ever be able to acquiesce to EU’s liberal-democratic normative-institutionalism? Will EU remain unified enough to sustain itself? How will the
political cleavages in Turkey (secularist vs. religious) coexist in the future? And, finally, will Turkey take a deeper turn to authoritarianism? Answering these and other questions will be a hard task because they are multi-dimensional and are crucial for grasping the inherent complexity of relationship between EU and Turkey, and beyond that, the inner complexity of both the organization and the state, respectively.

This thesis is split into five chapters most of which have their own sub-chapters and focus on different aspects of the relationship. Chapter one, titled “History”, serves as a cornerstone of the thesis and provides an insight into the history of the relations between the two. History must be a cornerstone of this thesis as it guides both the researcher and the reader through the vast complexity of Turkish integration into Europe, European geopolitical landscape, and transformation through which both Turkey and the EU went through in the last fifty years. From the early days of the process starting with the Ankara Agreement (1963) to the present, EU and Turkey have changed immensely and have yielded a plethora of dimensions through which one can analyze their relationship. Overviewing the history of the relationship helps us follow that complicated road and stay on track with rapidly changing Euro-Turkish political landscape of today.

Chapter two titled “Current Situation” briefly overviews the recent developments in the relationship (for example, the EU-Turkey Migrant-Swap Deal) and overviews the most recent EU Commission Report (2016), due in November 2016. The purpose of the EU Commission Report is to assess the current progress of Turkey on its path to becoming the EU members. EU Commission publishes this report annually for every country that is trying to become a member of the EU and is the best mirror of EU’s views on the position of each state in relation to its successes in integration to acquis communautaire (or the
Copenhagen Criteria). Therefore, it is essential thesis to survey the Report as it will help me articulate better the EU’s complex, and sometimes murky, position on Turkish accession.

Chapter three, titled “Constructivism and IR: The EU-Turkey Relationship is What Agents Make of It”, serves to position this work theoretically within critical constructivism. As this work seeks to analyze the history of the relationship with the aim of understanding socio-cultural and identitarian issues burdening the relationship, it must use an ideal theory to defend its conclusions. The EU-Turkey relations are an aspect of EU studies and, henceforth, need to be studied through the issues of socialization of states within the EU system. In that sense, Turkish integration in the EU is an essential part of the relationship and must be, therefore, understood with regards to social process of the relationship.

Chapter four is titled “Issues” and is divided into four sub-chapters, each analyzing and overviewing its assigned issue-area. Through “Issues”, I present the complex dimensionality of the relationship between the EU and Turkey by analyzing different issue-areas relevant to both actors today. In the first issue area, I investigate the relationship between the two in the sub-chapter called “Turkey, EU, and Construction of Identities”. As indicated, the chapter focuses on the identity construction between the two and its effects on the political dimension of the relationship. In this case, I look at the relationship between Turkey and EU from the standpoint of critical constructivism and will illustrate my main argument which is that Turkey and EU constantly keep on “othering” each other as their identities, and because of that, interests, while not mutually exclusive, are significantly different. This causes them both to behave in ways that are easily disruptive of continuing accession negotiations and are harming not only their political relations, but
also social perceptions of both Turkey’s role in Europe and Europe’s role in Turkey. Finding a way to construct each other’s identities in a mutually inclusive way is, at this moment, hardly possible so the EU and Turkey relationship will continue to stall.

The second sub-chapter of chapter four is “Public Opinion”. In this sub-chapter, I seek to present data on the EU-Turkey relationship in two sections. The first section analyzes literature and data on the public opinion of Turks and Europeans on Turkish membership. With that in mind, concomitant with qualitative data found in literature on public opinion on EU-Turkey relationship, this research seeks to obtain real-time statistics from Eurobarometer, EU’s regular research into public opinion of Europeans (from both member and candidate states) regarding pertinent issues within the block. The second section uses data derived from my interviews. I conducted interviews with the members of the Turkish community in Germany and Turkish academics in Germany during my studies at the Free University of Berlin in the Fall of 2016. Interviews are useful for this research not only because they demonstrate its academic strength (the importance of original data for academic research) but also because they help us grasp individual perspectives on the issues of identity, history, and social constructions on the relationship (see “Methodology” below).

The issue area of immigration is presented in its own sub-chapter titled “The Immigration Crisis: A New Frontier?”. In this sub-chapter I argue that the Immigration Crisis is an issue-area which gives Turkey significant leverage over the EU in both political and economic terms because Turkey serves as a sort of gatekeeper for migrants to Europe. Given the fact that Europe (EU) is encumbered with swathes of migrants and refugees at its doors, Turkey is given a lot of attention, particularly after the EU-Turkey Migrant Swap
Deal (2016), as it helps EU to mitigate the influence of their influx onto its territory. The sub-chapter will conclude with the notion that even though Turkey has significant leverage over the EU in this field (i.e. EU needs Turkey to ensure the functioning of its Asylum system at the moment), Turkey will not be able to score political points and open more EU accession chapters due to the fact that it is not complying with the *acquis* properly and is failing to understand the strong normative-institutional aspect of EU politics. On the other hand, EU is constantly failing to adjust its foreign policy to Turkey as it views it as just another candidate rather than an emerging world-power which cannot be treated normatively like some other states (i.e. Croatia). The conflictual intersubjectivity which was developed in recent months precisely because of two diverging political narratives is causing the EU-Turkey relationship to stagnate and is threatening its survival. In order for the relationship to continue on its normative course, both sides need to re-start the dialogue, end the discursive “war with words”, and properly identify all the issues that have come on their path. Without that, EU is risking losing one of its greatest partners, Turkey, to other countries (such as Russia) which will result in further foreign policy difficulties in the Middle East and elsewhere in the world.

Another issue-area explored in this thesis is the issue of Cyprus. This chapter investigates the constructivist effects of one of the world’s longest political crises. The Cyprus issue has been at the forefront of EU-Turkey relations since 1974 and its question has gained a new momentum recently with a series of botched meetings between the Greek and Turkish Cypriot representatives in Geneva, under good offices of Ban Ki-Moon, the now-former UN Secretary General. Cyprus is a politically divided island which entered the EU in its entirety in 2004. The north side of the island belongs to Turkish Cypriots who,
with the help of Turkish military in 1974, established their own independent state, only recognized by Turkey. The south side belongs to Greek Cypriots who have a lot of political influence in the EU due to the fact that Greece is also a member-state. Greece and Turkey, combined with the EU, represent the most significant players, and even, decision-makers in the case of Cyprus’ reunification. This is especially visible during the time when the reunification negotiations resume and Turkey, and Greece, take up very strong attitudes towards the issue. I argue that this narrative of Cyprus as an indispensable part of Greek and Turkish identity is interconnected with actual interests both states have in the area (see “History”), and legitimizes a conflicting intersubjective perception which seeks to construct Cyprus as partly Turkish and partly Greek. EU’s involvement with the issue has been limited, as the EU has outsourced it largely to Cyprus, Greece, and Turkey, however, EU is still blocking six negotiation chapters (since 2006) in the Turkish accession negotiations solely due to the issue of Cyprus. I end the chapter with a recommendation that EU must approach the issue more seriously and demand from all three sides to give in to a more honest and stronger compromise on the issue. It is crucial not only for EU’s internal safety, but also for relations between Greece, Turkey and EU to be more relaxed and open.

In the fifth chapter of the research, called "Perspectives for the Future", I offer different perspectives to the issue of the EU-Turkey relationship. These perspectives serve to be a thoughtful ending of the research by recentering the issue of the EU-Turkey relationship away from the question of whether Turkey will enter the bloc. One way of recentering the issue is by acknowledging the impossibility of Turkish accession to the EU at a given moment. This would allow us to accept different models of Turkish integration
in the EU that will offer it close association and an almost-membership status. The aim of this approach would be to relax the tension produced by constant failures to acquiesce to the Copenhagen Criteria. This does not mean that Turkey will be offered the infamous “Privileged Partnership”\(^2\), but rather, it makes use of policy practicality to help Turkey and EU gain political momentum in order to continue its full integration. This modality was entertained in Meltem Muftuler-Bac’s *Divergent Pathways: Turkey and the European Union: Re-thinking the Dynamics of Turkish-European Relations* book and seems like a constructive way of bringing interests and identities of both EU and Turkey together without risking disillusionment on the part of Turkey and frustration on the part of the EU.

Finally, this thesis ends with a conclusion which provides an overview of the matters entertained in the work and concludes with some closing remarks on the issue of EU-Turkey relationship.

3. Methodology

This thesis is a qualitative work in social sciences. Since this research seeks ways to gain a deeper understanding of the EU-Turkish relations, it is important then to also understand the perspective of European Turks on the Euro-integrations of their home-country.

This research will use mixed methods for collecting data on EU-Turkey relations. As the research part of the thesis is conducted in Berlin, Germany, where I spent the Fall semester of my senior year, I decided to seek potential participants from both academic circles and from the sphere of public (i.e. laymen).

\(^2\) Privileged Partnership is an alternative proposal to Turkish membership of the EU. While not excluding Turkey form EU, this proposal, supported by politicians such as Sarkozy and Merkel, offers Turkey deeper integration within EU’s economic sphere (access to the single market, for example) while excluding the probability of its membership in the community.
The principal way of collecting data for this research is, of course, through written academic works in the form of books and journal articles/publications. Turkey-EU relations have generated a great deal of written works which provide a great basis for analyzing this issue from a material and interest-oriented point of view. Therefore, the academic resources are not there to fulfill the goal of this thesis alone, they are merely useful for supplementing facts as well as certain ideas on how to proceed with the research. As this work is a work in critical constructivism, further analysis of discourse is needed to supplement and contribute to its analysis of the relationship (please see “Constructivism and IR: Relationship is What States Make of It”). A discourse is:

By 'discourse', we mean a particular way of representing 'the West', 'the Rest' and the relations between them. A discourse is a group of statements which provide a language for talking about (i.e. a way of representing-a particular kind) of knowledge about a topic. When statements about a topic are made within a particular discourse, the discourse makes it possible to construct the topic in a certain way. It also limits the other ways in which the topic can be constructed. (Hall and Gieben, 291).

This means that I garner a significant amount of news reports, articles and news journals that will allow me to identify how Turkey and the EU engage in a political discourse of othering which will further allow me to disentangle the historical-social patterns of mistrust, enmity, and blackmail in politics between EU and Turkey. Therefore, combining interviews with academic sources and every-day news reports will allow me to present a clear picture of how identity formations influences politics between the EU and Turkey.

The secondary method of collecting data for this research is a structured interview. Structured interview is an ideal technique for this thesis as it allows the researcher to prepare a set of questions participants should answer. This allows for a lot of control of what kind of answers the researcher is getting, which further allows the researcher to
specify the issue they want to learn more about. The interviews I conducted lasted from 20 to 40 minutes, depending on the length of participant’s answer. All of the questions are enlisted in the Appendices at the end of this work. By using structured interview, the researcher can obtain precise qualitative data relevant for the research. Interviews are often not the most comfortable way for participants to express their opinions, particularly given the current post-coup situation in Turkey, where the government is actively seeking ways to capture critics or dissidents from the regime. However, it is the most convenient way as it allows the researcher to gain a personal, yet informative, insight into what people (both academics and laymen) think about the issue of Turkish EU integration. I guarantee complete anonymity to all the participants, unless they wish not to be anonymous. For this purpose, I generated the “Informed Consent Form” in order to inform participants about potential benefits or risks of participating in my research. Informed Consent Form is a standard practice in the field of qualitative social research through which participants are thoroughly informed about the research they are participating in. The sample consent form is included in the Appendices section at the end of this thesis.

The sampling method for the research is snowball sampling. Snowball sampling is a type of sampling method that allows researcher to identify a person (or persons) who meets the criteria for inclusion in a study (Social Research Methods, 2016). When the researcher identifies the person/s he then establishes a rapport through which he obtains information about other people or organizations who fit the research criteria (Social Research Methods, 2016). The newly created web of fitting participants then provides further information to the researcher about a desired project. I decided to choose this method for obtaining participants for my thesis project because I am taking a course “Islam
and Europe” which deals heavily with integration of Muslims in Europe. Turks, being the largest Muslim population in Germany, and in Berlin, are a significant part of my coursework and I intend on focusing on this group for my research. Therefore, in order to get connected to the Turkish community in Berlin, I need a gateway person who would “snowball” the whole research process. My professor is a German Turk and a practicing Muslim, so he is fitting to provide contact with Turkish organizations in Berlin as well as it Turkish community. My professor provided mostly academic contact whereas I also need more of non-academic contacts from general Turkish community in Berlin. A colleague of mine at the Free University of Berlin, where my study abroad takes place, did her honors thesis on the issue of Syrian refugees in Germany (with emphasis on the city of Berlin). Being of Arabic, Muslim, origin, she provided me her personal contacts with regular Euro-Turks who were willing to talk to me about their perception of EU and Turkey’s relationship.
Chapter 1. History of Relations Between the EU and Turkey

1. Early Relations: From Ankara Agreement to the Invasion of Cyprus

The history of the relationship between the European Union and the Republic of Turkey often seems like a never-ending rollercoaster. Divergent interests, unresolved socio-political issues, the stigma of Turks as backwarded Muslims, European and Turkish political turmoil, all truly bring into question the credibility of the European Union and the trustworthiness of Turkish application to the EU. Turkey first applied to become an associate member of the European Economic Community in 1959 and has since then been on a “long and winding path” to achieve its goals (Akçapar, 19). The reasons for Turkish application were multiple, but there are two main ones that must be mentioned. The first one relates itself to the course Atatürk (Mustafa Kemal, the founding father and the first president of Turkey) set which can be simplified, although not summarized, in three words; modernization through westernization. The second reason for Turkish application for the EEC membership is a combination of two main political factors: Turkish involvement in the Western-Atlantic structure (NATO member since 1952, founding member of the Council of Europe in 1949) and the aftershock of Greek application which was submitted to the EEC in 1959. Turkey submitted its application only two weeks after Greece, with Adnan Menderes, the then-PM, remarking:” What can they do that we cannot?!” (Dismorr, 37).

Turkish membership path was seriously interrupted with the 1960 coup and the first strain on EU – Turkish relations manifested in the form of Turkish Kemalist military’s interference with democratic order. The coup saw Adnan Menderes’ removal from the office after 10 years of serving and his public hanging just a year afterwards. Adnan Menderes remains an interesting, and polarizing, figure in Turkish public life. He and the
Democratic Party were significant actors in Turkish political life for over a decade after ending CHP’s (Republican Nationalist Party- founded by Mustafa Kemal himself) political dominance in the 1950 elections. Menderes was also the first in line of Turkish politicians who took easier stances towards the concept of Turkish secularity thus opening the government and the politics to more religious involvement (Rabasa and Larrabee, 36).

Turkey was granted an associate member status after the military relinquished power to CHP (led by Ismet Inönü) and signed, in 1963, the Ankara Agreement which was defined as a long-term process outlining three main stages of the Turkish path to the EU (Bogdani, 23). These stages are as follows: a preparatory stage, aimed to prepare Turkish society and economics to becoming an EEC member (agreement stipulates a time frame of five years), a transitional stage aimed at providing a timeframe of twelve years during which Turkey should become ready for transitioning to the EEC (agreements such as the Customs Union of 1996 were a part of this stage), and a final stage which was meant to be the last step before fully integrating Turkey into the then-EEC (Ankara Agreement, 5). Upon signing the Ankara Agreement, the EEC Commissioner Walter Hallstein remarked:

    Today we are witnessing a historic event. Turkey belongs in Europe. Here lies the significance of this event. This is an expression of reality rather than a summarized geographical fact or the historical events of the past few centuries (Dismorr, 38).

What then-Commissioner Hallstein meant was that because of geopolitical reasons and the bipolar world order, Turkey belonged to EEC not only as a European nation, but also as an ally crucial for fighting the Soviet influence. This position changed over time and with the fall of the USSR, the cultural discourse aiming to present Turkey as non-European gained foothold in Europe thus making it harder for Turkey to integrate more (See chapter “Turkey, the EU and the Construction of Identities”).
The period between 1963 and 1974 was a turbulent time not only for Turkey but also for Europe. The European Economic Community, to which Turkey applied initially, become the European Communities with the signing of the with the “Merger Treaty” of 1967 thus reflecting a more politically-natured union among its members. To add to this, the EC later on became a more normative institution with a clearer, albeit not fully normative, criteria for accessing it (the Copenhagen Criteria, for example, were institutionalized in 1993 with the Maastricht Treaty). Turkey, on the other hand, underwent a military coup (1971) which worsened its democratic record and invaded Cyprus in 1974 thus significantly delaying the association progress.

2. Turkish Invasion of Cyprus

The ethno-national turbulence, and the subsequent Turkish invasion, on the island of Cyprus stand tall as the most important problems of the relationship between EU and Turkey. Until 1981, the Cyprus issue was not per se thought of as the European issue in formal terms. However, when Greece entered the EC as a full-fledged member in 1981, the Cyprus issue became an official EC issue and required EC to formally adopt Cyprus-specific policies. Even before the Greek accession, the Turks protested Cypriot application to the EEC in 1971, but the EEC did not see the issue as its own formal problem; Cyprus signed the association agreement in 1972 (Çakir, 34). The existence of Cyprus issue is not only related to the Turkish invasion of the island in 1974 under the guise of prevention of enosis or unification of Cyprus and Greece. It is related to three highly complex factors that involve EU, Turkey and Greece: 1. Turkish-Hellenic relations, the EU membership negotiations of the Turkey-Greece-Cyprus triangle, and Cypriot-Turkish relations. In order to present the issue properly, I must start with explaining the reason why Turkey invaded
Cyprus in 1974 and why Cyprus, a small Mediterranean island, is so important to Turkey. Cyprus was created in 1960 after signing of the Zurich-London Accords among UK, the Republic of Turkey and the Hellenic Republic (Camp, 46/7). Under the accords, Cyprus was to be an independent and sovereign state, allied to both Greece and Turkey, but not to NATO (Camp, 47). By signing the agreement, both Turks and the Greeks legally bound themselves not to create an *enosis* (unification) or a *taksim* (division) of Cyprus (Camp, 46). The Republic was created, but it soon entered existential troubles. The first president of Cyprus was Archbishop Makarios who had a hard time leading a state composed of around 80% Greek Cypriots and around 18% of Turkish Cypriots (Solsten, 1991). Before the Turkish invasion of Cyprus there were three Cyprus crises, one of which was resolved by the Zurich-London Agreements and the creation of Cyprus, and other two in 1964 and 1967, which were a pretext to Turkish invasion in 1974 (Camp, 54). Peace negotiations, such as the one in 1968, ultimately failed and the impending *enosis*, as requested by Greek officials, was irking the Turks who most surely did not wish to see Cyprus fall under Greek control (Camp, 56). In 1974, a coup d’etat happened and Makarios was ousted from the office thus providing a genuine reason for Turkish invasion of Cyprus.

The pretext for Turkish invasion of Cyprus in July of 1974 was, according to Semin Suvarierol, a strategic move on part of Turkey (Survarierol, 56). The (in)auspicious strategic location of Cyprus close to the Anatolian coast (about 40 nautical miles away from it) was always a problem for the Turkish state as it indicated that the Greeks control almost the entirety of waters surrounding Turkey (Suvarierol, 56). The location of Cyprus and the natural extension of Karpaz Peninsula (a tail-like northern peninsula of Cyprus) would allow Cyprus to block the gulf of Iskenderun thus endangering Turkish naval
abilities (Suvarierol, 56). If Cyprus fell into Greek hands (i.e. if enosis happened), then
Turkey would be disadvantaged strategically not only because of the danger this would
pose for Turkish navy but also because Cyprus is, in Suvarierol’s words, a “stationary
aircraft carrier”, therefore a potential threat to Turkish sovereign territory (Suvarierol, 57).
Indeed, if one looks at the map of the border between Greece, Cyprus and Turkey, one can
see why Turkey has serious strategic interest in either maintaining the full sovereignty and
independence of Cyprus or it’s division in two parts. Turkey is surrounded by Greek islands
which extend from Greek-Turkish border in the Balkans all the way down to Turkish region
of “Southern Anatolia” (Wordpress, 2011). Cyprus remains the only large island in that
territory which finds itself under its own authority and as such remains relevant for Turkish
politics (Suvarierol, 57). Although today all three countries (Cyprus, Greece and Turkey)
are bound by EU law not to interfere with each other’s sovereignty (which means Cyprus
will not disturb Turkey’s naval ability), the issue of territory was probably the main reason
for the invasion. To demonstrate how important Cyprus is to Turkish national interests, I
will paraphrase the former PM of Turkey Bülent Ecevit who: “Is said to have claimed in
1998 that Cyprus is so indispensable for the strategic interests of Turkey that Ankara would
not withdraw its troops even if there were not a single Turkish Cypriot living on the island”
(Suvarierol, 57). The Cypriot territory, in combination with the history of enmity between
Turkey and Greece, represents the first aspect of the Cyprus issue.

Turkish-Greek enmity is a far-reaching socio-political issue. In modern history of
Turkey, it stems directly from the Greco-Turkish War (1919-1922). The Greco-Turkish
War started when Greece invaded Turkey (or post-Ottoman province of Turkey), in 1919.
It ended with the Turkish victory in 1922 paving the way for the establishment of the
Republic of Turkey in 1923. From 1923 until the present, multiple issues have encumbered the Greek-Turkish relations out of which Cyprus and EU integration stand as the most important ones. When Greece applied in 1959 for the EEC membership, Turkey did not hesitate a moment and has submitted its own application just two weeks later. EU integration became especially cumbersome for Turkey when Greece joined the EC in 1981 and pushed for the Cyprus’ membership bid. When Cyprus applied for the membership in 1990, a result of strong Greek lobbying in the EC and Cypriot acquiescence to the criteria, Turkey was bedeviled. The Turks feared that when Cyprus enters the Community, the Greeks would gain another veto in the Council of the EU and thus manage to prevent further Turkish accession to the EC (Suvarierol, 57). This did not happen, as we can see, because the countries that do wish to prevent a full-membership of Turkey in the EU are far more powerful in the Council than Greece or Cyprus, and are intent on stalling the negotiations as much as possible. However, the issue of Cyprus did incentivize member states to block certain negotiation chapters in 2006 (Dismorr, 62). The Cyprus issue truly is a remarkable aspect of the relationship between the EU and Turkey and as such deserves more attention. It will be further analyzed in the second chapter named “Cyprus: Identity, Security, and the EU-Turkey Relationship”.

3. The 1980 coup d’état: Reform, the Kurdish Issue and the Council Decision of 1989

The 1980 coup d’état remains a particularly important period in Turkish modern history. After the setback caused by the Cyprus issue, the coup of 1980 marked the first time the EC froze the Ankara Agreement due to violations of human rights, democratic principles and sheer violence that swept over Turkey (Aksu, 8).
In September of 1980, the Turkish military conducted a military coup in order to restore stability to the in-fighting in Turkish politics (Dismorr, 41). The coup followed a decade of changing governments and political squabbles which left a great nation struggling both economically and socially. To put matters in perspective, from 1971 to 1980, Turkey had ten different governments (with Bülent Ecevit being a PM three times and Süleyman Demirel two times) indicating a kind of “revolving door government” crisis often occurring in European countries like Italy. The coup was preceded by deaths of approximately 5,000 people throughout Turkey which testifies to the level of political instability in the country (Dismorr, 41). The coup impacted Euro-Turkish relations heavily and for the fourth time in just twenty years, with the memory of Menderes’ execution, the coup of 1971, and the Cyprus invasion, the relationship between the EU and Turkey was in a precarious position. European integration was put on hold until 1983 when Turkey got a new constitution, still in effect, and the first post-coup multiparty elections were held. Turkish democracy was revived with the formation of the Motherland Party (ANAP) and the election of Turgut Özal as the Prime Minister. Özal was the first Turkish Prime Minister who held office for his entire mandate, and more, after 1971. He held office for 6 years, from 1983 to 1989. During his leadership, Turkey made impressive strides on its way of becoming a stronger democracy as well as a more credible associate member of the EC.

The 1983 Turkish Constitution did not only allow for multi-party elections to happen, it was also a result of twenty years of post-Menderes policies and strategies initiated by the Turkish military. Turkish military, often cited as the defender of Turkish secularism, interfered with the political system numerous times, but even more than that, it instituted several critical changes and policies which would permanently alter Turkish
socio-political landscape. In the 1960s, during the period of military control, a concept of “Turkish-Islamic Synthesis” was developed (Rabasa and Larrabee, 37). The military, aware of how powerful Islam still is in Turkish society, was insistent on using it as a tool to fight the appeal of communism and socialism in Turkey while at the same time protecting the well-instituted principle of secularity. This went hand in hand with the principle of Turkish laicite which saw government as absolute governor of religion on Turkish territory. In that sense, Turkish military created a “Turkish-Islamic Synthesis” whereby Islamic teachings were allowed, for the first time since Atatürk’s death, to be taught in public schools (as a matter of fact, they became compulsory in the national curriculum) (Rabasa and Larrabee, 37).

Furthermore, state-controlled moral and religious education was promoted not only in schools but in all spheres of public life (Rabasa and Larrabee, 37). The idea behind the “Turkish-Islamic Synthesis” was essentially “islamization from above”; the military wanted to homogenize Islamic political community and introduce more nationalist elements to it to be able to manipulate Islamic communities in Turkey so as to fight the communist and Islamist appeal (Rabasa and Larrabee, 38). This backlashed on the military as it helped the Islamic political community gain more legitimacy in Turkish political life while at the same time promoting Islam as an important socio-political element of Turkish identity (Rabasa and Larrabee, 38). The culmination of the “Turkish-Islamic Synthesis” is found in the 1983 Constitution which opened the doors to more religious freedoms albeit still under strict control from the state. The end-result of the “Turkish Islamic Synthesis” is the current state of Turkish politics with AKP as a leading party. The AKP party’s credo is combining both Turkish nationalism and profound Islamic teachings with modern liberal
democratic principles. Nominally, this seems as a positive development, but in reality, the authoritarianism expressed by AKP and its leader Erdogan is worrying. This issue will be entertained in later chapters (see Chapter “Issues”).

In the period after 1983, when the first post-coup multiparty elections took place, Turkey made significant progress on its EU path. There are instances in the history of relations between Turkey and EU where Turkish zeal for reform outweighed any opposition to its membership. The period from 1983 to 1989 seemed to be such an instance. However, unlike the period between 2001 and 2004 which is often referred to as the “golden age” of the relationship, the period of reforms lasting from 1983 to 1989 was, in the eyes of EC, not enough to commence accession negotiations. Although Turkey managed to pull through many reforms in accordance with the EC guidance and requirements, the EC rebuffed its application for membership in 1989. This caused a period of strained Euro-Turkish relations which ended in 1996 with the institution of the Customs Union (the second step as outlined by the Ankara Agreement).

In order to illustrate why EC’s decision negatively impacted Euro-Turkish relationship, we have to gain a deeper understanding of Özal’s reforms and the changing European political landscape. Prime Minister, and later President, Turgut Özal came to prominence in political life as a founder of the ANAP (the Motherland Party) in 1983. Prior to that, his career was truly remarkable. He worked as a World Bank employee and was educated both in Turkey and in the USA (Rabasa and Larrabee, 39). Apart from the World Bank, he worked in the private sector and was assigned as the Undersecretary of the Prime Ministry (Presidency of the Republic of Turkey). However, even though he was a westernized man due to his training and life experience, Mr. Özal was also a religious man
In that sense, by being religious and western-oriented, Özal personified a “modern” Turk (Rabasa and Larrabee, 39). Furthermore, Özal was of Kurdish origin and he was open about his ancestors thus bringing a positive momentum to public discussion of the “Kurdish Issue” (Rabasa and Larrabee, 39). His reforms were profound as they moved Turkey towards a free and liberal financial market. Özal firmly believed in economic liberalism and small government, so he instituted policies aiming to open up Turkish markets to the global free trade. This made a profound social impact on Turkey and remains quite relevant today. Rabasa and Larrabee explain it this way:

Özal’s reforms also resulted in an inflow of capital, much of it from the Arab world. This allowed the Islamists to organize politically. Under Özal’s more tolerant approach to religion, Muslim groups and brotherhoods were given greater freedoms and were allowed to finance the construction of private schools and universities. The reforms also opened greater political space for new political groups—including the Islamists. Islamist groups gained access to important media outlets and newspaper chains, which allowed them to reach a much broader political audience. Television, in particular, provided an important means of propagating their message (Rabasa and Larrabee, 39).

The period of Özal’s reforms was followed by a trend of rural, predominantly Anatolian, population moving away from the rural areas and into larger cities such as Istanbul and Ankara where they were seeking better lifestyle and financial security (Rabasa and Larrabee, 39). Many of them never integrated in the urban cultures of great Turkish urban centers so they lived in gecekondu mahallesi (shanty-towns) thus creating a large body of urban electorate outside of city centers (Rabasa and Larrabee, 39). This kind of social change had a profound impact on Turkey’s urban culture as well as Turkish electorate. Today, parties such as AKP (and, during the nineties, parties such as the Virtue Party) take a lot of their democratic legitimacy precisely from the more religious, and socially mobile, middle classes of Anatolia (Rabasa and Larrabee, 39). This means that,
due to Özl’s reforms, and the reforms of successive Turkish governments after ANAP and Özl, the development of social mobility in Turkey resulted in greater influence of Islam as a religion on the public sphere. This social mobility brought many issues to public; rights of religious minorities, the role of religion in public sphere, and the vision of more religious Turkish politics. These issues still encumber Turkish politics today. One of such issues is definitely Turkish relationship with its minorities, Kurds in particular.

Even though PM Özl was of Kurdish origin, during tenure as a Prime Minister not much was done to improve the Turkish-Kurdish relations and to satisfy the demands of the large Kurdish population in the country. Starting in 1984, the armed conflict between the Turkish military and Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK), a terrorist organization founded in 1978, caused great harm to Turkey’s international reputation as well as its EU accession negotiations. As aforementioned, one of the main reasons why Turkey was rebuffed by the Council in 1989 was justified by the issue of violence happening in parts of the country. The reason for Kurdish insurgency stems from decades of discriminative laws implemented by the Turkish government against the Kurds. These laws should be understood in the context of creation of Turkish identity and Turkish nationalism. Early in the making of the nation, people like Kemal Mustafa Atatürk believed that a strong national, Turkish, identity needs to take precedence over ethnic or religious identity (Yildiz, 16). With that in mind, in 1924, the use of Kurdish language, national clothing and music were banned in the public (Yildiz, 16). The relatively peaceful3 or controlled “Kurdish Issue” exploded after the 1980s coup when the 1983 Constitution reiterated the ban on Kurdish language (Yildiz, 16). Moreover, after the coup, the Kurdish villages were renamed with non-Kurdish names

3 I use the word advisedly, for there were instances of conflict in the period leading up to the 1984 escalation.
thereby further ostracizing Kurdish heritage in Turkey (Yildiz, 16). The Turkish-PKK armed conflict began in 1984 and by its end with the capture of PKK’s leader Abdullah Öcalan in 1999, it caused 37,000 mostly Kurdish deaths and the displacement of three million people (Yildiz, 16). Turkish government proclaimed in 1987 the State of Emergency lasting until 2002 (Yildiz, 16). The State of Emergency Legislation provided great powers to the newly established civil control for the Kurdish regions in Turkey (Yildiz, 16). These powers, as would later become known, were intended to intimidate local Kurds by arbitrary arrests, looting, beatings and “disappearances” (Yildiz, 16).

Regional governors who administrated the civil control over areas in state of emergency used their power in order to gain more information about PKK’s activities in any way possible (Yildiz, 16). The Kurdish areas of the southeast and eastern parts of the country became seriously underdeveloped after the conflict thus contributing to higher levels of radicalization, frustration, and child marriages (Dismorr, 116). Even before the civil war, the Kurdish areas of Turkey were largely traditional and agricultural, so the conflict only brought more socio-economic troubles for those regions (Dismorr, 116). In 1991, however, there was a small but important legislative change which signaled the opening of the long peace process. The public speaking of Kurdish language (Article 2932) after many decades of prohibition was finally allowed (Dismorr, 125). Although a very small step, this piece of legislation would prove to be crucial for greater visibility of Kurds in Turkey. This happened as Turgut Özal, who was of Kurdish ancestry himself, became the new president of the Republic. The opening was rather short-lived as Özal died suddenly in 1993. Not much would change on the issue of Kurdish integration until AKP came to power in 2002 (Dismorr, 125). The shift in Turkish policy immediately after Özal’s
death is striking. In 1994, Leyla Zana, a Kurdish member of Turkish parliament, was imprisoned alongside several of her colleagues for wearing Kurdish colors and speaking Kurdish language before the Turkish parliament (Dismorr, 125).

Zana, who would not be released until 2004, became a sort of a symbol of the fight of Kurds for their rights (Dismorr, 125). She is still active in Turkish political life today, being a member of the Turkish National Assembly (Turkish parliament). The capturing of Zana and other parliamentarians provoked strong response from the European Union, but it did not halt the relations as we will see in the later chapters. Today, the relations of Kurds and Turkey are still rather ambivalent. After a period of serious détente from 2001 to 2007, strengthened by AKP’s reforms and progressive laws against torture and capital punishment, the Kurdish issue became less of an issue and more of a challenge. This brief period saw Kurdish, and other minority languages, being supported by TRT (Turkish Radio-Television, a public channel) in 2004 when it started broadcasting in those languages. Unfortunately, with the Arab Spring and the Syrian Civil War, the Kurdish challenge became more complicated. Strong role played by Kurds in Iraq in fighting against the Islamic State brought international attention to their issues, especially in Turkey:

The PYD/YPG has recently gained a degree of international support, becoming a key ally to the anti-IS coalition. The YPG represents the coalition’s most successful partner on the ground in northern Syria, in part because persistent doubts about the nature of many other opposition groups have precluded the provision of comparable coalition support to those groups. The combination of US airstrikes and YPG intelligence and follow-up on the ground lies behind the most significant battlefield defeats that IS has suffered in Syria, including in Kobani and Tel Abyad (Salih, 4).

The breakdown of the Turkish-PKK peace process which started in 2012, after a period of escalation from 2008, does not bode well for an international coalition fighting
the IS. In this sense, the European Union and Turkey’s relationship should make a stronger emphasis on how Turkey (and most importantly, AKP) need to work with PKK in order to restart the peace process. At this very moment, a strong nationalistic campaign by president Erdoğan, followed by the attempted coup in July of 2016, is further harming the relations between ethnic minorities, especially the Kurds, thus making it harder to make progress on the Kurdish Issue as well as on Turkish EU integration.

We can see that Turkey, although making economic progress during the 80s, faced, and is facing, challenges that seem out of her control. During Özal’s time both as PM and as President we can see both worsening and relaxing of relations between the government and Kurds. However, the socio-political instability did not prevent Turkey from hoping that it would receive a positive answer (that is, candidacy for the EU membership) during the 1989 European Council. The upswing in Turkish social mobility and greater liberalization of its economy strengthened Turkey’s wishes for further integration into the Western political and economic bloc. That is why the government submitted the application for the candidacy to the EC Commission in 1987, four years into Özal’s mandate. The submission of the application for candidacy in 1987 was an exhilarating moment for Turkey. Carried by Özal’s reforms and the new-found political stability, Turkey hoped for a reward from the EC. In 1989, Turks were disappointed to realize that their application was rejected by the European Commission and that they’d have to wait in line longer in order to achieve their political, and increasingly, social goal of European integration. The reasoning behind the rejection was quite multifaceted. The Council rejected the application on the grounds that Turkish economy was not sufficiently developed and that Turkish democracy did not guarantee sufficient civil and human rights (Bogdani, 23). Furthermore,
the memory of Turkish invasion of Cyprus was still fresh and the lack of progress on that issue was particularly problematic for EC (Bogdani, 23). The human rights record, as we could see earlier, of Turkey has indeed not been well-adjusted to the EC’s standards (the capital punishment, for example, was still allowed) thus giving further reason for EC to rebuff the application.

However, apart from Turkish internal reasons, it is also important to note that Europe itself was, coincidentally, on a threshold of great political, social and economic change. In 1989, after 28 years, the Berlin Wall came down. The Soviet Union (USSR) disintegrated in 1991 and with it the Warsaw Pact was dismantled. This had strong repercussions for Turkey, a loyal and strong NATO ally, whose plea for westernization lost substance in the eyes of Europeans who now had less interest in Turkish accession. Turkey was no longer needed to fight the communist appeal and the Soviet influence, so it was easier to sidetrack it in the European integration process. Starting from the 90s, Europe has generally positioned itself more normatively as well as more politically against Turkish membership. Camps such as Austria, Germany and France are still leading the blockade of chapters of the *acquis communautaire* while UK, Spain and the Netherlands are looking more positively at the prospect of Turkish membership. One thing is for certain, the long wait of Turkey at the gates of Europe has saw the bipolar world order end and that has made the matters harder for Turkey. Özal’s reforms and the general feeling of euphoria did not help, but the ever-changing political landscape of the Middle East today (more than twenty-five years later) might just be a stimulus Europe needed to realize how important Turkey is for its strategic interests.
4. Turkey and EU during the 1990s: Customs Union and Candidacy

The 1990s were a period of great, international, political, and social change. The further integration of the EU following the fall of the Berlin Wall and disintegration of the USSR was anticipated enthusiastically. Furthermore, the creation of the European Union in 1993 signaled to the world that Europeans are serious in advancing the ideas expressed by the Schumann Declaration\(^4\) of 1950 and subsequent treaties signed by European officials. Turkey found itself divided over the issue of European integrations after the 1989 Council decision, but it had its hopes high because it was aware of the strategic importance of European integrations. Turkey sensed hypocrisy on the part of EC which deemed Turkish progress so far as not enough to start accession negotiations (Dismorr, 43). Turkey believed that in comparison to countries such as Portugal and Spain who got positive answers in 1978, despite being democracies for only three years, it deserved more acknowledgment (Dismorr, 43).

Although Turkish application was rebuffed by the European Council, the negotiations between Turkey and EC on other important aspects of the Ankara Agreement continued undisturbed. In 1990, a landmark agreement on customs union was negotiated between the two. The customs union between Turkey and the EC came into effect in 1995 thus further connecting economies of the two (Dismorr, 44). Not long after the customs union came into effect, another crisis encumbered the relationship. In 1996, the new Turkish government headed by a well-known politician Necmettin Erbakan (Welfare Party) held a weak, coalition-based, incumbent which, surprisingly, ran on a more pro-EU

\(^4\) The declaration is viewed as one of the foundational moments in EU’s history. Made in 1950, it marked a revolution in post-WWII Franco-German relations and it called for economic integration of the EU states (thus providing raison d’être for the European Coal and Steel Community, EEC’s predecessor, to be formed in 1951).
platform (Erbakan was an anti-EU, openly Islamist politician) (Dismorr, 44). Erbakan’s political engagement was viewed unfavorably, to say at the least, by the military establishment. Not long after Erbakan’s government entered office, the military threatened to oust it from power. The way Erbakan’s government was removed stands as an example of volatility of Turkish political system, but also of the strength of the Turkish military. In an event commonly known as the “Post-Modern Coup”, the Turkish military, aware of strong pro-Islamic tendency of Erbakan’s politics, pressured the PM into leaving office:

On February 28, 1997, the National Security Council—which was dominated by the military—presented Erbakan with a list of recommendations to curb anti-secular activity. When Erbakan balked at implementing the recommendations, the military held a series of briefings and mobilized the secular establishment against him, eventually forcing him to resign in June 1997 in what has been termed a “silent” or “post-modern” coup. In January 1998, the Welfare Party was closed down, and Erbakan and his key lieutenants were banned from politics for five years (Rabasa and Larrabee, 44).

The ironically titled “soft”, or post-modern, coup ushered a new, and important, era in the Turkish politics. An era during which Turkey will experience the stabilization and reorganization of Islamic political activity resulting in creation of AKP in 2001 and stronger incentives for EU membership.

Although the 1989 Council decision not to accept Turkish application for candidacy stipulated that candidacy and the membership are goals of the EU-Turkey integration process, it did not elaborate on how long it would take before Turkey crossed another threshold on its road to EU. (Bogdani, 23). In 1997, Turkey believed that it would be included in the packet of EU’s “Eastern Enlargement” with countries of the former eastern bloc. The Luxembourg Summit of 1997 did not see Turkey acknowledged as a candidate which shocked Turkish high officials (Bogdani, 23). The main reason for shock was that the countries that were members of the Warsaw Pact only seven years earlier were
proclaimed by the EU to be candidate states. Turkey, after 34 years of accession, was cast aside. The Luxembourg Group of states became members in 2004 in the EU’s largest round of enlargement. These countries are: Malta, Cyprus, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia and the Czech Republic. In the aftermath of the 1997 Council decision, the top EU-Turkey dialogue was effectively frozen and the atmosphere of distrust veiled the talks on integration (Dismorr, 49). However, in a fortuitous turn of events, the stimulus for further integration came in 1999 at the Helsinki Council of the EU where Turkey was finally given the status of a candidate state. There were four main developments which allowed Turkey to be accepted as a candidate state at the Helsinki Council: the capture of PKK’s Öcalan in 1999 and the subsequent end of the Civil War in Turkey, a thawing in Turkish-Greek relationship caused by mutual assistance during earthquakes in both countries, election of Tony Blair as the Labor PM of UK and, finally, the agreement of Turkey and EU on accession of Cyprus to EU. Abdullah Öcalan was captured in 1999 in the Greek embassy in Kenya. His capture brought further deterioration in Greek-Turkish relations, but it also brought an end to Civil War in Turkey (Dismorr, 45). When Öcalan renounced the use of violence for political means, Turkey and the world sighed in relief (Dismorr, 45). The Greek-Turkish deterioration was not long as a series of unfortunate events ended serendipitously. Later in 1999, an earthquake hit Istanbul killing 20,000 people (Dismorr, 45). Greece was among the first countries to provide extensive humanitarian aid to Turkey which Turkey reciprocated only few weeks later when an earthquake hit Greece as well (Dismorr, 45/46). This led to a series of “taverna diplomacy” meetings between the Turkish foreign minister Cem and the Greek foreign minister Papandreous (Dismorr, 46). The meetings yielded a so called “U-turn” in relations between
Greece and Turkey which ultimately proved helpful for Turkish bid in the EU (Dismorr, 46).

Furthermore, the elections of Tony Blair, Gerhard Schröder and Jacques Chirac as the new leaders of UK, Germany and France, respectively, brought additional stimulus for Turkish EU candidacy bid (Dismorr, 49). Blair, Schröder and Chirac supported Turkish integration and viewed it as a strategically important European partner, something that would change just a few years later when a new generation of politicians entered their respective offices. Finally, the 1999 last-minute compromise on Cyprus put an end to doubts of whether Turkey should become a candidate. The deal came after months of negotiations. High EU officials (such as Javier Solana, the EU Foreign Policy Chief) abruptly flew to Istanbul on the day of the Council to convince the PM Ecevit to accept the deal (Dismorr, 51). As Ecevit was an old-school Turkish politician who also ordered Turkish invasion of Cyprus, he viewed the agreement as a betrayal of Turkish interest and weakening of Turkish position in Europe. The agreement on Cyprus stated that Turkey will not require the solving of the Cyprus issue (i.e. the reunification of the island) before Cyprus’ accession to the EU (Dismorr, 51). In return for Turkish acquiescence on this, the Greeks would not block Turkey at the Helsinki Council (Dismorr, 52). Even though many serious reforms still had to be implemented in Turkey (e.g. the abolition of the death penalty was not enacted until 2004), the EU Council was satisfied with Turkish progression towards the EU and the recently-achieved end of the Civil War. This, in combination with Turkish “yes” on Cypriot accession was a good reason for accepting Turkey as a candidate state at the 1999 Helsinki Council (Dismorr, 52). However, even though Turkey became
a candidate state in 1999, the EU-Turkey relationship did not progress steadily but continued on being a political rollercoaster.

5. Turkey and the EU post-Helsinki: Progress, Stagnation and AKP

The period after the Helsinki Council saw EU-Turkish relationship reach a new and reinvigorated phase. The backdrop of the Council’s decision helped improve the relationship. However, it also made it much more precarious as the dialogue now revolved not around Turkey becoming a candidate state, but about Turkey becoming a member state of the EU. Gamze Avci writes:

Before Helsinki, Turkey’s focused on becoming an official candidate without any particular strings attached and on an equal footing with the other 12 candidates. Naturally, after the Helsinki summit, with the granting of the candidacy, the issue of EU membership acquired a somewhat higher profile (Çarkoğlu, 156).

Intricate diplomatic games and last-minute deals saw Turkey and EU increasingly frustrated with each other thus contributing to further disillusionment of elites. Fortunately, the post-Helsinki era also saw a rapid change in Turkish society where during the 2002 elections a new party emerged as an indisputable political champion thereby providing a strong reformist stimulus which the EU welcomed. Development and Justice Party (the AKP), led by Recep Tayyip Erdogan, came to power in 2002. It marked a new phase in Turkish political life. With AKP’s rise to power, the potential coming of a post-Kemalist era in Turkey gained stronger footing in Turkish politics (Dismorr, 216). The emancipation of a religious, albeit secular, party in the Turkish electorate, and without military involvement, marked a profound and still ongoing change of political culture in Turkey. Strong and practical reforms conducted by PM Erdogan from 2002 to 2005 resulted in Turkey getting the date for the start of accession negotiations: October 3rd, 2005. The start of accession negotiations finally lifted Turkey to the status of a full-fledged candidate and
normatively strengthened its political position within the EU (Bogdani, 24). Looking back from 2005 to 2000, Turkey managed to overcome many issues and provide concrete reforms in the fields of human rights and economics. For example, in the early 2000s, under Ecevit’s government, Turkey experienced an economic crash followed by a historic contraction of Turkish GDP by 9.5% (Rabasa and Larrabee, 48). This was one of the main causes why Ecevit’s coalition government fell apart and new elections were called.

After AKP’s election, in only four and a half years, Turkey’s political landscape changed completely with the reforms implemented that saw the limiting of the use of death penalty and granting further rights to religious minorities (Dismorr, 64). The EU complimented the progress done after the 1999 Helsinki Council, but it did not view the progress as enough. The thirty-seven constitutional amendments passed in 2001 brought significant change to Turkish system, but they were not fully satisfying to the EU (Dismorr, 55). The Turkish government limited the use of capital punishment, but it did not abolish it even though the EU rules clearly demanded its prohibition (Dismorr, 55). Turkey made significant improvements on the rights of religious minorities as well as the 2002 reform of the National Security Council which saw the decrease in the number of military officials and an increase of the number of civilian officials (Dismorr, 55, 59). Despite hopes, the 2002 Copenhagen summit did not provide concrete conclusions for Turkey, however, the French-German proposal at the Council stated clearly that the decision on the date would be made in 2004 and that the negotiations should start a year after that (i.e. 2005) (Dismorr, 59). This disappointed Turkish officials, but it also encouraged them as it signaled stronger EU involvement and support in the process. The Copenhagen decision also alluded to the fact that the reform process is long and difficult, and that deeper reforms had to be enacted.
in order to advance to a new stage of integration. The government did not hesitate a moment and pushed for further reforms on the way, with Erdogan declaring that if the EU did not give Turkey a start date for negotiations, Turkey would move forwards with reforms even if that meant renaming them “Ankara criteria” (Dismorr, 91). Erdogan’s enthusiasm was not for naught, for many important public issues were brought to spotlight. The Kurdish issue was very important and the broadcasting on Kurdish and other minority languages in 2004 created positive impact in the EU thus confirming Erdogan’s reformist appeal (Dismorr, 62). The arrival of AKP on the political scene also marked a Turkish policy shift on Cyprus. Erdogan, upon assuming the office, stated that:” No solution on Cyprus is no solution!” thus indicating a more active Turkish involvement with the issue (Dismorr, 62). This led to massive Turkish Cypriot support for the 2004 Kofi Annan Plan on the reunification of Cyprus (Dismorr, 62). Unfortunately, all hopes on the reunification were quenched when Greek Cypriot voters rejected the peace plan on a referendum thus halting the process (Dismorr, 62). Regardless, Erdogan’s energetic and constructive role in the early years of his incumbent was noted by the EU.

In the lead-up to the October 2005 accession negotiations, we also must consider the political shift that were happening in Europe. During 2005, both France and Netherlands rejected the proposed EU Constitution in referenda. The EU Constitution was an unsigned treaty aiming to unify the legal basis of the EU. In that vein, the proposed EU Constitution would replace all the treaties (such as the Treaty on European Union from 1993) and create a single text that would be EU’s Constitution. Although the issue would be somewhat resolved in 2007 with the signing of the Lisbon Treaty (in effect from 2009), in 2005 this started a kind of existential crisis within the EU. Without a clear path forwards,
the EU lost vigor and strength to push Turkey to enact more reforms to advance further in the integration process. In addition to that, unlike 1997/8, when people like Tony Blair, Jacques Chirac and Gerhard Schröder led the three strongest EU countries, 2005 saw a political shift in two of them. Angela Merkel and Nicolas Sarkozy won elections thus becoming the Chancellor and the President of Germany and France, respectively. Both politicians opposed Turkish membership in the EU, with Angela Merkel proposing a kind of “privileged partnership” that would create a special association of EU with Turkey but without full membership (Dismorr, 65/66).

By 2005, the reforms in Turkey were stalling and EU was growing increasingly frustrated with this. For example, PM Erdogan’s proposal for the ban of adultery in 2004 sent shockwaves across Europe (Dismorr, 90). Banning adultery unveiled a deeper religious orientation cultivated by the pro-EU reformer. This will prove to be of crucial importance for the integration process later. The accession negotiations, however, continued as arranged; they commenced on October 3rd, 2005. Since then, the relationship in itself has become more normative but, paradoxically, even more unstable. Turkey has to satisfy the most rigorous accession criteria of all the former and current candidate members (Dismorr, 66). Turkey’s accession to the EU does not only rest on its compliance to the Copenhagen criteria, it is also contingent on Turkey’s human rights performance (Dismorr, 66). EU warned Turkey that in the case that its human rights situation worsened, the EU would freeze the negotiations immediately (Dismorr, 66). This only testifies to the level of scrutiny Turkey must undertake in order to become a member of the EU. Today, with only 14 out of 33 negotiation chapters opened in 11 years since negotiations started, Turkey remains the slowest-progressing candidate ever (Commission Report 2015, 86). This
further testifies to the level of internal and external obstacles Turkey is facing during negotiations.

There are plenty of reasons for why Turkey only opened 14 out of 33 negotiation chapters. One of them is the fact that some member-states, like France, froze negotiation chapters on account of their unwillingness to accept Turkey as a future member-state (Dismorr, 67). Cyprus issue, unsurprisingly, was the main reason for such a reaction. In 2006 Turkey banned the free movement of Greek Cypriots on its own territory (Dismorr, 67). Turkey refused to allow Greek Cypriots to enter Turkish airports and ports thus directly violating terms and conditions of the customs union (Dismorr, 67). This resulted in Council freezing eight negotiation chapters permanently (Dismorr, 67). Apart from the blockade, an additional issue which bothered EU was harsh Turkish reaction to public recognition Armenian genocide. The prosecution of Orhan Pamuk, Turkey’s first Nobel Prize winner, and murder of Hrant Dink, a journalist-campaigner, for recognizing the issue of Armenian genocide, sparked worldwide outrage and seriously harmed Turkey’s reputation (Dismorr, 103).

Turkey-EU relations since 2007 AKP multiparty elections victory have been rather unstable. With most of the chapters blocked by member-states until 2014, Turkey’s ability to progress in negotiations is seriously limited. Furthermore, the complicated situation arising from the government’s response to 2013 Gezi park protests, the Refugee Swap Deal and the coup attempt of 2016 has put the relations on an unofficial hold. The distancing between Turkey and EU is obvious. When addressing the AKP Congress in 2012, the then-PM Erdoğan did not include EU membership in his Turkey 2023 vision speech (Tocci, 4). This bodes well for many European politicians who hope that Turkey will quit the
negotiation process and accept the “privileged partnership” offer, but it does not bode well for all of those who see Turkish strategic importance for the EU. In 2014, Erdoğan became the President and in 2015 AKP won the multiparty elections thus signifying Turkish support for his politics. The AKP has become largely overshadowed by Erdoğan whose increasingly authoritarian and religious-oriented style of leading is diminishing all the reforms his party, and government, undertook in the early 2000s. From an early reformist, under the guise of stability of the state, Erdoğan became a more authoritarian ruler. This only made EU and Turkey grow more apart. In addition to that, Erdogan’s more public use of religion is scrutinized heavily in Europe. There is a strong political camp in the EU which does not see Turkey as a viable candidate due to its location, culture and religion, and it is growing stronger because of Erdogan’s public appearance (this will be discussed in later chapters- see “Refugee Crisis: The New Frontier?”).

However, even though they’ve grown distanced in recent years, both EU and Turkey are aware that they strategically need each other. The Refugee Swap Deal of March 7th, 2016, demonstrates this strategic need. The refugee crisis in Europe is causing a nationalist and populist backlash threatening the European order and its liberal democratic institutionalism. With people, such as Geert Wilders from Netherlands (leader of the PVV Party) and the UKIP party members in Britain on the rise, Europe’s own human rights credo is under threat. The refugee crisis moved EU to rethink its asylum policy as well as its cooperation with gateway countries such as Turkey, but it also challenged traditional European political establishment. Under the refugee swap deal, Turkey would receive 6 billion Euros in installments from the EU to manage the crisis internally (Toaldo, 2016). Furthermore, the agreement stipulated the “one in, one out” principle by which every
irregular migrant crossing from Turkey into EU (mainly Greece) would be repatriated by using EU’s funds, while Europe would, in exchange for that one, resettle one refugee from Turkey to EU (Toaldo, 2016). In addition to that, the EU guaranteed Turkey visa free travel regime in exchange for Turkey’s reform of its anti-terrorist law (Toaldo, 2016). However, due to the terrorist threat in Turkey, and the recent coup attempt, Turkish government is refusing to reduce the scope of the anti-terror laws (Aljazeera English, 2016). Namely, Turkey’s anti-terrorism law is much stricter and broader than EU’s and as such it impinges on certain human protected by the EU laws. For example, during the immediate aftermath of the attempted coup, Turkey arrested and imprisoned more than 35,000 people (the full extent of arrests is yet fully unknown as the situation is developing). Under the provision of Turkish anti-terrorism law, the state can imprison anyone deemed highly critical of its policies; targets usually being journalists or academics (Gotev, 2016). Turkey’s uncompromising attitude over the visa-free traveling is putting the refugee swap deal into question and is harming EU-Turkey relations daily; President Erdogan said in May that Turkey will not change its anti-terror laws for visas and that, if EU keeps on insisting on the change, both EU and Turkey can go their own way (Gotev, 2016). In the context of EU-Turkey relationship, this statement may prove to be prescient. More on Turkey’s and EU’s current state of play can be found in the next chapter titled “Current Situation”.

Chapter 2. Current Situation

1. Recent Developments

A complex and explosive mixture of misunderstandings, bad blood and unrecognized but shared interests has brought EU-Turkey relationship to a critical juncture (Aydıntaşbaş Leonard and Tcherneva, 2016).
This chapter will focus on the immediate, and largely unexpected, turn in the relationship between EU and Turkey during 2016. For quite some time now, Turkey and the EU have not been communicating well. Despite the plethora of mutual interests, it seems that both sides have developed a sense of each other, an intersubjective perception, which seriously hinders any kind of progress not only on the accession negotiations, but also in general cooperation on issues like Syria and IS. Whereas Turkey is trying to carve out a new, leadership, role in the Middle East for itself, the EU is trying to show itself as a strong ally in the war against IS, but also as a helper, a donator, and a factor of stability in the turbulent Middle East and its neighborhood. This, among other developments, has caused great frustration in Brussels with Ankara, and vice versa. The year 2016 brought three new significant developments that are impacting the relationship quite negatively: the slow implementation of provisions of the Refugee Swap Deal, the attempted coup in Turkey and its aftermath, and the rapidly changing situation in the Middle East, particularly Turkish involvement in containing Kurds in northern Iraq which goes against the West’s strategy. For the purposes of this chapter, I will focus on the refugee crisis and the post-attempted coup, because they have a direct relationship to the accession negotiations.

i. The Refugee Swap Deal

In the previous chapter (Chapter 1, “History”), I have briefly outlined the refugee swap deal signed in March 2016. The deal itself was negotiated by the Chancellor of Germany Angela Merkel and her Turkish counterparts (the then-PM Davutoğlu and, unavoidably, President Erdoğan). It signals a new turn in the relationship where both the EU and Turkey become more reliant on each other due to strategic interests (such as solving

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5 By the West in this context I mean the allied forces the US, EU and NATO
the refugee crisis). Furthermore, this deal signaled that Turkey is increasingly cooperating more with individual member states than with Brussels (the “capital” of the EU). The impasse of EU and Turkey after the signing of the deal further increased the divide between Ankara and Brussels with President Erdoğan remarking that if the EU keeps on insisting on the change in Turkish anti-terrorism laws, in exchange for the visa free travel of Turks to EU, both sides can go their own ways (Gotev, 2016). Since March of 2016, the implementation of the deal stalled, but it did not stop. The European Commission factsheet states:

So far, around 1, 614 Syrian refugees have been resettled from Turkey to Europe and around 578 irregular migrants have been returned from Greece to Turkey, in full respect of EU and international law (European Commission, 2016).

This is viewed as a disappointment given that the Commission forecasted relocations of more than 60,000 people (Toaldo, 2016). On the other hand, the deal was created under a lot of controversy between EU and Turkey on the visa free regime. As stated in Chapter 1, the benchmarks for the visa free travel set by the EU stipulate that Turkey must change its anti-terrorism laws in order for the visa free regimen to be activated. This, per Turkish officials, is unacceptable due to the situation Turkey is in, especially given the state of emergency introduced in July which has been extended from three to six months- that is, from July, 2016 until January, 2017 (Peker, 2016). It is both in the interest of Europe and Turkey that Turkish nationals get a visa free travel, but the crisis around the whole visa free regimen stymies the whole integration and cooperation process for not much gain. Only about 5 percent of Turkish nationals hold a biometric passport required for visa free travel to the EU, and it seems that the number of holders of biometric passports will not extend rapidly in the future (Aydıntaşbaş, Leonard, and Tcherneva,
2016). Indeed, 5 percent out of approximately 80 million people is a significant number, but it still seems unsuitable that for the past six months, the visa free regimen has become one of the main stumbling rocks of the relationship and progress. This testifies to the fragility of the relationship.

ii. The Aftermath of the Attempted Coup

Another issue which impacted the relations greatly is the attempted coup of July 2016 and its aftermath. On July 15\textsuperscript{th}, 2016, the segment of Turkish military, allegedly under the control of controversial Turkish Islamic cleric Fetullah Gülen, the leader of the Gülen (Hizmet) movement, attempted to overthrow the Turkish government. The President, Erdoğan, was not in Ankara or Istanbul, he was in a Turkish resort of Marmara on vacation when the attempted coup happened (Srivastava, Guler, Solomon, and Pitel, 2016). The non-presence of the President did not weaken the immediate governmental response to the coup attempt. The coup plotters aimed at either imprisoning or kidnapping the President, however, they failed with Erdoğan barely flying from Marmara into Istanbul (Srivastava, Guler, Solomon, and Pitel, 2016). Before flying to Istanbul, the President managed to contact Turkish media via FaceTime and call on the people to take the defense of Turkish democracy to streets (Arango and Yeginsu, 2016). The rest is history.

Today, the Turkish government maintains a firm grasp on political power in Turkey. The impressive way it mobilized the Turkish people in its support awoke further Turkish nationalism and support for the AKP government. During the time of the coup, even the opposition parties (CHP and MHP) supported the government with their leaders meeting the President and denouncing the coup (Aydıntaşbaş, Leonard, and Tcherneva, 2016). The EU reacted lukewarmly and belatedly; no high EU official visited Ankara and
it took EU one day to even address the alleged conspiracy and the failed coup (Aydıntaşbaş, Leonard, and Tcherneva, 2016). The Turkish government and the AKP leadership interpreted this slow and lukewarm reaction as support for the plotters (Aydıntaşbaş, Leonard, and Tcherneva, 2016). This further deteriorated the relationship. Turkish government began the swift resistance against the coup plotters. It blamed the controversial cleric for infiltrating the Turkish system (judiciary, military, government, bureaucracy) in order to create a “parallel state” with which he would then try to crush the existing Turkish political system and bring himself to power (Aydıntaşbaş, Leonard, and Tcherneva, 2016).

The way the government prosecuted people it branded Gülenists sent shockwaves around the world. The counter-coup purge lasted intensively for about a month, but continues up to date; more than 100,000 people have been detained or fired, many media outlets closed and companies confiscated (Aydıntaşbaş, Leonard, and Tcherneva, 2016). Many people who even dared to criticize the governing regime were arrested or interrogated; this is where Turkish anti-terror laws come into play for they define terrorism quite broadly as discussed in Chapter 1.

Euro-Turkish relationship after the coup has been on the verge of a breakdown. At one point, President Erdoğan indicated that he would support the reintroduction of the penalty as a form of punishment for the coup plotters were Turkish National Assembly to vote affirmatively on it (BBC, 2016). The European Commission threatened that if Turkey legalized death penalty as a mechanism for punishment of coup-plotters, the Commission would immediately suspend all accession negotiations (BBC, 2016). Luckily, this did not happen, but the relationship remained quite strained regardless. Turkish foreign policy after

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6 I use the word regime advisedly to describe a governing system, not a particular authoritative government.
the coup has taken up a new direction, argue Leonard, Aydıntaşbaş and Tcherneva. This direction focuses solely on containing and cracking down on the network of Gülenists in Turkey and around the world (Aydıntaşbaş, Leonard, and Tcherneva, 2016).

The EU integration process is no longer the most important thing in Turkey’s foreign policy. On the other hand, it seems like Turkish integration is no longer on the list of priorities for the EU as well. The EU did not respond vociferously against the coup plotters, probably because of great mistrust it has in current Turkish regime and its allegations against “FETO” (the Gülenist movement). This caused great diplomatic backlash from Turkey which moved towards resuming its relations with Russia in order to gain more support. Russian-Turkish relations have been strained in the past year due to Turkish shooting down of a Russian warplane on its border in November 2015 (Aydıntaşbaş, Leonard, and Tcherneva, 2016). President Erdoğan officially apologized to President Putin in the aftermath of the coup and Turco-Russian relations entered a period of a detente. Turkish and Russian thaw definitely did not sit well with EU officials who tend to view it as further evidence of Erdoğan’s increasingly authoritarian style of ruling. This makes EU distance itself even more from Turkey.

The misjudgment of EU towards Turkey and vice versa is caused not only by geopolitical and internal factors. Turkey tends to misjudge European Union in three crucial ways. First, Turkey seems to misunderstand that internal processes of the EU have to be regulated by the principle of intergovernmental cooperation where all 28 members must agree on proposed legislation (Aydıntaşbaş, Leonard, and Tcherneva, 2016). Second, Turkey seems to view the international system, particularly its surrounding, through a prism of power-politics, something argued in subsequent chapters (Aydıntaşbaş, Leonard,
and Tcherneva, 2016). It increasingly perceives itself as a powerhouse and takes aggressive stances, personified in President Erdogan’s public speeches, to achieve its interests. Thirdly, Turkey appears to misunderstand EU’s normativism, particularly when it comes to the visa free regime negotiations (Aydıntaşbaş, Leonard, and Tcherneva, 2016). This in particular causes frustration on the part of Turkey with the EU, but it also causes greater mistrust the EU has in Turkish foreign policy. If Turkey cannot follow EU’s benchmarks, then it cannot expect the visa free regime to function. On the other hand, the EU has to be aware that the Turkish integration process has become a great frustration for Turkey because of its duration (more than 50 years now). The EU must be aware that Turkey is a powerful state with significant soft power influence in the region and cannot be treated solely like a candidate nation but also like a strategic partner. Turkey must accomplish the EU norms in order to advance further to EU, but EU must also be more cooperative and unified in its positioning towards Turkey.

Finally, the current situation in Turkey is highly unstable. Even though both partners have a strategic interest in cooperating with each other, general frustration and misperception of each other’s goals seems to have further damaged any kind of diplomatic/political process. The accession negotiations are essentially stalled but not officially stopped which gives hope for their revitalization.


The EU Commission Report is a tool allowing the EU to assess the state of play between EU and Turkey, and provide guidelines for all potential candidate and candidate countries. It is a part of the annual Communication on Enlargement which presents an overview in one of the most crucial aspects of the EU’s politics; the enlargement process.
Although seemingly technical, the report is of crucial value not only for the EU to know what is the state of play when it comes to perspective member states but also for the perspective member states to understand their position in the whole process.

In Turkey, the report has had great significance not only politically, but also socially, on its path towards the EU. As the relationship between the EU and Turkey has two sides: a normative one (the accession process) and the constructive one (Turkey’s alignment with the West), the Commission report is an important element for assessing both parts because it tackles normative and constructive prospects of the relationship. The first such report for Turkey was created in 2000, the year after Turkey was accepted as a candidate state during the Helsinki Council, and the latest one was created in November of 2016. However, before proceeding on analyzing what the conclusions from the 2016 Report tell us about the relationship between Turkey and the EU, it is necessary to ponder on the role the report has had in forming the relationship during the past years.

The dynamic of Turkey-EU relations has always been uncertain at best, so the Commission report has often had positive or negative impacts on it. Anne Dismorr writes that after the first commission had been published in 2000, the report and the association have become a sort of a national obsession in Turkey (Dismorr, 56). Although the relevance of the report itself faded throughout the years as the relationship stagnated progressively- in the period between 2000 and 2005- the report was one of the most wanted documents by the Turkish press, and by Turkish population (Dismorr, 56/7). Today, the Commission report is largely ignored in Turkey, especially after the European Parliament’s legally non-binding decision to break off the accession negotiations (Aydıntaşbaş, Leonard, and Tcherneva, 2016).
The Commission report is a (de)constructive element in the relationship which juxtaposes two sides against each other; it reviews what is needed to continue the accession process, and it refers to the problems in the relationship. In this sense, the Commission report is of great help for two reasons: it helps us grasp the state of play in the relationship and it confirms the extent to which the relationship between Turkey and the EU is normatively constructed. As this thesis intends on analyzing the relationship from a constructivist approach, the report is crucial to understanding the nature of interaction between Turkey and the EU, for it allows us to measure Turkish reaction and to see EU’s expectations. In order to concisely analyze and present the report which spans more than ninety pages, this sub-chapter will focus on a part of the report called “Political Criteria and Enhanced Political Dialogue” which assesses the internal political processes and development of rule of law and democracy in Turkey.

There are three main conclusions in the 2016 Commission report on Turkey. The first one is related to report’s analysis of the situation in Turkey post-coup. The report not only condemns the coup, but also makes it clear that there are norms and standards Turkey needs to uphold in the aftermath of the coup as a candidate member and as a democratic country. The report constantly refers to the situation in Turkey after the attempted coup which is very interesting since EU has had a very lukewarm reaction to the coup itself (i.e. no high-ranking EU officials visited Turkey immediately in the aftermath of the attempted coup). Second conclusion is that the relationship between Cyprus, Greece and Turkey is still strongly observed by the EU. It is EU’s interest not to implicate Turkey directly in the matters of its member states, but it is also in its interest to let Turkey know that its position on issues related to Cyprus is important for the relationship as well as EU’s stability. The
third, and final, conclusion of this section is that the parliamentary system in Turkey is backsliding and that there has been a significant slowdown of parliamentary activity in the past year, especially after the coup.

The first conclusion of the “Political Criteria” section of the report is outlined as follows:

Following the attempted coup, very extensive suspensions, dismissals and arrests took place over alleged links to the Gülen movement and involvement in the attempted coup. There were reports of serious human rights violations, including alleged widespread ill-treatment and torture of detainees. The crackdown has continued since and has been broadened to pro-Kurdish and other opposition voices. The measures affected the whole spectrum of society, with a particular impact on the judiciary, police, gendarmerie, military, civil service, local authorities, academia, teachers, lawyers, the media and the business community. Overall, as of the end of September 2016, some 40 000 people had been detained and more than 31 000 remain under arrest, including 81 journalists. 129 000 public employees remain either suspended (66 000) or have been dismissed (63 000). Over 4 000 institutions and private companies were shut down, their assets seized or transferred to public institutions. Additional 10 000 civil servants were dismissed by decrees under the state of emergency at the end of October and further media outlets closed and journalists detained. Turkey also reached out to a number EU Member States concerning, for example the closing of schools and other institutions allegedly linked to the Gülen movement. In this context, there are reports of members of the Turkish diaspora living in these Member States being under pressure to report on other members of these communities (Commission Report 2016, 9).

Although the EU is strongly condemned the coup in the report, the tone of analysis of the situation post-festum is wary and watchful. The analysis of situation is, however, not only directed at the government’s interference across different levels of government, which goes against the constitutional separation of powers, but also at the stability of democracy in Turkey in the context of President’s amassment of power. Through very diplomatic and seemingly disinterested tone, the EU report criticizes the government for reprimanding Kurdish parliamentarians in November. This is seen as a crucial aspect of Turkish
government’s emphatic breakdown on Kurdish office holders in Turkey and a crucial aspect of abrogation of the rule of law in the wider political context:

The adoption in May of a law allowing the immunity of a large number of deputies to be lifted and the ensuing detentions and arrests of several HDP Members of Parliament, including the two Co-Chairs, in November is a matter of grave concern. (Commission Report 2016, 5).

Not long after HDP’s representatives in the Turkish National Assembly were arrested, the EU Parliament promulgated a groundbreaking, although legally non-binding, resolution to halt accession negotiations with Turkey thus sending strong signals to Turkish government (Aljazeera English, 2016).7

Second conclusion of the report which is important for our analysis refers to Cyprus, Greece and Turkey relations. Cyprus, as mentioned in “Introduction” (See Chapter “History”, section two), is an important part of Turkish foreign policy and national security not only because of its strategic location but also because of position of Turks outside of Turkey and Turkish relations with its neighbor, Greece. The report sends a strong message to Turkey to respect international law and agreements it signed, but also warns Turkey of its volatility towards Cyprus:

Turkey continued to express support for the talks on a comprehensive settlement between the leaders of the two communities, and for the efforts of the UN Secretary-General’s Special Adviser. However, in March and August Turkey made statements challenging the right of the Republic of Cyprus to exploit hydrocarbon resources in the Cyprus Exclusive Economic Zone for the benefit of all Cypriots. The EU has repeatedly stressed the sovereign rights of EU Member States, which include inter alia entering bilateral agreements and exploring and exploiting their natural resources in accordance with the EU acquis and international law, including the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. The EU has also stressed the need to respect the sovereignty of Member States over their territorial sea and airspace (Commission Report 2016, 30).

As we can see, EU’s policy on Cyprus is unchanged and is crucially supportive of Cyprus’ sovereignty over its entire territory. To Turkey, the idea of *taksim* (division), is still on the table because it sees Cypriot Turks as its national responsibility. In the same sense, Greece has a very strong influence on Greek Cypriot politicians and has used that political leverage many times during the unification negotiations (i.e. the Cyprus referendum on the Annan Plan in 2004- see chapters “History”, section 2 and “Cyprus: Identity, Security, and the EU-Turkey Relationship”). On the other hand, a quick and sustainable solution to the Cyprus issue is very important for Turkey’s accession to EU because it would ensure Greek and Cypriot support in the Council (or, at least, it would ameliorate their opposition) which is crucial for opening accession negotiations on eight chapters closed provisionally in December of 2006 due to bilateral relations between Cyprus and Turkey (Commission Report 2016, 7). Therefore, even though Turkish accession to EU is a complicated process in its own right, Turkish relations with Greece and Cyprus add another complex dimension to the whole process of accession negotiations as well as the EU-Turkey relationship (see “Cyprus: Identity, Security, and the EU-Turkey Relationship”).

The final conclusion of the report relevant for this analysis is that the Turkish National Assembly is not working properly, and that the parliamentary procedures, as outlined in the Constitution, are being hastened or stalled according to the needs of the ruling garniture. Such an assessment by the EU Commission speaks volumes of the visibility of the process of the disintegration of the rule of law in Turkey, under the leadership of AKP:

There was no progress in aligning the legal framework on elections and political parties with European standards. The 10 % threshold for parties to
be represented in Parliament is still in place. There were no further improvements to the rules on the closure of political parties following the 2010 constitutional amendments. Funding for political parties and election campaigns remains to be addressed in line with the recommendations of the Council of Europe's Group of States against Corruption (GRECO). Following the general elections in November 2015, four parties obtained a representation in parliament. 82 women members were elected in the 550-seat Parliament. A law aiming at comprehensive ethical regulations for members of Parliament, such as declarations of assets and rules on conflict of interest, has yet to be adopted (Commission Report 2016, 10).

Furthermore, the report states that corruption in Turkish political system is prevalent and that, when it comes to the members of the parliament, the parliamentary immunity is not being repealed for corruption accusations but rather for other issues deemed more important by the ruling garniture (such as the removal of immunity for HDP’s parliamentarians):

Parliament’s ability to perform its key functions of law-making and oversight of the executive continued until 15 July to be affected by political confrontation. Legislation was often prepared and adopted without sufficient debate in Parliament and without consultation with stakeholders. Following the declaration of the state of emergency and its extension, Parliament's role in the law-making process was limited. The influence of the Committees on Human Rights Inquiry and on EU Harmonisation remained limited even on draft laws with a significant impact on fundamental freedoms. There was no progress on reforming parliamentary rules and procedures. Media accreditation and the rules for inviting stakeholders to committee meetings continue to be applied selectively (Commission Report 2016, 11/12).

The 2016 EU Commission Report did not make noticeable impact in the EU-Turkey relationship this year. In fact, it was received lukewarmly and was not given much attention (and, therefore, importance) in the public. This is because EU and Turkey are probably in the most precarious moment in their entire relationship. Europeans didn’t give much attention to the report because it did not surprise them and Turks because they are giving less and less importance to the EU matters and are turning their political focus on Syria, Russia, and the US. The accession negotiations have been replaced fully in the
discourse by high politics (the Refugee Crisis, ISIS, Russia and Syria) and are mentioned often as a nuisance, a process that has been weighing down on both Turkey and the EU. Turkish President Erdoğan is keen on reminding Europe that he has other options but EU integration and EU is keen to stress to Turkey’s officials that they don’t feel threatened by Erdoğan’s rhetoric and continue with the “business-as-usual” approach to bilateral relations. However, this incongruous public rhetoric is a manifestation of various problems in the relationship- when two approaches to EU integration are so divergent, a process, which is in itself social, stalls. In the case of EU and Turkey, the process is almost dead, even though both sides are aware of its strategic relevance.
Chapter 3. Constructivism and IR: EU-Turkey Relationship is What Agents Make of It

1. Constructivism: Overview, Methodology, and Implications for the EU-Turkey Relationship

   i. The Main Tenets of Constructivism

   Constructivism is a theoretical approach within the discipline of International Relations Theory (hereafter referred to as IRT). Constructivism, argues Ted Hopf, explains a number of central themes in IRT such as the meaning of anarchy, balance of power, elaboration of power, and the prospects for change in international politics (Hopf, 102). Constructivism focuses on the role of ideas, norms, knowledge, culture, and argument in politics while stressing the role of collectively held (intersubjective) ideas and understandings of social life (Finnemore and Sikkink, 392). Therefore, constructivism is a view: “that the manner in which the material world shapes and is shaped by human action and interaction depends on dynamic normative and epistemic interpretations of the material world.” (Adler, 322)

   This subchapter aims at explaining the development of constructivism, accounting for its main tenets, and positioning it with regards to the research question of this thesis. Furthermore, we will contrast constructivism with leading rationalist theories such as neorealism and neo-liberalism in order to establish the conceptual difference between these theoretical approaches.

   Christian Reus-Smit identifies four main factors that have caused the emergence of constructivism in IRT:

   First, motivated by an attempt to reassert the pre-eminence of their own conceptions of theory and world politics, leading rationalists challenged critical theorists to move beyond theoretical critique to the substantive analysis of international relations. While prominent critical theorists condemned the motives behind this challenge, constructivists saw it as an opportunity to demonstrate the heuristic power of non-rationalist perspectives. Second, the end of the Cold War undermined the explanatory
pretensions of neo-realists and neo-liberals, neither of which had predicted, nor could adequately comprehend, the systemic transformations reshaping the global order. It also undermined the critical theorists’ assumption that theory drove practice in any narrow or direct fashion, as global politics increasingly demonstrated dynamics that contradicted realist expectations and prescriptions. The end of the Cold War thus opened a space for alternative explanatory perspectives and prompted critically inclined scholars to move away from a narrowly defined meta-theoretical critique. Third, by the beginning of the 1990s a new generation of young scholars had emerged who embraced many of the propositions of critical international theory, but who saw potential for innovation in conceptual elaboration and empirically informed theoretical development. Not only had the end of the Cold War thrown up new and interesting questions about world politics (such as the dynamics of international change, the nature of basic institutional practices, the role of non-state agency and the problem of human rights), the rationalist failure to explain recent systemic transformations encouraged this new generation of scholars to revisit old questions and issues so long viewed through neo-realist and neo-liberal lenses (including the control of WMD, the role and nature of strategic culture and the implications of anarchy). Finally, the advance of the new constructivist perspective was aided by the enthusiasm that mainstream scholars, frustrated by the analytical failings of the dominant rationalist theories, showed in embracing the new perspective, moving it from the margins to the mainstream of theoretical debate (Reus-Smit, 196).

At the outset of this quote, Reus-Smit identifies the division between the “leading rationalists” and “critical theorists”. The academic divide between the rationalist and interpretivists, or reflectivists, (postmodernists, critical theorists, poststructuralists, and feminists) was the most important struggle within International Relations Theory before the emergence of constructivism. However, the rationalists (that is, adherents to rational-choice theories such as neo-realism and neo-liberalism) initially took precedence in academic work because their theories seemed to account best for behavior of states in an international system. When constructivism emerged, the initial conceptual fog around it made it hard to discern from interpretive theories. Adler states that:

The reliance of constructivist International Relations Theory on interpretive social theory and vocabulary; the mistaken belief that constructivism, poststructuralism and postmodernism are all varieties of the same
‘reflectivist’ approach; the relative scarcity of early constructivist empirical research; and, most important, the debates within constructivism itself as to ‘what constructivism is really about’- all these have tended to obscure constructivism’s scientific basis, its preference for ontology and epistemology over methodology, and its potential contribution to a better understanding of International Relations (Adler, 320).

In that vein, constructivism was conflated with other interpretivist/reflectivist approaches in IRT. However, with time, it emerged to be one of the leading IR theories. We established earlier that constructivism relies on ideas, norms, knowledge, and ontology in order to contribute to International Relations. Because of its focus on ontological and epistemological categories in International Relations, constructivism is also referred to as “idealism” by academics. Therefore, constructivism’s conception of IR as a social science is essentially as ‘social’ rather than ‘natural’ (Adler, 320). Here lies the main distinction between constructivism and rational choice theories. Rational-choice theories focus on analyzing the IR through the lens of positivist, natural-scientific research. They assume that actors’ (individuals or states) interests in a system are exogenously determined meaning that they are pre-social in that they already have a formed set of preferences before meeting each other (Reus-Smit, 197). Therefore, in rationalist terms, society is shaped by material preferences and operates in a strategic domain (Reus-Smit, 197). The concept of strategic domain implies that, apart from being pre-social, actor’s nature, interests, and preferences are not altered in a society they live in (be it national or international) because they already have their interests embedded in them (Reus-Smit, 197).

In contrast to rationalists, constructivists argue that society constantly shapes actor’s interests, identities, ideas, and preferences in a process of mutual constitution of knowledge. That is, because actors in a system are of social nature, their preferences are constituted within that social domain. Adler concludes that:
Constructivists believe that International Relations consist primarily of social facts, which are facts only by human agreement. At the same time, constructivists are ‘ontological realists’; they believe not only in the existence of the material world, but also that ‘this material world offers resistance when we act upon it’ (Adler, 323).

What Adler infers here is that while upholding social reality as crucial for understanding preference and behavior-formation, constructivist argue that material things also help shape actors’ preferences and behaviors. Even though we have social facts, agreed upon by humans, material things matter in that they help form our preferences by resisting our socially constructed world. Rationalists do not acknowledge this. Therefore, constructivism offers itself as an approach that is not analyzing international politics *per se* (that is, it is not a theory of international politics only) but is trying to understand how society informs and influences the formation of international politics (Adler, 323).

In an earlier quote by Reus-Smit, we have acknowledged that the Cold War and its end was crucial for formation and establishment of constructivism. With that in mind, the slow thawing of the Cold War starting in 1970s and its end with the disintegration of USSR, stimulated alternative ways for explaining International Relations. Because the failure of the Cold War came so abruptly, many critics established that dominant IR theories during Cold War, such as neo-realism, could not account well enough for changes within International Relations (Fierke, 178). The static material assumptions about International Relations were challenged and those that centered around social dimension of international politics started gaining foothold in academia (Fierke, 178).

The static material assumptions about International Relations in neo-realism are as follows: the ordering principle of International Relations is anarchy meaning that there is no overarching body that moderates state behavior (Mearsheimer, 79). Because we live in anarchy, preferences of states are formed by its structure- that is, they are exogenously
given (Mearsheimer, 79). In that sense, because states live under anarchy, their behavior will be constrained, and stimulated, by its structure. Therefore, the main assumption of realist theories is that: “International structure emerges from the interaction of states and then constrains them from taking certain actions while propelling them towards others” (Donnelly, 35). Consequently, because states live in a self-help system, a logic of consequences models their behaviors. Logic of consequences is a principle which states that a rational act is one that will produce an outcome that maximizes the interests of the individual unit (Fierke, 181). Because states live under a self-help system in which the logic of consequences operates, they wish to secure their survival by amassing power for the sake of security (Mearsheimer, 79). States are, in a way, rational egoists able to create strategies for their survival while maintaining that their survival is dependent on the amount of power they can amass (Mearsheimer, 79-80). Finally, states form their preferences according to the principle of “relative gains” (Burchill, 65). This means that, because states under anarchy are rational-egoist actors, the only way for them to cooperate with other states is when they benefit more from that cooperation than other states do (Burchill, 65). In that sense, they will refuse to cooperate if they see that, relative to other states, they would not gain more from cooperation:

Anarchic pressures towards balancing and against cooperation are reinforced by the relativity of power. Power is control over outcomes, ‘the ability to do or effect something’. It is less a matter of absolute capabilities – how much ‘stuff’ one has – than of relative capabilities. Facing an unarmed man, a tank is pretty powerful. The same tank facing a squadron of carrier-based attack jets is not very powerful at all. The relativity of power requires states to ‘be more concerned with relative strength than with absolute advantage’. Bandwagoning seeks absolute gains, aligning early with a rising power to gain a share of the profits of victory. Balancing pursues relative gains (Donnelly, 38).
As states are utility-maximizers, this means that all they see in cooperation is utility for themselves and benefit for themselves. Neo-realists, then, reject the idea of morality in International Relations. For them, the logic of consequences is the main reason for why morality is unable to develop, or for why it is so fragile.

Although these principles are more prominent under structural realism (or neo-realism), neo-liberal institutionalism accepts them as its main principles as well. However, because neo-liberalism rests on Lockean tradition of liberal thought, rather than on Hobbesian one, the prospect for cooperation under anarchy is stronger. Neo-liberalism espouses a view of actors as rational agents whose main goal is peace (Burchill, 58). Following the Kantian and Lockean logics, neo-liberals assume that the laws of nature dictate harmony and cooperation between peoples (Burchill, 58).

Neo-liberals, therefore, focus on the spread of liberal-democratic values in international system for they believe that these values espouse the rule of law, establish universal morality, and create an international society thereby decreasing the probability for conflict and increasing probability for cooperation and trade (Burchill, 60). Development of trade relations and commerce would increase the chances of every state to prosper and would further decrease the probability of conflict (Burchill, 63). Unlike neo-realists, neo-liberals are reasoning that rational actors will opt for cooperation under self-help rather than balancing, or even self-sufficiency, by aiming to trade with other states (Burchill, 63). Commerce and trade, in their view, increase interactions between different actors and force them to understand each other better in order to improve cooperation:

Liberals have always felt that unfettered commercial exchanges would encourage links across frontiers and shift loyalties away from the nation-state. Leaders would eventually come to recognize that the benefits of free trade outweighed the costs of territorial conquest and colonial expansion.
The attraction of going to war to promote mercantilist interests would be weakened as societies learn that war can only disrupt trade and therefore the prospects for economic prosperity. Interdependence would replace national competition and defuse unilateral acts of aggression and reciprocal retaliation (Burchill, 63).

Therefore, because states would trade and develop connections under anarchy, they would be capable of forming common preferences and interests that would guide their behavior. Driven by this logic, leading neo-liberals, such as Keohane and Nye, have posited that by creation of institutions under anarchy, the states could form rules and norms that would reduce the importance of self-interests and self-help, and increase the importance of an internationalization, cooperation, harmony, and peace:

Accepting the broad structures of neo-realism, but employing rational choice and game theory to anticipate the behavior of states, liberal institutionalists seek to demonstrate that cooperation between states can be enhanced even without the presence of a hegemonic player which can enforce compliance with agreements. For them, anarchy is mitigated by regimes and institutional cooperation which brings higher levels of regularity and predictability to international relations. Regimes constrain state behavior by formalizing the expectations of each party to an agreement where there is a shared interest. Institutions then assume the role of encouraging cooperative habits, monitoring compliance and sanctioning defectors. Regimes also enhance trust, continuity, and stability in a world of ungoverned anarchy (Burchill, 63, 64, 65).

Because neo-liberals posit that states behave in the way that they do, states are by nature interested in “absolute gains” (Burchill, 65). For neo-liberals, absolute gains mean that states will desire cooperation irrespective of how that cooperation benefits other states (what will gain me the most?) (Burchill, 65). They argue that international relations are not always a zero-sum game and that states can benefit from cooperation mutually without needing to focus on relative gains (Burchill, 65). In that sense, the development of trade connections focusing on mutual development, and creation of institutions will develop something called “economic interdependency”. States, argue neo-liberals, who operate
within economic interdependency will realize that a) they are dependent on other states for their benefit and b) war will be destructive for everyone in the system (Burchill, 66). Neo-liberals believe, therefore, that by mutually upgrading each other’s capacities (which is a rational thing to do), states will create a sense of universalism and will be able to promote not only economic growth but also development of human rights and rule of law (Burchill, 66).

Constructivism is positioned as a “middle-ground” in the neo-neo debate (that is, a debate of neo-realism and neo-liberalism) (Adler, 323). This means that for constructivists, material interests and ideational structures (such as institutions) are not irrelevant, however, that they have a different conception of how those are formed. One of the fundamental tenets of constructivism is that the ordering principle of the international system (that is, anarchy) is what states make of it (Wendt, 436). It follows from there that self-help and power politics are institutions, not features, of anarchy (Wendt, 436). Therefore, unlike in neo-realism where anarchy hinders any kind of meaningful interaction amongst states, and neo-liberalism where cooperation and state behavior under anarchy are dependent on micro-economic modeling, constructivism posits that the mutual constitution of interests, identities, and ideas within an international system is a process of learning and adaptation which (in)forms, guides, and institutionalizes state preferences and behavior (Weber, 64). Unlike neo-realism and neo-liberalism which espouse a logic of consequences, states under constructivist theoretical approach apply logic of appropriateness. Logic of appropriateness states that what is rational is a function of legitimacy, defined by shared values and norms within institutions or other social structures rather than purely individual interests (Fierke, 181). In that vein:
It means that even if we accept the (neo)realist description of the world as an anarchical, self-help world, by supplementing this anarchical structure with the intersubjectively constituted structure of identities and interests, then neither anarchy nor self-help are meaningful terms prior to the social interactions of states. Anarchy and self-help only become meaningful once social interactions have taken place. And, because ‘people act toward objects, including other actors, on the basis of the meanings that the objects have for them’, and because the objects of ‘anarchy’ and ‘self-help’ have no meaning prior to state interactions, we will only know if anarchy and self-help will lead to conflict or cooperation once we know what states do socially (Weber, 65).

Constructivists argue that identities and interests are mutually constitutive in International Relations. Identities perform three essential functions in a society: they tell us and others who we and they are (Hopf, 103). Because identities inform us in that way, they strongly imply a set of interests with respect to choices of action in particular domains, and with respect to particular actors (Hopf, 103). While neo-realists and neo-liberals understand actors as pre-social entities—that is, entities that come with a set of preferences that may (neo-liberalism) or may not (neo-realism) be further developed—constructivists argue that actors are inherently social and that their preferences/interests are products of their identities which, in turn, are products of mutually constituted and commonly shared (intersubjective) knowledge in a social system of International Relations:

Constructivism shows that even our most enduring institutions are based on collective understandings; that they are reified structures that were once upon a time conceived ex nihilo by human consciousness; and that these understandings were subsequently diffused and consolidated until they were taken for granted. Moreover, constructivists believe that the human capacity for reflection or learning has its greatest impact on the manner in which individuals and social actors attach meaning to the material world and cognitively frame the world they know, experience and understand. Thus, collective understandings provide people with reasons why things are they are and indications as to how they should use their material abilities and power (Adler, 322).

We can see how constructivism differs from rationalist approaches in IRT. However, we also must answer questions related to constructivist methodology and its variations in
order to give a well-rounded account of this theoretical approach, and to position this work successfully within the realm of constructivism.

Unlike rationalists, writes Finnemore, constructivists do not engage in wars about various -isms in IRT (the neo-neo debate, for example) (Finnemore and Sikkink, 396). She writes that, on the contrary, constructivists follow prominent problems in world politics and debate how to approach these issues and how to determine what drives them (Finnemore and Sikkink, 396). Therefore, constructivism has a certain methodological flexibility when it comes to studying International Relations.

However, there is a distinction between different directions within constructivism, although these directions are not as divisive as in rationalist approaches. Hopf introduces us to different variants, as he calls them, of constructivism (Hopf, 102). These are conventional and critical constructivism (Hopf, 102).

Conventional constructivists, argues Hopf, desire to present an alternative to mainstream international relations by using reconceptualization of balance-of-threat theory, the security dilemma, neoliberal cooperation theory, and the democratic peace (Hopf, 103). Critical constructivists rely on critical social theory to substantiate their claims:

Work of “critical” constructivism has intellectual roots in critical social theory, including such figures as Anthony Giddens, Jurgen Habermas, and Michel Foucault. Although it shares the core features of constructivism identified above, critical constructivism adds a belief that constructions of reality reflect, enact, and reify relations of power. Critical constructivists believe that certain powerful groups play a privileged role in the process of social construction. The task of the critical scholar is both to unmask these ideational structures of domination and to facilitate the imagining of alternative worlds (Finnemore and Sikkink, 398). As we can see in Finnemore’s and Sikkink’s statement, the work of critical constructivism relies on ideas, discourse, power, knowledge, and culture to analyze
international relations. Hopf offers a remarkable insight into the world of critical constructivism by stating that:

Constructivism argues that both material and discursive power are necessary for any understanding of world affairs. I emphasize both because often constructivists are dismissed as unrealistic for believing in the power of knowledge, ideas, culture, ideology, and language, that is, discourse (Hopf, 104).

Therefore, as a work in critical constructivism, this thesis aims at unraveling social constructions that influence the relationship between EU and Turkey. Finnemore and Sikkink write that the goal of critical constructivists is not to establish, or test, new causal theories but rather to reveal the power relations between dominant constructions (Finnemore and Sikkink, 398). With that in mind, this work also aims at looking into different socio-historical concepts that guide the logic of appropriateness in the relationship between EU and Turkey. For that purpose, analyzing the language, behavior, representations, and constructions between EU and Turkey will be a crucial element of this work.

ii. Applying Constructivism to EU-Turkey Relationship

Turkey found its place in Europe and the West as an ally and a friend because it played a significant role in the defense against the spread of Communism. Led by a Kemalist ideology of modernization through westernization, Turkey became a founding member of many important western organizations such as OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development) in 1948 as well as the Council of Europe in 1949 (Stivachtis, 35). In 1952, Turkey also joined NATO, a fundamental western protection organization whose raison d’etre was countering the Soviet influence in Europe and the spread of communism to the West (Stivachtis, 35). Finally, its road towards EU
membership began in 1963 when Turkey became an associate member of the European Economic Community, a precursor to the EU and a fundamental organization of post-WWII European unity (Stivachtis, 35). Through these organizations, and its internal process of modernization, Turkey found its place in the West, and in Europe. After signing the 1963 Ankara Agreement that confirmed Turkish associate membership in the EEC, Walter Hallstein, the first European Commission president, concluded: “Turkey is a part of Europe” (Rehn, 2)! Turkish officials were satisfied because Turkey had finally become modernized, however, without knowing that becoming fully European will be an arduous and long process.

After the fall of the Berlin Wall and the disintegration of the USSR, European community downplayed the need of a security dimension:

European identity has been usually defined against the “Others”, such as communism during the Cold War. As Hettlage argues, Europe has achieved its unity and self-definition generally in response to the “others” (Öner, 23). However, currently there is a lack of commonly recognized cultural, geographical or historical “other” which makes defining Europe much more complicated (Öner, 23). This cultural memory of Islam as a foreign, romanticized, barbaric object perhaps does not have a straightforward influence in political-normative terms however, its social influence is very important when forming political narratives of Europe (see chapter “Turkey, EU, and the Construction of Identities”).

It is precisely here that the basis for my constructivist argument lies. Alexander Wendt wrote that “anarchy is what states make of it” in order to convey the message of anarchy as a social construct (Wendt, 436). In this sense, anarchy as the ordering principle of the international system is not a structure but rather a process in which states interact;
there is no “logic” of anarchy except for the practices that create certain structures of identities and interests (Wendt, 436). Accordingly, the European Union and Turkey are social actors in the accession negotiations. Turkey perceives accession negotiations in two ways: a) a logical course of action for modern Turkey would be to join European and Western institutions; and b) acceding into the EU would help Turkey politically and economically, and would strengthen its democratic institutions. European Union perceives accession negotiations as a will of one country to join the European family. Comparing and contrasting these two views allows us to see why accession negotiations are what EU and Turkey make of it. In one hand, Turkey has identity-oriented interests (e.g. modernization through westernization) and has genuine material interests (e.g. financial strength and profit). In other hand, the European Union is a normative institution which accepted Turkish candidacy on the basis of rational interests. However, because the European Union conceives itself as a family and as a community of values, the Turkish candidacy has become problematic as Turkey has been an agent of otherness in Europe for centuries. Adler writes:

The research agenda on security communities requires identifying those interstate practices and transnational forces that create assurance that states will not settle their differences through war. It also entails the notion that states will govern their domestic behavior in ways that are consistent with the community. Said otherwise, membership in the community is shaped not only by state’s external identity and associated behavior but also by its domestic characteristics and practices. For example, it would be very difficult for a European state to consistently abuse human rights and still be deemed to belong to contemporary ‘Europe’ (Adler, 345).

Constructivism posits that people act towards objects, including other actors, on the basis of meanings those objects have for them and, therefore, a state interacts differently with other states based on meanings those states have for it (Wendt, 437). It follows that
state actions depend on distribution of mutually constituted and shared understandings among two or more different actors. This distribution of knowledge creates an intersubjective image, an intersubjective understanding, the two have for each other. In constructivism, states are not pre-social actors who form their preference according to black-boxed economic models attempting to predict their behavior; they are essentially social players whose social knowledge (i.e. social facts) influences their behavior and, consequently, their interests. Although the European Union is an organization consisting of twenty-eight different social agents, its community of values is what makes it a unified social agent. These values are, for example, liberal democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights. However, the European Union consists of a certain set of twenty-eight members who relate to a similar history, similar religion, and a similar experience with Islam and the Ottoman Empire.

Therefore, this community of values has two logics embedded in its social identity; one is the logic of consequences which guides EU’s behavior in a rational way of maximizing one’s interests (Fierke, 181). Accordingly, the conflict which arises in EU over Turkish membership follows from both rational reasoning (i.e. Turkey’s alignment with the Copenhagen criteria) and the logic of appropriateness which relates to EU’s and Turkish identity (i.e. the concept of European family). Constructivism would state that the logic of consequences simply follows from the logic of appropriateness. Therefore, Turkish membership of EU is only apparently a technical issue and is rather an issue of the logic of appropriateness, the logic of culture. This assertion is supported by Yannis A. Stivachtis who writes that:

Order among European states was generated by agreement on not only international values, but also domestic values of a social and cultural nature.
This alternative source of order operates at a societal level rather than the level of the sovereign state. As it has been suggested, the logic of anarchy operates differently in the international system from the logic of culture and, therefore, the operations of the two logics produce different outcomes (Stivachtis, 17).

Therefore, we can see how constructivism can be utilized as an analytical model through which we can observe and study the EU-Turkey relations. As such a model, it allows us to create ideal-types which can help us analyze the relationship in a more specific manner. Earlier, we established that constructivism offers a “logic of appropriateness” explanation for relationships between the agents. Following that logic, this thesis will establish three essential ideal-type models that seek to demonstrate the basis for the logic of appropriateness in the EU-Turkey relations. The constructivist analysis of this thesis will rest on these three theoretical models. The three models are: Europe as a Security Community, Europe as a Cultural Community, and Europe as a Liberal-Democratic Community.

These three models will help us to unravel the social dimension of the EU-Turkey relations, and its effect on the accession process. However, following conclusions from our earlier discussion on constructivism and its central tenets, it must be acknowledged that the purpose of these models is not to create a testable theoretical model (see above). Rather, their purpose is there to guide us and help us understand the intersubjective held beliefs manifesting between EU and Turkey across different issue areas as presented in these models. Moreover, these models are not meant to be distinct issue-areas; they are interconnected and will manifest themselves flexibly within one another. Their interdependence does not make these models less original, or less important for analyzing the relationship, but rather it simply testifies to the idea that the relationship between the
EU and Turkey is a set of complex variables which can be understood because they have a common, social, basis.

That being said, we must concede that because the goal of this research is not to develop new theories but rather to analyze and unravel existing social power-structures in the relationship between EU and Turkey, the models presented below will not offer any predictions regarding the relationship.

Ideal-Type Analytical Models: Approaching the Complex Identity

i. Europe as a Security Community

The first analytical model, Europe as a security community, is a complex model because it seeks to outline how the construction of Europe as a security community affected the relationship between EU and Turkey. For the purposes of this thesis, this analytical model will present two main influences security had on the relationship between the EU and Turkey.

The first influence is the Cold War. The second influence is the recent refugee crisis which was conflated with terrorist attacks and resulted in securitization\(^8\) of the issues of refugees and securitization of Muslims in general. Through this model, we will be able to demonstrate how security is a social fact which can cause emergence or disappearance of different variables influencing the relationship between the EU and Turkey. For example, in the case of the Cold War, because of the security culture between 1949 and 1989, Turkey

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\(^8\) I use the definition of securitization as developed by the prominent Copenhagen School’s theory of securitization: “While securitization theory must be seen in the context of the shifting agendas of security, and as part of the broader theoretical movement to study the social construction of security, the Copenhagen School has developed a distinctive position within these debates. In securitization theory, “security” is treated not as an objective condition but as the outcome of a specific social process: the social construction of security issues (who or what is being secured, and from what) is analyzed by examining the “securitizing speech-acts” through which threats become represented and recognized. Issues become “securitized”, treated as security issues, through these speech-acts which do not simply describe an existing security situation, but bring it into being as a security situation by successfully representing it as such.” (Williams, 513)
was “European” and “Western.” However, after 1989, when the dominant paradigm was changed, Turkey’s cultural background and its historic role in Europe started emerging in a largely identity-based model of EU integrations.

During the early stages of the Cold War Turkey was seen as a part of the Middle East colonial sphere rather than a Western nation and an important ally (Martin, 14). This was caused by a strong sense of disappointment the western leaders (such as Churchill) had with Turkey's neutrality during the World War II (Martin, 14). Turkey had a few sympathies in Europe, and the US seemed indifferent towards early Turkish attempts at becoming visible in western security agenda (it was not invited to be a NATO member in 1949) (Martin, 14). Turkey’s case for western protection was not taken seriously and Soviet’s looming threat (following the British withdrawal from supporting Turkey) to Turkish sovereignty had made Turkish diplomatic appeals to the west stronger (Martin, 14). As Natalie Martin writes: “As Nikita Khrushchev later said, Joseph Stalin successfully frightened the Turks into the arms of the Americans” (Martin, 15). The Korean War occurred in 1950 and Turkey finally saw a chance to prove itself to the US. After sending a considerable number of troops to Korea, NATO’s doors to Turkey were left open until it finally acceded in 1952 (Martin, 15). Given Turkey’s location, and US need to access areas closer to the Middle East (such as the southern flank of Anatolia), Turkey became a viable member of the western security umbrella (Martin, 16). However, Turkey was not only a member of NATO, it also became a member of other European organizations such as the Council of Europe (1949) thereby making itself an invaluable member of the fight against Communism (Martin, 16). However, Turkey’s early achievements during the 1950s were not enough for it to become a member of the EEC/EC/EU in the years following 1963.
Martin states that this was due to the fact that Turkey misunderstood the idea of the EU and understood that as a valuable NATO member it could get *quid-pro-quo* from the EU on its path to membership (Martin, 16). As we will see, this would cause Turkey significant issues in understanding the normativism of the EU. Furthermore, the Cold War element downplayed Turkey’s cultural and historical ties with Europe, so the issues of identity were not a problem: “Geostrategic considerations after World War II meant that the evolving European integration project saw Turkey as “European” because it was a part of “Western” security and integration institutions rather than any integral European nature” (Martin, 6).

The relevance of culture and identity in relations between the EU and Turkey was not emphasized until after the Cold War. The end of the Cold War ushered an era of “culturalism” within international relations which meant that Turkish bid for integration in the western structures adopted a new dimension:

> The question of identity has had a crucial importance in the relations between Turkey and the EU since the end of the Cold War. In recent years, the opponents to Turkey's membership have based their arguments on cultural identity, although her eligibility for membership was confirmed in the Commission's Opinion expressed in 1989 after Turkey's membership application in 1987 (Öner, 123).

In more contemporary times, Turkey's relationship with the EU is influenced by another aspect of security: securitization of Syrian refugees and Muslims. Jocelyne Cesari writes in 2009 that:

> Anti-immigrant sentiment is common in many countries facing the difficulties of integrating culturally diverse populations. However, in European countries, this can degenerate into what can be termed more accurately *Islamophobia*. Because immigration introduces such a large proportion of Muslims into Europe, the anti-immigrant rhetoric of extreme right-wing parties has become markedly anti-Muslim. The French National Front has adopted an electoral strategy that associates Islam with terrorism. Jean-Marie Le Pen described the potential radicalization of Muslim immigrants in terms that implicated him for inciting hatred, but his party still came in second in the 2002 French election (Cesari, 4).
Therefore, because the discourse of securitization of Muslims and Islam was revived in Europe in the late 20th and early 21st century, it has become conflated with securitization of mainly Muslim refugees, particularly those from Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Morocco. This element is significant for the accession road of Turkey who has accepted millions of Syrian refugees on its territory. In addition to that, Turkey's accession road has become securitized because of the issue of immigrants through the recently-signed "Migrant Swap Deal" with the EU (see chapters "Current Situation" section I, and "Refugee Crisis: A New Frontier?"). Turkey is aware of the political leverage it has gotten by the deal, so it uses the possibility of opening its borders towards Europe to refugees as a threat in order for the EU to liberalize its visa system to Turkish nationals as well as to pursue the accession negotiations (Shaheen and Wintour, 2016).

ii. Europe as a Cultural Community

The second ideal-typical analytical model for analyzing the EU-Turkey relationship is Europe as a cultural community. This model is also dichotomous: the Islamic Turk and Europe, and Europe as a cultural-geographic area. This model is essential as it presents the basis for the social dimension of research into the EU-Turkey relations. Because it seeks to investigate and demonstrate socio-historic roots of the causes of “othering” of Turkey in the EU, and vice versa, it will serve to support the most fundamental arguments of this thesis.

The first category refers to the idea stemming from centuries of tense, warlike, relations between the Ottoman Empire and Europe, the idea of the “Turk”:

The "Turk" was seen as a pernicious force sent by God to scourge Christendom for its sins." To fend off this evil, all that was required was for Christians to repent, unite and take up the defense of the faith (Stivachtis, 25).
In combination with the image of Islam, developed through centuries of "othering" between Europe and the Islamic world, the "Turk" became a notable "Other" for Europe, a discursive element which is close (as Ottomans penetrated deep into the continent) to Europe but also far from it. The ideological unity developed by Europe in its fight against Muslims and the Ottomans was secularized in more recent centuries and was "culturalized" in a way that presented Muslim Ottomans as cultural-existential threats to Europe (Stivachtis, 25). As Europe grew more secular and technologically advanced, and the Ottoman Empire grew weaker, and "sicker", the idea of otherness was recentered from purely religious to civilizational dualities; Ottoman Turks were now perceived as uncivilized barbarians (Stivachtis, 31). This idea of the uncivilized Turks would haunt them even after the fall of the Ottoman Empire, hence the strong Kemalist drive to overcome such prejudices. Europe in the 20th century was less focused on Turkey than it was in the 19th centuries due to its own internal divisions ("The Iron Curtain" or the Russian Revolution), however, after the 20th century had ended, the European identity was restructured in a way that de-securitized it and re-unified it under the umbrella of the value-based European Union. In such an atmosphere: “The Turk surfaced once again as one of the candidate ‘Others’- and for many the one- in the European self-definition” (Stivachtis, 35).

Europe as a cultural-geographic area is another significant element of this ideal-type analytical model. As we have previously established, the discourse of religious and cultural duality between Europe and the Ottoman Empire, and later Turkey, was a carrier of much of political and social strife between the two. However, this strife also created a self-defining momentum in Europe, which still continues today, that fundamentally,
although not solely, rested on the idea of being ideologically unified under the umbrella of Christianity, secularism, liberalism, democracy, and technology. Therefore, Europe as we know it today, in its geographical terms, has been different throughout the centuries because of differing prevalent cultural discourses on Europe. The idea of the culturally "Other" (Ottoman) Turk helped Europe establish its cultural-geographic area, and consequently its own identity in relation to the Turk:

The first excerpt from above constructs Europe in the geographical sense of the words, with exclusive borders. In fact, it is through the exclusion of Turkey in geographic delineations that we are conveyed the idea as to where Europe's eastern borders lie. The second excerpt also engages in geographic construction ("it is not only a question of territory"), although with no explicit reference to borders. "European" borders, as with any frontiers, are hereby treated as contested social constructs that have been ascribed various different meanings in history. Similarly, "continents" are conceptualized as discursive constructions rather than fixed geographic entities that exist independent of the ways in which we talk about them. Hence, predicating Turkey as beyond the boundaries of Europe discursively constructs Europe as a geographically bounded area with strict delimitations as to who is in and who is out (Aydın-Düzgit, 132).

The notion of Europe as geographically distinct from Turkey was also aided by a cultural discourse on the Turk. By delineating Europe from Turkey (or Ottoman Empire) in both geographic and cultural terms we can see how the identity formation of Europe depended greatly, in binary terms, on the idea of "us" in terms of not being "them". Therefore, it can be concluded that:

In addition to the discursive construction of an essentially bounded "European" geography, both excerpts, through the usage of the topos of culture and the topos of history, construct Europe as a cultural and historical entity that is exclusive of Turkey." (Aydın-Düzgit, 133).

Although influenced by post-structuralist ideas, this argument has important implications for constructivism. As agents are social players, their identities are in the process of construction which is influenced by their interaction:
The integration process within the framework of the EU have influenced the identities of the Member States, simultaneously European identity has been in an ongoing construction process among the citizens of the EU. As [first name] Rosamond argues, the focus of the "EU-studies constructivism" is different from mainstream "international relations constructivism". "International relations constructivism" focuses on the dynamics of interstate interaction, security dilemma and the nature of anarchy, "EU-studies constructivism" focuses on the EU institutions which provide atmosphere of socialization, within which actors' interests are constructed (Öner, 41).

In that sense, we can see how Europe as a construct in terms of culture and geography can play an important role when constructing EU's material interests in the negotiations with Turkey. If EU already perceives Turkey as "other" at the start of the accession negotiations, then EU's behavior will be projected onto Turkey in a way that diminishes, or encumbers, its ability to satisfy the EU criteria. Therefore, we can see how constructions of Europe influence the construction of Turkey in EU and how constructions of Europe affect the normativism of EU. Speaking in constructivist terms, the logic of appropriateness influences the behavior of the EU member states and therefore EU to behave in a way which treats Turkey ambiguously; as an ally and a candidate, and as the “other”.

iii. Europe as a Liberal-Democratic Community

The third, and final, ideal-type model that will be used to study EU-Turkey relations in constructivist terms is Europe as a liberal-democratic community. This ideal-type model will treat EU as essentially a community of states with liberal-democratic values which were normativized through the Copenhagen criteria instituted in 1993. This model treats liberal democracy as a:

It has been difficult to recognize this problem because for almost a century in the West, democracy has meant liberal democracy- a political system marked not only by free and fair elections, but also by the rule of law, a
separation of powers, and the protection of basic liberties of speech, assembly, religion, and property (Zakaria, 22).

Although the EU member-states have different issues which make them more or less liberal democracies, I intend on treating the EU as a community harboring liberal-democratic values. In that sense, for the purposes of this thesis, particular "illiberal" turns in some member-states of the EU (such as Hungary) will be omitted and a general picture, focused on the *acquis communautaire*, will be central to this ideal-type analytical model. There are also two aspects to this ideal-type analytical model. The first one is the relationship between EU’s proscriptions on the rule of law and the rise of illiberalism amongst Turkey's neo-conservatives, primarily in the leading Justice and Development Party (the AKP Party). The second one deals with the rise of religiosity in Turkey and its influence on the secularism of the country. I intend on examining whether the ideological focus of the AKP party threatens the long-established practice of laicité in Turkish political-judicial system and as such causes shifts in Turkish political-social system which the emphasizes the cultural distance between Turkey and the EU.

The relationship between the EU and Turkey has taken an abrupt and genuinely disconcerting turn in the past year as a result of the global events such as the refugee crisis and due to the recent attempted *coup d’état*, which significantly changed Turkish political life. Both, in combination with the ruling party's dubious political practices, have caused worries "at home", in the EU, that Turkey is becoming an increasingly authoritarian state, going above and beyond to centralize the power in the hands of one party and one man, President Erdoğan. Martin writes that:

The current political situation in Turkey, in which power is increasingly concentrated around the office of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, is very far removed from the liberal democratic ideal enshrined in the Copenhagen criteria. The technically correct "democracy" of Turkey is being
undermined in EU terms by the authoritarian tendencies of its democratically elected leader. Ironically, the illiberalism of the AKP is at least partly responsible for its electoral success. Those who have benefited from the policies of the AKP in terms of economic success and health, and social welfare reform, have limited sympathy for the Kurds and the urban secular elite which, they feel, had previously ignored them (Martin, 170).

The technically correct "democracy" mentioned by Martin is a reference to a series of controversial events in Turkish socio-political life which have caused the world, and the EU in particular, to seriously doubt the AKP and Erdoğan, in their attempts to reform the Turkish society, and make it more democratic. In the aftermath of 2007, when the relationship between the EU and Turkey lost its vigor, Turkish political and social life has been hit with four main events that have confirmed her illiberal turn: the Ergenkon and Balyoz corruption affairs, the Gezi park protests, and finally, the aftermath of the attempted coup d’état in 2016. For the purposes of this analytical-model, I shall only include the last one as it is the most relevant one for the current relationship between the EU and Turkey. The aftermath of the coup, which is ongoing, has seen a serious crackdown on the liberties of Turks who disagree with AKP’s leadership of Turkey, and who are openly critical of government’s policies. To date, the emergency state in the country has been extended three times (and is still lasting), more than 40,000 people have been arrested, out of which there were 194 journalists and around 1500 deans resigned from various Turkish universities (Aydintasbas, 2016). The response from the EU has been highly critical. In the chapter "Current Situation", I outlined the most recent EU Commission Report on Turkey’s progress towards the EU membership which concluded essentially that the most recent developments in Turkey are not in line with the Copenhagen criteria and that its treatment of prisoners is not in-line with the rule of law clauses which EU finds fundamental to its values (see "Current Situation", section ii). This analytical-model seeks to investigate how
Turkey's illiberal turn affects its membership candidacy in not only material terms, but rather against a backdrop of interplay between the two before-outlined models, and how its image in Europe is critically dependent on the state of liberalism within its democracy.

For the second aspect of this model, I intend on investigating the ideological basis of AKP as a party, and how their recent actions testify not only to Turkey's growing illiberalism but also its growing religiosity in public and political terms. As Turkey is a country with a strong secular legacy which was protected by the military for more than eighty years of its independence, it is interesting to see how AKP party, with support of the European and international partners, instituted an agenda which slowly, but surely, changed the religious and political landscape of the Republic. Although AKP seeks to incorporate secularism in its ideology because it respects the principles of state-church separation, its increasingly using religion in daily political life to legitimize its neo-conservative platform amongst its voters who come from mostly rural, or traditional areas of Turkey (Ertuğrul, 162). In that sense, the AKP party is increasingly modelling its politics according to the identitarian principle which constructs Europe ideally as a union which "others" Turkey, but also uses the same elements Europe others in order to legitimize itself as the defender of Turkish democracy and its peoples:

As David Gardner wrote in the Financial Times, by 2010 Erdoğan was displaying a “swaggering populism” and, while this may have alienated some of the educated middle class who had been attracted by the initial promise of liberal Islam, it remained popular with the Anatolian rump of AKP support. Such popularity, the need to maintain it and the need to consolidate its power base against Kemalist onslaught encouraged the AKP down the path of authoritarianism that has been outlined above. With repeated electoral success, the AKP no longer felt the need to pander to liberal concerns either within Turkey or abroad. In so doing Erdoğan squandered “a golden opportunity to widen and deepen reform (Martin, 179).
This quote illuminates perfectly the importance of studying AKP’s populism against a backdrop of the EU reform. By instigating stronger and stronger populism, the AKP legitimized itself more in the eyes of the voters, however, on the other hand, it fought the reform system harder in order to maintain the status quo and increase its power-hold. This resulted, with the aid of economic and foreign-policy successes of Turkey, in AKP’s being perceived as a power generator of the strong Turkey, independent Turkey, neo-conservative Turkey, which did not need Europeans who already perceived Turks as barbaric, and “othered” them. This combination of pro-Western, albeit staunchly nationalistic, conservative, and moderately Islamic (although many would argue “moderately”) stances helped AKP shift political currents in Turkey away from the predominant Kemalist-secular political wing led by the CHP (the Republican People’s Party) and into a discourse of fight for neutrality of state, and military, in the face of religious freedoms in a country with a strong and powerful leader legitimized by people’s votes. The place for EU in this discourse is vague; it serves as an ideal construction against whose perceived hypocrisy AKP defines its legitimate Turkishness, but it is also an ideal-construction of civilized west to which Turkey still strives to became a part of.

I. Table Presentation of Ideal-Typical Analytical Models

This table seeks to illustrate and simplify the meaning of ideal-typical analytical models presented above. It is a useful scheme to follow throughout this thesis.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Europe as a Security Community</th>
<th>Turkey presented as a member of the Western security umbrella as well as European nation due to security/geopolitical interests in the</th>
<th>Turkey securitized through the prism of the refugee crisis. The securitization of immigrants is conflated with securitization of Islam. The end-result is a discursive</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

82
| Europe as a Cultural Community | The “Turk” is “othered” in a long-term process of Europe’s struggle with Islamic foes. This process was secularized and changed in more contemporary times to the idea of the “uncivilized” Turk. Due to the Cold War this aspect was downplayed, however, in the aftermath of the 1990s, the “otherness” of Turkey became increasingly emphasized. | Europe as a cultural-geographic area is a social, not a scientific construct. Because Europe was united in the face of the Islamic threat throughout the history, the borders of Europe were essentially the borders of the Christian culture. This played into the “othering” process which signified everything outside of these borders as non-European and comparatively less significant. |
| Europe as a Liberal-Democratic Community | The European Union is conceived of as a liberal-democratic project. This idea is evinced in the Copenhagen criteria, established in 1993. Turkey is a democratic state, however, it’s increasingly illiberal turn is pushing it further away from the EU and is playing into the process of cultural/social “othering”. | AKP’s neo-conservative ideological template seeks to take elements of liberal-democratic order by removing the “military” factor in protecting the Constitution and secularism, however, it is also legitimizing its conservative and illiberal power-hold by using these values in combination with populism. The end-result of this process is further distancing from the |
EU as Turkey’s reform process stalls and the status quo is justified by the EU’s “othering” of Turkey as a non-civilized and non-European state/society.

2. Conclusion

Finally, we can see how relevant and how cogent a constructive argument for analyzing EU-Turkey relations is. From the above-demonstrated examples, one can understand that the process of Turkish accession has changed over the years; as the paradigm shift in Europe changed from collective security to collective identity, Turkish candidacy has become a burden on the homogeneity of the EU. Constructivism does not ignore the real material issues of Turkish candidacy such as Turkey’s size, its political issues, and its non-compliance with certain EU provisions (i.e. the rule of law), but it adds a social dimension to the relationship that is a precursor to material interests. By applying constructivist models in studying the EU-Turkey relations, one can unravel the vast complexity of socio-material identities and interests in a methodological manner, and is also able to make a strong argument for why Turkey is not seen as a viable candidate member by the EU member-states. On the other hand, applying constructivism can help us understand certain changes in Turkey itself which have caused a political and social shift in the country. We can further discern the complexity of the relationship by stating that the above-outlined ideal-typical analytical models are simply inextricable from each other. By analyzing the relationship from the standpoint of the analytical model of Europe as a security community, we are not precluding the model of Europe as a cultural community.
but are rather stating that both models, including the one of Europe as liberal-democratic community, are mutually reinforcing each other. However, we can also see that neither of the models takes precedence in predicting which way the relationship will go. By using the security-analytical model we can assume that the relationship will be securitized in the future, however, we cannot predict which way this securitization will go, or whether the securitization will have stronger influences on the accession process. In addition to that, by interpolating the cultural and security model with the liberal-democratic model, we can see that all of them indicate to a negative outcome in the relationship but without exactly predicting the end-result of the process. In the end, this thesis will strive to demonstrate that even though constructivism, and the subsequent models, cannot predict the future of the EU-Turkey relationship, they can be utilized to help us understand more closely the EU enlargement process from an aspect of socialization.
Chapter 4. Issues

Subchapter 1. Turkey, EU, and the Construction of Identities
   1. Introduction

   This chapter functions as an analysis of the issue of identity construction which affects the EU-Turkey relationship. This thesis is a work in critical constructivism (see chapter “Constructivism and IR: EU-Turkey Relationship is What Agents Make of It”) and as such beckons identity as the referral point in state behavior. The EU-Turkey relationship has, as we will see, weathered many international political changes (such as the end of the Cold War) that have impacted EU and Turkey in many ways. This chapter will seek to unravel and present one of the most important aspects of the EU-Turkey relationship- that is, the process of formation and reconstruction of the intersubjective knowledge EU and Turkey have of each other. In that sense, what this chapter will do is to present concepts of crucial importance for understanding EU’s and Turkey’s preference formation against a backdrop of their intersubjective knowledge, and meaning that that knowledge has produced.

   Therefore, this chapter will elaborate on concepts such as Turkish-Islamic Synthesis, Kemalism, and the other “Turk” as they pertain to the EU-Turkey relations. Furthermore, it will offer an insight into changing political landscape of Turkey as well as EU’s contemporary vision of Turkey’s role in EU integrations. This chapter will also seek to expand upon the role of religion in politics, especially against a backdrop of the EU-Turkey relations. In that sense, concepts of Turkish-Islamic Synthesis and Kemalism will be contextualized within the historical-social patterns of change in the post-Ottoman Turkish society. The role of religion is crucial for understanding identity formation in the case of EU-Turkey relations, so it beseeches further attention.
When it comes to the analytical models as presented in the chapter on constructivism, this chapter will be most connected to the model of Europe as a cultural community. However, as we have established earlier, all three analytical models from the chapter on constructivism are intertwined, where model of Europe as a cultural community does not preclude the model of Europe as a security community but rather plays into that model by stating that the role of culture and identity-formation is crucial when forming, for example, security-oriented policies.
1. The “other” Turk

The idea of the “other” Turk signifies the process of construction of Turks as the main diametrical opposites of the European self. The concept was developed in academia during the 20th century, its formation stimulated by studies of European identity through the prism of European discourses on other civilizations and cultures whom Europe historically interacted with. Paul T. Levin in *Turkey and the European Union: Christian and Secular Images of Islam* identifies the creation of Turk through four different phases of changes in meaning of Islam in Europe:

First, Ottoman Turks gradually took over the role as Europe’s and Christendom’s primary Muslim ‘Other’, inheriting the roles discussed above that formerly were used to depict Saracens, Agarenes, and Ishmaelites. Second, the growing European interest in the classical heritage introduced ancient Greek frames of references with which the Christian meta-narrative could be reinterpreted and elaborated by including new roles such as that of the *barbarian*. However, this development did not constitute an eclipse of the Christian worldview by a radically different secular humanism: the mostly Christian humanists retained the basic elements of medieval Christian images of the Saracen even as they rearticulated them in classical terms and applied them to the Ottoman Turks. Third, the classical revival in Renaissance in Europe involved the transfer of ancient Greek frames but also more recent- and very hostile- Greek Orthodox representations of the Ottoman Turks who conquered Constantinople in 1453 and vanquished the Eastern Roman Empire. Finally, beginning in the fifteenth century many European representations of Turks were shaped as much by the proximity of the Ottoman military threat as by the European context of growing theological divisions between Catholics and Protestants (Levin, 81).

Therefore, the model of the “Turk” was created early on in Europe’s history to define its historical “other” and help build its solidarity in the face of a Muslim-Ottoman threat. However, although many argue that the creation of Europe’s identity goes on the principle of “us” versus “them”, the importance of the “Turk” is not measured in its binary value for creation of the European identity (i.e. “us” versus “them” being a constant historical variable) but rather in the degree to which “us” versus “them” matters as a model
allowing Europe to distinguish itself from others (Öner, 23). Therefore, distinguishing Europe against the model of the Turk was important-to a different degree- in different phases of Europe’s history for creation of the European identity.

Consequently, representations of Turks in the European discourse have had three main phases. The first one was through the prism of religion where Turks were represented as the Islamic other to the European Christian self (Öner, 118). This period lasted from the Crusades until the 19th century (Öner, 118). The second one was based on the idea of civilization and it lasted from the 19th century until the period between the two world wars (Öner, 118). Because Turkey was reformed as a young nation-state, the idea of the Islamized Turk was recentered as a constitutive “other” of Europe (Öner, 118). Danielle Kuzmanovic in *Religion, Politics, and Turkey’s EU Accession* identifies the civilizational othering of Turkey in terms of:

The latter, among other right wing, nationalist, and conservative circles, argue that Turkey belongs to another civilizational realm, defined by cultural and political values that are fundamentally different from those shared by the EU member-states. The country, therefore, has no place in the EU. The difference, in their view, has much to do with Turkey being predominantly Muslim and with an Islamic historical heritage (Kuzmanovic, 42).

Finally, the third prism of construction of the Turk in Europe is through culture (Öner, 118). This period started after the Cold War when culture as a means of constituting the European “family” was introduced as the most important aspect of European identity.

Today, Europe does not have such a strong “other” to distinguish itself from. The EU integration process has expanded Europe and the fall of the Cold War displaced the ideas of the Western vs. Communist East division. The concept of the “Turk” was also diminished because Turkey emerged as a candidate state for EU membership. Despite the fact that the model of the “Turk” still exists (and it could be argued that it is reinforced now
in the face of Turkey’s increasingly illiberal politics), its meaning for Europe was recentered in a way that it no longer constitutes the main opposing value to Europe’s “self”. In that sense, although the “Turk” seems like an outdated model and its relevance for EU-Turkey relationship is often considered insignificant, we have to recognize that, given the cultural construction of Europe as a “family”, the “Turk” was simply recentered due to socio-political factors (such as the expansion of the EU and Turkey’s candidacy for membership in the EU) and still operates in the political discourse of the relationship. It operates most prominently on the political (center)-right in Europe, as we have established earlier, and the political center-right of Turkey (see “Public Opinion”, section I). For example, it is used in Turkey’s political discourse to legitimize increasingly illiberal policies of the ruling regime (concomitant with the idea of “fortress Europe”, see chapter “Refugee Crisis: The New Frontier?”). In Europe, it operates within the criteria of recognizing Turkey’s Europeanness. Levin writes that Turkey was considered to be in Europe but not a part of Europe which indicates the way in which its Europeanness is measured (Levin, 162).

Verdicts on the cultural Europeanness of Turkey as a precondition for its EU membership have been centered on the basis of Europe’s historical, social, political, and militaristic experience with the Ottoman Empire, and later Turkey. In that sense, the “Turk” was always in touch with “Europe” but was never considered to be European itself. In the chapter on the Cyprus issue, we have described a case of French use of the “otherness” of Turkey for practical purposes. Citing Turkey’s incompatibility with the EU, France froze multiple negotiation chapters thus encumbering Turkey’s accession negotiations process (see chapter “Cyprus: Identity, Security, and the EU-Turkey Relationship”).
This only testifies to the visibility of cultural component of EU-Turkey relations. Although accession negotiations are simply a part of the larger EU-Turkey relationship structure, they are a significant part of the relationship and constitute a genuine example of Turkey’s becoming a part of Europe. Therefore, blocking the accession road while citing cultural difference is case *prima facie* of the political influence of the constitutive process of othering Turkey in Europe.

2. Kemalism

Kemalist state ideology is a political ideology based on the philosophies developed by Mustafa Kemal Pasja (Atatürk⁹) during his presidency of Turkey (from 1923 to 1938). Netherlands Scientific Council for Government Policy (NSCG), in their report titled *The European Union, Turkey, and Islam*, establish that Kemal’s ambition was to modernize the Turkish nation and launch it into the mainstream Western culture (NSCG, 47). With that in mind, Kemal aspired to reach the accepted standards of civilization by bringing the new nation-state socially and culturally closer to Europe (modernization through westernization). He abolished the caliphate (administration of the Muslim community) and put *ulema* (religious scholars) under the control of the *Diyanet* (state institute for administering religious matters) (NSCG, 47). He prohibited movement’s outside the state control (such as Sufi’s), reformed the sharia-informed family law in a way that it represented the Swiss civil code¹⁰, banned Islamic symbols (such as the *fez*, traditional headdress of men), and closed theological faculties (NSCG, 47). He essentially established a strong secular state with principles of *laicité*:

Turkey was thus the first Muslim-majority country to declare itself secular and to make the separation of politics and religion an official policy.

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⁹ In Turkish, this means “the father of Turks”.
¹⁰ A codified law in Switzerland establishing provisions for regulating relations between individuals.
Having demoted Islam, however, Atatürk needed some other principle to unify his new country, so he elaborated an ideology that sanctified six isms: nationalism, secularism, reformism, statism, populism, and republicanism (Ansary, 301).

Kemal’s reforms were not *sui generis*. They were a part of the process of Westernization of the Ottoman Empire before its fall in 1918. In that vein, the *Tanzimat* reforms 11 which intended to modernize the ailing Ottoman Empire and save it in the face of nationalist upsurges in its territories. The Tanzimat reforms yielded the first written constitution of the Ottoman Empire in 1876 (interestingly, at the same time as most of Europe was experiencing its “spring”, it appears that the *sick man of Europe* was reforming as well) (NSCG, 48). After the fall of the Ottoman Empire, Mustafa Kemal took the ideals of modernization and applied them on to the new Turkish nation citing achieving the standard of civilization as the *raison d’être* of the new Turkish state (NSCG, 470).

3. Turkish-Islamic Synthesis

In the chapter on history of the EU-Turkey relationship, I portray Turkish-Islamic Synthesis as a political tool used by Turkish military in the aftermath of the 1980 coup d’état to portray secular values as inherently found within Turkish Islam (see “History”, section 3). Turkish military used the idea of the synthesis to ameliorate its harsh public image in the aftermath of the coup. Furthermore, the establishment of the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis as an ideology followed a fall of the “National Vision” (*Mili Görüş*), an Islamic political program within Turkey aiming to represent traditionally-minded citizens who considered themselves unrepresented in the existing political spectrum (that is, from 1960s until 1980s) (NSCG, 50). The National Vision focused on strengthening ethics and morals

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11 A series of administrative reforms carried between 1839 and 1876 intending to modernize the Ottoman Empire.
in education and upbringing, fighting usury and corruption, abolishing articles in the constitution and criminal law that penalized the political use of religion, and freeing religion from state control (NSCG, 50). Turkish military viewed this kind of political program (spearheaded by Necmettin Erbakan—see “History”, section 4) as a dangerous form of populism aimed at reversing the modernizing course of the nation and its secularism (NSCG, 51). Turkish-Islamic Synthesis, therefore, was utilized by the military to counter the National Vision. Its ideology stressed strong Turkish identity, unity, harmony, military, and authoritarian values (NSCG, 51). While it presented Islam as an ‘enlightened’ religion (open to science, for example), it also affirmed strong state control over it, unlike the National Vision program (NSCG, 51).

The importance of the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis as a political program during 1980s and early 1990s is found in the ironic fact that it allowed economic modernization and liberalization of Turkey (see “History”, section 3), which further allowed many conservative-minded people to move into urban areas and gain more economic, and political power (NSCG, 51). Today, the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis is credited for allowing AKP’s voting base, for example, to be more prominent in the face of secularist criticism. This has important repercussions for the EU-Turkey relationship because the changing socio-political landscape in Turkey influenced the state of play between the two (see below).

4. Turkish Political Landscape and its Effect on the EU-Turkey Relationship

The changes in Turkish political landscape are a result of three distinct social issues. First, the socio-political reaction to Kemalism and its authoritarian undertones. Two,
Turkey’s EU-integration process combined with Turkey’s increased economic performance and mobility of its citizens. Three, the resurgent nationalist-Islamism rhetoric in the AKP government as a result of accumulation of power and disillusionment with EU integrations.

Traditionally, Turkish political players could have been divided on to two main cleavages, as identified by Meltem Müftüler-Baç in her book *Divergent Pathways: Turkey and the European Union: Re-Thinking the Dynamics of Turkish-European Union Relations*. These cleavages are between the secularists and the Islamists; and then between the nationalists and globalists (Müftüler-Baç, 88). The first cleavage was inherited in the Turkish Republic from the remnants of the Ottoman Empire where largely traditional society reacted to westernizing reforms of the political elite by invoking religion (Müftüler-Baç, 90-91). When Turkey was created, a strong nationalist and secularist rhetoric pushed the Islamist into political underground by banning political parties, Islamic symbols, and putting Islam under state control (Müftüler-Baç, 91). After Turkey became the multi-party democracy in 1946, the Islamic political parties managed to be visible, and they won elections in 1950 with the election of Adnan Menderes of the Democratic Party as the Turkish Prime Minister (see “History”, section 1) (Müftüler-Baç, 92).

Notwithstanding multiple coups (such as the one in 1980), the Islamic political activity in Turkey has managed to reform itself and stay relevant, and adopt pro-EU stances it was once critical of (Müftüler-Baç 93). In that sense, the secularist Kemalist elites in Turkey, after 1980s, became increasingly more nationalist and the lines between them and the Islamists, who were viewed as reactionaries to Kemalism, began blurring with regards to the process of Europeanization of society (Müftüler-Baç, 93). The Islamists adopted a
pro-EU agenda because it called for religious freedoms and further democratization of society (thereby acquiring modernizing tendencies) whereas the Kemalists feared that due to ideological stances (thereby acquiring nationalists tendencies):

From the moment of political Islam’s emergence in the 1960s, it has polarized the political debate in Turkey. Given the Turkish state’s history of denying and suppressing Islam as a political force, this is not surprising. The Islamic-political breakthrough, both locally and nationally, during the 1980s and 1990s, kept the temperature high on the issue, as did international developments in the form of the rise of Muslim fundamentalism and terrorism. However, the extreme reactions in Turkey against political Islam were not justified by events on the ground. The political manifestation of Islam, through its various mutations in Erbakan’s party, expressed the wishes of groups that did not identify with the Kemalist project (therefore, reactionary). This drew new demographic groups into the public arena and into politics (NSCG, 55-56).

The second cleavage was also inherited from the Ottoman Empire, according to Müftüler-Baç. In that vein, nationalists developed during and after the WWI with calls for a strong Turkish state based on a strong Turkish national identity (Müftüler-Baç, 93). Nationalists, according to Müftüler-Baç perceive Turkish politics through the prism of Kemalist ideology and authoritarian rule of Kemal himself (Müftüler-Baç, 93). They perceive the globalization of Turkey as detrimental to its identity (they generally are against the EU integrations); they are largely organized under the MHP party (Nationalist Action Party) (Müftüler-Baç, 93). They were especially prominent in the period of 2002 to 2005, when sweeping pro-EU changes led by AKP reformed aspects of Turkish politics (Müftüler-Baç, 94). Globalists, on the other hand, seek to integrate Turkey globally in political terms, however, they tend to avoid integrating Turkey into global economic order (Müftüler-Baç, 93).

With the rise of AKP since 2002, the two cleavages as presented above have started overlapping. That is, nationalists, who are thought of as Kemalist-secularist, are
increasingly democratized in a sense that they are not opposed to religion whereas
globalists, who are also Islamists, tend to adopt very nationalist rhetoric (e.g. President
Erdoğan’s statements- see “Refugee Crisis: A New Frontier?”) to justify their policies
(Müftüler-BAç, 95). This, according to Birol Yeşilada and Peter Noordijk in *Islamization
of Turkey Under the AKP Rule*, is a result of significant social and political developments
in Turkey since the 1990s:

Since the beginning of the 1990s, significant socioeconomic and political
developments have taken place in Turkey. One of these developments is the
emergence of Islamist-oriented political parties as a credible choice for
voters despite repeated attempts by the military and its laicist partners to
keep the Islamists out of power. The rise of the Welfare Party (RP) and its
closure by the Constitutional Court (in 1998), followed by the similar fate
of the Virtue Party (FP) exemplify this conflict. With the split of the FP into
two alternative political parties, the Felicity Party (SP) and the Justice and
Development Party (AKP), Turkish electoral politics entered a new chapter.
The AKP managed to attract many supporters from the traditional center-
right as well as the conservative elements of the traditional right of the
political spectrum and swept into power in the 2002 national elections
(Yeşilada and Noordijk, 7).

As we can see, the socio-political cleavages in Turkey formed a fierce political
competition, which resulted in the victory of reactionist Islamist parties (that have changed
significantly since 1950s) over traditional Kemalist elites. All of the changes and struggles
on the secularist-Islamist plane affected the EU-Turkey relations (e.g. the influence of
coups of 1980 and 1997) significantly, however, as we have established, the EU shaped
Turkish political landscape profoundly as well.

Turkey’s EU accession negotiations process greatly influenced the change in the
Turkish political landscape. Starting in the 1990s, and with the introduction of the
Copenhagen criteria in 1993, the EU-Turkey relationship (and Turkish accession process)
was put in the framework of strong normative political system where Turkey’s reform
progress has been actively evaluated. Although EU’s influence on Turkey’s politics goes
back before 1990s (for example, EU’s insistence on the return of the civil government in the wake of the 1980 coup d’état), this research will focus on the period of 1990s until today.

The EU enlargement process greatly impacts every potential member-state. Historically, most prospective member-states had to first initiate a set of deep political reforms to improve their state’s political, judicial, and civic atmosphere, and bring it to the level the EU found satisfying. For example, Croatia had to undergo significant reforms in political, economic, justice, and civic sectors before joining the EU in 2013. Although not all of these reforms have been successful, Croatia managed to accede into the EU less than ten years after accession negotiations started (at the same time as Turkey 2005) and its socio-political, judicial, and economic system have been greatly amended and reformed. Therefore, the candidate states enter a social process when negotiating with the EU. By using the logic of appropriateness (see “Constructivism and IR”), we can argue that actors are guided by collectively shared understandings of what constitutes socially accepted behavior (Börzel, 11). In that sense, such collective understandings strongly influence the way actors (in this case candidate states) define their goals and interests. Therefore, the accession negotiations cause an emergence of Europeanisation, a process of emergence of new rules, norms, practices, and structures of meaning to which member states are exposed and which they have to incorporate into their domestic rule structures (Börzel, 11). Following from that is the conclusion that the EU accession negotiations are a catalyst for political and social change in candidate countries.

Turkey is an interesting state to study in terms of the EU enlargement because it has been trying to enter the EU for more than fifty years. During that time, and especially
in the last twenty years, EU’s role in Turkey was significant. EU was perceived as a natural path for a young Turkish nation given its history. However, Turkey’s EU road today seems to be increasingly viewed in the context of disillusionment with EU’s positioning on Turkey and in the context of the rise of AKP in Turkey’s political scene:

This, of course, does not mean that there were not any internal political dynamics that led to political clashes and changes in Turkey. One could conceptualize the role of the EU’s political conditionality as a catalyst that induced change in Turkey. An important component of that change is the internalization of norms by the Turkish society. One should note that the adaptation to EU rules is a costly process that the governments that engage in significant political reforms have to incur and that the reception of European norms by various segments in the Turkish society during the negotiations process is a particularly problematic process (Müftüler-Baç, 90).

With that in mind, Turkey’s EU accession negotiations did two things to Turkish political landscape. First, they diluted the social support for the Kemalist elites and military’s primacy in certain constitutional matters (such as the defense of secularist principles). Two, the accession negotiations pushed forth the liberal democratic agenda in Turkey which legitimized calls for relaxing the religious rules and diversifying Turkey’s political landscape. In that sense, the accession negotiations were one of the things (apart from the changes in Turkey’s society and reactions to the 1997 coup) that opened a space for parties like AKP to be more prominently featured as democratizers and Europeanizes while being religiously, albeit moderately, conservative.

Political parties in Turkey, most notably the AKP party, have used the EU accession process to legitimize their power hold in both positive and negative ways. At first, the AKP government instrumentalised the promotion of EU accession to widen its support base towards the center and to anchor its political reforms aimed at rolling back the influence of Kemalist forces and the military (Börzel, 17). After gaining satisfying electoral support
and systemic power, the AKP party stopped using EU as a legitimizer for change but rather started using it to promote a largely nationalist agenda (Börzel, 17). In that sense, the AKP party today justifies its political position as a defender of Turkish dignity in face of EU’s unwillingness to treat it like other candidate states (that is, on equal footing). This is most notable in the case of the recent refugee crisis, as discussed in later chapter on this issue (see chapter “Refugee Crisis: A New Frontier?”).

The slow fading of EU’s relevance as a legitimizing actor in Turkish politics is, therefore, connected to the rise of illiberal and nationalist agenda of the AKP party, headed by President Erdoğan. The agenda consists of:

That is, economic and social modernity (capitalism as a system of socio-economic relations and the bourgeois order) needs to be embedded in the traditional and religious values and morality of society to reproduce and legitimize itself (Ertuğrul, 165).

The slow fading of EU’s relevance as an important factor in Turkish politics is also followed by the increase in conservativism and traditionalism in Turkey in general. Yeşilada and Noordijk conclude that a trend of rise of conservativism in Turkey has been happening since at least 1995, however, that it became more prominent and visible during the AKP rule (Yeşilada and Noordijk, 22). In that sense, the outcome of years of political struggles between Kemalists and Islamists, in the context of Turkey’s historical westward political trajectory (that is, Turkey’s integration in the western security and political umbrella), is a modern conservative democrat, staunchly nationalist, authoritative, Islam-inspired, political discourse spearheaded by the AKP party. The former Turkish PM Davutoğlu, considered one of the fathers of AKP’s political philosophy, wrote that Islamist elements in Turkey’s politics strengthen the connection between society, culture, and politics thus confirming the notion that AKP is a party whose political ideology not only
has religious undertones but is precisely embedded in Ottoman ideas of Islam as a vital element of Turkishness (Ertuğrul, 170). This is confirmed by Davutoğlu’s invocation of Sultan Abdülhamid II’s model of new “strategic identity and mentality” of the Ottoman Empire as a model that AKP should be inspired by (Ertuğrul, 170).

The recentering of secularism in the political discourse in Turkey, followed by an illiberal and nationalist turn in AKP’s policies, does not bode well for the EU-Turkey relationship. As we have seen, initially the AKP legitimized its political position by being the reformist party. Today, the AKP party is increasingly viewed as the reason for why Turkish politics, and society, are reverting on the EU reforms (threats to reintroduce death penalty which is a no-deal for the EU). As we have seen in this subchapter, the issue of political identity in Turkey (secularism vs. Islamism or nationalism vs. globalism) informs Turkey’s political preferences. By legitimizing the conservative ideas of Turkey, the AKP party is contributing to the process of othering of Turkey in Europe while at the same time contributing to the process of othering Europe in Turkey (that is, perpetuating the idea of the EU as a Christian Club- see “Refugee Crisis: A New Frontier?” for examples).

5. Conclusion

Finally, we can see that the issue of identity in Turkey-EU relationship is of fundamental importance for both players. In Europe, the way Turkey is seen according to cultural-historical patterns and constructs (such as the “Turk”) downplays Turkey’s significance as a candidate state in the accession negotiations. On the other hand, Turkey’s volatile politics are contributing not only to the legitimization of romanticized ideas of the

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12 An Ottoman Sultan towards the end of the 19th century whose traditionalist approach to statecraft reverted many provisions of Tanzimat reforms and reinstated the Sultan as an absolute monarch. His rule is still an inspiration to many conservative-minded Turkish parties.
“Turk” but are also contributing to their own ideas of Turkishness (Islam as a connection between people and the state) which in turn other Europe. This has significant implications for the EU-Turkey relationship because these processes reduce the perceived importance of EU in and for Turkey, and vice versa. Furthermore, this leads to problems of having a normative-institutional relationship in the context of accession negotiations and decreases the possibility of political compromises on issues such as the refugee crisis or the situation on Cyprus.
Subchapter 2. Public Opinion

1. Introduction

Public opinion helps us understand both the perception of the relationship by Europeans and Turks as well as their perception on how different factors influence the relationship. Although positive EU public opinion is not a requirement for admitting a new member-state, it still occupies a very important role in the EU enlargement process:

Firstly, EU itself has stated that citizens’ support is necessary for the success of the enlargement. We have therefore an acknowledgement of public opinion’s role, despite the lack of details or further clarifications. In every case, public opinion is closely related and affects the definition of what is called “EU’s absorption capacity. As a result, public opinion should be taken into consideration by policymakers. Public opinion matters due to the role of member-states in the accession process. If public opinion in member-states holds a negative attitude towards Turkey this creates difficulties in the accession process, mainly with regards to the ratification of the accession treaty. Ratification either through national parliaments or referendums (e.g. France has said that will hold a referendum on Turkey’s EU membership) shows how public opinion can be a crucial factor in Turkish membership. Fear of political cost discourages member-states governments to decide in favor of Turkey’s membership while their voters are strongly opposed to Turkey’s EU entry” (Dagdeverenis, 1).

In that vein, studies on EU enlargement, with particular focus on Turkey, for example, always focus on public opinion and seek to present it to the reader. This speaks volumes when it comes to understanding how the EU relationship with states works. It is bidirectional and it rests fundamentally on the perception of one towards another (see below).

Additionally, in this chapter, I present the findings of qualitative interviews I conducted during the Fall semester while in Berlin, on the role of identity, religion, and discourse in the relationship between the EU and Turkey. As such, this chapter presents a normative and qualitative basis for my research and serves as a background to other
chapters, especially those dealing with identity construction and its effect on the relationship.

2. Literature and Data on the Public Opinion of Turks and Europeans on EU-Turkey Accession Negotiations

This research presents the public opinion of Europeans on EU-Turkish relations through an interplay of three main dimensions: a) Turcoskepticism, b) Euroscepticism, and c) enlargement fatigue.

Canan-Sokullu writes that the emergent Turkoscepticism hasn’t been a single monolith episteme shaping the European public opinion on Turkey, but that it has encouraged intellectuals and elites to be more vocal against Turkish membership as well as that it encouraged the strengthening of the “cultural” argument against Turkish membership in the EU (i.e. Europe is a cultural space resting on Judeo-Christian values to which Turkey doesn’t belong) (Canan-Sokullu, 484). He defines Turkoscepticism as based on:

A limited perception of Turkey as a poor and populous Islamic country with economic, social, cultural and political problems related to adopting and effectively internalizing the values of the European state system. Although Turkey’s EU integration project has been a process of political incorporation premised on inclusive notions of rights as well as European political value orientations, debates at both societal and political levels have revolved around perceived differences in collective identities rooted in religion, culture, ethnic and national dynamics. This debate has contributed to the growth of Turcoscepticism, creating what can be described as doubts or negative feelings and attitudes towards Turkey. Turcoscepticism has recently been encouraged by fears associated with Islam and Muslim immigration. While Europe has experienced immigration from Muslim countries – in particular from Turkey since the 1970s – in the post-September-11 era, concerns about whether Europe would be Islamized following Turkey’s EU membership have made the European vox populi gradually more anxious. Many voices have suggested that the Turkish ‘crescent’ would endanger the European ‘cross’, in that the Islamisation of Europe would most likely come about through Turkey’s EU membership.
The future immigration of Muslim Turks into Europe has, inter alia, heightened popular worries, the prospect of Turkey joining the EU generating unease among Europeans (Canan-Sokullu, 483/84).

The European Union, in order to function properly, needs to have a consensus of its, now twenty-eight, member states. However, many times, those member states diverged from EU’s goals due to public pressure exercised in the referenda. For example, the most famous instance of Eurosceptic dissent of the public was the EU Constitution referendum in France and the Netherlands when the French and the Dutch voters, respectively, rejected the EU Constitution drafted after the Nice Summit (Ruiz-Jimenez and Torreblanca, 1). Although rejection of the EU Constitution by Dutch and French voters was not inherently connected to Turkish accession negotiations, which also started in 2005, Turkish accession, as the research shows, is more likely to cause the biggest split in public opinion with regards to the EU enlargement agenda (Ruiz-Jimenez and Torreblanca, 2). Ruiz-Jimenez and Torreblanca write:

The absence of a direct link between the French and Dutch ‘nays’ to the Constitutional Treaty and Turkish accession does not conceal, however, the dominant negative mood existing among EU founding member states when it comes to support for enlargement. Europeans show little enthusiasm for enlargement in general, and for Turkey’s accession in particular (Ruiz-Jimenez and Torreblanca, 2).

In addition to this, Ruiz-Jimenez and Torreblanca point out that the general support for the accessions of south-eastern European states is rising thus indicating the divergence of public opinion on Turkish accession in comparison to some other states, such as the south-eastern European ones (Ruiz- Jimenez and Torreblanca, 2). Moreover, the new-member states do not seem to be generally affected by the EU enlargement fatigue as the western European states do, however, they as well are not enthusiastic in their support for Turkish accession:
Furthermore, owing to the fact that citizens of the new member states (NMS) predominantly favor future enlargements, the 2004 enlargement has generally had a positive impact on the levels of support for the future accession of countries in south-east Europe, yet assent for Turkish accession has not benefited from this effect. As a consequence, a split has appeared when it comes to support for future accessions, with Turkey being located at the most negative end of the spectrum on future enlargement (Ruiz-Jimenez and Torreblanca, 2).

When it comes to the three dimensions of public opinion: enlargement, Euroscepticism, Turkoscepticism, the public opinion seems rather divided. To support this, Ruiz-Jimenez and Torreblanca have divided their results into three main approaches: utilitarian, identitarian and post-national (Ruiz-Jimenez and Torreblanca, 2/3). The utilitarian approach, argue Ruiz-Jimenez and Torreblanca, refers to people who view the EU through the cost-benefit analysis lens (Ruiz-Jimenez and Torreblanca, 2). In that sense, they argue that people will favor enlargement of the EU more if it will bring visible and positive economic and safety changes (Ruiz-Jimenez and Torreblanca, 3). The identitarian approach, on the other hand, refers to the idea that Europe is a geographically delimited entity with its cultural and historic heritage (Ruiz-Jimenez and Torreblanca, 3). Therefore, those who belong to this approach would gauge their support for EU policies based on identitarian values (Ruiz-Jimenez and Torreblanca, 3). Finally, the post-national approach views the EU integration and enlargement as resting on a set of universal principles and values, such as human rights and rule of law (Ruiz-Jimenez and Torreblanca, 3).

Accordingly, they’ve set up three main hypotheses for their research: utilitarian, identitarian and post-national. The utilitarian hypothesis states that: “the more that Turkish accession is considered beneficial, the higher the support will be for accession and, conversely, the costlier accession is perceived, the higher the opposition will be to enlargement.” (Ruiz-Jimenez and Torreblanca, 4). Identitarian hypothesis states that: “the
more that European citizens believe Turkey is part of Europe (in geographical, historical and cultural terms), the more they will support Turkish accession and vice versa.” (Ruiz-Jimenez and Torreblanca, 5). Finally, the post-national hypothesis states that: “the more importance citizens assign to the set of shared principles on which the Union is based, and which conform to the enlargement acquis, the more likely their level of support for or opposition to Turkish membership will depend on whether they think Turkey meets or is in the position to meet these criteria.” (Ruiz-Jimenez and Torreblanca, 6). According to Ruiz-Jimenez and Torreblanca’s research, the public support in the EU for Turkish membership is low and shrinking (Ruiz-Jimenez and Torreblanca, 7). Although this research was conducted in 2008, its results go hand-in-hand with the overall trend of shrinking support for EU enlargement process (51% of Europeans against it in autumn of 2016) and with Jean Claude Juncker’s campaign not to expand the EU more until 2019 (Eurobarometer 86, 24). Ruiz-Jimenez and Torreblanca conclude that even though the support for Turkish membership is low and declining, the results coming from three hypotheses are very complex. For example, they conclude that those who support the identitarian approach towards the EU are most likely to be against Turkish membership in the EU (Ruiz-Jimenez and Torreblanca, 23). However, they also say that those who view EU through a post-national lens tend to support Turkish membership the most (Ruiz-Jimenez and Torreblanca, 23). Finally, the utilitarian hypothesis was found to be the least relevant one for the public opinion in the EU on Turkish membership (Ruiz-Jimenez and Torreblanca, 23). This testifies to an interesting, albeit conflicting view the EU citizens have of Turkish accession. In one way, it appears that perceived ideas of European culture
and identity are least permissive of Turkish accession and on the other, it appears that the post-national idea of the EU is most permissive for Turkish accession.

The identitarian hypothesis which demonstrates that identity and culture-oriented individuals are less likely to support Turkish EU accession, gives rise to Turcoscepticism. As defined earlier, Turcoscepticism bases itself on a negative image of Turkey as a poor and Islamic country whose economic and cultural integration in the EU would be problematic, if at all possible (Canan-Sokullu, 483). Going in line with constructivist ideas, identity, as well as individuals and societies, have become referent objects of perceived threats (Canan-Sokullu, 485). Therefore, the reinvigoration of the idea of identity-threat in Europe has negative reflected on Turkey and its accession path. Following the 9/11 attacks, Europe strengthened its policies against terrorism and immigration, and the EU public came to view Muslims and Islam as something foreign as well as something dangerous (Cesari, 11). The 9/11 attacks were partially organized in Europe, in Hamburg, and there were at least twenty Europeans among the individuals imprisoned in Guantanamo Bay since; the EU states have arrested twenty times the number of terrorists the US has (Cesari, 11). Therefore, the issue of Turkish accession to the EU has been securitized through the prism of securitizing Islam and Muslims in the European context. However, the issue of othering Islam is not a new issue in the European context. Ideas of West, the fight against Ottomans and colonialism have all brought discursive othering to Europe long before the EU was even created. Europe’s struggle with the Ottomans have become discursively

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13 Stuart Hall defines othering as a process by which societies create a discourse, a certain regime of truth which enables them to distinguish themselves from other societies by asserting that “they are not what those others are” (Hall and Gieben, 294). In that sense, Hall posits that the cultural idea of the West, which is predominant in Europe, is used against mainly Middle Eastern and Islamic peoples as a tool to other them- meaning that “we”, the West, are not what “they”, the Rest, are (Hall and Gieben, 296).
interwoven to Europe’s struggle with Islam and have created an idea of Europe as a Christian continent:

Gradually, despite their many internal differences, the countries of western Europe began to conceive of themselves as part of a single family or civilization—'the West'. The challenge from Islam was an important factor in hammering Western Europe and the idea of 'the West' into shape. Roberts notes that, 'The word "Europeans" seems to appear for the first time in an eighth-century reference to Charles Martel's victory [over Islamic forces] at Tours. All collectivities become more self-aware in the presence of an external challenge, and self-awareness promotes cohesiveness. And Hulme speaks of ‘... the consolidation of an ideological identity through the testing of [Europe’s] Eastern frontiers prior to the adventure of Atlantic exploration.... A symbolic end to that process could be considered Pius III's 1458 identification of Europe with Christendom (Hall and Gieben, 289).

Therefore, Europe’s history of conquest and struggle has become embedded in European consciousness as an identitarian struggle which helped define the continent as it is today. With this in mind, the creation of perceived threats of Turkish accession in the EU has been a process which intertwined discursive othering with real-life threats. It has been conflated with fears of immigration and the well-established fear of Islam. When it comes to fears of immigration, Canan-Sokullu identifies two ways of manifesting these fears: attack on individual’s pocket economy and symbolic threats that stem from prejudice (Canan-Sokullu, 487). Attack on individual’s pocket economy arises from a fear of competing with cheap labor influx thus leaving local, costlier, workers jobless (Canan-Sokullu, 487). In this sense, Canan-Sokullu’s argument is similar to Torreblanca’s and Ruiz-Jimenez’ in that it posits a cost-rational approach to Turkish membership. The same conclusion is found in Meltem Müftüler-Baç’s and Yannis A. Stivachtis’ book *Turkey-European Union Relations: Dilemmas, Opportunities, and Constraints* with authors concluding that:

Most Europeans and Turks believe Turkey’s accession to the EU will serve the Turkish interests mostly with divided opinion on its impact on the
European interests as a whole. The extent to which the Europeans would perceive Turkey’s accession to be in their own interests will determine their support for Turkey’s accession. In other words, if Turkey’s accession will improve the future of Europe significantly in a material fashion, then most probably feelings of animosity and perceptions of Turkey as an alien culture would be less intense. (Müftüler-Baç’s and Stivachtis, 129).

Symbolic threats arise from the in-group and out-group behavior that creates a communal identity and culture which then becomes threatened by an influx of new linguistic and cultural agents (Canan-Sokullu, 487). In her article, Canan-Sokullu divides the public opinion on mass and elite with elite public opinion consisting of high-ranking EU officials coming from the EU parliament, the Commission and the Council (Canan-Sokullu, 485). She concludes her article analyzing the public (mass) and the EU political elite opinion on Turkish accession to the EU. Her findings show that from 2006 to 2008 (the timespan of the research), the perceived threats of immigration and Islamic fundamentalism have significantly contributed to public opinion on Turkish accession to the EU (Canan-Sokullu, 492). This goes in hand with Dagdeverenis’ research’s conclusions that Turkey is the least preferred potential member of all candidate states:

There is a steady negative trend towards Turkish accession in the period 2005 – 2010. Four surveys (2005-2, 2006-2, 2008-1 and 2010-2) measure European public opinion especially for Turkey’s membership. The percentage of those opposed is high (between 55 and 59%). It is worth mentioning that compared with other candidate countries Turkey is the least preferred country for EU membership. (Dagdeverenis, 6/7).

However, when it comes to the EU elite, Canan-Sokullu concludes that the perceived threats did not influence EU elite’s opinions significantly (Canan-Sokullu, 492). Canan-Sokullu’s findings, however, do not preclude EU elites from discursively othering Turkey. Senem Aydin-Düzgün, in her book Constructions of European Identity Debates and Discourses on Turkey and the EU writes that the EU elites belonging to the EPP (European People’s Party, a center-right, majority, political group) group in the EU
Parliament tend to other Turkey through neo-orientalist discourse which constructs EU in a geographic and cultural sense and others Turkey as an Islamic, eastern, and immigrant threat to a homogenous unity of Europeans who culturally belong to the West (Aydm-Düzgünt, 133). This indicates that more right-wing oriented parties prefer to utilize the identitarian approach when debating Turkish membership in the EU.

In Turkey, on the other hand, the public opinion relating to the EU has been relatively stable and supportive of Turkey’s efforts (German Marshall Fund, 8). Although Turkish public generally, and traditionally, supports the membership bid, recent events show that the support is fading. The traditional support of Turks for the EU membership stems from the same Kemalist principles that have guided Turkey towards its integration in in western security umbrella (i.e. NATO). However, Turkish public and elite support for the EU membership is multidimensional and does not only depend on the idea of modernization of Turkey through its adoption of westernized lifestyle. Therefore, we have to look beyond traditional public opinion of the Turkish membership in the EU and focus on political parties which, by the virtue of their ideologies, have varying views of the EU.

Political changes and issues during the negotiations have left their mark on the public opinion of Turks when it comes to EU membership. For example, before 2004, when the referendum on reunification of Cyprus was held and Greek Cypriots rejected it, the support for the EU was as high as seventy per cent (Yeşilada, 62). Since then, however, the support of Turks for the EU membership has fallen to and below fifty per cent (Yeşilada, 62). The disappointment with Cyprus is combined with the fact that the Turkish electorate has generally moved towards the right of the political spectrum since the 1990s (Yeşilada,60). This produced a long-term effect of erosion of belief of quality and credibility of the EU
accession process as well as the necessity of Turkey’s accession to the EU. Today, in 2017, more than fifty years after Europe and Turkey started negotiations towards accession, and thirteen years since the Cyprus disappointment, Turks have become quite skeptical of whether Turkey wants and needs to enter the European Union (Eurobarometer 85, 2016). This is due to multiple reasons ranging from frustration with the length of the negotiations to frustration with EU’s lack of reaction after the attempted coup in July of 2016.

As for the traditional Turkish public opinion of the EU, the most recent Eurobarometer report (Eurobarometer 85, May 2016) states that Turkey continues supporting the EU membership bid (Eurobarometer 85, 74). The percentage of participants who are in favor of Turkey joining the EU is at 39% and there is 26% of those who oppose it (Eurobarometer 85, 74). When we compare these results to the results of other member states, however, we can see that the support for EU membership of Turkey is low. In Albania, 79% of respondents are in favor of membership, in Montenegro 53%, and in FYR Macedonia 53% (Eurobarometer 85, 73). However, many more respondents in Turkey perceive the EU membership as a positive thing (53%) with 38% disagreeing (Eurobarometer 85, 74). Even though Eurobarometer notes that the perception of EU membership in Turkey as beneficial is changing (in comparison to Eurobarometer 84, support is down from 56% by three points and skepticism is up from 30% by eight points), it remains important to note that levels of support have not radically changed in recent years and do not constitute a clear breakaway from recent opinion polls (Eurobarometer 85, 74). Therefore, we can see that generally, Turkish people do support the Turkey’s EU membership and view it as something beneficial for their country.
When it comes to Turkey’s elites and their views of Turkey’s EU bid, we must look at Turkish political parties to obtain and analyze data. The multidimensionality of Turkish perception of the EU is illustrated in Olli Rehn’s (former EU Commissioner for enlargement) statement that there are three main groups which support Turkish EU bid: Kemalist-secular public support, confessional/Islamist support and then the liberal elite support. (Müftüler-Baç, 126). Müftüler-Baç writes that, unlike these three groups, the nationalists, which are a fourth, and a very important group in Turkish society, generally form an anti-membership block (parties such as CHP or MHP) (Müftüler-Baç, 126). She argues that their support has withered in recent years due to double standards applied by the EU on Turkey in accession negotiations (Müftüler-Baç, 126). She further writes that the previous CHP leader Deniz Baykal (who led the party from 2002 until 2010) stated that the EU is mocking Turkish national pride (Müftüler-Baç, 127). In an interesting twist of events, Müftüler-Baç’s conclusions in 2008 demonstrate a clear breakway from Çarkoğlu’s findings from 2002. Çarkoğlu writes that, apart from SP (Felicity Party, founded in 2001) whose members don’t support EU membership, all other relevant political parties in Turkey then, apart from newly-founded AKP, have clear majorities in support of the EU membership (MHP, the nationalist party had a 68% support for the membership) (Çarkoğlu, 178). AKP marked support for the membership but it was weak, with 52% of members supporting the EU membership (Çarkoğlu, 178).

However, Turkish elite and public opinion are highly connected to EU’s actions towards Turkey. It appears that the public opinion of both masses and elites in Turkey comes as a reaction to EU’s policies towards Turkey, irrespective of the state of Turkey’s accession. Turkey today is seen in increasingly hostile terms in the EU, especially after the
signing of the EU-Turkey migration deal and Turkish refusal to meet all 72-benchmarks that would allow Turkish citizens to travel to EU without visas (see “Current Situation, section 1.”). Turkey perceives the EU in increasingly negative way as well. EU’s reaction (or the lack of it) to the attempted coup in July is seen as a clear sign of EU’s ambivalence towards Turkey:

The reaction of EU institutions and member states to the coup was slow and cautioned against overreach in the aftermath. Among most Turkish politicians (oppositional CHP and HDP excluded) there is a firm impression that this was feeble and unsupportive at best. Europe is perceived as having not fully understood the significance of what happened and the consequences it could have had. Some see European decision makers’ lack of sympathy as expressing tolerance of the coup attempt, and as a visible manifestation of Europe’s broader attitude to Turkey. This was described by one high ranking Turkish official as “like a matryoshka doll - it has Erdoganophobia on the outside, then xenophobia and racism, then antisemitism, and Europhobia at the core (Aydıntaşbaş, Leonard and Tcherneva, 2016).

There is a clear intersubjective perception amongst the two actors which helps them other one another. EU easily dismisses Turkey as a reluctant candidate and a country which is rolling back on its reforms. Turkey perceives EU as an institution that publicly channels general European fears of Turkey as well as their belittlement of Turkish power and accomplishments.

The relevance of this chapter is not only for us to understand the mass and elite opinions in the accession process but rather because it enables us to see and understand three main trends. First one is that Europeans are clearly divided on the issue of Turkish accession and that there is a difference between European public and elite opinions with elites favoring Turkish accession more than the public. Second one is that Turks still perceive the EU membership as something beneficial for their country in a clear break from
AKP’s\textsuperscript{14} and Erdogan’s more recent public comments and attitudes towards the EU. The third and final conclusion is that the divisions in both public and elite opinions of both actors on the EU-Turkey accession negotiations follow a deepening political divide and lack of constructive cooperation between EU and Turkey. In recent months, the immigration deal signed in March, 2016, has been perceived as an obstacle, rather than a push for the relationship, due to divergent attitudes of Turks\textsuperscript{15} and Europeans\textsuperscript{16} on the issue of 72 visa-free travel benchmarks (See chapter “Current Situation, section 1.”). Moreover, the attempted coup from July 2016 has brought the relationship to its knees due to EU’s lukewarm response and Turkey’s government’s backlash on dissenters and coup-plotters. Political reality of the relationship, combined with public and elite opinions on EU-Turkey accession negotiations, demonstrate a deteriorating intersubjective relationship which, in turn, gives rise to a political atmosphere that is increasingly moving Turkey and the EU away from each other.

3. Interviews

In this section of the chapter, I will present the findings of my interviews. By using a coding analysis, I have identified five main themes across three interview transcriptions. The themes are as follows: religious identity of Turkey and EU, refugee crisis, the size of Turkey, Turkish political establishment, and Europeanness. Naturally, these five themes are not the exclusive themes in my interviews, however, they seem to be the ones which draw the most consensus amongst interviewees and are the most important ones for my

\textsuperscript{14} I refer only to AKP here as they have won an overall and clear majority of Turkish National Assembly in the elections in November, 2015 thus becoming the strongest party in the state.

\textsuperscript{15} In this context, the political representatives of the Republic of Turkey

\textsuperscript{16} In this context, the political representatives of the EU
argumentation. However, before proceeding with the interview analysis, I wish to write a bit about the interview process itself.

Although I have contacted around a dozen of prospective interviewees, only a handful (four) of them responded positively to my request to talk about EU-Turkey relations. Interviewees rejected my request for interviews for two reasons. The first reason is simply unwillingness to talk about such a complicated issue. This reason manifested itself mainly within the German-Turkish community where people are generally weary of political and social topics; most people told me that they simply didn’t “wish to think about it”. However, the second, and by far the most important reason for rejecting my offer for an interview was the current emergency situation and Turkish government’s backlash on dissenters. In that sense, many potential interviewees told me that, despite the fact that information provided would be confidential, they simply did not wish to be involved in such a conversation for security reasons. The four interviewees that have accepted my requests did not have any specific requirements, however, most of them simply wished to be anonymous. In addition, this research uses only three, of the four, interviews for its analysis. This is because during this research, I have experienced certain administrative difficulties causing me to lose an Informed Consent Form obtained from one of the interviewees. With academic honesty in mind, I decided to remove the data from one of the interviews in order to ensure trustworthiness of my conclusions. Luckily, however, the fourth interview was not significant in information so it did not impact my conclusions at all.

As I indicated in the Methodology section of this paper, the interviews conducted were structured interviews. The interviews were conducted in a place chosen by
interviewees. I envisioned the interviews as a relaxed conversation regarding the Turkish road to EU as well as Turkish and European identities, and prospects for the future. For example, for one of the interviews I met my interlocutor in a Berlin café as he felt comfortable there. Therefore, the welfare of my interviewees was a crucial point for establishing a rapport and receiving factual and honest answers from them. Furthermore, even though interviews were structured, some participants could not provide answers to all the questions, so I could not obtain satisfying answers to all of them. In that case, I have not excluded participants’ answers but have rather reformed the questions in order to add more clarity for future use. I also did not delete their responses but have decided to include them in the transcription. The average length of the interviews was between twenty-two and twenty-five minutes.

The first theme I wish to explore in this chapter is the theme of religious issues between EU-Turkey. When it comes to the theme of religious identity in Turkey and the EU, the participants have answered questions such as:” Turkey is a predominantly Muslim country. Do you think that that has any influence on EU-Turkey relationship?” as well as:” Is EU a “Christian Club”, or a union of and for only Christian states?” (Personal Correspondence, 2016). Both questions were met with negative answers in all except one interview. The interviewee in question gave a firmly positive answer to the first question and a reluctantly negative answer to the second one. As for other interviews, it seems that even their negative responses to both questions are not emphatic, but rather multidimensional. In that sense, these two questions wanted to address more recent concerns in the field of study of the relationship between the EU and Turkey that focus on religion-based identity issues. As one of the participants stated, the idea that Turkey is a
Muslim country and that that is problematic has emerged after the Cold War (Personal Correspondence, 2016). Therefore, the accession skeptics who base their skepticism on the argument of religion seem to be products of a new identitarian discourse in the EU. Going from there, this identitarian discourse has developed not only because of the end of the Cold War but also because of Turkish integration itself. Participant II\textsuperscript{17} stated that Turkish accession negotiations have stimulated EU and Europe to think about who and what they are in terms of their identities (Personal Correspondence, 2016). Another participant (Participant III) stated that indeed religion plays a big role in terms of Islam because Turkey has been othered in European history for decades and centuries (Personal Correspondence, 2016). Hence, the idea of Turkey as an Islamic invader of Europe has persisted from medieval ages hitherto (Personal Correspondence, 2016). However, during my interviews, two participants have pointed out that there are other countries with large Muslim populations applying to be EU member states. In that context, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, FYR Macedonia and Kosovo were mentioned. It appears that the idea that Turkey as Muslim country is not the sole factor which influences the religious-identitarian approach. As one of my interviewees said, it is important to note that apart from being Muslim, Turkey is also construed as non-white and non-European (Personal Correspondence, 2016). In that sense, the aforementioned Balkan states are constructed as white and as European which makes them “less Muslim” in the eyes of the EU political establishment:

\begin{quote}
I don’t, I think that in the case of Bosnia and Macedonia, the Balkan region, which is in the heart of Europe and that region always has more advantage than Turkey and also if you look at Bosnian Islam which is always seen as a sort of a white and secular Islam, I think that it has something to do with Turkey as Ottoman and also its history with Europe from all the wars and
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{17} I shall refer to interviewees by non-chronological numbers
congresses so it’s different. I think also that Germany especially, for example, is very engaged with Turkey, especially because of migration and because of its Turkish population, that’s why German-Turkish relationship is a big part of Euro-Turkish relations and it also kind of helps measure the level of integration of Turks in Europe and then, of course, they use their level of integration to judge whether Turkey is ready to be an EU member. (Personal Correspondence, 2016).

Another interviewee played into this argument by saying that the Balkan states are not “hinge states” between Europe and Asia which makes them more easily digestible than Turkey (Personal Correspondence, 2016). Perhaps, this argument on race as a religion-legitimizer in Europe can be studied more and consequently fill in some conceptual holes, especially in EU enlargement studies.

We can see that constructions of the discourse in Europe are very important as they divide Muslims on to “acceptable” and “unacceptable” ones. In this case, the distinctions are made based on racial/geographic and experiential\(^1\) factors. Despite the fact that Europe’s borders are not exactly determined and that Turkey shares a lot with Europe in terms of identity, culture and history, the negative image, the romanticized image, of Turks seems to prevail in discussions on accession regardless of the fact that Turkey is, or is not, ready to be an EU member. Naturally, this kind of discourse is not only connected to Muslims and Islam but also to other minority groups. Therefore, Turkey is deemed an “unacceptable” Muslim country due to the history of Europe with Turks as well as recent political developments inside the country. Policy implications of this would be massive as it is easier for European politicians to deal with Turkey from a position of power where the public opinion of Europeans is already generally negative (see part a) towards the prospect of Turkish accession. This makes it easier for them to construct Turkish cooperation (or

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18 Referring to personal, or socio-cultural, experience with Muslims and Islam.
the lack of it) through the lens of culture (i.e. Turkey does not satisfy the Copenhagen Criteria because Islam is incompatible with European values).

When it comes to the question of the EU as a Christian Club, the interviewees were in a consensus in saying that even though Europe has Christian background and that the EU was perhaps more Christian in nature initially, the political developments inside the EU institutions have enshrined the principle of secularism despite attempts of instituting the Judeo-Christian heritage of Europe in the EU Constitution. For example, one of the interviewees (PI) stated that:

Let me connect it with no 9 and with the Christian Club question, the things is that some years ago, some ten years ago, the EU was working on a constitution and there was the idea that there’d be a preamble that defined the Judeo-Christian heritage of Europe and France, which is very secularist, very laicist, was one of the countries that said no, we are not into identity politics in terms of religion here, Europe is a geographic entity with political principles, in terms of basic human freedoms, government…but, it does not have a religious litmus test, so, uhm, in that sense, I wouldn’t necessarily think that the EU consciously thinks of itself as a Judeo-Christian club, but the extent to which it somehow, subconsciously works to impact members particular countries like Poland or Ireland which are defined by religion culturally, uhm, but to our view that explicitly that the membership criteria say that you can only be a part of the EU if you’re predominantly a Christian nation, the question has to be also how many people are still religiously active? If religion is relevant at all? (Personal Correspondence, 2016).

Here, we can see a reference to the EU Constitution which was rejected in 2005, however, before its rejection it started a fiery debate on European identity. Certain member-states asked for a preamble to be introduced which would outline EU as an organization which has roots in Judeo-Christian civilization. The request was formally denied by France and the Netherlands and has never been re-introduced again. However, on a subconscious level, we can see that the requirement, and the fact that only two countries voted against and that seven states asked for the introduction of the preamble (led by Italy) is enough to conclude that the cultural/identitarian approach has a strong foothold in the EU politics.
Other participants (participant III, namely) stated that although they did not believe EU was a Christian Club any longer, there are some secular tendencies arising from Christianity which could have an effect on EU’s positioning towards certain candidates, but that this is highly unlikely due to a strong secular tradition of the EU (Personal Correspondence, 2016).

The second theme I wish to explore in this chapter is the theme of the refugee crisis. The refugee crisis plays an important role not directly in the accession negotiations between the EU and Turkey but rather in the general relationship between the two. This being said, it must be noted that the general relationship largely rests on the accession negotiations and that any damages to the relationship, as we have seen before (see "History of Relations") can cause a stalemate in the accession negotiations, and vice versa. In that sense, the recent refugee crisis (see "The Refugee Crisis: A New Frontier?") is an important element of this thesis. Interview questions which deal with the refugee crisis are as follows: "What effect, if any, does the current Refugee Crisis have on the EU-Turkey relations?" (Personal Correspondence, 2016). The responses to this question have been interesting and complex.

Participant III, for example, stated that both the EU and Turkey are either using the refugees as threats (the case of Turkey) or are perceiving refugees as threats (the case of EU) because the whole issue of refugees has been securitized in the wake of terrorist attacks and Islamist radicalism:

Europe is using Turkey as a buffer zone to keep the refugees out and is also making negotiations on the visa regime, and of course Turkey is using this situation as a leverage and says that the borders will be opened if Europe doesn’t listen. I think also that Europe is scared of the refugees due to terrorism and we have to see that many terrorist attacks were also conducted by European Muslims. Europe has to see the radicalization inside which is a consequence of failed social integration policies as well as the poor situation outside its borders. (Personal Correspondence, 2016).
Participant I carried out a different but also interesting point that states that the refugee crisis is a part of the larger package of accession negotiations:

Because we can tie their hands on many things, you know, legally, that they may not want to pursue\(^\text{19}\), but that’s, leaving that aside, assuming that they want to, the refugee crisis is at least being used as an element in the broader picture package deal kind of approach. Turkey says you guys do this to help us with the refugee crisis, and then we will, you know, accommodate you on the refugee issue. So, in that sense, the refugee crisis has had an effect on the relationship and on the bargaining between sides. It is one of the issues. (Personal Correspondence, 2016).

This response establishes that the refugees and the refugee crisis is being used as a leverage in the accession process. President Erdoğan and AKP have prominently become symbols of accepting Syrian refugees in the world media, however, many do not report the fact that they are also gaining political leverage over the EU by accepting so many refugees (who live in poor conditions). We can see that the EU, in order to keep Turkey a "buffer zone", so to speak, has agreed to give six billion Euros to Turkey for accommodating the refugees, predominantly Syrian ones (see "Current Situation, section a). Therefore, the refugee crisis has become a significant issue in the relationship on a constructive level. The refugees, who are securitized, are seen as threat-agents who need to be kept outside the EU. Turkey, on the other hand, realizes that these agents in themselves can help Turkey realize its interest of gaining not only a hand in the accession process (perhaps, more inclination of the EU to open negotiation chapters which are largely frozen?) but also gaining the visa free travel without fulfilling all benchmarks for it (see "Current Situation, section a). Participant II's response testifies to this argument:

It propelled but in a completely different context. But, remember that five or six years ago the relationship was more profound. So, the accession negotiations were happening, right now the relationship has become

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\(^{19}\) This in reference to the reform package initiated during the accession process (I.e. Copenhagen Criteria completion)
securitized, so the Europeans want to use Turkey as a buffer zone and Turkey tries to blackmail the Europeans. You’re right, but sort of the agreement was a positive thing for the relationship, and especially for the refugees, and Greece, and the loss of life was very high especially in the winter, so it is very dangerous, so this was a success. But on the other hand it is clear that Erdogan is willing to use this issue as a part of the domestic rhetoric, engaging with Russia and everything. When the European Parliament reprimanded Turkey for its rule of law record and recommended the suspension of recommendations because you cannot do much in this kind of situation, Turkey said that the EU should be careful because they have a certain leverage over it. In a way, he is conducting his EU policy, but it is important to remember that it is also a part of his domestic policy, because Turks receive this message, his policy, as a very brave and honorable defense of Turkish interest against others who aren’t interested in Turkish welfare and are trying to partition Turkey. (Personal Correspondence, 2016).

The third theme coming from the coding analysis is the theme of the Turkish political establishment. This theme covers an important element of the relationship, namely, the way the current regime establishment interacts with the EU and their policies, behaviors as well as statements related to the EU matters. This theme is presented through questions: "Does Erdoğan’s style of leadership, in your view, harm EU-Turkish relations?", as well as: “Do you think Turkey has been a credible partner in integration process? As in, has Turkey been successfully following EU’s guidelines on integration?” (Personal Correspondence, 2016). The participants answered generally in agreement, saying that, in both questions, there was a negative approach of Turkey towards the EU. For the first question, they agreed that President's style of leadership is harmful, however, some of them stated that it really is not only up to the president but also up to the institutions of the state which are traditionally weak in Turkish politics. For example, PII stated that:

I think it’s more than the style of leadership, it is also that, but it is also the quality of Turkish institutions, so this strong-man, single leader tradition is not uncommon in Turkey. Atatürk used to be the same figure so the opposite camp is sort of similar in that way. So still people venerate Atatürk as a sort of a divine figure, like he never made a mistake, he did everything right.
But, the most important issue is the lack of democratic checks and balances mechanism. (Personal Correspondence, 2016).

In addition to that, PII stated that initially AKP’s pro-EU reforms were a genuine step forward in both the accession process and Turkish integration process (Personal Correspondence, 2016). However, since then, due to the lack of checks and balances, effects of those reforms were undone (Personal Correspondence, 2016). Participant III had a similar position but did not base his arguments on Turkish institutions:

But, now with everything happening around Erdogan, this whole process changed. He really showed a different Turkish position. Today we can criticize him but in the beginning of his political rule, especially during the first period of four years, he was doing many pro-EU reforms, and he banned the death penalty, allowed headscarves in universities. He was really pro-EU and with the Kurds, he was opening Turkey to something else. (Personal Correspondence, 2016).

We can see that both participants acknowledge a certain twist in Turkish politics which was caused, amongst other things, by the weak institutions that allowed the accumulation of power in the hands of the President. Another aspect in which president's style of leadership harms the EU-Turkey relations rests in the fact that there are many in Europe who do not wish for Turkish accession into the organization and they feel especially encouraged by the authoritarian elements in president's rule:

Right, it does harm, in that sense, you know if there are people who do not wish Turkey well, in terms of it not wanting to come to the EU, then Erdogan is giving them extra ammunition by the way he behaves. They might say his own behavior, the party he leads, some might say look a secular stable democratic Turkey we are willing to consider, maybe there are some other issues in terms of economics where Turkey must get better, but that’s a different story. But, in the sort of a cultural and political sense, the way he operates is giving extra fire, ammunition, to those who say “Nah, Turkey doesn’t belong”. In that sense, yes, he harms, he harms, I would also say he harms Turkey’s negotiation position, diplomatic influence. Because, it is the "brist of the mill" of those that already are doubting that Turkey is the right country. So, that, hand on the table, style of leadership is not good. (Personal Correspondence, 2016).
This interpretation is quite interesting as we have seen two recent trends happening in the EU politics regarding the events in Turkey; general lack of will for pushing for reforms and general perception of Turkey as a state that cannot be returned towards the accession path. In that sense, countries such as Austria and institutions such as the EU Parliament are insistent on ending the accession negotiations. In one hand, they are right because Turkey has not been fulfilling EU recommendations but on the other hand, they're perceiving Turkey to be just another candidate state without acknowledging specific (geo)political as well as social factors influencing Turkish politics. The extreme rise in terrorist attacks in Turkey (the most recent one happening on the New Year's night of 2016 on 2017) are instilling fear in the public and are pushing the authoritarian government to be even firmer, especially in the wake of the post-attempted coup developments (BBC, 2017). EU needs to acknowledge that and provide support for Turkey to transition and consolidate its democracy which is not dead and can be revived. However, in the case of both the EU and Turkey there is a fundamental question to be asked; is there a will for cooperation? This relates to the question of credibility of Turkey towards the EU (and vice versa). Participant I stated that:

And one can say certainly with Erdoğan that, you know, Turkey hasn’t really been fully willing to uphold the criteria, they keep on backsliding on things, and having a regime like Erdoğan’s where there’s the death penalty issue, the press freedom issue, uhm, so, uhm, with number five the question was has it been really credible when it is so long, now the question is, if it has been that long, has Turkey simply not met the criteria? Or, is it the EC/U that’s been moving the markers and changing the game all the way. There, I don’t have it on top of my head, what the specific things were, but, you know, when you talk about credibility, the fundamental issue is, with the EU, does the EU want to enable Turkey to enter? Turkish side- does Turkey really want to do what it takes to get in? And in both cases, there are question marks. (Personal Correspondence, 2016).
This answer follows the overarching theme of this research. The accession negotiations have been ongoing since 1963 with the Ankara Agreement (see "History of Relations") whose end-goal was Turkey's accession to the then-EEC. Both Turkey and EEC have experienced radical changes in their political and social fabric during the past fifty-four years and it appears that the will for accession to continue is fading. The mistrust both agents have towards each other is ever-present and the cooperation, especially on crucial political issues such as the refugee crisis or Turkey's respect for the rule of law is at the lowest point in years.

The fourth theme which is relevant for the study of EU-Turkey relations is the issue of the size of Turkey. Turkey is a country of eighty-one million people. It's neighbors are Iran, Iraq, Syria, Greece, Bulgaria, Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan (actually, its exclave of Nakchivan). This testifies not only to the population size of Turkey but also to its geographic size. Turkey is located in the Asia Minor and has for centuries been a trading center for the Euro-Asian traders. Its location is both ideal as well as problematic because Turkey is perceived as a country that does not belong either to Europe or Asia. The size of Turkey, both geographic and population-wise, is a crucial aspect of its accession negotiations, although it is not enumerated in the Copenhagen Criteria. The participants have answered the following question: "Do you think that the size of Turkey has any impact on its EU integration?" (Personal Correspondence, 2016). There are three main arguments that have come up from the answers. First one is that Turkey, as a large country, is relatively economically and politically unstable (Personal Correspondence, 2016). Furthermore, it is a country which will be hardly digestible by the EU (Personal correspondence, 2016). Second one is that Turkey would occupy the most EU Parliament seats and would be a
large net-recipient of EU budget funds which would encumber the EU financially and would cause other member-states issues as more funds would go to Turkey than would come back (Personal Correspondence, 2016). Third argument is that Turkey would become the most influential member-state in the EU Council (Personal Correspondence, 2016). In that sense, because the voting procedure in the EU Council is a combination of qualified majority principle with the population-size majority principle (EU Council, 2016). In that sense, in order for a law to pass in the Council, there needs to be a majority of 55% of member-states (16 out of 28) who comprise more than 65% of the EU population (EU Council, 2016). Turkey would add a significant leverage in the population-size aspect.

Participant I has given a profound answer to this question, connecting multiple issue Turkey faces on its accession path and giving an answer which states that all of the problems Turkey faces (from identity-related issues to size) are not canceling themselves out but are rather a part of the problem:

If you look at your first and your tenth question, what you’re talking about are the factors that are going to impact the possibility of Turkish integration in the EU, if you go back to that then there is the religious, the size, population size, but not only that because you could have a wealthy population, that more than size, if Turkey were a big but stable politically and economically, you know, and if it were in a different neighborhood, there’d be a different situation. I mean, ah, so, I mean if you compare it to Norway, go diagonal. Norway is not in the EU? Why would it be? It has a number of advantages over Turkey, most importantly- good neighborhood, small population which is wealthy, stable politics, not the Islamic factor that may complicate things, stable government- that’s an interesting juxtaposition. To take and compare these two. Why would it be easier to integrate Norway than Turkey? Then we can see that we have religion, government, politics, size and all of the individual factors that make up the composite influence- how do those interplay together? If, you say, Norway were not so wealthy but has 4 million, more rural, people. Not very well off, farmers…But if its stably run and is progressing because four million partly economically struggling inhabitants is easier for the EU to deal with than 80 million. A combination of things is a problem. (Personal Correspondence, 2016).
This answer relates itself to the first argument. Turkey has a large population in its central, central-southern, and central-northern areas which are hardly reachable. There, the population is not developed as much as it is in the EU member-states and is harboring more traditional, religious sentiments that are different from the perceived European life-style. On top of that, Turkish problems with accommodating large masses of refugees, dealing with terrorism, political drawbacks, as well as the issue of culture of democracy in the country are all factors which add up and make Turkey an unwanted candidate. When it comes to the second argument, the issue is as follows:

I am not sure if the EU funds would be so generous to Turkey due to its size, it is so big and it would be a big disturbance to the EU budget, but the very existence of this political prospect, condition, would be very important. Size, you mentioned Turkish size, of course it would be a big issue. Why? Because until the Turkish candidacy, the big countries in the EU were those who contributed to the EU budget. So, Germany and France were the big players so they had the most influence but they also contributed the most to the EU budget. In the Turkish case that would be reverse, so Turkey would be a very big country, big population, but it would be a net recipient, not a net contributor to the EU budget. So, I would say, in light of the Turkish EU membership, and in light of the fact that Europe will need immigration, one way or the other, that would be a big influence. But, of course that’s very difficult to say in the public, Merkel does it- the people who don’t understand it and are thinking just about themselves but in the big picture, they don’t see it. (Personal Correspondence, 2016).

The EU Parliament issue is another big thing. Apart from the budget, which is approved by the EU Parliament, the EU Parliament itself would have the most representatives from Turkey thereby surpassing even Germany which has the most representatives. What this means is that, under the current arrangement, the EU parliament has 751 members (700 members plus the President) and cannot go over that number. If Turkey were to become a new member-state, it would have the maximum of ninety-six members of the EU Parliament which would mean that the Parliament structure would have to be changed (perhaps leading to some member-states to lose representatives?) in order to
accommodate the new arrangement. Participant III believes that the size of Turkey is one of the biggest reason for why the EU is not keen on accepting Turkey:

Oh yeah, I think so. I think so. I think also that that’s one of the main reasons why Turkey was not accepted and we have all these Copenhagen Criteria but for human rights we did a lot before, and for economy, and in comparison to Bulgaria and Romania we fared well. But the people did not understand why, especially the Turks here (Germany), why Bulgaria and Romania entered the EU instead of Turkey and that’s what made people angry about this whole thing. But, I think it’s really because of the size because we can see that Turkey would have the most representatives in the EU Parliament. (Personal Correspondence, 2016).

When it comes to the third argument which is related to the EU Council, participant II stated the following:

In my opinion, we already have the Council voting mechanism with its two criteria: there’s a double-qualified majority of member states, one needs to have that and it benefits the small states to pass something in the Council. But there’s also a population-weighted vote which depends on the population size. There could be a per-capita GDP weighted vote or the contribution to the EU budget criterion if Turkey enters which would balance its influence, so introducing the third criterion to the voting mechanism would protect the small states like Malta and their influence in the Council. These economic criteria would reduce Turkish influence to the size of, perhaps, Poland so Turkey wouldn’t be as strong as Germany. (Personal Correspondence, 2016).

The final theme arising out of the coding analysis is the theme of Europeanness. Europeanness as a term will be applied in this thesis to denote the feeling of whether somebody belongs to the perceived European geographic-cultural identity (the degree of Europeanness). In the interview process, this issue was addressed through question three: "Is Turkey a European nation? And if so, do you think Turkey belongs in the EU?" (Personal Correspondence, 2016). However, questions found in the first theme are also connected to this one, as the issue of religious identity has important ramifications when it comes to constructing the European identity. Participant II gave an excellent example of how Europe, as a geo-cultural entity, is subject to historical changes:
If you ask me, I will answer to you that the borders of Europe have been changing but it’s also that the borders of Europe have been more a matter of politics and not a matter of science. For many thousands of years, the Greeks lived on both sides of the Aegean, no one considered this something very important. Founding texts of European civilization come from Egypt, from Alexandria. In the same sense, you can make the case for Russia. Russia has been a part of Europe sometimes and sometimes it has been a part of this Russo-Asian world. It was also the case that, sort of, the borders of Catholicism were the borders of Europe and the Orthodox were not really European. There’s also the case of Cyprus, Cyprus is very far from the nearest Greek island and is closer to the Turkish coast and Israel, and Aleppo, and Cairo, than European countries. No one said that Cyprus was an Asian country during the accession process. It is a cultural division, I wouldn’t necessarily check the Turkish membership because of that but I also understand that there have to be certain values of Europe so if Turkey is adapting to them then it should have a fair chance at the accession. (Personal Correspondence, 2016).

Coming from the region of Balkans, which for a long time belonged to a so-called "Communist block" of states during the Cold War (although SFR Yugoslavia was a member of the "Non-Aligned Movement") it is easy to see how Europe's identity is a changing matter. During the Cold War, the primacy on “Europe” was centered around countries of the Western Europe (Benelux, France, the UK, Italy), but non-democratic countries who were not included in the EC (European Community) were outside of that discourse on Europe (for example, Spain and Portugal even belong here, although they entered the EU during the 1980s which changed their position). Turkey, although being connected to Europe for centuries, has become an othered subject discursively after the Cold War, unlike the former-Communist block states which rapidly became members of the EU. Turkey today finds itself at odds with the vision of Europe as a closely bound union of liberal democratic states that are closer to the continent. Turkey, being at the borders of Europe (Asia Minor) is often not seen as such whereas countries like Georgia who are also at the borders of Europe, do not seem to have a discursive problem (but rather a problem of their neighborhood) when it comes to their EU aspirations.
Turkey carries a strong laicist-Kemalist legacy which for years constituted the major socio-political orientation in the country and is being changed now under the rule of AKP. This legacy hindered democracy throughout history (i.e. it was a direct cause of four coups) but it also kept Turkey as one of rare majority-Muslim but secular countries. Religion is still a matter of contention in Turkey and its effects on the population are a matter of great social and political debate. Another perspective which confirms the existence of this religious-social-political debate in Turkey is the perspective of participant III who states that:

Ok, I would, let’s say it like that, in certain discourses and debates, Turkey is a European nation. If you look on the formation of the state, secularism as its doctrine which follows the European model and the Western model. Atatürk had a very Western-European idea of a nation. I think also, of course, that in terms of culture and language, and mentality itself, I think it’s a more Mediterranean nation and I wouldn’t say that it’s really a European nation in itself. It is a mix of both and I don’t like emphasizing the idea of hybridity, but I think it’s very influenced by Eastern, Arab and Islamic traditions but also very influenced by the Western, modern and secular tradition. If you look at fashion, modernization, state ideas and politics, Turkey is really modern. It is a parliamentary system despite Erdogan’s autocratic rules, it is still a parliamentary system. (Personal Correspondence, 2016).

The Kemalist idea of a Western-European nation is precisely the idea of modernization of Turkish nation after the fall of the Ottoman Empire. Mustafa Kemal purged Turkish language and culture of Oriental and Islamic influences, and has created a modern nation-state on the basis of a completely new state ideology called Kemalism (see chapter “Turkey, EU, and the Construction of Identities”). This new state ideology worked well, but it was a great barrier for the full development of Turkish democracy (Turkey only became a multiparty democracy in 1946 when CHP won the first multiparty elections- see chapter “History”, section 1). Today, the strength of Kemal's personality remains in Turkish political life, but Kemalist ideas and Kemalist factions are fading away under the
influence of growing political islamization of country. Both Kemalism and Islam as political tools are hindering Turkish progress on its road to the EU and are also hindering Turkish democracy and rule of law. The strengthening of Islam as a political tool in Turkey (and the neo-conservativism of AKP) is perceived by many in Europe as an inevitable occurrence as Islam, according to them, is incompatible with democracy (Ertuğrul, 1). Because of AKP’s governing, Turkey is even more othered as a non-European, nationalistic, Islamic country which does not belong in the EU. This has important implications for the relationship of the two as the process of othering is not only a social one, but also a political one.

Subchapter 3. Refugee Crisis: A New Frontier in the Relationship?

1. Introduction

In the previous chapters, we have established that the reasons for the deteriorating state of EU-Turkey relationship have a social dimension. This conclusion was further confirmed by the findings of the previous sub-chapter (see “Public Opinion”- section I.) which concluded that although Turkish-EU relationship is perceived across different variables (such as, for example, Turkey’s size or the enlargement fatigue), the identitarian variable seems to have the most influence on the perception of the relationship. Therefore, the constructivist argument posited early in this thesis that EU-Turkey relations are what the EU and Turkey make of it, does have a cogent analytic strength. However, if we want to explore the relationship in a holistic way, we have to study the particular instances where the manifestation of this social dimension in EU-Turkey relations is most visible.

This chapter, as well as subsequent chapters, will be crucial for determining and disentangling precisely what makes the relationship between EU and Turkey so socially encumbered. Furthermore, they will explore what kind of interests manifest themselves
from the identities formed by the logic of appropriateness operating between EU and Turkey. As the relationship between the EU and Turkey is a social process, the current global context influences it in both constructive and destructive ways. The recent refugee crisis (2014-present) is an evidence of a destructive influence. Although the refugee crisis holds an inherent constructive value which can help Turkey and the EU realize its interests by joining together, it appears that the social anxieties formed due to the crisis itself have negatively influenced the way both agents behave in the process of implementing the Migrant Swap Deal, signed in March of 2016. Following the ideal-typical analytical models, the refugee crisis issue will here be analyzed through the prism of securitization of Islam, refugees and immigration in Europe. This chapter seeks to conclude that, although the Migrant Swap Deal of March 2016 was a positive step for the relationship, the subsequent political issues have given rise to a negative discourse between the EU and Turkey that showed the internal social and political structures of othering in the relationship.

2. EU, Turkey, and Immigration

The issue of immigration (both legal and illegal) into the European Union has been one of the most emphasized aspects of the discussion on EU’s unity and legal practices. Although the EU does not have a supranational migration or asylum policy (that is- a common asylum policy), it has certain mechanisms, such as the Frontex agency established in 2004, or the European Border and Coast Guard (essentially a part of Frontex), established in 2016, intended on helping the EU control its external borders. These mechanisms are working together with the larger system, which controls immigration,

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20 For more information, see “Constructivism: Accession Road is What Agents Make of It”.
21 For more information, see “Current Situation”, section a.
called the Dublin Regulation. The Dublin Regulation establishes an intricate system of processing asylum applications on the territory of the EU. It states that the asylum applications are not processed on the EU level but rather that a country where an applicant applied for asylum, or where an asylum-seeker first arrived, processes his asylum application, and decides what happens to the applicant (Terron, 2015). The goal of the Dublin Regulation was essentially to curb the number of asylum applications to the EU territory by limiting asylum-seekers to apply to only one country (Huysmans, 756). Therefore, the asylum system established by the Dublin Regulation is essentially a rerouting system which represents an EU-level legislation, aiming to strengthen the national sovereignty over asylum-related issues. The Dublin Regulation today is seen largely as one of the main reasons for why the recent refugee crisis encumbered the European system so much.

Starting in 2015, the refugee crisis swept over Europe and, in conflation with horrible terrorist attacks (e.g. Paris in January and November of 2015), caused panic on both public and elite levels. UNHCR reports the extent of the crisis by offering concise data comparisons for every month of the refugee crisis. For example, in January of 2016, there were 73,135 arrivals reported from the Mediterranean Sea routes (e.g. Libya or Egypt), compared to only 5862 from January of 2017 (UNHCR, 2016). Furthermore, there were 362,373 asylum seekers on the territory of EU in 2016 (UNHCR, 2016). In comparison to 2015 this is a significant decrease because in 2015 there were approximately 1,015,078 asylum seekers on the territory of the EU (UNHCR, 2016). However, both figures from 2015 and 2016 demonstrate a significant influx of asylum-seekers and refugees on the territory of the EU:
Per Eurostat, 213,200 asylum seekers applied for protection in the EU during the second quarter of 2015, representing an increase of 15% over the first quarter (185,000) and 85% over the second quarter of 2014 (Ulviyye, 110).

Most of the asylum seekers who entered Europe by the Mediterranean Sea route ended up going to Italy or Greece (therefore, the first-intake countries). The sudden increase in the number of asylum-seekers in Europe in 2015 put considerable strain on such countries whose ports and cities were overflowing with refugees coming from Libya and Egypt (See Figure 1.0 below). They started calling for a more flexible and urgent response from the EU in the form of financial assistance but also investments to EU’s neighborhood as well as negotiating the readmission agreements such as the one with Turkey.

Figure 1. Number of Immigrants Arriving to Greece weekly between 9th of June and 27th of October, 2015 (Okyay and Zaragoza-Cristiani, 52).
Concomitant with the Mediterranean Sea route (which ended in Italy or Greece), another route opened for immigrants on their way to the EU, the Balkan route. The opening of this route, starting in Bulgaria and Greece, and ending in Slovenia or Hungary, was caused by the overflow of refugees/immigrants on the Turkish border with Bulgaria (therefore, the EU). This caused further strain to countries such as Hungary or Slovenia because smaller Balkan states, such as FYR Macedonia, simply could not afford keeping in the asylum-seekers and processing them, so they opened their borders and allowed them to pass through. This put the entire Schengen System\textsuperscript{22} at risk because many member-states such as Hungary, Slovenia, Austria, and Denmark started closing their borders and reinstating the border guards in order to protect themselves from the influx of refugees.

The Dublin Regulation was deemed lacking and calls for a more integrated, EU-level, approach to the asylum system have increased. Because the EU could not find a unified approach to dealing with the refugee crisis, the EU officials started negotiating bilateral treaties with countries such as Turkey in order to stem the flow of refugees to Europe (the so-called readmission agreements):

There are many more examples of the restrictive and control-oriented imperative that drives European migration policy. Among the most visible are the coordination of visa policy in the Union and the coordination and facilitation of so-called readmission agreements. The latter are agreements with neighboring countries about the readmission of illegal immigrants found on the territory of an EU member state (Huysmans, 756).

\textsuperscript{22} The Schengen System is a system of managing EU’s external borders while at the same time providing EU citizens with free movement across national borders (European Commission, 2017). It abolished border controls, passport checks and visas between participant states (European Commission, 2016). The system was established in 1995 and has since then been one of the greatest achievements of the EU (European Commission, 2016). It provides free movement for more than 400 million European citizens (European Commission, 2016). It comprises 24 member-states of the EU and includes two other European states (Norway and Switzerland) who aren’t EU members (European Commission, 2016).
Following EU’s incentives to start negotiations on the readmission agreements, the EU-Turkey delegations started meeting later in 2015. The signing of the EU-Turkey Migrant Swap Deal ended in March of 2016. This deal saw EU and Turkey approach each other and cooperate openly thus bringing hope for the revival of strained relations:

What followed was the most significant advance for Turkey’s EU accession process since 2010 – and perhaps a last-ditch effort to salvage the much-criticized framework for negotiations. At a mini-summit in October 2015, European leaders agreed to “re-energize” Turkey’s accession process in return for its cooperation in stemming the flow of refugees. On 1st of November, the German Chancellor, Angela Merkel, flew to Istanbul and met with President Erdoğan two days before he general election in Turkey, agreeing, in principle, to a European aid package of €3 billion and to revitalize the accession talks in return for a Turkish commitment to serve as gatekeeper for Syrian refugees. In December 2015, the European Commission opened a new accession chapter (Chapter 17 on Economic and Financial Matters) for the first time in five years. And, in March 2016, Turkey and the EU shook hands on a final arrangement for Turkey to take back migrants who had made their way to Greece, and secure its borders in return for €6 billion in refugee aid, visa-free travel for Turkish citizens (as early as summer 2016, but as soon as Turkey fulfils the 72 benchmarks), and revived talks on accession to the EU (Aydintasbas, 4).

Therefore, as we can see, the refugee swap deal was from the start aiming not only at stemming the flow of migrants from Turkey to Europe but also at bringing Turkey closer to the EU in both accession negotiations terms as well as in visa-free travel terms. It is also important to add that the deal was limited to sending a maximum of seventy-two thousand asylum-seekers back to Turkey, a number which did not satisfy many but was regardless included as a goal (Okyay and Zaragoza-Cristiani, 51). After the signing of the deal, crucial developments happened in Turkey which effectively changed the discourse on rapprochement in a negative way. Only a month after the deal was signed, President Erdoğan dismissed PM Davutoğlu from his post. Davutoğlu, former foreign minister of Turkey, was a crucial AKP official in Turkish politics after Erdoğan and was seen as one of the masterminds behind the refugee deal (alongside Chancellor Merkel). This sudden
change at the top of Turkish politics was followed by an increasingly harsh discourse of President Erdoğan regarding the seventy-two benchmarks Turkey had to fulfill in exchange for the visa-free travel regime. Even though the benchmarks were a part of the deal from the beginning, as one high Turkish official said, President Erdoğan and the Turkish government refused to amend the anti-terror law citing security concerns in the wake of terrorist attacks across the country (Aydintasbas, 6). In May, only one day after Davutoğlu resigned as the Turkish PM, President Erdoğan made a harsh public call saying that if the EU did not enact the visa-free regime for carriers of the Turkish passport, then Turkey would: "We'll go our way, you go yours" (BBC, 2016).

After May, the situation in Turkey was further complicated with the attempted coup d'état which failed. However, the government crackdown on the alleged coup-plotters saw thousands arrested or fleeing Turkey. The EU Parliament reacted in November by voting to suspend the accession talks with Turkey over its blatant disrespect for the rule of law (EU Parliament, 2016). The EU Parliament decision was a symbolic response (it is legally non-binding) to announcements that Turkey might reintroduce the capital punishment for the alleged coup-plotters. President Erdoğan again reacted angrily by saying that Turkey would open its borders to refugees going to Europe:

You cried out when 50,000 refugees were at the Kapikule border,” he said, referring to the border crossing with Bulgaria, one of the busiest in the world even in normal times. “You started asking what you would do if Turkey would open the gates. Look at me — if you go further, those border gates will be open. You should know that (Nordland, 2016).

President Erdoğan obviously realized that Turkey has substantial leverage over the EU decisions now when the EU is in panic and is vulnerable. Accordingly, Turkish officials such as the former PM Davutoğlu used discourses on Europe as a Christian fortress to legitimate their calls, and the righteousness of their demands, in international community:
Erdoğan also accused Europe of being inconsistent with its own values and causing deaths in the Mediterranean due to its negligence in this humanitarian crisis. In a similar vein, Turkey’s PM Ahmet Davutoğlu called on the EU to stop “putting the onus on Turkey, adopting a purely defensive approach with wholesale security measures and building walls to create a Christian ‘fortress Europe (Okyay and Zaragoza-Cristiani, 54).

The EU's response to these public attacks has been largely institutional, starting with EU Parliament's symbolic decision on halting the accession talks and expressing concern for the rule of law, and the respect for the principle of separation of powers in the government through tools such as the EU Commission Report 2016:

EU-Turkey relations are even more strained after the failed coup attempt of 15 July. While Turkey criticized the EU for not condemning the attempt to overthrow the elected Turkish government strongly enough, the EU struck back, criticizing the post-coup crackdown in which thousands of people (including journalists and academics) were detained and warning Turkey about the grave consequences for its membership prospects of the potential reinstatement of the death penalty (Okyay and Zaragoza-Cristiani, 62).

However, it is evident that President Erdoğan's statements cause significant frustration and distress in Europe. Although the Refugee Swap Deal is standing, and the readmissions are happening, the EU is frightened that the whole crisis could easily be repeated, especially if Turkey intentionally opens its border with Bulgaria to millions of people.

The discourse set in President Erdoğan's statements constructs migrants as a political tool that can be used in order to achieve political means. In that sense, because the migrants have become a securitized element in the now largely transactional relationship, they are no longer perceived as people in need of shelter but rather elements within a larger power discourse. The EU fears another migrant influx, and more terrorist attacks, while Turkey needs EU's political and financial assistance to deal with its own immigrant influx. As Turkey has spent more than eight billion USD supporting refugees and has registered
more than 2.2 million Syrian refugees on its territory, the necessity for obtaining EU’s financial assistance is fundamental for its continued support for immigrants (Ulviyye, 107). However, even though Turkey is in need of financial assistance, it is very important to note that before the deal was signed, Turkey refused multiple international assistance offers in order to convey an image of itself as caring for the refugees:

Interestingly, according to reports published particularly in the initial years of the crisis, Turkey had turned down most offers of international assistance (Okyay and Zaragoza-Cristiani, 54).

Turkish officials did this in attempt to demonstrate to the international community the dedication, and humanity, Turkey fosters towards the Syrian refugees in the face of Europe’s lack of response. Turkey used its humanitarian position to legitimize calls to the EU to acknowledge its position as a country that is a boundary between “Europe and chaos” (Okyay and Zaragoza-Cristiani, 54). These calls strengthened Turkey’s position in negotiations and allowed it to demand increase in the aid offered by the EU:” This argument was used not only to legitimize Turkey in the eyes of the international community, but also to negotiate higher amounts of financial aid from the EU.” (Okay and Zaragoza-Cristiano, 54). By establishing itself as a migration nexus state, Turkey’s political position became stronger in that it started appealing to international masses by criticizing EU’s lack of empathy towards the refugees in comparison to Turkey’s willingness to help. As the numbers of refugees started rising in the second half of 2015, Turkey saw a chance, a window of opportunity, to push its agenda on EU’s panicked politicians:

These developments opened a window of opportunity for Turkish authorities to voice arguments aimed at cornering the EU. On the one hand, this strategy was aimed at delegitimizing Europe’s claims to normative actorness with utmost respect for human rights and much sensitivity towards humanitarian crises, while legitimizing Turkey with its higher
degree of moral and material support given to refugees. On the other hand, it was to demonstrate that the survival of the Schengen area largely depended on Turkey’s discretion in cooperation, given the divisions within the EU (Okyay and Zaragoza-Cristiani, 54).

When it comes to Europe, the issue of migrants has also become a politically disruptive problem. Migration and the refugee influx are seen as one of the most important factors which weaken national traditions and the homogeneity within the EU (Huysmans, 758). The issue of securitizing migrants in the EU has developed over the years and is not a novel issue, however, with the surprising increase in refugee numbers arriving to Europe in 2015, the discourse of securitization of migrants became conflated with many existential issues in the EU, such as the economic crisis, which then yielded the growth of populism across the continent (in France, Germany, Italy, Denmark, Hungary...). The issue of migration then became the most apparent issue, and the most important one for the existence of the EU in European public/political discourse. The importance of the issue of migration for the EU was very apparent during the Turkey-EU delegations’ meetings prior to the March 2016 deal. The EU gave massive concessions to Turkey in order to strike the best bargain with regards to the migration agreement. For example, the issue of the EU Commission Report of 2015 came up. As I wrote in the previous chapters (see “Current Situation, section II”), the EU Commission report has served as both a constructive and deconstructive element in the relationship between the EU and Turkey. In this sense, the concessions given by the EU to Turkey in the fall/winter of 2015 testify to my statement:

The extent to which the migratory crisis constitutes the EU’s soft underbelly becomes even more apparent when its intensified efforts and its readiness to give major concessions to strike a deal with Turkey are embedded in this particular political context. Illustrative of the EU’s vulnerability is that, by indicating that it could and might cease keeping the gate, Turkey was getting
the EU to commit to hitherto very hard-to-get rewards, such as the VLD\textsuperscript{23} acceleration and the opening of new chapters. The delayed release of the European Commission’s Annual Progress Report from its scheduled pre-election release date of 14 October to 10 November was rather revealing in terms of the extent of ‘normative’ concessions the EU was ready to make. According to the leaked minutes of a meeting between Erdoğan, Tusk and Juncker during the mid-November G20 meeting, Juncker reportedly said that the Commission faced much criticism because it delayed the report ‘on Erdoğan’s request’ (Okyay and Zaragoza-Cristiani, 58).

We can see that EU’s need to protect its borders and soothe the anxious public have forced it to bend its usually staunch normativist principles; by prioritizing the immigration, the EU has confirmed that even its normative-institutional principles are not as strong as it has believed. Delaying the EU Commission report for almost a full month gave Turkey a chance to organize its government, as the fall of 2015 was a post-elections period, and the negotiation team without the normative pressure, and unnecessary publicity, caused by the EU Commission’s report.

Because of the negative political discourse and existential European political crisis, many politicians supporting the open-borders policy have changed their stances. For example, the crisis resulted in Chancellor Merkel proclaiming multiculturalism a sham in a public speech. This proclamation came as a surprise because Germany under Chancellor Merkel has generally been labelled as probably the most immigrant-friendly country in Europe. Her policy of "Wir schaffen das" ("We got this"), supporting the open borders policy, has become symbolic globally in the wake of the refugee crisis. However, the public pressure as well as fears of new terrorist attacks have caused Merkel's CDU to toughen its stance towards immigrants. Müftüler-Baç writes that the question of multiculturalism in

\textsuperscript{23} Visa Liberalisation Dialogue- political dialogue aiming to liberalize the EU visa system for Turkish passport-holders. For more information, please visit the Eur-Lex website at: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52016DC0140, Accessed March 18\textsuperscript{th}, 2017.
Europe is an implication that a multicultural society, the one including non-Europeans, is a threat to the values, norms and culture of the European society (Müftüler-Baç, 79). This threat, argues Müftüler-Baç, comes from immigration and perhaps even potential expansion of the EU because it introduces more non-European peoples to the generally homogenous EU society (Müftüler-Baç, 79). Therefore, because of these fears, the EU has a strongly protectionist migration policy. When it comes to Turkey, we can see how this migration policy played out in EU’s attempts to prevent large influxes of refugees to enter EU soil. On one hand, the EU was willing to provide substantial financial assistance to Turkey (Ulviyye, 113). However, on the other hand, the EU has agreed to open negotiation chapters in order to stimulate the accession talks with Turkey in exchange for Turkey's signature on the deal (Ulviyye, 113). This testifies to the fact that EU does not really see Turkey as a viable candidate state because, if the accession process is a normative issue, then it should flow (or stall) regardless of the refugee crisis (Ulviyye, 113). In this instance, the refugee crisis has confirmed that accession road is what agents (the EU and Turkey) make of it; it is a normative process but it is also a political tool aimed at alleviating social and economic anxieties, in this case regarding the influx of Syrian refugees to the EU.

When it comes to the deal itself, it must be stated that it worked, however provisionally. The number of refugees going from Turkey to Europe was reduced and the readmission process began (See figure 1.2, below).

Figure 1.1: Line-graph depicting the total number of arrivals in Greece from Turkey per month from April 2015 to June 2016 (Okyay and Cristiano-Zaragoza, 61).
Although the migrant swap deal is working, it has been criticized by many human rights advocates for its lack of legal strength and potential disregard for human rights. These criticisms serve to testify to the anxious and quick atmosphere in which the deal itself was forged. The Migration Policy Institute writes in March of 2016 that there are only two ways under which the migrants can be readmitted from the EU territory: a) if they are “irregular migrants” meaning that they did not apply for asylum or do not qualify for it, and b) if the country from which they arrived is a “safe country”, that is, a country in which they had or could have claimed protection (Migration Policy Institute, 2016). It is debatable whether Turkey is a safe country at all because even though their laws do comply with EU regulations, the number of people processed and protected falls short and indicates that their system is not ready for readmission of a significant number of more than 72,000 asylum seekers. For example, in February 2016 out of 200,000 asylum seekers, only 38,595 have received protection (Migration Policy Institute, 2016). Furthermore, the issue gets a new dimension as the most (40%) of asylum seekers are children, as well as the fact that most asylum seekers who come to Greece are in genuine need of protection (52% are
Syrian and 41% Afghan out of 57,000 who arrived in February of 2016) (Migration Policy Institute, 2016). Accordingly, even if the EU and Turkey successfully exchange asylum seekers, a process which is ongoing, the issue with the deal is that a few migrants can be returned:

However, the deal has also unveiled a paradox for a European Union that has spent several decades preaching its own high asylum standards to neighboring countries. To achieve its self-imposed goal—a significant reduction in arrivals and an increase in returns to Turkey—policymakers will have to drastically cut legal corners, potentially violating EU law on issues such as detention and the right to appeal. But if governments execute the agreement in conformity with international and European legal frameworks, few arrivals are likely to be returned, and the agreement risks becoming the latest in a long series of undelivered promises to exasperated publics for whom the complex legal conundrums of implementation are both meaningless and irrelevant (Migration Policy Institute, 2016).

Therefore, we can see that the deal did yield a desired effect for the EU, that is, the significant reduction in arrivals on the EU soil (see Figure 1.2. above) and that Turkey almost got everything it wanted (six billion Euros and an almost-achieved visa-free regime with the EU). However, the readmission aspect of the deal seems to be lacking in fundamental EU values as well as legal practice which, in combination with the power discourse between the EU and Turkey over migrants, confirms the idea that the intersubjective image between the EU and Turkey is largely an anxious, if not outright negative, one.

3. Conclusion

Conflated with many events, from EU’s financial crisis to the attempted coup d’etat in Turkey, the refugee crisis seems to be a crucial part in the intersubjective world of mistrust the EU and Turkey project towards one another. The securitization of the term "refugee" and of the general refugee crisis has brought about populist rises across the continent which genuinely lessen the prospect of Turkish membership to the EU.
Generally, far-right populist parties in Europe tend to emphasize the Judeo-Christian civilizational project of Europe and are intent on ejecting any "otherness" from Europe in discursive and, unfortunately, practical terms (i.e. evicting Muslims from different EU countries). These calls have become very influential in Europe’s public discourse due to the refugee crisis, and as such represent the singularly unique existential threat to EU’s unity. The necessity of the migrant deal between the EU and Turkey is overshadowed only by the necessity of preserving the European Union in the face of such threats. The construction of Turks and Muslims as threats to European cultural homogeneity seem abstract, however, they have important implications for EU's foreign policy as we have seen on the example of including accession negotiations as an element of quid pro quo transaction on the refugee deal. On the other hand, Turkey's ruling establishment seems intent on using power in both material and social (i.e. public speeches) terms to achieve its goals. The populist rhetoric coming from Turkey sometimes even appeals to populist securitization of Muslims in order to legitimize its power hold as well as the "morality" with which it is handling the crisis. President Erdoğan often mentions Europe's insensitivity towards refugees (e.g. the idea of Europe as a fortress) in his public appearances to appeal to his voters, but this discursive element carries a strong political message which states that if Turkey's wishes (or AKP's wishes) are not fulfilled, then Europe will suffer at the hands of refugees. Such a rhetoric is indeed disconcerting; however, it has become a political reality in the EU and Turkey and, therefore, must be thoughtfully scrutinized in the future.
Subchapter 4. Cyprus: Identity, Security, and the EU-Turkey Relationship

1. Introduction

Earlier in this research, I wrote that the issue of Cyprus stands tall as one of the most important issues in the relationship between EU and Turkey (see "History", section 2). In a sense, the Cyprus issue has become something more than a matter of divergent interests; it has become a symbol of Greco-Turkish struggle and it has also become symbolic of EU's powerlessness in dealing with its own internal political issues. However, the Cyprus issue is not only a burden on the relationship between EU and Turkey but rather on the international community as well. The United Nations Force in Cyprus was established in 1963/4 on a demilitarized zone that runs along what is known as "The Green Line", that is the line dividing TRNC (Turkish Republic of North Cyprus), an internationally unrecognized country established in the northern part of Cyprus in 1983, and the RoC (the Republic of Cyprus), an EU member state since 2004, established in 1960 on the whole island (Meisler, 156). The UNFCYP mission to Cyprus has been patrolling the Green Line for more than forty-five years now and stands as one of the longest, if not the longest, UN peacekeeping missions in its history. It was established by Ralph Bunche, under U Thant's leadership of the United Nations (Meisler, 156). Therefore, investigating the influence of Cyprus on the EU-Turkey relationship presents a complex, albeit an important problem that can help us understand generally the International Relations of the Mediterranean region and Europe. The complexity of the struggle of reunification of the island of Cyprus under one government has produced a vast amount of academic materials on this topic as well as a recurring public controversy.

This chapter will analyze the Cyprus issue by using three main points which go in line with three analytical models presented earlier in this research (See chapter
"Constructivism and IR: Accession Road is What Agents Make of It", section 2). The three points seek to demonstrate the constructivist basis for analyzing the Cyprus issue and its effect on the EU-Turkey relationship as well as Turkey's accession process to the EU. The first point states that due to the negative intersubjective image between Turks and Greeks (both in Turkey/Greece and on Cyprus), the solution to the problem seems unlikely. This negative intersubjective image has been a product of two processes, namely the Greco-Turkish relations as a historical struggle (if not enmity) and an open utilization of the EU normative-institutionalism by Greece, and later on by Cyprus, to exert pressure on Turkey to concede to their demands. That is to say, the normative-institutional processes of the EU have been constructed as means of pressuring Turkey to concede its interests in Cyprus in exchange for improving its position in the EU accession negotiations. This paper will argue as the second point that because the RoC acceded to the EU, the matter of reuniting the island of Cyprus is no longer a matter of only security concerns but also of cultural-identitarian trust developed on the island. Because peoples from northern and the southern part of Cyprus were divided for so long, the formation of a common identity which is necessary for a sustainable solution of the issue should be one of the goals of reunification negotiations as well as of EU's efforts in integrating the TRNC area in its system. This has important implications for the EU-Turkey relationship as Turkey refuses to concede to any solutions which are not in the interest of the Cypriot Turks. The third point will argue that because Turkey is experiencing a period of resurgent nationalism and a turn in illiberalism, its demands in Cyprus will revert back to the domain of power-politics, including stronger reliance on Turkey's military presence on Cyprus and construction of Cyprus as a sine qua non in Turkey's foreign politics. This causes Turkey to lose legitimacy as an interlocutor
in the reunification talks and is reverting its Cyprus policy to the pre-Erdoğan era (that is, from 1974 until 2002). Finally, all the points will be crucial for understanding how the EU-Turkey relationship is influenced in a global context. This relationship does not only depend on bilateral relations but also on Turkey's and EU's regional, international, political, and identitarian interests.

a. The First Point: Historical Basis of Mistrust Among Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus, and Its Implications for the EU-Turkey Relationship

   i. History and Mistrust

   The analysis of the historical foundation of mistrust among Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus in this research will be based on the post-1878 period of Greco-Turkish relations. With that in mind, we have to acknowledge that Greeks and Turks, as ethnic and national groups, have a perceived historical struggle stretching well from the fall of the Byzantine Empire, the Ottomans, and then to the modernity. However, this research will not focus on it for the sake of clarity and simplicity.

   The island of Cyprus was occupied by the Ottomans for almost three centuries (1571-1878) after which it was annexed by the United Kingdom (Bhutta, 65). The period of Ottoman occupation of Cyprus, in the wider context of Greco-Turkish relations, was perceived by Greeks to be a yoke on their nation, and by Turks as a period of multicultural peace (Heraclides, 8). In 1878, Cyprus was awarded to United Kingdom by the Ottoman Empire who exerted its sovereignty over the island until 1914, when the UK annexed them in the wake of WWI (Bhutta, 67). Greece, however, gained its independence in 1829 and has since then, with the help of Russian Orthodox Church, expressed a yearning for union with its Cypriot brethren (Bhutta, 66). Although the Greek Orthodox Church in Cyprus was
allowed to operate freely during the Ottoman rule, it was connected greatly to the Orthodox Church in Greece and in Russia with Russians instigating the Greek Cypriots to revolt against the Ottomans after the Greek War of Independence (Bhutta, 66). This proved to be important for Cypriot Greeks' later attempts at unifying Cyprus and Greece (enosis). During the 20th century, relations between Turkey and Greece were often transferred on to Cyprus. There are three main events in the 20th century which further entrenched a negative intersubjective image between Greeks and Turks: The Greek-Turkish War (in Turkey known as the "Turkish War of Liberation") lasting from 1919 until 1922, the enosis movement instigated by Cypriot Greeks, and the Turkish invasion of Cyprus in 1974 following the constitutional crisis and an attempt of coup d'etat by the Cypriot Greeks.

The Greek-Turkish War remains one of the most important elements in the cultural history of othering between Turkey and Greece. The aftermath of the Greek-Turkish War was an establishment of an independent Republic of Turkey (Treaty of Lausanne in 192324) and the ultimate victory of the Turkish National Movement over the Greek idea of Megali (the greater Greece) and their establishment as an autochthonous nation in the region (Heraclides, 7). The Greek-Turkish War gave rise to the Sevres Syndrome, that is a fear of Turks of the partitioning of their territory as outlined by the Sevres Treaty25 signed during the Paris Peace Conference in 1920 (Heraclides, 21). Following the Sevres Syndrome, the partitioning of the Ottoman Empire has remained a subconscious fear of many Turks when it comes to their independence and sovereignty:

24 Treaty of Lausanne was signed at the end of the Greek-Turkish War (1923); won by Turkey. Mustafa Kemal Atatürk emerged as a father of the Turkish Republic and any aspirations to cede and divide Turkish territory were stopped.
25 The Treaty of Sevres partitioned former Ottoman province amongst the victors of the WWI. The partition of Turkey would be conducted by ceding different territories and giving it to other states or non-Turks for administration. In this case, and this is particularly painful for Turks, the area of Thrace would be given to Greece and the city of Izmir (Smyrna) would be placed under Greek administration (Mallinson, 106).
The main Turkish concern that is a cause for intense insecurity and has a bearing in Turkish self-identity is holding on to their territory and issues of sovereignty. This is due above all to being “burdened by memory of territorial losses” from the days of the Ottoman Empire, many of which were territories that were annexed to Greece, from 1830 until 1920. This is related to another surprising perception: that even though they have lived in the region for centuries (as Ottomans and from 1922 as Turks), they have a sense of not being an ‘autochthonous element’ of the region but the ‘latest comers’ (Heraclides, 20).

On the Greek side, the Greek-Turkish War presented a major defeat and a confirmation that territories of the Byzantine Empire, whom they perceive as essentially Greek, were lost to Turks (read Ottomans) who were perceived as barbaric invaders of the area:

According to the first narrative the modern Greeks are ‘resurrected’ descendants of the Ancient Greeks; that ‘Greece’ was reborn after its demise in the 4th century B.C. like the mythical phoenix from its ashes. Paparrigopoulos incorporated the Macedonian and Byzantine eras in the Greek narrative and thus was able to achieve historical continuity and also provide a crucial synthesis between Ancient Hellenism and Christianity cum Byzantium, which however implausible is the self-evident truth for the Greeks (Heraclides, 9).

The idea of national cause and national survival in both cases has become a well-entrenched social and political norm. Although the relationship between Greece and Turkey has somewhat progressed from 1974 (the year when Cyprus was invaded), old enmities persist. These historical constructs inform Greek and Turkish politics daily which strengthens the process of othering.

Therefore, as we can see, the Greek-Turkish War was constructed by both Greeks and Turks as an essential war for establishing of their identity in the aftermath of the Ottoman Empire. The subliminal mistrust and cultural-historical bitterness that has developed after the war persist until today even though both nations have conceded that they do not foster territorial pretensions with regards to one another.
The Cypriot Greek attempts at *enosis* (unification) with the Greek mainland can be seen as a cultural proxying of Greco-Turkish enmity and are also crucial for understanding the issue of Greek and Turkish positioning when it comes to the Cyprus. During the British rule over Cyprus (Britain officially made Cyprus its colony in 1925) in 1931, the Greek Cypriots instigated pro-*enosis* protests on the island (Bhutta, 67 and 68). The pro-*enosis* protesters demanded that the UK allows Cyprus to unite with Greece. The protests essentially created an atmosphere of mistrust between the Turkish and the Greek community on Cyprus and have resurrected subliminal cultural process of othering from the state of brief hibernation\(^{26}\). The British, however, have handled the protests and managed to suppress them but not for long because their own resources began fading and their power over colonies started crumbling after the WWII. The 1931 pro-*enosis* protests' political and social legacy remained until the 1950s when the Greek Cypriots, this time led by Archbishop Makarios of the Greek Cypriot Orthodox Church, sent a petition to the UN formally requesting unification with Greece (Bhutta, 68). We can clearly see the influence of Church on Greek Cypriot's political aspirations. Bhutta establishes that Turkey started thinking more strategically on Cyprus precisely because of the Greek Cypriot Orthodox Church's political interferences that were backed by the Soviet Union (Bhutta, 69). In that sense, the spread of Marxist ideology operating within the USSR on the island would not bode well for Turkey who was a NATO member at the time and who played a prominent role in curbing the influence of Soviets in the Mediterranean region. William Mallinson writes:

More recently, Turkey has been crucial to the West as a cold war buffer against the USSR, as the Cuban Missile Crisis so poignantly demonstrated,

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\(^{26}\) The Friendship Treaties signed in 1930 have relaxed the relationship between Turkey and Greece until 1950s when the Cyprus issue became more prominent (Mallinson, 21).
when the USSR cited the stationing in Turkey of US nuclear missiles so justification for doing the same in Cuba (Mallinson, 112).

Furthermore, the British, under whose authority Cyprus was, did not really react to the petition as they wanted Cyprus under their control. British interests in Cyprus revolved around Cyprus being a crucial geostrategic island in their access to the Suez Canal. Since the Suez Crisis\textsuperscript{27} happened in 1956, it would not be so far-fetched to argue that the British wanted to keep Cyprus in order to prevent the possibility of such an event (Mallinson, 115). After the British Minister for Colonies, Henry Hopkinson, stated that some colonies would never be independent nations, the Greek government mobilized their diplomacy in the UN in order to consider Cyprus' right for self-determination (Bhutta, 69). The Greek intervention was set off by a disappointment the Greek government had in Britain. Because of the rise in nationalist pressures on the Greek government, it felt compelled to diplomatically retaliate against the British, which had no intentions of abandoning Cyprus. A Greek Cypriot reaction to UN's non-reaction on Makarios' petition was the creation of EOKA (The National Organization of Cypriot Fighters), a guerilla junta aiming to secure Cyprus' independence (Bhutta, 69). It goes without saying that Turkey could not stand the strengthening of Greek position on Cyprus. This would endanger Turkey's position in the East Mediterranean as Greece would be in control over most of it (if not all of it) and would

\textsuperscript{27} The so-called War of Attrition between France, Britain, and Egypt marked the end of Anglo-French colonial pretensions in the Middle East (and in general). The crisis was sparked when General Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal in a move that surprised the British and the French, who administered the Canal until then. They decided to move against Nasser by conceiving a plot in which Israel would attack Egypt, followed by an ultimatum from France and the UK to cease all fights or risk their takeover of the Canal (Meisler, 94). Nasser rejected the ultimatum causing UK and France to invade (Meisler, 94). During the invasion, the plot became public causing Britain and France great embarrassment (Meisler, 94). Nasser won and the US-British-French relations were historically low due to American disappointment with the invasion. In the aftermath, the Suez Crisis marked the slow weakening of British and French colonial rule.
be too close to Turkey's borders (see chapter "History of Relations", section 2). Bhutta quotes the former Turkish FM Zorlu in saying:

From the military perspective, the island of Cyprus has to be in the hands of a state, which is concerned in the fate of Turkey and the surrounding Middle Eastern States… The dominant power on the island would have a position of control over the harbors of Turkey. If this dominant power is the same dominant power in the islands to the west [of Turkey], Turkey would be de facto encircled by this power. Turkey thinks that it is convenient to maintain the current status quo of the island. If it is going to be changed, then it must be returned to Turkey. …Turkish people cannot think differently about the future of an island which is existentially important to the defense of the country (Bhutta, 70).

Furthermore, the notion of Greeks extending influence to the area where Turks lived was unacceptable and evoked memories of ethnic conflicts just years before (and with that, population exchanges). The British saw that Turkey was disconcerted with the events in Cyprus and decided to bring them in the geopolitical game. The British did not want to relinquish Cyprus to anyone else; it was far too important for their geopolitical aspirations. The developments in the international sphere, that is, the relationship between Greece-Turkey-Britain influenced the developments on Cyprus. The two communities there became enraged at each other resulting in development of EOKA and TMT (Turkish Resistance Organization) (Mallinson, 109 and 110). The inter-communal violence was prominent, with terrorist attacks on both sides occurring intermittently. In 1958, for example, the Cypriot Turks started responding aggressively to Greek Cypriot's demands for enosis with violence instigated by Denktash (Turkish Cypriot deputy leader) who returned from Turkey to Cyprus and gave an incendiary speech at a rally (Mallinson, 32). The ensuing inter-communal violence caused many Cypriot Greeks to flee their homes (Mallinson, 32). Today, both sides of Cyprus are relatively ethnically homogeneous, which was not the case before the 1974 invasion. As British colonial power faded- especially after
the Suez Crisis, all three sides attempted at negotiating over the island. This was instigated
by Greek and Iranian proposals in the UN. The Greek proposal of 1958 called for Cypriot
self-government leading to independence and the Iranian proposal called for trilateral talks
on the issue (Mallinson, 32-33). The Iranian proposal was passed and the trilateral meetings
began in Zurich in December of 1958 and in London at the same time. The results were the
following: Cypriot independence with strong guarantees to Muslim minority under
guarantees of Britain, Turkey, and Greece (Mallinson, 33). The island would have a Greek
president (from 1960 until 1974, this was Archbishop Makarios), Turkish vice-president,
joint national assembly (however, separate communal assembly's), and would receive 950
Greek and 650 Turkish military troops (Malinson, 33). The British would retain two bases
on Cyprus (Mallinson, 33). Although Makarios’ dream of enosis was seemingly destroyed
at the time, the compromise on the issue brought relative stability to the island, but not for
long. The decade of the 60s set up a perfect motive for Turkish invasion of Cyprus in 1974.
The Zurich and London Agreements produced three treaties: Treaty of Establishment
(transferring sovereignty form the UK to Cyprus), Treaty of Guarantee (signed by all four
parties), and Treaty of Alliance (establishing provisions for Turkish and Greek military
presence on Cyprus) (Mallinson, 34).

As we can see, the constitution of Cyprus did not really confer sovereignty on the
island but rather a sort of a protectorate. It's complicated structure (uncannily similar to
today's Bosnia and Herzegovina) did not satisfy already divided Cypriot Greeks and Turks.
Calls for partition of the islands soon started over boundaries of Turkish and Greek
municipalities or common armed forces (Mallinson, 34-35). In that atmosphere,
Archbishop Makarios proposed his Thirteen Points aiming at amending the Constitution
and securing more powers to Cypriot Greeks. Turkey instantly rejected the proposals especially because of stipulations that saw the decrease in institutional power of Cypriot Turks (President and vice-president of the state would lose veto power, for example) (Mallinson, 35). As the inter-communal violence grew, Turks started mustering the invasion (according to them, this was provided under the Treaty of Guarantee), the Greeks were getting ready for enosis, and international players (Britain and the US) started thinking about partitioning the island. The 1960 arrangements were out of the picture. In the meantime, the UN got involved and sent its peace troops to watch over inter-communal violence (see above). The relations between Greece and Turkey worsened consequently. Turkish and Greek minorities in respective countries were maltreated and the situation was very tense:

There is no sign yet that the campaign is abating. It is undoubtedly organized from Ankara and it reveals an ugly side to the Turkish character. There has always been an element in any Turkish Government, which wants to get rid of the Greek minority here. Cyprus is an excuse but only an excuse for prosecuting such a campaign. Secondly, and also independently of Cyprus, the Turkish Government find it convenient for home political purposes to encourage the latent chauvinism of their people (Mallinson, 40).

As the inter-communal mistrust grew worse, Turkey and Greece threatened military interventions in Cyprus. Turkey was more aggressive, stating that it would invade the island and divide its Turkish part from the Greek. In this atmosphere, many were dissatisfied with the ruling garniture in Cyprus. President Makarios' position was not as strong as during the early 60s, and many Cypriot Greek fractions did not want him in that position. In 1974, the military junta coup led by Nikos Sampson, a journalist and an EOKA member, and supported by the Greek government, overthrew Makarios in a violent coup d’état (Bhutta, 80). Turkey reacted swiftly, led by PM Ecevit, and invaded the northern part of Cyprus (mainly Turkish territory). Since then, the situation on Cyprus has been
monitored by the UN but it has not changed and remains in a state of frozen conflict. Cyprus was divided into TRNC (Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus) and was recognized only by Turkey, and into the internationally recognized Republic of Cyprus. The developments in 1974 bring to a conclusion the first aspect of this point.

As we have demonstrated, the Turkish-Greek-Cypriot relationship is the one of security concerns imbued with significant socio-historic meanings. This conclusion follows the constructivist train of thought in that it recognizes the social basis of the conflict on Cyprus. Since 1974, there were multiple attempts at negotiating the reunification of island and it is during that time that the EU started playing a more prominent role in the Cyprus issue. The second part of this point refers to the more contemporary relationship of Turkey-Greece-Cyprus under the umbrella of EU institutions. Greece acceded to the EEC in 1981 and remains an EU member until today, whereas Turkey officially became a candidate member in 1999 during the Helsinki Council. Cyprus became a candidate in 1997 and a member in May of 2004.

ii. European Institutionalism and Political Struggles

All three guarantor powers from the Treaty of Guarantee of 1960 (that is, UK, Greece, and Turkey) have become either members of the EU or its associate members starting from the 1960s. In that light, the EU integration process and its logic of enlargement made it harder for EU to distance itself from the island of Cyprus. In their article on Cyprus-EU relations, Meltem Müftüler-Bac and A. Güney state that in 1973, the EEC signed an association agreement with Cyprus, justifying its move by establishing that association agreements were merely economic in nature (Müftüler-Bac and Güney, 284). The diplomatic failure of the EC is in that the Cyprus which signed the EC Association
Agreement was the Greek Cyprus as the Turks abandoned government in 1963, due to Makarios' Thirteen Points (see above). This issue persists today:

Unfortunately, the EU treats Northern Cyprus (the Turkish Cypriot part), its governmental and state authorities and hence the Turkish Cypriots, as part of the defunct Republic of Cyprus where in fact the Turkish Cypriots have been absent since 1963 (Yeşilada, 48).

Since Cyprus was generally non-involved in the Cold War (apart from being a geopolitical pawn), its Association Agreement with the EC did not bear significant political relevance. However, in 1981, when Greece acceded the EC, Cypriots recognized an opportunity for joining Greece under the common borders. This is manifested in the statement made by Costas Simitis, former Greek President, in 2003 when he stated that Greece and Cyprus have finally achieved enosis within the EU borders (Müftüler-Bac and Güney, 285). Furthermore, the Greek accession to the EU meant something more important for the EU-Turkey relations:

Greek membership meant that Greece would use the EU institutions in two distinct ways: one was to prevent the recognition of Turkish Cypriots inside the EU economic framework, and the second was to link all new developments between Turkey and the EU to the resolution of the Cyprus problem (Müftüler-Bac and Güney, 285).

The prevention of Turkish Cypriot recognition in the EU economic framework meant excluding Cypriot Turks from economic arrangements made within the EC market. Encouraged by the developments in Greece and the Association Agreement they signed in 1973, the Greek Cypriot (that is, the RoC- the southern part of Cyprus) applied for full membership to the EU in 1990 (Müftüler-Bac and Güney, 285). One of the goals of Greek Cypriots was to force Turkey, which had its own EU aspirations (see "History", section 3), to make concessions resulting in reunification of Cyprus and to push it to pull its military from the island (Müftüler-Bac and Güney, 285-286). In 1993, the EU Commission
accepted Cypriot application and included RoC in its next round of enlargement in 1994 (Müftüler-Bac and Güney, 286). While Turkey was negotiating the Customs Union with the EU (signed in 1995, effective from 1996), the Greeks threatened to veto the Customs Union unless Cyprus was given acceptable day for the start of accession negotiations (Müftüler-Bac and Güney, 287). This is a crucial development as the Cyprus issue finally became contentious within the European institutional framework and as such has become a contentious object in the process of the EU institutional socialization (see "Constructivism and IR: Accession Road is What Agents Make of It", section 1, subsection iii). Greece removed its objections and agreed to sign the Customs Union with Turkey only when the EU confirmed its intentions in starting the accession negotiations with Cyprus (Müftüler-Bac and Güney, 287). The EU further agreed that it would start accession negotiations without the precondition of Cypriot unity, which bears significant political meaning (Müftüler-Bac and Güney, 287). The EU insisted in 1993, upon accepting Cypriot application for membership, that the resolution, or a prospect of a surer settlement, is a precondition for Cyprus' membership in the community (Müftüler-Bac and Güney, 286). The EU's belief was that it could (re)unite Cyprus by pushing the accession process and Copenhagen Criteria. However, the 1995 agreements showed the improbability of such an outcome. After including the RoC in its 1997 enlargement package, but excluding Turkey, the EU sent a strong signal to Turks that their accession to the EU will be harder and that it will be contingent on the situation on the island. The confirmation of this came in 1997, at the Luxembourg Council, when the EU Enlargement Agenda 2000 was adopted and when Turkey did not receive a confirmation of its application for candidacy for membership of the EU but rather a condition on its membership stating that Turkey needs
to work with UN to resolve the Cyprus problem (Müftüler-Bac and Güney, 288). Cyprus, on the other hand, became an official candidate then (Müftüler-Bac and Güney, 288). Turks firmly believed that the Cypriot application for membership had no validity and that, under the provisions of the Zurich and London Agreements, Cyprus cannot join international organizations, political, and economic unions of which both Turkey and Greece are not members (Müftüler-Bac and Güney, 288). Therefore, Turkey inferred that EU’s policy on Cyprus was essentially Greek policy and moved towards integrating TRNC in its economic, social, and political system (Müftüler-Bac and Güney, 288). Turkey further decreed that all attacks on Turkish Cypriots will be considered as an attack on Turkey (Müftüler-Bac and Güney, 288). In 1999, however, Turkey was accepted as a candidate member during the Helsinki Council (see “History”, section 4).

The Helsinki Council of 1999 (see chapter “History”) ushered in a new phase in EU-Turkey relations, the one which, arguably, lasts until today. When Turkey was accepted as a candidate member in 1999, its problems with the EU grew larger as the Greeks demanded that all the issues with Turkey be solved through its accession negotiations (this excludes Cyprus, however, includes other disputes in the Aegean Sea) (Müftüler-Bac and Güney, 289). Furthermore, Turkey’s becoming a candidate state for membership meant that, even though the Cyprus issue is not a part of the Copenhagen Criteria, the EU would use all of its power to try and resolve it by using Cyprus as a leverage against Turkey’s membership. Cyprus, on the other hand, ended its negotiations with the EU in 2002 and acceded in 2004. Fortunately, the Cypriot progress in the EU negotiations and Turkey’s candidacy brought novel, and positive changes to the relationship. Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot leaders started negotiating on the solution
of the Cyprus issue under auspices of Kofi Annan, the UN secretary-general. Annan presented the infamous Annan Plan prior to the Copenhagen Summit of the EU (during which Turkey would receive the date for the start of accession negotiations) (Müftüler-Bac and Güney, 290). The opening in relations was paralleled by the change in Turkey’s political scene. When the young Justice and Development Party (AKP) came to power in 2002, it changed the traditional Turkish policy on Cyprus (see section iii) and campaigned for opening of the Green Line (see above) in 2003. The opening of the Green Line marked the first time in 30 years that Cypriots could move freely from northern to southern part of the island (Müftüler-Bac and Güney, 290). The PM Erdoğan was truly a refreshing figure on Turkey’s political scene and his ideas on Cyprus found admirers amongst EU politicians:

As for Turkey, the Turkish government's traditional foreign policy on Cyprus's EU membership is that it is illegal. However, at the November 2002 general elections in Turkey, a new government was formed by an Islamist, conservative party, the Justice and Development Party, which seems to have some different views on the Cyprus issue. Thus, in Turkey a new hope emerged that the new government might not have the old guard's conservative views on Cyprus. It is interesting to note that the first message to Recep Tayyip Erdogan, leader of the JDP, came from the Greek Prime Minister Costas Simitis signaling a Greek desire to work in close collaboration with the new Turkish government. The JDP's party's declaration of 6 November 2002 that they would consider a Belgian model for the resolution of the Cyprus problem must have sounded like music to most ears in the EU. Erdoğan's first visit was to Rome and then to Greece, Brussels and Madrid. These visits seemed to demonstrate that the JDP is aware that Turkey's road to the EU passes through Athens as well as the importance of shuttle diplomacy (Müftüler-Bac and Güney, 290).

The AKP Party was much more flexible in negotiating on Cyprus and, concomitant with vast reforms it undertook in Turkey from 2002 until 2005, it positioned Turkey strongly at the negotiating table. The EU involvement in Turkey (as in, the results of the Helsinki and Copenhagen Councils) combined with the new government in Ankara yielded
solid results and stabilized the relationship between the two. However, the prospect of success of the Annan Plan remained to be one of the most anticipated aspects within the relationship. The Annan Plan was presented to President Clerides (Cypriot Greek) and Mr. Denktash (the president of TRNC) on November 11th, 2002 (Mallinson, 162). The plan was presented one month before the Copenhagen Council, where future members of the EU signed their Accession Treaties, was held (the enlargement of 2004 is the largest EU enlargement in its history)\(^2\)\(^8\). Essentially, Denktash and Clerides were expected to agree on the plan (its main articles) by the time of the Copenhagen Council, agree on its annexes next February, and call a referendum in March of 2004 (Mallinson, 163). The provisions of the plan were such that Cyprus would function as a very fragmented, albeit unified, state. For example, the Greek and Turkish Cypriot members of the “common state” parliament would be able to veto legislation (Mallinson, 164). The head of state would actually be a council of six members, two of whom would be Turkish Cypriot, where decisions would be taken by simple majority (Mallinson, 164). Finally, the Supreme Court would consist of nine members (three Greek Cypriot, three Turkish Cypriot, and three non-Cypriot) (Mallinson, 164). The constitution of Cyprus, as proposed in the Annan Plan, would be quite similar to the one of Bosnia and Herzegovina (the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina, for example, is the same as the Annan Plan proposal for the Supreme Court of Cyprus). The Annan Plan was, therefore, the single most important event in the recent history for the reunification of Cyprus due to the political momentum it was created in and the necessity for a change in Cyprus which would become a member of the EU shortly after the planned referendum. Political representatives agreed on plan’s provisions,

\(^{28}\) Cyprus, The Czech Republic, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Slovakia, Slovenia, Hungary, Estonia, and Poland all joined the EU on May 1st, 2004.
however, on the day of the referendum the Cypriot Greeks voted overwhelmingly negatively.

Table 1: The Results of the Referendum on the Annan Plan, April 24th, 2004 (Drevet, 18).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>As a Percentage</th>
<th>Registered</th>
<th>Voters</th>
<th>Votes Cast</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>South</td>
<td>77.0</td>
<td>89.3</td>
<td>77.6</td>
<td>24.2</td>
<td>75.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North</td>
<td>23.0</td>
<td>84.4</td>
<td>22.4</td>
<td>64.9</td>
<td>35.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>88.1</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>66.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The reasons for why the Cypriot Greeks rejected the plan were multiple with the most prominent one being that the Cypriot Turks would gain considerable power in state matters. Cypriot Greeks did not want to risk their estate being influenced indirectly by Turkey and wanted to strengthen their part of Cyprus more in anticipation of the EU membership (Mallinson, 187). In such an atmosphere, the "No" vote coming from the Cypriot Greeks shocked the world, and Europe (although many presumed that Cypriot Greeks would vote negatively beforehand), and seemingly set Cyprus back. However, the division of the island remained and Cyprus managed to accede to the EU in May of 2004, just after the referendum. The infamous Cypriot Greek "No" triggered mass protests in the Northern Cyprus as Cypriot Turks thought it unfair that they should be left out of the EU and Cypriot Greeks should be allowed to enter (Kaliber, 232). Despite the shocking referendum result, Cyprus entered the EU, however, the application of the acquis was suspended for the northern part of the island until the issue of division was resolved.

In her book, *Divergent Pathways: Turkey and the European Union*, Meltem Müftüler-Baç writes that in the aftermath of the referendum, the EU Commission sent a recommendation to the EU Council in which it stated that the Turkish Cypriots should be freed from trade restrictions (Müftüler-Baç, 64). In that sense, the Commission was trying
to reward Cypriot Turks and send a message to the Cypriot Greeks, however, since the Cypriot Greeks became official members of the EU in May of 2004, they vetoed the proposal so the Cypriot Turks remained in relative economic isolation (Müftüler-Baç, 64). The crucial developments for the EU-Turkey relationship actually happened in the aftermath of the referendum and Cyprus’ accession to the EU. In 2005, the EU Commission asked Turkey to extend its Customs Union Agreement to all the new members of the EU (all the countries that acceded in May of 2004), however, although they obliged, Turkey did not expand its Customs Union on to Cyprus because they kept their harbors and ports closed to Cypriot goods since 1997 (when Turkey was not included in the EU Enlargement Agenda at the Luxembourg Council) (Müftüler-Baç, 64). Turks wanted to press Cypriot Greeks to accept Commission's proposals for removing trade tariffs with Northern Cyprus (Müftüler-Baç, 64). Turkish EU pressure failed, however, because Cyprus and Greece retaliated efficiently. As a new member of the EU, the RoC now had an even stronger political position in Europe vis-a-vis Turkey. Starting in 2005, the EU enlargement negotiations somewhat changed. The number of chapters, for example, of the Copenhagen Criteria was increased from 31 to 35 (still remains on that level) and states were given more powers when it comes to vetoing different negotiation chapters (Müftüler-Baç, 65). The Commission then adopted its Negotiations Framework with Turkey in July of 2005 as a formal map of the accession process (Müftüler-Baç, 65). The EU Commission proposed that starting from June 2006, Turkey would open its accession negotiations with two chapters (Science and Education, and Culture) which were relatively easy to close (Müftüler-Baç, 66). However, Cyprus immediately blocked the chapter on Culture (Müftüler-Baç, 66). Furthermore, the EU Commission proposed blocking eight negotiation
chapters related to the movement of goods and persons in the EU territory because Turkey did not expand its Customs Union on to Cyprus (Müftüler-Baç, 66). Finally, Cyprus further blocked the chapter on energy in 2009 (Müftüler-Baç, 66). Apart from Cypriot vetoes of accession chapters in the Council, some other member states (like France), vetoed different chapters of the accession process thus making it even more difficult for Turkey to integrate its system with the EU (Müftüler-Baç, 66-67). The EU Enlargement policy was, therefore, utilized for political purposes:

In other words, the Turkish negotiation process turned out to be the most visible illustration of the role the member states play in shaping EU enlargement policy. It is also an important indication of a possible clash between the multilateral and bilateral aspects of the negotiation process (Müftüler-Baç, 67).

Therefore, out of 35 chapters of the negotiation process, Cyprus alone vetoed six (Müftüler-Baç, 69). This is not counting other member states' vetoes that form a wholly different issue. The French, for example, vetoed four chapters explaining that these chapters prejudge accession as the final outcome of the negotiations (Müftüler-Baç, 68). We have to keep in mind that the EU-Turkey relationship at that time was also influenced by the issue of the EU Constitution and a strengthening of the identitarian discourse in the EU (see "History", section 5). With regards to Cyprus, the precondition, of course, for the removal of Cypriot and EU's vetoes is Turkish adoption of the Additional Protocol expanding the Customs Union on to Cyprus (Müftüler-Baç, 64).

Nothing much changed since 2006 and 2009 with regards to the Cyprus issue. The negotiations on the reunification of the island are still ongoing with all sides, including Turkey, expressing support for Cypriot reunification and sovereignty. However, the issue of Cyprus, as we have seen, has strong implications for the EU-Turkey relationship. As a
matter of fact, Turkey's accession to the EU is stalled, amongst other reasons, because of Cyprus. In 2012, when Cyprus took over the presidency of the Council of the EU, the FM of Turkey Davutoğlu stated that:

If the Greek Cypriot side stalls negotiations and takes over the presidency of the European Union in July 2012, this means not only a deadlock on the island, but also a blockage, a freezing point in Turkey-European Union relations (Kaliber, 235).

During the Cypriot presidency of the EU this is precisely what happened but luckily enough, a country can preside over the Council of the EU for only six months which means that the relationship has resumed since then. Regardless of that, FM's statements concerning the Cypriot presidency of the Council of the EU are indicative of what will happen when Cyprus assumes the presidency again and are indicative of general political attitudes of Turkey towards Cyprus.

The EU institutionalism, in combination with patterns of historic enmity that was proxied on Cyprus, was in this case a crucial element of political pressure against Turkey. We can see that, although Turkey in many ways is not ready to satisfy some criteria, Turkish opportunity at accession depends almost entirely on its political willingness to open up to Cyprus (at least seemingly). That is, not counting other barriers to its membership such as EU's polarity on whether Turkey should at all become a member (the reason the French vetoed accession chapters). In the rest of this chapter, we will see how other factors related to Cyprus influence the EU-Turkey relationship.

b. The Second Point: Downplaying Security, Amplifying Identity

Although Turkey still maintains a military presence of 30,000 to 40,000 soldiers and military personnel on the northern part of Cyprus, and Greece has around 1,000 soldiers in the south, the issue of security in the Cyprus-Greece-Turkey triangle has been
downplayed since Cypriot accession to the EU. This is because now Cyprus and Greece are EU members, Turkey is a candidate, and Turkey and Greece are NATO members (Cyprus was a member of the Non-Aligned movement and maintains military neutrality with regards to NATO). The foreign relations of these three states have *de facto* and *de jure* stabilized and calmed the situation in their relationship. However, they did not remove the security-related concerns as well as the Sevres Syndrome-related fears of Turkey (see above). Instead, with the gradual Europeanization\(^{29}\) of Turkey's policies as well as Cypriot and Greek policies, the relationship was transferred on to the EU-level. As the issue of security was downplayed in the relationship, this section will argue that there was an increase in identity-related claims with regards to Cyprus. For example, in Turkish social and political discourse, there is an idea of vitality of Cyprus to Turkey connected to historical constructions of enmity against Greece. The Turkish brethren on Cyprus, according to that logic, are being treated unfairly by the Greeks (both native\(^{30}\) and Cypriot) as well as the EU. In Greece, similar mechanisms are in place:

Demonization and threat perceptions are pervasive. On the basis of their imagined history and chosen identity the Greeks (in their great majority) are convinced that Turkey is since 1974 (from the Cyprus mega-crisis) in the throes of ‘neo-Ottomanism’ and expansionism: to divide the Aegean into two parts and ‘ensnare’ the eastern Greek islands; grab Greek Thrace, if given the opportunity; and control all of Cyprus. The Turks for their part believe that Greece is swayed (since the mid-1950s) by the irredentist Megali Idea (Great Idea) of the period 1850-1922 (whose avowed aim was to conquer as many Ottoman territories as possible), though Athens now treads more carefully, not head-on but by using a careful legalistic stratagem, be it in the Aegean (to render it a ‘Greek lake’) or with regard to Cyprus (union with Greece until 1974, ‘indirect union’ today via the EU from the mid-1990s onward) (Heraclides, 7).

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\(^{29}\) Europeanization is described as: "a process of change and adaptation which is understood to be a consequence of the development of the European Union. It denotes an EU-induced process of domestic change and adaptation to the penetrating 'European values, directives and norms' " (Kaliber, 228).

\(^{30}\) By "native" Greeks I mean Greeks who live, and come from, Greece (The Hellenic Republic).
The idea of reunification of Cyprus is potent and is an official policy of all actors involved in the issue, however, it seems that the idea of reunification is somewhat hard to achieve in a community that is fundamentally divided. Psaltis and Chakal argue that the divided collective memory of Cypriot Greeks and Turks - as it pertains to Cyprus’ history - constructs the idea of belonging of and to Cyprus in completely divergent ways:

In the case of Greek Cypriots, and given the official policy on the reunification of the RoC, and the withdrawal of Turkish occupying forces, the political narrative goes along the following lines “We have always lived peacefully with Turkish Cypriots and we can do it again once the Turkish troops leave the country” and “the key to the solution is located in Ankara and not in the TC community”. For Turkish Cypriots on the other hand, the political master narrative that promoted the idea of two separate states in Cyprus is, more or less, like this: “The experience of living with Greek Cypriots was one of domination and suppression and we will be better off having our own state” and “Turkey intervened in 1974 with a peace operation to save us from GCs” (Psaltis and Chakal, 230).

The discursive practices that have become embedded in political discourses effectively (re)create mistrust in every way. In the early days (between 1950s and 1970s) of the development of the Cyprus issue, the idea of Cypriot community was not always connected to the idea of the unified state, however, politicians from both sides have advocated a dual partition of the island. Today, such solution is unlikely due to the fact that Cyprus is an internationally recognized state which is also an EU member. However, the inter-communal life is divided on a more deeper level, which is demonstrated in political discourse. When the FM Davutoğlu stated that there would be a freeze in EU-Turkey relations if Cyprus assumed the presidency of the Council of the EU (see above), he also indicated that the EU is not treating the Turks fairly (Kaliber, 235). In that sense, the idea of Turks being mistreated by the EU is not intended only to dab at EU but also to indicate that EU is biased towards Turks and follows Greek political desires (both native and
Cypriot). As the reunification negotiations continue, and Cypriot integration in the EU system is finalized, we are seeing that the security dimension of the relationship is no longer as important as the idea of living together (or not). This is not to say that Turco-Greek security issues have disappeared but rather that they have been replaced with identity as the most important segment in the relationship. The Cypriot bid to join the EU, for example, was hailed as a strong incentive for reunification of island and a push for Turkey to become an EU member, that is one of the reasons for why the EU Commission accepted Cypriot application for membership in the first place (see above). It was also hailed as a signal that Turco-Greek enmity and historical struggle can be solved by solving the issue of Cyprus. Contrary to these visions, the Cyprus issue did not bring Turks and Greeks (both native and Cypriot) any closer than before.

The historical struggle and mistrust persists. In a recent statement, Turkish President Erdoğan demonstrated that the mistrust between Greece and Turkey when it comes to Cyprus will probably last forever by saying that even in the case the settlement in achieved Turkey plans on having some number of troops (much lower than 30,000-40,000) permanently placed on the island (The National Herald, 2017). In fact, he said that they would remain there "forever" (The National Herald, 2017). This statement in itself not only corroborates the basis for arguing that the mistrust of Turks and Greeks both on Cyprus and in native states is strong but also indicates that idea of eternity of attrition and eternity of claims over the island. Following the conclusions we carried above, that Turkey and Greece effectively demonize each other in the process of othering, it can be concluded that the idea of eternally claiming Cyprus is not only a nationalistic demagoguery or a
statement pertaining to security issues, but also a realization of dreams of confirming Turkish, on one hand, and Greek, on the other, identity on the island.

The increase in rhetoric related to the Cyprus issue does not only confirm the idea that the solution to the issue rests in Turkey but also confirms the idea that beyond settling the issue, creating a viable democratic and social institutions that will foster the strengthening of Cyprus as a reunified island will be hard because social mistrust is recreated for political purposes. This is confirmed by empirical studies regarding how people on Cyprus perceive their identity. With regards to the Cypriot Turkish community, Psaltis and Chakal conclude:

In the Turkish Cypriot community, the results were as follows: Only Turkish and not Cypriot (7.6 %), Turkish and a bit Cypriot (7.3 %) to the same extent Turkish and Cypriot (61.8 %), Cypriot and a bit Turkish (12.4 %) and Only Cypriot and not Turkish (10.9 %). It should be noted once the answers of native TCs only are taken into account, then the percentage of participants identifying as “Only Turkish and not Cypriot” drops to 2.6 % while positions giving more weight to the Cypriot than the Turkish element become more similar to the situation in the GC community (about 1/3 of the sample) (Psaltis and Chakal, 236).

On the other hand, we will notice a parallel similarity in the responses of Cypriot Greeks:

In the Greek Cypriot community, the results were as follows: Only Greek and not Cypriot (0.8 %), Greek and a bit Cypriot (5.2 %) to the same extent Greek and Cypriot (57.9 %), Cypriot and a bit Greek (16.2 %) and Only Cypriot and not Greek (19.9 %) (Psaltis and Chakal, 236).

As we can clearly see, the idea of belonging to Cyprus and being Cypriot before being Turkish and Greek is strong, however, the mutual perception of two groups of what it means to be Cypriot and be in a community of shared values and interests is different:

Correlational analysis of the strength of identification with superordinate identity and various measures of intergroup relations often show “feeling
proud of being Cypriot” is essentially taken to be synonymous with “feeling proud of being a Greek Cypriot”. From this perspective, it should be no surprise that in some studies strength of identification with being “Cypriot” is related to higher levels of prejudice, threats and distrust (Psaltis and Chakal, 236).

This only demonstrates that if identity politics take precedence in the political discourse over matters of security or reunification, the prospect of peace and community on Cyprus seems hard to imagine. If the idea of being Greek and Turkish is historically positioned at two opposing ends, with added religious polarization (Turkish=Muslim, Greek=Christian), then the meaning behind being Cypriot Turk and Cypriot Greek, especially if these two categories are related to the ideas of being Turkish and being Greek, indicates separation, strife, and division. These conclusions might be speculative although we have demonstrated strong basis for them in our earlier accounts of Turco-Greek relations, but they should nevertheless be investigated more. Finally, if the idea of Turco-Greek enmity is so well-entrenched in the social and political discourse in respective national/ethnic groups, then the prospect for EU-Turkey relationship will also be gloomier. If the issue of Cyprus, whose solution apparently rests on Turkey, is not sustainably solved (that is, if the basis for trust is not established and both sides continue their military presence and strong identitarian discourse), then the prospect for Turkish accession to the EU will be low.

In this section, we have demonstrated that, as the identitarian discourse reasserts itself through the dimension of mistrust over and in Cyprus, the prospect for the solution of the issue will look grimmer. Furthermore, we have established in this chapter that because the EU-Turkey relations do depend greatly on the Cyprus issue (see section a), it can be concluded that no-solution on Cyprus, or an inadequate solution on Cyprus, will encumber the EU-Turkey relations. As the prospect for resolution of the issue remains frozen, or
becomes grimmer, then the EU-Turkey relations will be tenser, especially given their current state.

c. The Third Point: Resurgent Nationalism Entrenches Old Positions

As Turkey is now seen as the main actor for solving the Cyprus issue, this subchapter will argue that the recent political turmoil in Turkey, that strengthened and emboldened President Erdoğan and the AKP Party in their consolidation of (authoritarian and illiberal) power, will make it harder for negotiations to reach a compromise on the issue. As we have seen earlier, President Erdoğan's policy towards Cyprus is the one of continual military presence. In contrast to his (and AKP's) early positions of opening towards Cyprus, and accepting the Turkish responsibility in achieving a compromise, President Erdoğan uses the discourse of power to outline his actions. Before outlining this, I shall attempt at providing a succinct account of Turkish policy on Cyprus before Erdoğan (but after 1974) in an attempt to understand how it informs Turkish policies today.

The Turkish policy towards Cyprus before the rise of AKP and Erdoğan can be summarized in Bülent Ecevit's remark that the issue of Cyprus was resolved in 1974 (Heraclides, 3). This policy of "no solution is a solution" has remained a strong force in Turkish foreign policy. Essentially, Turkey never recognized the statehood of RoC as it deemed its existence contrary to Zurich and London Agreements which are no longer valid. It, in fact, justified its invasion of Cyprus in 1974 by using the Treaty of Guarantee (see above, section a) as a basis for it. The existence of RoC and its application for the EU membership was contrary to Turkey's visions for and of the island. The very strong, and power-imbued, political stance harmed Turkey internationally, but as Cyprus was "a national cause", it remained unchanged during the 20th century (Kaliber, 231). Turkish
foreign policy on Cyprus was influenced in part by Turkish national awareness of its Ottoman past and its former power. Concomitant with a strong military, Turkey's discourse on Cyprus was, during the most of the 1900s, essentially power-arrogant and neorealist (Heraclides, 21). The "no solution is a solution" policy had a military backing to it, and Turkey's strong military presence on the northern part of the island meant only that war was always a solution.

Fast forward to 2002 when Recep Tayyip Erdoğan becomes the Turkish PM and a new democratic, conservative-based, party takes power in Turkey (AKP). The Cyprus issue, shockingly, becomes an issue to be solved through peaceful means:

It is fair to suggest that soon after the AKP came to power, the Cyprus issue has increasingly turned out to be an integral part of the internal debates and power struggles in Turkey. From the end of 2002 onward, the Cyprus issue has emerged as one of the main 'discursive battlefields' of the polarization among the ruling AKP and the opposing state elites. For the AKP reforming Turkey's Cyprus policy was a necessity not only because it failed and proved to be counter-productive, but also it was required by the EU (Kaliber, 230).

The new Turkish foreign policy reconstrued Cyprus as an issue that is not of vital importance for Turkey thereby relieving political elites of the pressure and creating space for constructive dialogue with international partners under the auspices of the UN. The opening towards Cyprus was marked by Turkish accepting of the idea that they had to push harder for the solution, opening the Green Line on Cyprus (see above, section a), and creating an atmosphere of political cooperation. The new Turkish foreign policy on Cyprus was, therefore, strong, and assertive, but not power-imbued and aggressive. This did cause trouble in Turkey where nationalist parties criticized AKP for betraying the "national cause" (Kaliber, 231). This must be contextualized in the time where AKP took power over
from Bülent Ecevit, a man who was the PM in 1974 and a poster-politician for tough stance on Cyprus.

Today, the situation is effectively unchanged despite initial successes and Turkey's support for reunification of Cyprus (see above, section a). However, the recent difficulties, and an almost-failure, in negotiations over Cyprus in the time-frame of now-President Erdoğan's consolidation of power in the aftermath of an attempted coup in 2016, demonstrated the return of the power-imbued discourse over the issue. Although Turkish foreign policy on Cyprus has not officially changed and Turkey keeps on supporting the reunification and negotiations, the idea that there are 30,000-40,000 Turkish troops on Cyprus and a claim that they will be there forever encumbers the process and, consequently, influences the relationship between the EU and Turkey.

Turkish foreign policy in the Mediterranean region since the rise of AKP has become increasingly characterized by two things: zero-problems with neighbors and smart power assertion. Although initially Europeanized (see section a), Turkish foreign policy has recently become more independent (marked by the dual characterization above) of the European/EU influence:

These declarations (the declarations by FM Davutoğlu regarding Cyprus. See section b) by Turkish policy-makers reveal that Europeanisation is currently far from being a normative/political context influencing Turkish policies. They are also indicative of the fact that the current government does not feel the same level of dependency on EU perspective to consolidate its power and legitimacy in domestic politics (Kaliber, 235).

The zero-problems characterization comes from former FM and PM Ahmet Davutoğlu's influential academic work "Strategic Depth" (Stratejik Derinlik) in which he attempts at conceiving a reorganized Turkish foreign policy based on:

Turkey as the central country on an 'ideational' and geographical basis, with a sphere of influence covering the Middle East, the Balkans, the Caucasus,
Central Asia, and the Mediterranean, Caspian, Gulf, and Black Sea regions. In this vision, it is expected that Turkey would transform into a 'global power' from this basis (Ertuğrul, 168).

This idea carried the notion of Turkish foreign policy as "neo-Ottoman" but also resting on the idea of Turkish national power and strength:

This enabled Davutoğlu to implement his theory of 'strategic depth' and 'zero problems with neighbors' which sought to repair relations with Syria, Iran and Iraq, whilst maintaining the rapprochement with Greece and taking the first steps towards repairing 100 years of deeply fractured relations with Armenia in order to build secure economic ties and prosperity (Martin, 149). Although the FM, and later PM, Davutoğlu was removed from power by President Erdoğan in a move which consolidated his power, the neo-Ottoman idea of Turkey's power and influence in the region remains strong in Turkish political discourse (see chapter "Refugee Crisis: The New Frontier?"). Combined with an upsurge in nationalist rhetoric and draconian levels of government repression (that is, the rise in political illiberalism) following the attempted coup d'état in 2016, the neo-Ottoman idea emboldens Turkish foreign policy and as such allows its officials to formulate stronger positions in world politics.

With regards to Cyprus, this stronger position remains connected to Turkish military presence on the island. Turkey will not pull its forces back unless Greece does so as well, remarked Turkish President in a public rally recently (The National Herald, 2017). Turkey is increasingly viewing itself in an almost pre-2002 terms as a security guarantor to Cyprus (an idea stemming from the Treaty of Guarantee). In this light, the idea of Turkey pulling back at the same time as Greece is not delusional, however, it stems from a discourse of justification of the invasion of the island. In comparison to Greece, Turkey maintains a massive force of dozens of thousands of soldiers on Cyprus (see sections a and b) which is a direct threat to the security of the island. Recent negotiations on the
reunification of the island stumbled precisely over this issue which further confirms the importance of projection of Turkish national ideas (e.g. the greatness of the Ottoman Empire and Turkey as its successor) on its foreign policy.

As the solution to the Cyprus issue stalls, Turkish accession negotiations stall and the EU-Turkey relationship remains tense. Since 2006, the EU has maintained that expanding the Additional Protocol on Customs Union on Cyprus is a precondition for allowing Turkey to complete eight chapters in its accession negotiations process (see sections a and b). Furthermore, the solution to the Cyprus issue would solve Cypriot vetoes of Turkey's accession chapters. Therefore, President Erdoğan's policies on Cyprus that have, as we have established, nationalist undertones, combined with recent consolidation of authoritative power in Turkey, make it harder for achieving a compromise and negatively influence the EU-Turkey relationship.

2. Conclusion

In this chapter, we have carried out three main points related to the Cyprus issue and its effect on the EU-Turkey relationship. These three points are that the historical mistrust between Greece and Turkey was transplanted on the Turkey-EU relationship through the problem of Cyprus. As such, this problem enabled Greece and later Cyprus to use EU institutionalism against Turkey. The second point is that due to the fact that EU plays an appeasing and balancing role in the region, the security issues between Cyprus-Turkey-Greece have been downplayed, although not diminished at all, and an identitarian approach to dealing with Cyprus took precedence in political space. The issue of identity, in combination with EU institutionalism, does not bode well for the relationship between the EU and Turkey. Finally, we have established that recent illiberal tones at home in
Turkey are being projected on its foreign policy. In that sense, the concept of “Strategic Depth” which inherently relies on national ideas of Turkish power was combined with an increasingly illiberal tone of politics in Turkey and as such blocks space for maneuvering negotiations on Cyprus with regards to Turkish and Greek military presence on the island. This also influences the relationship negatively as it keeps the accession negotiations stalled thus not allowing for Turkish progress towards membership. Furthermore, it creates a tension in the EU-Turkey relations as Turkish military presence on Cyprus, who is an EU member-state, creates a sense of insecurity within EU’s borders.

Finally, the issue of EU-Turkey relations has, in this context, become quite internationalized with multiple actors having a stake in it. From Britain to the UN, Cyprus issue presents one of the most intransigent problems in the EU-Turkey relationship. As the prospect for reconciliation worsens, the relationship remains pessimistically in place and creates an atmosphere of instability in the eastern Mediterranean Sea region.
Chapter 5. Perspectives for Future

In this research, we have sought to establish that the socio-cultural, identity-related, factors are at the core of the relationship between EU and Turkey. These factors (such as the construction of Turkey as non-European based on views of Turks as Muslim) are crucial for understanding not only the state of play in the relationship but rather different issues affecting both the EU and Turkey. For example, we have established that the issue of the refugee crisis, on both sides, opened the doors for the use of political and security normativism (such as bilateral treaties on immigration) in order to legitimize, on one hand, fears of the invading “others” (that, is Muslims) and, on the other hand, to legitimize the political power hold by employing fearmongering rhetoric (e.g. President Erdoğan claiming that Europe will be invaded by refugees unless Turkey is satisfied- see chapter “Refugee Crisis: New Frontier?”). However, apart from analyzing and establishing that the relationship between EU and Turkey is what both make of it- that is, following Wendtian logic of anarchy, the relationship between EU and Turkey is socially constructed- we have not offered any perspectives for the future of the relationship.

When I tell my fellow colleagues that I am writing a research on the relationship between EU and Turkey, all of them, without excuse, ask me whether I think Turkey will join the bloc. My answer is never clear-cut—that is, yes or no- but is rather undetermined, for I firmly believe that given the social fears prevailing in Europe and given the political situation in Turkey, Turkey cannot objectively claim the right to enter the European Union, even though we cannot remove it from EU’s political and social system.

Furthermore, as this research shows, the relationship between EU and Turkey is so complicated and so deeply rooted in historical mistrust that it is hard to expect that material interests will be able to guide their relationship in a more productive way. With that in
mind, I think that positive aspects of the relationship, such as the customs union, at this moment are not perceived as strongly in a positive way as is the construction that Turkey simply does not belong amongst Europeans (or that the EU is a Christian club). In that vein, the current issues stemming from the authoritarian power-hold of AKP and President Erdoğan over the nation simply legitimize the idea of Turkey in Europe as non-European because: a) Islam is incompatible with democracy and b) Turks are culturally prone to being authoritative (i.e. comparisons of Erdoğan and the Ottoman sultans) which is not a European trait.

But, does Turkey belong to the EU? And, will it ever be a member state? I cannot clearly answer these questions. However, I can offer three main perspectives that can help guide the reader in thinking about EU-Turkey relationship as well as about Turkey’s integration in the European socio-political consciousness.

First, the EU-Turkey relationship goes beyond Turkey becoming a member-state of the EU. We have outlined earlier the process of modernization through westernization set forth late in the Ottoman Empire and especially during the rule of Mustafa Kemal Pasha, that effectively sets Turkey on the goal of becoming a modernized, European, albeit nationally aware (e.g. retaining the Turkish cultural, Islam-influenced), society. Having this in mind, we have to acknowledge Turkey’s political contributions to the Western political and security umbrella system (i.e. NATO) while also acknowledging the socially embedded idea that the new Turkish nation must be European in order to fulfill the dream of its nationhood. Furthermore, European Union sees in Turkey more than a partner in economic and military terms (i.e. a member of the customs union) in that it sees Turkey as a friend and acknowledges its role in European history.
Two, Turkey is not capable of entering the EU at this moment (and it will not be for a while) due to obvious lacks in institutional strength, rule of law, and respect for the principle of separation of powers. However, the EU is not capable of absorbing Turkey itself. Current political state in Turkey negatively affects its image in Europe and serves as a legitimizer of fears and misgivings about Turkish national identity, and the role Turks have played in Europe culturally and historically. Furthermore, due to the size of Turkey it is impossible to integrate it without harming the dynamic of power between the EU 28. Given the fact that Turkey’s population is projected to increase to 95 million by 2030 and Germany’s to decrease to 78 million at the same time (Germany is the largest EU state in terms of population), this becomes an even greater issue (Müftüler-Baç, 71). Were Turkey to accede, for example, other states (most prominently Germany) would have to give up seats in the EU Parliament in order to accommodate the 96 members Turkey would have as the largest state in the 751-member EU Parliament (see chapter “Issues”, subchapter “Public Opinion”, section 2) (Müftüler-Baç, 71).

Three, in order to increase the cooperation dynamic between EU and Turkey, and create an atmosphere of mutual trust and acknowledgment, there has to be a change in approach these two players have in their relationship. Given the fact that social constructs influencing the relationship are one of the main hinderers of Turkish-EU cooperation (take for example the French ban on 4 accession chapters- see chapter “Cyprus: Identity, Security, and the EU-Turkey Relationship”), the primacy of the issue of accession of Turkey to the EU must be recentered in political discourse and praxis. If the EU insists on normative benchmarks that are not fairly implemented on all candidate states (in this case Turkey) and if Turkey keeps on insisting that its EU accession is a sine qua non for the
relationship, then the political and socio-cultural stalemate in EU-Turkey relations will persist. However, were we to open the relationship to other modes of integration such as the expanded customs union or a provisional privileged partnership then the stalemate in relations might be downplayed and cooperation would have more room to express itself. Müftüler-Baç establishes that:

The Positive Agenda {of 2012, see the “History” chapter, section four} targets increased dialogue and harmonization between Turkey and the EU on the Schengen regime, enhanced cooperation on energy issues, foreign policy, and the fight against terrorism, and increased participation in people-to-people programs, all mutually beneficial targets for both parties. The adoption of the Positive Agenda seems to indicate that, even in the absence of full membership, Turkey’s integration in the EU could be possible in multiple new policy areas, clearly indicating a path of differentiated integration with Turkey. To put it concretely, a path of differentiated integration with Turkey would include increased harmonization with regards to the single market, extension of free trade arrangements on textiles and agriculture, and increased cooperation in the financial sector, in other words a deepening of the 1995 customs union agreement. (Müftüler-Baç, 72).

Therefore, at the time when Turkey and the EU seem almost incompatible, there are still many policy areas of interest to both in political, economic, and socio-cultural terms (i.e. Erasmus exchange programs31) that can enhance cooperation and break through the icy stalemate. This means that we have to shift the framework under which the EU-Turkey relationship operates (enhanced political dialogues predicated on the state of the accession negotiations) to a new framework of more open communication and cooperation, unhindered by purely normative “take it or leave it” (dis)incentives.

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31 Essentially an intercontinental study abroad system established by the EU where students from participant countries can attend universities at all levels for different periods of time (i.e. from one to four years, or more) across the EU. The Erasmus program is considered to be one of the greatest achievements of the EU in social terms as it allows for spreading the European culture and education. For more information, please refer to the Erasmus webpage: [http://erasmusprogramme.com/](http://erasmusprogramme.com/).
With all of the aforementioned in mind, we also have to acknowledge that Turkey-EU relationship has had multiple stalemates throughout its history. This means that current issues, and the current stalemate, are not anomalies in the relationship. For example, after the 1980 coup, the then-EC froze its relations with Turkey (see “History”, section 2) or in 2012 when Turkey froze its relations with the EU due to Cypriot presidency of the Council (see the chapter on Cyprus, section a, subsection II). The relations rebounded, especially after the 1980 coup and the cooperation between Turkey and the EU seemed revitalized, if not unstoppable. Turkey is capable of integrating itself into the EU arrangement. The question of whether accession to the EU is possible seems a bit overplayed because the actual state of play between the two goes beyond the mere “yes” or “no” to Turkey becoming an EU member-state.

Finally, as we can see, Turkey and the EU still have many tools to work with in order to improve their political and social relationship. However, the real work must be implemented in bringing Turkey closer to Europe in socio-cultural terms, and vice versa. This work established a strong and socially motivated background of EU-Turkey relations. From the ideas of Kemalism that inspired Turkey’s integration into the West to constructs such as the “Turk” or the “Christian club”, that serve to remove Turkey and the EU from each other, the relationship must be constructed in a new way that would allow for bridging of differences, amelioration of negative social constructs, and acknowledgment of strong socio-political, and historical ties.
Conclusion

In this work, I have outlined the three most contemporary issues in the EU-Turkey relationship: the refugee crisis, the Cyprus issue, and the aftermath of the attempted coup d’état in July of 2016. To analyze them constructively, I needed to account for the complex historical patterns of socio-political mistrust and examples of othering in the relationship.

Since the start of this project, there were many events that have modified its approach to studying the EU-Turkey relations. With that in mind, when I started writing this thesis in June of 2016, I did not anticipate that I would have to provide an account of the July coup d’état and its subsequent influence on the relationship (and contribution to the volatility of Turkish politics). Although I initially sought to use conventional constructivism for understanding the EU-Turkey relationship, it had become clear to me during this research that I would have to approach the matter in a more critical manner. Hence, this thesis is a work in critical constructivism, such that it wishes to approach the matter in particularist way, while looking at discoursive political practices.

There were plenty of instances where discourse hit a proverbial bingo thus contributing to the strength of my conclusions (such as President Erdoğan’s threats during the refugee crisis). However, there were also many challenges since the work is particularist in nature (that is, it looks at particular instances to understand the relationship). These were related to the volatile nature of politics between the EU and Turkey. In that sense, the complexity of the relationship has encumbered the methodology of this work initially but has been hopefully overcome (or its negative influence thoroughly minimized). As this research tries to understand the EU-Turkey relationship in a time when it seems to be at its most precarious, it needed constant and consistent updating, reworking, and
adjusting to the present circumstances. This will probably cause many conclusions of this research to be outdated in the near future. However, the strength of this work does not necessarily lie in its conclusions. I would argue that the strength of this work lies in the fact that it provides a cogent argument for understanding the EU-Turkey relationship by utilizing the ideal constructions (often referred to as historical patterns of mistrust and othering, that is- issues of socio-historic and identitarian nature).

Since critical constructivism is not a theory of international politics, but rather a theoretical-methodological approach to studying international relations, this work does not seek to fully explain the relationship between the EU and Turkey. Consequently, this research cannot predict the future course of the relationship, except maybe ascertain that it’s outlook is pessimistic (in the full meaning of the word). However, this research can offer (and it offers) a methodical unpacking of social constructions that encumber and constrain EU and Turkey in their relationship. These allow us to have a better grasp at what guides the logic of the relationship. Furthermore, we can use these constructions to understand how we can reconceptualize Turko-European relations in a more sustainable manner.

At the present moment, the Turkish-European relations are, more than ever, on the verge of a precipitous fall. The accumulated mistrust over the last two years has caused unprecedented amount of political misunderstanding and has, as a matter of fact, strengthened the process of othering between the two. It seems that Turks and Europeans have never been more distanced in civilizational terms. Europeans perceive themselves at the forefront of political-economic integrations within a liberal-democratic order and they perceive Turks as sliding into the Ottoman-era socio-political order. Turks, on the other
hand, are growing increasingly nationalistic. This is due to the strong power-hold of the current AKP establishment (and especially President Erdoğan) which legitimizes itself by using constructions of threats to Turkish existence, similar to the Sevres syndrome, either from “Islamophobic Europeans” or from internal enemies, such as Kurds.

Because of that, this work holds immense academic and practical importance. Were we to understand better what guides the logic of the relationship between European Union and Turkey, we would be able not only to understand the relationship itself, but also create more sustainable dialogue between the two. In that sense, European Union would have to insist less on normativity in its relationship with Turkey and Turkey would have to insist less on complete integration as a sine qua non for the relationship, at least for the time being. This would, I firmly hold, help us relax the tensions and create more space for development of firmer political trust, and consequently strengthen the public support for the relationship.


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“Turkey-Macedonia Files.” *Wordpress,* [https://goo.gl/4Cg9sV](https://goo.gl/4Cg9sV), Date of Access: October 23rd, 2016.
Appendices

Appendix 1. Informed Consent Form Sample

_Informed Consent Form_
Lake Forest College/Undergraduate Thesis Project
Toni Cerkez

_Title of Project_

From Ankara to Brussels: The (Dis)Integration of Turkey in the EU

_Researcher’s Name(s) and Contact Information_

I have been invited to participate in a study conducted by [Toni Cerkez, Lake Forest, Illinois]. The faculty advisors for this project are professors: PhD Ahmad Sadri, PhD Aleksandar Jankovski and PhD James Marquardt (main advisor). Contact information: tonicerkez@hotmail.com / +1 847-275-5032

_Purpose_

The research is a senior bachelor thesis aiming to investigate social and political nature of the relationship between the European Union and the Republic of Turkey with a particular focus on social theory of International Politics.

_Participants_

The participants in this research project are:

Target population are experts on the topic; members of various NGO’s or governmental organizations as well as faculty of local universities and simply regular people who agree to participate. There is no particular condition for being a participant of the study. However, the research is aiming on recruiting Euro-Turks, academics of both Turkish and non-Turkish origin (but who are knowledgeable of EU processes).

_Procedures_

If I agree to participate in this study, I will be asked to do the following:

The qualitative process (the interview) will be conducted on the location of agreement. Audio taping will be a method used for conducting an interview and the participant will have to participate in the research only once, in the capacity of an interviewee. Length of time for participation depends on how long it takes for the participant to answer questions (note, the research will strive to provide participants with questions prior the interview) and on how many answers he/she knows how to answer. The researcher expects the interview to last around 20 to 40 minutes and conceptualizes an
interview as an insightful and pleasant conversation on the topic. All this information will also be presented orally to the participant.

**Voluntary Nature of the Study**

I understand my participation in this research is completely voluntary. There will not be any penalty or loss of benefits if I refuse to participate. I understand I can withdraw from the study or refuse to answer any question at any time, without penalty or loss of benefits. I will contact Toni Cerkez should I decide to withdraw from the research.

**Expected Risks of Participation**

To the best of the researcher’s knowledge, there will be no more risk of harm than I would normally experience in daily life. The anticipated risks associated with my participation in this research will be minimal.

**Benefits of Participation**

Other than the experience of participating in this research projects, there are no particular benefits for the participant; you.

**Cost and Compensation of Participation**

The researcher does not expect any costs on behalf of the participant and, should there be any, is willing to fully refund the participant.

**Privacy**

I understand the data collected in this study will be kept private and confidential. Specifically, the researcher will enclose my data on a password-protected PC and on password-protected cloud server. Furthermore, after the research is complete, the researcher will destroy all the data on participants in order to preserve their identity and privacy.

**Questions, Suggestions, Concerns, or Complaints**

Before I decide whether to accept the invitation to participate in this project, I can ask any questions about the study.
• If I have any questions, suggestions, concerns, or complaints about this project, I can contact Toni Cerkez

**Statement of Consent**

I affirm that I have read this information, asked questions and received answers, and am at least 18 years old. By my signature, I consent to be a volunteer in this research project.

**Signature of participant**

____________________

**Date**

____________________

**Printed name of participant**

Person Obtaining Consent:

*I have explained to the participant above the nature, purpose, risks and benefits of participating in this research project. I have answered any questions that may have been raised and I will provide the participant with a copy of this consent form.*

____________________

____________________

**Name of [authorized] person obtaining informed consent**

**Date**
Appendix 2. Senior Thesis Questions

Interview Questions for Undergraduate Senior Thesis Research

Toni Cerkez

From Ankara To Brussels: The (Dis)Integration of Turkey in the EU

1. Turkey is a predominantly Muslim country. Do you think that that has any influence on EU-Turkey relationship?
2. Is EU a “Christian Club”, or a union of and for only Christian states?
3. Is Turkey a European nation? And if so, do you think Turkey belongs in the EU?
4. Is Turkey a politically stable country? If yes, why? If not, why?
5. Is EU a politically stable entity? If yes, why? If not, why?
6. Do the Euro-Turkish negotiations have any impact on Turks living in Europe?
7. Does Erdogan’s style of leadership, in your view, harm EU-Turkish relations?
8. What effect, if any, does the current Refugee Crisis have on the EU-Turkey relations?
9. Has the recent attempted coup in Turkey demonstrated Turkey’s lack of democracy, or its democratic strength? As in, was Turkish democracy abrogated/harmed after the coup or was it saved and improved?
10. Do you think EU has been a credible partner during the integration process? As in, did the EU treat Turkey fairly and normatively?
11. Do you think Turkey has been a credible partner in integration process? As in, has Turkey been successfully following EU’s guidelines on integration?
12. Will Turkish EU integration help Turkey become a more prosperous nation?
13. Does the size of Turkey have any impact on its integration in the EU?