Explaining Dissent: A Comparative Study on How Political Culture and Socialization Account for Disparate Levels of Political Violence in Protest

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Abstract
Conventional theory suggests that the level of political violence a state experiences in protest directly correlates to the government structure of the state; this school of thought expects liberal democracies to be relatively peaceful while authoritarian states are expected to have high levels of violence. This study aims to counter this belief and instead explores the relationship that socialization and the political culture of a state have on political violence. Using comparative analyses of four case studies – looking at Iran, the United States, France, and Russia within these cases – my research tests models created for this thesis that allow for observations to be made about political violence. My results indicate that neither socialization, political culture, nor the government structure of a state can be solely linked to the level of political violence in a state. Rather, it is a combination of all these elements and much more.

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Senior Thesis

Explaining Dissent:  
A Comparative Study on How Political Culture and Socialization Account for Disparate  
Levels of Political Violence in Protest

by

Brent A. Brewer

April 24, 2020

The report of the investigation undertaken as a  
Senior Thesis, to carry two courses of credit in  
the International Relations Program

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Abstract

Conventional theory suggests that the level of political violence a state experiences in protest directly correlates to the government structure of the state; this school of thought expects liberal democracies to be relatively peaceful while authoritarian states are expected to have high levels of violence. This study aims to counter this belief and instead explores the relationship that socialization and the political culture of a state have on political violence. Using comparative analyses of four case studies – looking at Iran, the United States, France, and Russia within these cases – my research tests models created for this thesis that allow for observations to be made about political violence. My results indicate that neither socialization, political culture, nor the government structure of a state can be solely linked to the level of political violence in a state. Rather, it is a combination of all these elements and much more.
for
My Parents
Acknowledgments

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1.1 Background

Public protest is a social phenomenon that can be found in every state. All peoples, to one degree or another and one issue to another, have something to gripe about. Yet protests vary from one country to the next – in some countries it happens frequently and often takes a violent turn, while in other countries it is atypical and rarely, if ever, turns violent. The disparities in the level of violence across states is popularly correlated to regime structure. However, this is an explanation that I, alongside other scholars in the field, find unsatisfying. Perhaps, instead, the level of violence within a state’s public protest can be linked to the unique political culture within the state. The study of political culture is not a new field of study, but its relation to disparate violence levels is a lesser developed field that my research will help expand upon.

Furthermore, the persistence of political protest, and the dangerous violence it can produce, proves the necessity for further research on the topic. Just this past year, protests have begun in Hong Kong, Indonesia, the Netherlands, France, the United States, and countless others.¹ This is an issue that is worldwide and yet we know very little about why these protests evolve the way they do. A large part of this is due to a lack of understanding why protests turn violent, or stay peaceful, and why they vary so drastically from state to state. Political violence within public protests can take a number of forms ranging from the throwing of milkshakes or eggs to the use of Molotov cocktails and the destruction of public property. Often these typologies are tied to states, but not often are they tied to a regime typology, meaning that discrepancies persist amongst

liberal democracies as a group as well as amongst authoritarian states as a group. This lack of uniformity suggests there must be some other explanation, or variable, that has yet to be produced. Thus, there exists a strong gap in theorizing that fails to explain these variances and our understanding of political violence suffers as a result.

1.2 Statement of the Problem

The aim of this research is to fill the gap in comparative politics theory that exists regarding how we understand disparate political violence across states. The importance of this research, however, comes more so in its application and the way I hope to connect leading theories in this field. My research and literature review are largely built upon the works of Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba’s *The Civic Culture* and Ted Gurr’s *Why Men Rebel*. These scholars have each presented their own arguments, Almond and Verba on political culture and Gurr on political violence, with each producing their own findings and models. My research hopes to build on this scholarship by creating a new set of models that link the ideas presented by these leading scholars in these two texts. With the creation of these new models, I will be able to conduct my own tests and make my own findings. My case studies within this research will be dated back twenty years, with my analyses of protests being predominantly built off of protests coming after the year 2000. The primary goal of these tests is to ascertain whether political culture correlates to the variance in degrees of violence in public protests across various states.

The concepts I will turn to in my discussion of political culture and political violence stem from the research of prior scholars. These concepts are dense, and you

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would be hard pressed to find reading as dry as some chapters in these texts. Nevertheless, the models they produce have proven invaluable in my own research and serve as the basis for my own models and argument. Further discussion of these models will take place within the literature review, but I find it important to stress that my models serve to connect these loosely related fields into a more unified study. Whereas some past scholars have observed disparities in levels of political violence, it is of my understanding that none have connected the concepts of political culture and political violence the way I have in this thesis. Using the models for types of political culture found within Political Culture, I will connect the theories of political violence found within Gurr’s Why Men Rebel to produce new models capable of testing correlations between political culture and disparate political violence. My case studies make use of these models and allow me to test four distinct hypotheses that will answer the research questions my thesis is built upon.

1.3 Research Questions:
1. Does a correlation exist between the political culture of a state and the level of political violence found within said state?
2. Does socialization, as an extension of political culture, explain disparate levels of political violence?
3. Can the political structure of a state (authoritarian, liberal democracy, etc.) be used to determine the level of violence said state can expect in a protest?
Literature Review

The terminology and concepts used in this research can be confusing, but these terms are essential to understanding my original research. Therefore, the literature review section of my thesis will be dedicated to exploring these terms and the theoretical precedent that my research is founded upon. I will analyze theoretical concepts around the terms public protest, political culture, and political violence as they are the main aspects of my research.

Political Culture

Historically, theoretical understanding of political culture has been greatly shaped by Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba’s famous book, *The Civic Culture*. Their text is a comparative analysis of political culture and a discussion of the relationships citizens have with their government as a result of their socialization within the state’s political system. Since the publication of *The Civic Culture* in 1963, a variety of scholars have offered their own understandings of political culture, all with subtle variations to the original works of Almond and Verba. To fully understand the term and to build up to the main theoretical work found in *The Civic Culture*, we will observe the origin of the term before discussing these external texts that add to this field of study. Chronologically, the modern understanding of the term arose through Gabriel Almond’s solo work in a political journal for Princeton University in 1956. His argument would go on to serve as the foundation for his later research with Verba and it explains the beginnings of the theoretical field, which has since grown exponentially.

Almond’s brief research paper, “Comparative Political Systems,” aimed to expand contemporary notions of comparative analyses across states, an area of increasing interest in the United States due to growing expansion of U.S. involvement around the
world. In his text, Almond aimed to identify aspects of political systems that could be used in comparative studies. He discusses “orientation to political action” as a key aspect of understanding political systems and claims terms that typically describe these orientations, such as “attitudes towards politics” and “political values” are “diffuse and ambiguous.” Almond extends his argument further by suggesting his own interpretation of political culture, stating that as “every political system is embedded in a particular pattern of orientations to political action” it is “useful to refer to this as the political culture.” He stresses that this political culture is “not the same as general culture” as “political orientation involves cognition, intellection, and adaptation to external situations, as well as the standards and values of the general culture.” This early definition of political culture serves to explain political culture as a narrowed view of political systems that also explains how citizens are oriented to action within said systems.

Almond would go on to develop The Civic Culture with Verba, thus creating the core concepts my thesis is built upon. However, it is equally important to view some of the ways that other scholars have interpreted political culture since its inception. Walter Rosenbaum divides the term into two distinctions that vary both in their application as well as with the level of political life that is being studied. When applying to the individual, Rosenbaum specifies that “political culture . . . [asks] what bonds exist between him and the essentials of his political system and how these bonds affect his

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4 Ibid., 396.
5 Ibid.
6 Ibid.
behavior.” However, Rosenbaum distinguishes his second interpretation of political culture as the “collective orientation of people toward the basic elements in their political system.” This emphasis on the collective is more interested in how large swathes of a population interact with their state. Rosenbaum’s views of political culture emphasize the many ways citizens engage with their government, both as individuals and as a collective; my research will view political violence as an example of the collective interaction through public protest.

Rosenbaum is not alone in his interpretation as countless other scholars have chimed in on this topic. This shows that a divide does still persist, with interpretations often deviating from The Civic Culture. Perhaps now, it is more appropriate to delve into this text, seeing that a basic set of definitions has been explored. Political culture within The Civic Culture “refers to the specifically political orientations – attitudes toward the political system and its various parts, and attitudes toward the role of the self in the system.” They speak to the capacity of their research by limiting it to a study of culture, but only insofar as it relates to the political orientation of society, an echo of what Almond said in his original journal article. A more encompassing definition comes from the statement that the “political culture of a nation is the particular distribution of patterns of orientation toward political objects among the members of the nation.” This statement is the foundation of their models as they begin to explain the modes of political

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8 Rosenbaum, Political Culture, 4.
10 Ibid., 15.
orientation as well as the classes of political objects that citizens interact with which and that define political culture.

*Almond and Verba’s Models for Types of Political Orientation and Political Objects*

1. **cognitive orientation**: “knowledge of and belief about the political system, its roles, its inputs, and its outputs”

2. **affective orientation**: “feelings about the political system, its roles, personnel, and performance”

3. **evaluational orientation**: “the judgements and opinions about political objects that typically involve the combination of value standards and criteria with information and feelings”

These orientations were used by Almond and Verba to systematically map out an individual’s feelings towards his state, thus informing the political culture of the state.

The orientations above were also used together to explore four distinct objects as shown in Figure 1, which comes directly from the text:

**Figure 1**

Dimensions of Political Orientation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cognition</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Affect</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evaluation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. Summarized as the knowledge an individual has of his “nation and of his political system in general terms, its history, size, location, power” and his feelings towards those characteristics. These will be further discussed in the case studies later in my research, but it is important to further clarify this object of political

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12 Ibid., 17.
culture. The system as a general object can be viewed as how much a citizen understands about his nation in the grander scheme of global politics. As such, much of my research of a state’s involvement with this orientation looked to the civic education that said state prescribed to its citizens.

2. Summarized as the knowledge an individual has “of the structures and roles, the various political elites, and the policy proposals that are involved in the upward flow of policy making” and his feelings on these topics. This object can be further explained as the actions one takes to influence politics in a state preemptively. My research on this object for states often looked to voter turnouts or involvement with political parties to ascertain whether a state is oriented to it or not.

3. Summarized as the knowledge an individual has “of the downward flow of policy enforcement, the structures, individuals, and decisions involved in these processes” and his feelings about these topics. This object, opposite to input objects, deals with the reactionary aspect of political involvement. My research on this object looked directly to the protests of a state, as this is the clearest way to see these reactionary forces.

4. Summarized as the individual’s perception of “himself as a member of his political system” and his knowledge of “his rights, powers, obligations, and of strategies of access to influence.” Includes his feelings about his own capabilities and can be described as the way we view ourselves as a member of the political system. My research points to polls taken about citizen’s involvement with politics and the ability a citizen has to operate in a political system that is free from corruption to satisfy orientation to this object.

Therefore, in order to characterize a nation’s political culture, you must fill in this graph for a valid sample of the population. This political culture becomes “the frequency of different kinds of cognitive, affective, and evaluative orientations toward the political

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13 Ibid.
14 Almond and Verba, Civic Culture, 17.
15 Ibid.
system in general, its input and output aspects, and the self as political actor.” This shows how political culture is measured through the frequency of these orientations for each object; this frequency being observed through the cognitive, affective, and evaluative aspects discussed earlier. Almond and Verba would go on to build upon this information with a second table showing the three primary types of political culture their research discovered.

Figure 2
Types of Political Culture

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>System as General Object</th>
<th>Input Objects</th>
<th>Output Objects</th>
<th>Self as Object</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Parochial</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subject</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participant</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

_Parochial Political Culture:_ This form of political culture occurs when “the frequency of orientations to specialized political objects of the four kinds specified in Figure 1 approaches zero.” Parochial cultures most commonly align with communities resembling African tribal societies in that they have “no specialized political roles” and that the “parochial expects nothing from the political system.” Here political responsibility is nigh non-existent.

_Subject Political Culture:_ This form of political culture has a “high frequency of orientations toward a differentiated political system and toward the output aspects of the

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16 Ibid.
17 Almond and Verba, _Civic Culture_, 17.
18 Ibid., 18.
system, but orientations toward specifically input objects, and toward the self as an active participant approach zero.”\textsuperscript{19} Here the individual “is aware of specialized governmental authority; he is affectively oriented to it, perhaps taking pride in it, perhaps disliking it; and he evaluates it either as legitimate or as not.”\textsuperscript{20} This breeds a more passive relationship as only the output of the political system is engaged with. My expectation of states that have a subject system is that they would refrain from higher levels of violence, as a result of their laissez faire attitude toward politics. Subject citizens would choose output methods like protests in their interactions with the politics of their state, rather than becoming heavily involved with every aspect of the political system they have little regard for.

\textit{Participant Political Culture:} This third type of political culture “is one in which the members of the society tend to be explicitly oriented to the system as a whole and to both the political and administrative structures and processes: in other words, to both the input and output aspects of the political system.”\textsuperscript{21} This culture breeds individuals who tend “to be oriented toward an ‘activist’ role of the self in the polity” and reflect that through their consistent involvement in all aspects of the system.\textsuperscript{22} My research expects participant states to be more active in politics, perhaps being more influenced by socialization aspects of the state as a result, something that will be further discussed in the next section of my literature review.

\textsuperscript{19} Ibid., 19.
\textsuperscript{20} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{21} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{22} Ibid.
A point should be stressed in understanding these topics that this classification of a state’s system “does not imply homogeneity or uniformity of political cultures.”

Almond and Verba stress that while these cultures may be dominant in a state and visible through the individuals who subscribe to this dominant culture, other subcultures may still exist. In a participant society, there may exist some parochial and subject individuals who are still produced, as a result of “imperfections of the processes of political socialization.”

For Almond and Verba’s research, they use these models to develop an understanding of Civic Culture, which they define as a “particular mix of citizens, subjects, and parochials.” This, “citizen,” is described as “a particular mix of participant, subject, and parochial orientations.”

The goal of their research is to further develop these systems and understand how the “civic culture” can be achieved; which they classify as being the most perfect form of political culture.

Furthermore, parochial, participatory and subject cultures are not beholden to any set regime structure. Although they may be more easily linked to certain styles, it is the orientation of the citizens of state that determines the political culture. The four objects listed in the tables – system as a general object, input objects, output objects, and the self as an object – are the determinates for political culture and depend solely upon how the citizens themselves orient toward these objects. In the case of my own research, which will forego the study of parochial systems, it is important to view this for a participant and subject system. In the case of a participant system it must be understood that an authoritarian or liberal democracy could host said system. The same must be understood

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23 Ibid., 20.
24 Almond and Verba, Civic Culture, 20.
25 Ibid.
26 Ibid.
for a subject system as participation and understandings of political culture vary amongst groupings of authoritarian and liberal democracies. These systems provide us the lens to view socialization of a state through, but they cannot be held accountable to a certain regime style. The following section on my methodology will detail how I will use these models for my own research as I look to the political violence found in each system.

**Political Violence**

The goal of this thesis is to explore political culture and to discern whether it can be used to explain disparate levels of political violence across states. Political violence, however, is a very broad term that is applicable across many different fields of research. To narrow our understanding of this term – and to enlighten those who may be unfamiliar – this section will discuss the definition, typologies, and common theories of political violence before turning to the chief text that will be used for my own research. In defining political violence, we must first ensure it is viewed fairly and in a favorable perspective, in order to understand the term as it is viewed in the comparative politics and international relations subfields of political science. H. L. Nieburg states in *Political Violence* that “extreme and violent political behavior cannot be dismissed as erratic, exceptional, and meaningless.”²⁷ He argues that by dismissing political violence as a viable source of political action, we “deny the role of violence in creating and testing political legitimacy and in conditioning the terms of all social bargaining and adjustments.”²⁸ Already, a definition is beginning to form here that looks at political violence as a means of understanding the legitimacy of a state by violently challenging the states authority as a collective.

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²⁸ Ibid.
For Nieburg, political violence is a legitimate means by which people interact with the state. Rather than dismissing these violent acts altogether as meaningless dissidence, he argues that “violent acts may be looked upon as society’s early warning system, revealing deep-rooted political conflicts which are gathering strength beneath the surface of social relations.” The very presence of this violence within a state points to underlying feelings of dissatisfaction that leads to mass political dissent. Viewing these actions as legitimate is critical in my research as public protestors who resort to violence must also be seen as legitimate actors. The variance in political violence between states who undergo protests cannot be used as a means to rule certain public protests as illegitimate over others.

Nieburg defines political violence as “acts of disruption, destruction, injury whose purpose, choice of targets or victims, surrounding circumstances, implementation, and/or effects have political significance, that is, tend to modify the behavior of others in a bargaining situation that has consequences for the social system.” This definition concisely narrows our focus to only those acts that are politically charged in an effort to differentiate this form of violence from common interpretations of the word. However, this term still has far reaching and broad applications within the political realm that ultimately weaken the definition. Acts of individuals, such as assassinations, can still be politically charged actions and they are most certainly violent in nature. Furthermore, political ties can be vaguely assigned to groups such as the KKK, despite their being known to have ulterior, racial issues driving their organization. When we view the violent acts of groups like this, we cannot skirt the responsibilities of discerning the presence of a

30 Ibid., 13.
hate crime by hiding the institution behind their political ties. I believe the same can be
said about defining acts of true political violence. Therefore, while Nieburg provides a
solid ground for understanding political violence, it does not satisfy the needs of my
research and shows the need for understanding the typologies of political violence.

To examine the typologies of political violence, my research brought me to an
article in Social and Economic Studies by Perry Mars, which analyzed the nature of
political violence. Mars aimed to find clarity in the term as he mentioned that “there is a
general lack of consensus among political theorists about the precise nature of political
violence,” something I strongly echo in my own analysis. However, the article still
manages to hone in on a strong list of typologies for political violence. The list below,
which Perry developed using the work of political scientists R. J. Rummel and Raymond
Tanter, serves my research by listing typologies pertinent to the exclusively internal
political violence of a state. As my research looks to political protests, which almost
exclusively operate within a state, I found this research most useful in my own study.

General Strike: General strikes are defined as being “aimed against governmental
authority or policy and involving at least 1,000 workers.”

Guerrilla War: A guerrilla war is classified as “armed activity of irregular forces
aimed at overthrow of the existing government.” This is a more large-scale
movement likely involving direct and large-scale attacks on the established
regime.

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32 Rudolf J. Rummel, “Dimensions of Foreign and Domestic Conflict Behavior: A Review of
34 Ibid.
**Major Government Crisis:** Major government crises are situations “threatening the downfall of the regime; evidenced by declaration of martial law, suspension or abrogation of the Constitution, etc.”

**Purge:** A purge is a “systematic elimination of opposition by the political elite – jailing or execution, arrests, etc.”

**Riot:** A riot is classified as a “violent demonstration or clash of citizens involving at least 100 people.”

**Anti-Government Demonstration:** These demonstrations are “unorganized, peaceful, public gathering[s] involving at least 100 people for the purpose of displaying or voicing opposition to government policies or authority.”

**Revolution:** A revolution is defined as an “armed successful or unsuccessful attempt to form an independent government involving pitched battles between opposing forces on a grand scale.”

These terms serve to distinguish types of violence, yet they lack specifics on the levels of violence within these movements. Furthermore, the events are more classified by size and role, rather than the level of violence they experience specifically. While my research primarily focusses on just the riot and anti-government demonstration definitions above, I still feel these lack clarity. My thesis, and more specifically the methodology section of my research, will serve to craft more distinguishable levels of violence that will build upon these definitions of protest.

Theories surrounding political violence are plentiful in the comparative politics and international relations fields, perhaps a result of the variations in definitions and multitudes of typologies. Nieburg takes us through a few of these theories that can help

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36 Ibid.
37 Ibid.
38 Ibid.
39 Ibid.
us to understand the importance of political violence and contemporary thoughts that scholars have on the topic. One such theory, listed as the “Riffraff and Reds” theory, bears the “notion that Communists or ‘outside agitators’ with links to Hanoi, Peking, Havana, if not Moscow, are behind every serious act of disruption and collision.”

This theory doesn’t suggest that every act of political violence begins with these actors, but it suggests that they agitate or expand the act if they were not the root cause. This theory explains the root of this violence further by stating that “spontaneous contagion enables incorrigible mischief-makers and no-gooders to unleash uncontrolled escalations, sweeping responsible and law-abiding citizens into a vortex of violence.” From this perspective, it is the riffraff of society that is riled up by outside influencers that pushes a larger group of more mild-mannered citizens to act violently.

Another prominent theory is the “McLuhan Thesis” which argues that “electronic communications are transforming and "retribalizing" society, inducing a new immediacy of human contact and a violent revolution of individual consciousness.” This theory looks at the evolution of political violence through the evolution of media, as dissenters adapt their actions to the medium that portrays them. Another theory, dubbed the “Return of the Killer Instinct,” suggests that “social institutions must vent, repress, and contain [societies] fixed dosage of murderous potential.” The fear being that if left unchecked by the state, “the gleeful, blood-thirsty caveman in each of us breaks out in search of a target or victim.” This theory resorts to an extended look at Social Darwinism, again

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Ibid., 20.
Ibid., 26.
Ibid., 36.
Ibid.
showing the extraordinary range present in political violence theory. Unfortunately, none of these theories, nor the work of Nieburg himself, will be used to support my own research. Instead, my thesis uses the work of political theorist, Ted Robert Gurr, and his book, *Why Men Rebel*.45

Gurr presents his own interpretation of political violence as being defined as “all collective attacks within a political community against the political regime, its actors – including competing political groups as well as incumbents – or its policies.”46 He also introduces the typologies that he would discuss, listing them as “revolution . . . guerrilla wars, coups d’état, rebellions, and riots,” thus far bearing a strong resemblance to the prior definitions and typologies discussed in Nieburg and Mars’ texts.47 The distinction that Gurr makes, however, is in his classification of the levels of political violence; these classifications include turmoil, conspiracy, and internal war, but in reading through his text I isolated turmoil as the most relatable to my own research. Turmoil is defined by Gurr as “relatively spontaneous, unorganized political violence with substantial popular participation, including violent political strikes, riots, political clashes, and localized rebellions.”48 His description here closely aligns with my own research, although my own study will refrain from looking at rebellions as a source of political violence. For the purposes of this research, this definition will serve to define the cases that are introduced later in the case studies.

46 Ibid., 4.
47 Ibid.
48 Ibid., 11.
Gurr’s study looks to determine the psychological and social sources of collective violence and in doing so he introduces some interesting ideas that I will incorporate in my methodology. In his work, Gurr developed his own theory called the frustration-aggression proposition which states that “the greater the frustration, the greater the quantity of aggression against the source of frustration.”\textsuperscript{49} Simply put, he states that a correlation exists between frustration and the magnitude of violence, suggesting that greater frustration leads to greater violence. In his discussion of determining the magnitude of violence, Gurr states that three variables should be analyzed: “the extent of participation within the political unit being studied (scope), the destructiveness of action (intensity), and the length of time violence persists (duration).”\textsuperscript{50} Whilst I am incredibly interested in the theory presented here, my own research will take a narrower look at political violence by just looking to test the intensity of violence. Nevertheless, this theory provides a strong base for Gurr’s research and provides me with the definitions I required for the development of my own models.

While Gurr takes a very broad, yet detailed, look at the multitude of sources that lead to political violence, my own research is more limited to political culture. Thus, my research draws directly from his Chapter 6, which focuses on the socialization, tradition and legitimacy of the state and how it pertains to political violence. People are socialized to behave in their state in a variety of ways that all impact how we view violence in our respective states. This political “learning” can take many forms, but I believe the three most relevant aspects of political socialization to how we view political violence are what my research must focus on. These three aspects of socialization are (1) the state's

\textsuperscript{49} Gurr, \textit{Why Men Rebel}, 9.
\textsuperscript{50} Ibid.
historical precedent for violent protest, (2) the state's historical precedent in responding to protestors demands, and (3) the legitimacy of the state's regime in the eyes of the people.

For his argument on historical precedent to violence, Gurr provides his own hypothesis:

“Hypothesis JV .2: The intensity and scope of normative justifications for political violence vary strongly with the historical magnitude of political violence in a collectivity.”

Gurr argues that states with a precedent for political violence will have a higher rationale for justifying political violence again. Furthermore, the intensity of the political violence experienced also correlates to the intensity of past uses of political violence. Therefore, we can expect states who have had high levels of violence in protests, or times of turmoil as Gurr would put it, to again experience these levels of violence in future protests.

For his argument on historical precedent for state response, Gurr provides his own hypothesis:

“Hypothesis JV .3: The intensity and scope of normative and utilitarian justifications for political violence vary moderately with the effectiveness and scope of past regime action in alleviating relative deprivation.”

Here the argument is made that the states response and effectiveness at alleviating the issues affecting the protestors engaging in violence directly correlates to the protestor’s justification for violence. Furthermore, he argues that the precedent for response also determines how intense the violence actually is. Perhaps, those protestors from a

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52 Ibid., 182.
historically apathetic state would engage with more intense violence than those in a state that were historically more sympathetic to protestors wants.

For his argument on the legitimacy of the state, Gurr provides his own hypothesis: "Hypothesis JV .5: The intensity and scope of normative justifications for political violence vary strongly and inversely with the intensity and scope of legitimacy."\(^{53}\)

Gurr argues that as a state loses legitimacy in the eyes of its citizens, an inverse reaction occurs that leads to a higher sense of justification for intense political violence. Therefore, the socialization of a state includes how the citizens view the state in terms of legitimacy.

The importance of this literature view comes explicitly through its ability to explain the terms deemed essential to the research I have conducted. However, the explanations provided are brief and surface level explanations of concepts and theories that have decades of study behind them. Subsequently, these three hypotheses will be discussed further in my own methodology as I link these topics of socialization to the models discussed in Almond and Verba’s text. Only the essentials will be incorporated and detailed appropriately in my methodology, but the literature review operates to inform the reader that this research is prominent and that my own research serves a purpose to link concepts and fill gaps. By establishing this field of study, I hope to persuade the reader that my own goals are attainable and worthwhile for pushing the boundaries of international relations theory.

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Methodology and Research Design

The main challenge that arises in my research – being to demonstrate a correlation between political culture and political violence – comes from connecting two principle texts from my literature review. While related, these two texts are still focused on unique aspects of comparative politics theory, and I must be able to convincingly bridge the gap between these two realms. The literature review introduced the core concepts and literature of my research, but it is through this methodology that I will pull the essentials from these prior analyses. Moreover, I craft my own models based upon the works of Almond and Verba that incorporate the theories and hypotheses devised by Gurr. These models will be used to test my own claim in this thesis – that political culture is directly linked to the level of political violence a state experiences in protests, as a result of the forms of socialization the aforementioned political culture breeds.

Before discussing these models, it is important that I note what aspects of the literature review I deem essential, and what will be left out of my own research. In the discussion of Almond and Verba, the introduction of the parochial, subject, and participant societies was important in that it developed and explained the concepts in *The Civic Culture* more wholly. However, my own research only pertains to the study of states undergoing civil unrest and thus, the parochial system proves itself unimportant for my work. The parochial system explicitly states that every object of the political system is orientated to the point of approaching zero, meaning that almost no interaction occurs between the state and its inhabitants. This system, while interesting in its own right, has no correlation to the theoretical assumptions I am making through this thesis.

There exists a gap in the literature that I hoped to engage with here in the methodology as well. This gap is the lack of clarity or definition of these disparate levels
of violence. I have henceforth developed my own definitions that list four classifications for political violence in times of political protest.

*High Levels of Political Violence:* This is the highest classification of political violence in a state. Examples of such violence include the use of extreme force through assault, heavy destruction of public property, the use of Molotov Cocktails, arson, deaths, etc. This level of violence must precede any full-scale revolution and must be contained within the confines of the protest.

*Middling Levels of Political Violence:* This middling tier explains violence that operates in between high and low levels. Political violence can fall into this category when examples of both high and low tiers of violence are prevalent and yet, no single grouping can be accurately used to categorize said violence.

*Low Levels of Political Violence:* This is the lowest level of actual political violence that can be found within a state. Examples of such violence include the use of light force through vandalism, light destruction of public property, throwing of non-lethal objects (shakes, rocks, etc.), violence towards government response officials, etc. This level of violence must precede the qualifications listed for a high and middling level of political violence.

*No Political Violence:* This is the lowest level of political violence that can be found within a state. This level is purely peaceful and must not include any means of violence. With these four classifications, my case studies can more accurately measure the disparities that I am investigating in my research. The definitions provided allow for my case studies to have a definite end result, creating a comparable result for my analyses.
Hypotheses

Hypothesis 1.1: If a participant state has precedent for both a high level of violence in political protests and a weak state response to the wants of past protests, and the citizens have precedent for viewing the regime as illegitimate, then a high level of political violence can be expected during a public protest.

**Hypothesis 1.1 Figure**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Participant State “X”</th>
<th>Level of Precedented Violence in Protest</th>
<th>State Response to Wants of Past Protests</th>
<th>State Legitimacy</th>
<th>Expected Levels of Violence:</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>Illegitimate</td>
<td>High</td>
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</table>

Hypothesis 1.2: If a participant state has both precedent for only a low level of violence in political protests and precedent for a generous state response to the wants of past protests, and the citizens view the regime as legitimate, then low levels of violence can be expected during a public protest.

**Hypothesis 1.2 Figure**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Participant State “X”</th>
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</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Legitimate</td>
<td>Low</td>
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</table>

Seeing as though participant state systems are made up of citizens strongly oriented to all objects of the political system, it is expected that precedent and legitimacy would be strong influences on justifications for political violence. Citizens in said system understand their position within the state and view their role as important prompting justifications for, or against, violence to be more directly tied to the behavior and expectations of the regime. Therefore, if a participant state has not responded favorably
to protests in the past, current protestors are likely to resort to high levels of violence due to the frustration-aggression theory and protestors’ expectation that the state will not favorably respond to their wants. Whereas, if the state has acted favorably in the past, current protestors will be much slower to engage in violent action, if at all, as the state has proven itself as compromising in the past. Therefore, my expected levels of violence in Hypothesis 1.1 and Hypothesis 1.2 expect these states to maintain their precedented levels of political violence.

Hypothesis 1.3: If a subject state has precedent for both high violence in protest and a generous state response to the wants of past protests, and the citizens have precedent for viewing the regime as illegitimate, then a middling level of political violence can still be expected during a public protest.

*Hypothesis 1.3 Figure*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subject State “X”</th>
<th>Level of Precedented Violence in Protest</th>
<th>State Response to Wants of Past Protests</th>
<th>State Legitimacy</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Illegitimate</td>
<td>Middling</td>
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Hypothesis 1.4: If a subject state has both precedent for low violence in protest and a weak state response to the wants of past protests, and the citizens view the regime as legitimate, then low levels political violence can be expected during a public protest.

*Hypothesis 1.4 Figure*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subject State “X”</th>
<th>Level of Precedented Violence in Protest</th>
<th>State Response to Wants of Past Protests</th>
<th>State Legitimacy</th>
<th>Expected Levels of Violence:</th>
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<td></td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>Legitimate</td>
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The subject state is expected to be comprised primarily of non-actors who understand the state and yet do not wish to interact with it. This comes as a result of having no orientation to the input objects of the system, which participant states have. The people in these systems are not taught to participate or possibly are not allowed to do so and thus are less quick to turn to violence. However, they are still oriented to the output objects of the state and thus are more reactionary to the state, rather than participant societies which are all encompassing in their orientation. Furthermore, as Hypothesis 1.3 shows, favorable state precedent and the subject political culture together can still be expected to overrule the influence of an illegitimate state with a precedent for high levels of violence. Thus, leading me to state that said state should anticipate a lower level of violence than preceded. Hypothesis 1.4 does not experience this decrease in the level of violence as a result of the weak state response in the past and the already low levels of violence preceded. With these aspects of the state considered, it would be very difficult to see the next lower tier of violence - being no political violence - be achieved, leading me to expect low violence to be maintained.
Table of Figures

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<th>Hypothesis 1.1</th>
<th>Level of Precedented Violence in Protest</th>
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<tr>
<td>Hypothesis 1.2</td>
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These figures serve as my models for my own theoretical research, working to provide me the backdrop required for my case studies. Whilst further dissemination of these models could be studied with more variance in the levels of precedent or more nuanced feelings of legitimacy, the models I have created allow for a direct observation of my research questions. Furthermore, the use of these specific combinations allows for us to view real life states that fit these models and show the wide range of application that variations of these models could be used for in further studies. They serve a direct purpose and allow for a more coherent, and simpler, discussion of the case studies that I have selected. The models created have been evaluated and will be assigned states that seemingly fit into the precedent and feelings of legitimacy during protest.

For clarification, my use of legitimacy in this research does not align with traditional expectations of the term. Whereas legitimacy most commonly refers to a society’s view of a state as an acceptable authority, my interpretation looks at the propensity of a society to act on these feelings of illegitimacy. Therefore, my classification of illegitimate in my hypotheses refers only to the state having precedent
for citizens viewing the state as illegitimate and subsequently acting on this belief – shown through a revolution or coup de tat. Conversely, my classification as legitimate refers to a state that has no precedent for being viewed as illegitimate and thus, no past action on these feelings. This aspect of socialization is expected to further justify political violence in a state concurrently with the precededent view of legitimacy. Models with an aspect of socialization listed as illegitimate will be more likely to justify higher levels of violence, while models with this aspect of socialization listed as legitimate will not be as likely to justify these higher levels.
Case Study Selections

The cases below have been selected because they most closely exemplify the political culture and three aspects of socialization listed in their paired figure. They have been selected so that the hypotheses I have created can be tested directly using real-life models and comparative analyses of political protests across the world.

Case Study One: This case study tests Hypothesis 1.1 using Iran as the backdrop for analysis. Iran exemplifies the political culture traits of a participant culture by having citizens fully oriented to the political system. Iran also has historical precedent for high levels of violence in protest and a history for weak state response to protestors wants. Furthermore, Iranians have a history of viewing their state as illegitimate during times of political dissent. Their propensity to view the state as illegitimate assures us that they have been socialized for this behavior and their past revolutions, like the revolution in 1979, give proof to this claim. These qualifications will be further explored and dissected within the case studies before introducing the protests that will fully test my hypothesis.

Case Study Two: This case study tests Hypothesis 1.2 using the United States as the backdrop for analysis. The U.S. exemplifies the political culture traits of a participant culture by having citizens fully oriented to the political system, albeit in a different fashion to Iran. Whereas Iran may have citizens more explicitly involved through public dissent, the U.S. has a political culture that expects citizens to vote extensively. The U.S. also has little to no precedent for high levels of political violence and generally has a high level of state response to protestors wants. Solidarity with the state and its long-standing institutions, like the Constitution, also mean that people generally view the state as legitimate. These qualifications will all be further examined through the case studies and the protests within the U.S. will allow for me to test my hypothesis.
**Case Study Three:** This case study tests Hypothesis 1.3 using France as the backdrop for analysis. France fits into the subject system simply because the citizens are more inclined to be involved with the output objects of the political system and due to the recent failings of the traditional input objects. This is evident through the fact that, while France is a liberal democracy, the involvement of citizens of France with input objects of orientation is limited. This was even supported by Almond and Verba, who stated that a “French royalist is aware of democratic institutions; he simply does not accord legitimacy to them.”

France also has strong precedent for high levels of violence in protests and a generally favorable response from the government to past wants of prior political protests, perhaps in fear of the aggressive protests of the past. French history of regime change also shows the propensity to view the state as illegitimate and qualifies them for this third aspect of socialization. These claims will all be explored more thoroughly in the case study and the examination of French protests will allow me to test my hypothesis.

**Case Study Four:** This case study tests Hypothesis 1.4 using Russia as the backdrop for analysis. Russia fits most closely to the subject political system as the citizens of the state are generally apathetic to the often-corrupt input orientations of the state and are thus more inclined to react to policy on the output aspect. Furthermore, Russia has little to no precedent for high levels of violence in protests and a history of weak response to the wants of political protestors. However, despite their weak response to protests, Russian citizens have still not had a revolution since the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917. Even this, however, led to the creation of the Soviet Union and not the more recent Russian Federation that will be analyzed in this research. Tensions are

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rising in Russia, and disdain for corrupt politics may eventually breed citizens who view the state as illegitimate, but as of right now, these feelings have yet to be acted on in a revolutionary fashion. These claims will be analyzed in this case study with greater depth and the discussion of Russian protests will serve as a means to test this hypothesis.
Case Study One: Iran

Hypothesis 1.1: If a participant state has precedent for both a high level of violence in political protests and a weak state response to the wants of past protests, and the citizens have precedent for viewing the regime as illegitimate, then a high level of political violence can be expected during a public protest.

_Hypothesis 1.1 Figure_

<table>
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Using the analyses of Almond and Verba in conjunction with the three aspects of socialization found in Gurr’s text, I test the correlation between political culture and political violence in Iran. In conducting this case study, I examined how Iran serves Hypothesis 1.1, how Iran exemplifies the aspects of socialization listed in this hypothesis, and the level of violence that my model predicted Iran to experience during political protest. The hypothesis’ predictions were then applied to political violence in Iran today to test the validity of my claims. Although I would love to claim this case study as a successful test of my model, certain factors gave me pause, leading me to reflect on other sources that may affect political violence. The details of this study below show the complexities that accompany this study.

_How Iran Serves Hypothesis 1.1_

In this hypothesis, Iran is identified as a largely participant system, meaning that its citizens are oriented to all aspects of the objects listed in the literature review over political culture. These, again, include: the system as a general object, input objects,
output objects and the self as an object. Iran has affectionately been known as “A Cradle of Civilization” by numerous sources. The average Iranian citizen is aware of this cultural impact and are proud of this belief. Viewing the system as a general object means that citizens within the state have knowledge of their “political system in general terms, its history, size, location, power.” The pride felt from being such an integral part of world history coupled with Iran’s geo-political power creates a state with citizens that are orientated to the system as a general object and beginning to qualify Iran as a participant culture.

As for the input objects, these entail the understanding a citizen has of “the structures and roles, the various political elites, and the policy proposals that are involved in the upward flow of policy making.” These upward flow mechanics include political parties and elections wherein action is taken by citizens preemptively, rather than in response to the state. In a report published by the Statista Research Department, some of these input objects can explicitly be seen in Iran. Their research shows that, since 1980 and up until their most recent data set of 2017, Iran has always had voter turnout rates above 50% in election years. This is an impressive statistic on its own, but if we read further in between the lines, voter turnout is shown to be remarkably high. In October of


56 Almond and Verba, *Civic Culture*, 17.

57 Ibid.

1981 and 1997 voter turnout reached 74.26% and 79.92% respectively. Furthermore, turnout rates reached their peak in 2009 with an astounding 85.21% of the population voting. Even as more recent elections show a lower turnout, these rates show strong orientation of the Iranian people to input objects of their political system which further qualifies Iran as a participant system.

Output models, being the knowledge of the “downward flow of policy enforcement, the structures, individuals, and decisions involved in these processes,” are also evident in Iran. This classification represents the reactionary aspects of political action, as people respond to the actions of the state. Moreover, it is the action citizens take in response to implementation of new policies or institutions that the state has decided upon. Political dissent represents the most direct form of this type of object and seeing as though protests are an integral part of this research, I feel it important to highlight a couple of these protests here. Iran is no stranger to political dissent, but in a more contemporary sense, the past twenty years especially have been a hotbed for dissent. In 1999, “students at Tehran University gathered to protest” and in 2009 “the Green Movement . . . reached its height when up to 3 million peaceful demonstrators turned out on Teheran streets.” From 2017 to 2018, citizens “took to the streets to protest the government’s economic policies” and just earlier this year in January of 2020, “Iranians launched anti-government protests after officials admitted that the Revolutionary Guards had mistakenly shot down Ukraine International Airlines Flight

59 Ibid.
60 “Voter Turnout Rates in Iran 1980–2017.”
61 Almond and Verba, Civic Culture, 17.
62 “Fact Sheet: Protests in Iran (1979-2019),” Iran Primer, last updated January 21, 2020,
752.” These protests show that Iranian citizens are not strangers to dissent and their orientation to these output objects satisfies this aspect of my model.

Finally, the view of oneself as an object can be defined as the individual’s belief of “himself as a member of his political system” and his knowledge of “his rights, powers, obligations, and of strategies of access to influence.” This is where Iran holds only a vague link to the participant system, seemingly as a result of the authoritarian structure of the regime. In a poll taken by the World Values Survey, “18.7 percent of men and 12.6 percent of women reported ‘frequently’ discussing politics with friends; respectively, 28.8 and 24.2 percent reported ‘never’ doing so.” These are low numbers and certainly seem to point to low orientation to the “self as an object,” which contradicts the expectations of a participant system. However, I retort that it was already discussed in the literature review that states are not beholden to one dominant system, as varying degrees of other systems can permeate a state. Furthermore, as Iran is authoritative and freedom of speech is more limited than in liberal democracies, the expectations that citizens within Iran would view themselves as vocal “members of his political system” is improbable. Therefore, given the circumstances surrounding the authoritarian regime hindering the orientation to this object, I still believe it permissible for Iran to serve this model.

How Iran Fits the Socialization of Hypothesis 1.1

63 Ibid.
64 Almond and Verba, *Civic Culture*, 17.
Hypothesis 1.1 presupposes a state that has experienced high levels of violence in political protests of the past; Iran serves this expectation in a variety of ways. In an article published by *The New York Times*, an Iranian journalist details some of the protesting that took place in 2009 in Tehran. This journalist, Maziar Bahari, states that he “turned his camera on a small number of demonstrators hurling Molotov cocktails.” As “some of the protestors tried to storm the base . . . Basij militiamen, who had been firing tear gas and warning shots, began shooting indiscriminately into the crowd.” This quickly shifted what was originally a peaceful protest into a prime example of high levels of violence, according to my own classifications. Looking further back to the revolution in 1979, we can see this precedent for violence in some of the protesting that took place the year prior. The Qum Protests of 1978 were originally peaceful but as “demonstrators were starting to comply . . . someone – police officials claimed it was protestors; protesters claimed it was provocateurs – threw stones through a nearby bank window.” This in turn led to the crowd “[shouting] slogans, [breaking] store windows, and [resisting] the security forces with branches and stones.” The level of violence portrayed across these cases give strong precedent for high levels of violence in Iran, accurately portraying this aspect of socialization.

Hypothesis 1.1 also expects state response to these protests to be weak, meaning that the wants of the protestors are not met or that violence is directed to the protestors from the state. Already, we have seen that the protests in Iran are often met with stiff

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67 Ibid.
69 Ibid., 292.
resistance and government crackdown, often leading to high death tolls and mass arrests. To speak on the response of the state more specifically however, it is best to look back at the Green Movement and the results of the 2009 election. In 2009, “following a heated campaign between reformist candidate Mir Hussein Musavi and incumbent President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad,” Iranians voted in droves with 85.21% of the population accounted for.\(^{70}\) This all took place amid “allegations of vote rigging and election fraud” which prompted “public demonstrations in several major cities” throughout Iran.\(^{71}\) These demonstrations were met with harsh governmental crackdown, as “nominal leaders of the uprising were systematically arrested, subjected to kangaroo courts and jailed” while Mir Hossein Mousavi, a symbolic leader of the movement, was “put under house arrest and silenced.”\(^{72}\) This was a generally peaceful movement and yet popular figures were silenced and even arrested while protestors were killed. Iran can certainly be said to have a weak response to the wants of protestors and thus, satisfies this aspect of socialization.

Finally, my final aspect of socialization deals with the state as a legitimate – or illegitimate – entity. However, this discussion does not seek to claim any state or regime as legitimate or illegitimate – I will not claim to be the authority on regime legitimacy here. Rather, I hope to state that the citizens of said state have the propensity, and precedent, of claiming the state as illegitimate and acting against the authority of said state. Already we have seen Iranian protestors claiming election fraud and mass protests in Iran have often stirred fears of full-scale revolution for many government officials.

\(^{70}\) “Voter Turnout Rates in Iran 1980–2017.”
These fears coupled with the recency of the 1979 Revolution show that Iranian civilians do in fact have the propensity to view the regime as illegitimate. Thus, all aspects of political socialization expected by my model have been satisfied.

*Expected Levels of Violence in Iran:*

With these aspects of socialization, my model predicts political violence in protest to be high in Iran. Examples of high violence include the use of extreme force through assault, heavy destruction of public property, the use of Molotov cocktails, arson, death, etc. To test this, my research will look closely at a more recent protest, going through the three types of socialization and working through how they influence the protestors, and ultimately, the level of political violence they appropriate. In order for my hypothesis to be satisfied, this protest must show strong connection to my definition of high violence, meaning that a clear set of examples must be achieved. My research in this case study will be further discussed in my conclusion, following the remaining case studies.

*Protest in Iran:*

Whilst protests are ongoing in Iran right now, as a result of the revelation of Iran’s involvement with the downing of Ukraine International Airlines Flight 752, my research will focus on the protests that took place over late 2017 into 2018. These protests, collectively known as the Dey Protests, “were the largest demonstrations since the 2009 Green Movement.”

explicitly.”74 This was a very different protest which may cause concern as to whether the precedent used in the three aspects of socialization can truly be applicable. However, I retort that it is those events that socialize the public and form their expectations and justifications for political violence – independent of the core issues at stake in the protest.

As for the political violence itself, the Dey protests proved to be quite eventful after all; a research report by a professor and his co-researcher, Dr. Afshin Shahi and Ehsan Abdoh-Tabrizi, at the University of Bradford (UK) detail these events and the actions that now characterize them. His research states that “in the December 2017 to January 2018 protests, the protesters attacked and torched police stations, Basij and IRGC outposts and state-related religious foundations.”75 For further clarification, the “Basij Resistance Force is a volunteer paramilitary organization operating under the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corp (IRGC)” which “Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has mobilized . . . to counter perceived threats to the regime.”76 The violence only escalated however, as “around 20-30 individuals were killed” in just a two-week period; “two of them were IRGC and Basij personnel.”77 This can be compared to the much longer period of protests during the Green Movement wherein violence was notably less prevalent, although still present and high. The escalation of this violence and these specifics will be considered for my own research.

My hypothesis expects high levels of violence in Iranian protests, and as shown through these sources, high levels of political violence did occur. Heavy damage to

74 Ibid.
public property, torching of police stations, and the deaths of government personnel all satisfy my definition for high violence. It would be easy for me to claim this as a success and as definitive proof for my hypothesis. However, I have my own reservations about these findings and how the data I am presenting may be warped by external factors outside of the socialization I discussed in this case study. My hypothesis suggests that the precedent for violence encourages and justifies the use of violence in subsequent protests. It also suggests that precedent for weak state response to protestors wants naturally encourages a strong inclination to high levels of violence against the state, in order to further spur the state into action. And, finally, my hypothesis believes that a state with citizens who have the propensity to view the regime as illegitimate can expect high levels of violence. All three of these aspects of socialization can be stated to have had an impact on the Dey protests. My reservations for resting on these influencers come from my belief that the lack of organization and the wider demographics of the Dey protests may have also had an impact. With no leader and a much broader audience, the crowds become more difficult to control and escalation becomes more accessible. In my conclusion, my findings and these reservations will be discussed again in conjunction with the rest of my case studies.
Case Study Two: The United States

Hypothesis 1.2: If a participant state has both precedent for only a low level of violence in political protests and precedent for a generous state response to the wants of past protests, and the citizens view the regime as legitimate, then low levels of violence can be expected during a public protest.

_Hypothesis 1.2 Figure_

<table>
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<tr>
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This case study, like the first, uses the analyses of Almond and Verba alongside the three aspects of socialization found in Gurr’s text. Using these sources, I test the correlation between political culture and political violence by using the United States as my case study. I explore how the United States serves Hypothesis 1.2 accurately, how the U.S. exemplifies the aspects of socialization listed in Hypothesis 1.2, and the level of violence that my model expects this case study to produce during a political protest. My predictions were then analyzed using real life protesting in the United States to see if my models were able to accurately portray the political violence within the U.S., as a result of the state’s political culture and socialization. Whilst Model 1.2 was found to be correct in predicting the level of political violence, external factors similar to those in case study one prevents me from affirming my hypothesis here again.

_How the U.S. Serves Hypothesis 1.2_

Like Iran, the United States closely resembles a participant political culture, meaning that all aspects of the four objects listed in the literature review on political
culture are orientated to. These four objects being: the system as a general object, input objects, output objects and the self as an object. The first of these, the system as a general object, means that citizens in the state understand their “political system in general terms, its history, size, location, power.” Just off definition alone, it is hard to imagine a way this does not fit in with the bravado and unabashed patriotism that many Americans boast. This feeling perhaps being a derivative of the standards across U.S. education that enforce learning about the American political system. A study published by Tufts University in 2012 states that “civics/government along with other disciplines such as history and geography” are found in all states with “the theme of civic ideals and practices . . . found in every state’s standard except Missouri’s.” With this incredibly widespread application of these values, it can stated that the United States strongly qualifies for this aspect of orientation to the participant culture.

Moving on to the input objects, which are defined as the understanding a citizen has of “the structures and roles, the various political elites, and the policy proposals that are involved in the upward flow of policy making,” we see further distinction. Wherein the Iranian orientation to input objects focused on the turnouts for elections, American voter rates have never been as strong. However, input objects are still an integral part of American political culture as interactions with, and allegiance to, political parties dominate American political discussion. Involvement with these parties varies in scope and size but can include things like “volunteering for or donating to campaigns, attending

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78 Almond and Verba, *Civic Culture*, 17.
80 Almond and Verba, *Civic Culture*, 17.
protests or meetings, contacting officials or expressing their views on social media.”  

Of these examples, a study done by Pew Research Center found that overall, “a large majority (67%) reports having engaged in at least one of these activities in the past five years; nearly half (46%) say they have done so in the past year alone.”  

These numbers show strong connection to the input objects of the political system and show how Americans interact with politics preemptively. This interaction qualifies the United States for this aspect of the participant political culture laid out by Almond and Verba.

The output models of a participant system, defined as the knowledge of the “downward flow of policy enforcement, the structures, individuals, and decisions involved in these processes,” are also quite evident in the United States. As discussed in the Iranian case study, these reactionary responses can be most easily identified through political protest. Political dissent is not an anomaly in the United States as a number of protests have occurred over the past twenty years alone. Starting in spring 2016, “thousands of people . . . gathered near Cannon Ball, N.D., to protest the construction of an oil pipeline near the Standing Rock Sioux Reservation” which “have occasionally resulted in violent clashes with law enforcement.”  

In 2007, protests erupted as “thousands of anti-war demonstrators . . . marched on the Pentagon . . . to mark four years of war” in Iraq.  

In 2009, while many dispute the actual size of the protests, “thousands of conservative protestors from across the country converged on the Capitol .

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82 Ibid.
. . to demonstrate against President Obama’s proposals for health care reform and voicing opposition to big government.”

These protests all serve to prove that American citizens are fully oriented to the output objects of the political system further showing that it supports a participatory system.

The final object, being the view of oneself as an object, is defined as the individual’s belief of “himself as a member of his political system” and his knowledge of “his rights, powers, obligations, and of strategies of access to influence.” The United States prides itself as being a country for all; a place where the so-called “American Dream” can be achieved by anyone. According to Pew Research Statistics, “most Americans say they have achieved the ‘American dream’ or are on their way to achieving it” with “just 17% of Americans [saying] that the American dream is ‘out of reach’ for their family.”

American citizens identify with this goal and the majority believe they have achieved it, cementing their belief of themselves being a functional member of the state. This, alongside the prior three objects, qualifies the United States as a participatory culture and allows for it to be used in this case study.

*How the United States Fits the Socialization Aspects of Hypothesis 1.2*

Hypothesis 1.2 expects a state to have experienced only low violence in prior protests, an expectation the U.S. strongly follows. In the Iranian case, we looked at examples of protests wherein Molotov cocktails and destruction of public property dominated the conversation. In the United States, protests range in their scale of political

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86 Almond and Verba, *Civic Culture*, 17.

violence but never reach the heights seen in Iran, instead only rarely erupting to the low levels of violence my model predicts. In 2017, “some 4.1 million people reportedly took part in the various Women’s Marches across the United States” which “remained largely peaceful, with no arrests reported in Washington, DC, and only a handful in other cities.”\textsuperscript{88} This was a wide scale protest with millions of participants and yet no escalations of violence occurred, with only a handful of arrests acting being made. However, in the same year, protests in Charlottesville had a very different result with people “beating each other in the streets . . . throwing things and firing pepper spray.”\textsuperscript{89} This piece by ABC News further states that “there were people carrying bottles full of urine and others with bottles filled with concrete.”\textsuperscript{90} While the article states this protest as atypical for the United States, it still only fits into the low level of political violence in my outline. Therefore, the United States matches my models’ expectations of a state that has precedent for little to no political violence in protests.

With this being said, I felt it important to identify some of the outliers that exist against my model. In Iran, classification for a high precedent of political violence was shown through some of the protests that included these levels of violence. However, not all protests in Iran experience this intensity, as some protests remained fairly peaceful. It is how common this violence was and how quick the violence escalated that qualified Iran for Hypothesis 1.1’s model. The same can be stated for the United States, in its classification as a state that experiences low violence. Outliers do exist, and in the 2015

\textsuperscript{88} “Women’s March,” History, January 21, 2017, \url{https://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/womens-march}.


\textsuperscript{90} Ibid.
Baltimore riots, this became evident. During these protests, which were originally “peaceful demonstrations,” “demonstrators looted, burned 144 vehicles and 15 buildings, and threw bricks, bottles, and other objects at police” certainly qualifying this as a high level of violence.\(^9\) This protest serves as an outlier however, as it is a local demonstration that while expressing concern over a national issue, did not become a national protest.

The prior paragraph discussing the low, and sometimes non-existent, political violence in the United States serves to show the “normal” level of violence that Americans experience in protest.

Hypothesis 1.2 also expects state response to these protests to be favorable and strong, with the wants of the protestors being heard and action being taken by the state. In the United States, as a liberal democracy, representatives are held accountable by their constituents and protests only heighten the urgency of this relationship. Preceding the Civil Rights Movement in the 1960s, “the Montgomery bus boycott was a 13-month mass protest that ended with the U.S. Supreme Court ruling that segregation on public buses is unconstitutional.”\(^9\) This was a controversial decision for its time and yet, the Supreme Court ruled in favor of the protestors, changing historical precedent and the course of the United States. To look at a more contemporary issue, the March for Our Lives protests also show strong nationwide response to the wants of the protestors. These protests for stronger gun control came after the Parkland shooting and led to “states across the country, including 14 with Republican governors, [enacting] 50 new laws restricting

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access to guns."93 This also followed a federal ban on the selling of bump stocks, showing further precedent for strong state response in the United States.

Finally, we look at the legitimacy of the state, and seeing as though the United States has not experience revolution the way Iran has, state allegiance is more obvious. I hold that the legitimacy of the state rests upon the Constitution our nation is built upon and the system of checks and balances that splits power in our government. No one singular entity holds all power in the United States, and with the Constitution preserving our own liberties, we as Americans feel we have little to fear. Furthermore, with a representative democracy, our leaders are beholden to the whims of the society if they wish to be elected. This mix of kempt government, personal liberties, and strong representation of the majority breeds a state that has little danger of being viewed as illegitimate, evident by the lack of mass revolts in American history. With the three aspects of socialization thus sated, we now look to the expectations of my model and Hypothesis 1.2.

*Expected Levels of Violence in the United States:*

My model predicts that a state that experiences these types of socialization, under a participant system, should expect low levels of violence. Low levels of violence examples include vandalism, light destruction of public property, throwing of non-lethal objects, light violence towards government officials, etc. My analysis of American protests will look at a recent nationwide protest, observing the impact of these three aspects of socialization and their influence on the level of political violence the protests

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experience. For my model and for Hypothesis 1.2 to be satisfied, this protest must be shown to be logically tied to my definition of low violence, meaning that the examples listed must be observed but not exceeded into definitions of middling or high violence. The results of this case study will again be discussed in my conclusion, following the remaining case studies.

_Protest in the United States:_

In my examination of political violence in America, I sought to analyze the series of protests that occurred quickly after the inauguration of Donald Trump as President of the United States. During these protests, “six police officers were injured and 217 protestors [were] arrested” as “protestors smashed storefronts and bus stops, hammered out the windows of a limousine and eventually launched rocks at a phalanx of police.”

This level of violence comes incredibly close to crossing into my definition of high levels of violence and may qualify as the middling tier, which does not bode well for my hypothesis. However, the protests continued into the next day, becoming the 2017 Women’s March, with a decidedly different level of violence.

The day after the inauguration, “hundreds of thousands of men and women descended into the nation’s capital . . . to show their support for women’s rights” (13). Here “an estimated 500,000 people attended” and “those who participated . . . said the event was much more peaceful and positive than the protests during Friday’s inauguration.”

These are connected protests but a disconnect obviously persists that

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separates these days. The events of the inauguration protests threaten to deviate from my hypothesis in that the violence seems to be on the extreme side of my definition of low violence. However, the protests of the next day remained peaceful, threatening my model on the opposite end as no political violence occurred. In order to understand this disparity, in what seems like connected protests, my research led me to view these acts of violence under more scrutiny.

According to witnesses of the protests, “self-described anarchists were behind some of Friday’s violence.”\textsuperscript{96} This explanation brings the point that, just as outliers exist in protests, so too do protests have external actors who may cause trouble. Yet, the Huffington Post has another additional explanation for this disparity in violence. This article argues that “a large group of mostly white women wearing pink hats is simply not going to be policed in the same way a large group of people of color would be.”\textsuperscript{97} They tout precedent from the Civil Rights Movement and the Black Lives Matter movement, which often turned violent, as their rationale for this claim. As it stands, the protests of the inauguration fit into my model by showing low levels of violence as a result of the socialization and precedent of past protests, so long as these outliers are not included. As the anarchists were behind the bulk of the violence on Friday and seeing as though their absence the next day meant no violence occurred, I feel comfortable claiming this event as a low level of violence once the anarchists’ actions are removed. However, it is apparent to me that other factors that my research did not consider could also have a large effect on this data.

\textsuperscript{96} Ibid.
Hypothesis 1.2 expects low levels of violence in American protests and low levels of violence, albeit borderline, did persist. I should be able to claim this as a successful test of my model, but, similarly to the Iranian case study, I ran into issues. The first of these begs the question as to whether these protests, which occurred over the span of two days, can truly be described as one singular event given the differences in violence. Furthermore, with the possibility of anarchists being behind the bulk of the violence in this protest, how can I distinguish their actions against the actions of the “true” protestors? Finally, the response of the state cannot be expected to be the same for every protest and thus the socialization of government response must also be considered. As people organize protests, it is fair to assume they understand what to expect in the way of policing and government response on the day of the protest. As this can change from protest to protest, perhaps along ethnic and racial lines, it presents another avenue for my research to consider. Therefore, despite my model’s “success” in predicting a low level of violence, excluding the outliers I identified, these external factors complicate my data. Further discussion of these external factors will be made in my conclusion.
Case Study Three: France

Hypothesis 1.3: If a subject state has precedent for both high violence in protest and a generous state response to the wants of past protests, and the citizens have precedent for viewing the regime as illegitimate, then a middling level of political violence can still be expected during a public protest.

Hypothesis 1.3 Figure

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subject State “X”</th>
<th>Level of Precedented Violence in Protest</th>
<th>State Response to Wants of Past Protests</th>
<th>State Legitimacy</th>
<th>Expected Levels of Violence:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Illegitimate</td>
<td>Middling</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This case study also uses the analyses of Almond and Verba alongside Gurr’s three socialization aspects seen above. This correlation between political culture, being a subject system in this case, and political violence was tested by using France as my case study. This case study first explains how France fits the definition of a subject political system in Hypothesis 1.3, how France exemplifies the aspects of socialization listed in Hypothesis 1.3, and the level of violence that my models predict France to experience during political protest. The hypothesis’ predictions were applied to political violence in France today, in order to gauge their success at predicting political violence. Unfortunately, the level of political violence that France experienced in my test was high rather than middling, thus leading me to reject Hypothesis 1.3. An explanation for the failure of my model can be seen at the end of this case study.

How France Serves Hypothesis 1.3

Hypothesis 1.3 works as a means to test a subject state and its unique models of socialization. As a subject system, it is only the system as a general object and the output
objects that the people are oriented to. As we focus on these first, we look at the system as a general object, which is defined as a citizen’s knowledge of their “political system in general terms, its history, size, location, power.” In France, this can be seen most explicitly in a recent push from the Education Minister, Najat Vallaud-Belkacem, to add classes on civic education. Starting in the 2015-2016 academic year, “the new course in Moral and Civic Education . . . will be taught in all primary and secondary school classrooms.” These classes include “four main themes: Sensitivity (understanding your feelings and those of others), Rules and Rights (understanding your legal rights and the rules of society), Critical Thinking (making rational decisions) and Social Responsibility (learning to become a responsible member of society).” These classes are nationwide acknowledgements of the system as a general object and as citizens go through these classes, they are orientated to this object.

The final object that subject systems are oriented to are the output objects of a state, or the “downward flow of policy enforcement, the structures, individuals, and decisions involved in these processes.” The orientation to these objects I seek to prove comes from the response French citizens have had to these output objects. By discussing some of the protests France has had in the past, we can observe the precedent for output orientation through a strong response to this downward flow of government. In 2005, “two French youths of Milan and Tunisian descent were electrocuted as they fled the police in the Parisian suburb of Clichysous-Bois” which “sparked nearly three weeks of

98 Almond and Verba, Civic Culture, 17.
100 Ibid.
101 Almond and Verba, Civic Culture, 17.
rioting in 274 towns.” 102 In 2013, “after police carried out an identity check on a Muslim woman in a full-face veil,” “two nights of rioting in . . . Trappes . . . left dozens of cars destroyed, at least 10 arrests and a 14-year-old injured.” 103 In a more recent protest, the 2016 “Nuit Debout” movement began “on a main square in Paris, the Place de la République” which has “been packed with young people . . . venting their anger – at just about everything.” 104 These protests, and many others, highlight the orientation French citizens have to the output objects of the subject system and shows their response to the states actions.

The subject system differs from the participant system in that the citizens of a subject system are not oriented to the input objects or to the view of oneself as an object. The input objects being the “structures and roles, the various political elites, and the policy proposals that are involved in the upward flow of policy making” and the view of oneself as an object referring to the individuals belief of “himself as a member of his political system” and his knowledge of “his rights, powers, obligations, and of strategies of access to influence.” 105 My rationale for putting France in this model, thus equating it to a subject system that rejects the aforementioned objects, comes from the recent failings of their political parties. In the 2017 presidential election, “François Fillon, of the conservative Républicains party, and Socialist Benoît Hamon” represented the

105 Almond and Verba, Civic Culture, 17.
longstanding two party system in France.\textsuperscript{106} However, neither of them made it to the secondary round of voting; “political scientists point to long-term trends to explain” this, including “the rise of identity politics and a feeling among voters that both parties have failed to change France for the better.”\textsuperscript{107} I claim that France fits this subject model because the people have become disillusioned with the traditional input models of France and thus no longer view themselves as an object as a result of this. Even despite the election of Emmanuel Macron in this election, who does align with the traditional party system, the French citizenry are failing in their orientation to these objects which prevents them from being a participant system.

\textit{How France Fits the Socialization of Hypothesis 1.3}

Similar to the Iran case study in Hypothesis 1.1, Hypothesis 1.3 expects France to have precedent for high levels of violence in political protests of the past. This seems to be quite easy to prove in this case as French protests are often violent in very high degrees. In the 2005 protests we examined earlier in this case study, reports state that rioters caused over “€200 million in damage as they torched nearly 9000 cars and dozens of buildings, daycare centers, and schools.”\textsuperscript{108} Furthermore, “the French police arrested close to 2900 rioters; 126 police and firefighters were injured, and there was one fatality.”\textsuperscript{109} In 2017, during the May Day Celebrations, protests ripped through France leading to “some 276 protestors [being] arrested” and “31 businesses [suffering] damage.

\footnotesize
\textsuperscript{106} Pierre Briançon, “France’s Two Big Parties Face Long-Term Decline,” Politico, last updated April 21, 2017, \url{https://www.politico.eu/article/frances-two-big-parties-face-decline-conservatives-socialists/}.
\textsuperscript{107} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{108} Sahlins, “Civil Unrest.”
\textsuperscript{109} Ibid.
two of which had been set ablaze.”

This level of violence is not uncommon in France, showing that French citizens are socialized to high levels of political violence, which my model requires.

Where Hypothesis 1.3 differs from Hypothesis 1.1 is in the precedent for the states response to protestors wants. Whereas in the first case study, Iran was shown to have a weak response to these protests, France bears stronger resemblance to the United States in that the response to protestors is quite generous. In 2015, France was rocked with a widespread strike from French taxi drivers who felt as though “the US-based firm Uber [was] stealing their livelihoods.”

The immediate response to this movement came from “France’s interior minister” who “ordered a ban on the low-cost car-sharing service UberPOP after a day of nationwide protests.” Furthermore, French President Macron launched his “Great National Debate” that consisted of “town halls across the county to respond to concerns raised by the Yellow Vest movement.”

His town halls led to a series of drastic reforms, seemingly in an effort to placate the growing prominence of the Yellow Vest movements across France. Whatever the rationale that Macron had for this action, it still shows the incredibly quick and favorable response that the French government has had in the past to protests.

Hypothesis 1.3 also expects a state that has precedent for the citizens to view the state as illegitimate, which seems to be quite common throughout French history. France

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112 Ibid.
is on its Fifth Republic, meaning that large scale regime change has occurred four times since the French Revolution in 1789, twice as a direct result of political protest. For instance, the second republic arose as “French citizens held numerous protests and uprisings” leading to “a coalition of politicians [creating] a second constitution and a new republic in 1848.”\textsuperscript{114} The collapse of the second republic and the precedent for revolution from the French Revolution show strong historical support for viewing the state as illegitimate. Furthermore, as France has since progressed to a Fifth Republic, justifications for harsh regime change are not uncommon. This satisfies the final aspect of socialization in my model and shows that France can be used to accurately test Hypothesis 1.3.

\textit{Expected Levels of Violence in France:}

With the aspects of socialization analyzed above, Model 1.3 predicts political violence in protest to be middling in France. This middling level expects a mix of examples of violence that neither fully commit to low or high levels of violence. An example of such a protest could be an event wherein heavy public property destruction may have occurred – showing high levels of violence – but little injuries took place and no projectiles were used – showing low violence. To test this, my research will observe the most recent mass protests that have affected France, the Yellow Vest movement we discussed earlier. In my analysis, I will observe the protests to better understand how the three aspects of socialization have affected the level of violence present in current protesting. Furthermore, as this is a study of a subject system, my model expects a lower tier of violence than what precedent calls for. France has a history of high levels of

violence, but my model reasons that precedent for reasonable state response to protestors wants mixed with the subject systems expectations of a citizens more reluctant role in politics supports the belief that violence would lessen. Despite strong orientation to output objects, which can be seen through protest, my hypothesis still expects a more apathetic response to the state as a result of the subject system political culture and the socialization aspects discussed. In order to satisfy this hypothesis, I must be able to show a strong connection to my definition of middling violence. My research in this case study will also be discussed further in my conclusion, following the final case study.

Protest in France:

The Yellow Vest movement “began on November 17 [2018] over planned hikes in diesel taxes” but quickly “snowballed into a wider movement against Macron’s perceived bias in favor of the elite and well-off city dwellers.” The movement gets its unique name from the yellow safety vests that protestors have donned in a show of unity throughout the protests. The protests also gain distinction in how long they have lasted, even after Macron’s Great National Debate, as protestors still persist in France today. For the purpose of my research, we will analyze these protests and the political violence that can be found in the past year. Early in the protests, “more than 250,000 people wearing fluorescent yellow vests joined the nationwide protests” leading to “two people [dying] and more than 750 others, including 136 police officers, [having] been injured.”

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being fatally wounded. However, the violence did not stop here, as political violence persisted as the protests continued.

Four months into the protesting, violence continued to erupt as “rioters set fire to a bank . . . ransacked stores” and “hurled cobblestones at riot police.”\textsuperscript{117} While numbers were down, “with an “estimated 10,000 . . . in the protest,” injuries were still numerous with “42 protestors, 17 of their own officers and one firefighter were injured.”\textsuperscript{118} The strength of these protests seems unwavering and, unfortunately for my own hypothesis, so too seems the strength of violence. With multiple deaths, mass injuries, and heavy destruction of public property, it seems impossible not to view this political violence as high according to my own definition. This obviously conflates with my hypothesis and leads me to state that Hypothesis 1.3 is unfounded. My hypothesis had suggested a reduction in the level of violence that France would experience, yet these elements of violence prevent me from stating this to be true.

Perhaps my expectations for a subject system to portray violence lower than what is historically preceded, as a result of precedent for generous state response to protestors, was misguided. I anticipated that generous state response would have an impact on the already laid-back subject culture of France and yet, no impact is detectable in my research. Perhaps this is an issue of time, as the recency of Macron’s Great National Debate could mean it has had little time to socialize the protestors in France. Or maybe, this is another issue of external factors affecting my research again, as those elements discovered in Hypothesis 1.1 and 1.2 most certainly are at play here as well.

\textsuperscript{117} Leigh Thomas and Simon Carraud, “French Violence Flares as Yellow Vest Protests Enter Fourth Month,” Reuters, March 16, 2019, \url{https://www.reuters.com/article/us-france-protests/french-violence-flares-as-yellow-vest-protests-enter-fourth-month-idUSKCN1QX0B1}.

\textsuperscript{118} Ibid.
The reasoning behind the failure of this model will be further explored in my conclusion, but unfortunately, it seems as though Model 1.3 was unable to explain a correlation between political culture and political violence in France. My expectations that France would have only middling levels of violence were incorrect, as high levels of violence continued.
Case Study Four: Russia

Hypothesis 1.4: If a subject state has both precedent for low violence in protest and a weak state response to the wants of past protests, and the citizens view the regime as legitimate, then low levels political violence can be expected during a public protest.

Hypothesis 1.4 Figure

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subject State “X”</th>
<th>Level of Precedent Violence in Protest</th>
<th>State Response to Wants of Past Protests</th>
<th>State Legitimacy</th>
<th>Expected Levels of Violence:</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>Legitimate</td>
<td>Low</td>
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Finally, this last case study once again uses my prior analyses of Almond and Verba alongside the three aspects of socialization that Gurr discussed in his own text.

This case study will use Russia in order to test the correlation between political culture and political violence, hoping to prove my hypothesis above. In performing this case study, I examined how Russia fits Hypothesis 1.4, how Russia exemplifies the aspects of socialization listed in this hypothesis, and the level of violence that my models predict Russia to experience during times of political protest. My hypothesis’ predictions were then applied to political violence in Russia today to test the validity of my claims. The conclusion of this case study shows that my models were in fact able to predict political violence in Russia as being low. This final case study concludes my research and allows for the comparative aspect of my thesis to begin.

How Russia Serves Hypothesis 1.4:

Like France, Russia is identified in this case study as a subject system, meaning that its political culture is comprised of citizens oriented only to the system as a general object and to the output objects of the state. Looking at these objects, we will first
analyze how Russian citizens are oriented to the system as a general object, which is defined as a citizen’s knowledge of their “political system in general terms, its history, size, location, power.”\textsuperscript{119} A study done in 2004 observes the rise of this orientation as the collapse of the Soviet Union allowed for a stronger sense of civic education to be implemented in the new Russian state. This study observes how “Samara’s (a large city in Russia) regional minister of education made civic education a requirement in all its elementary and secondary schools.”\textsuperscript{120} The study makes clear that this Russian civic education is broad, with it being “as likely to address problems of unemployment, drug abuse, and children’s rights as it is to address citizen’s rights and responsibilities and the ways laws are passed.”\textsuperscript{121} Despite this breadth, it is clear that Russian citizens are instructed about their political system as a general object, thus satisfying this aspect of the subject political culture.

The next aspect, orientation to output objects of the state, is defined as knowledge of “the downward flow of policy enforcement, the structures, individuals, and decisions involved in these processes.”\textsuperscript{122} Again, this orientation is most evident through the protests that a state experiences, which are not hard to find in Russia. In 2008, a small-scale protest made nationwide news as “seven human rights activists kneeled on Red Square . . . unfurled a banner reading ‘For Your Freedom and Ours’ . . . commemorating a similar action by Soviet dissidents 40 years ago.”\textsuperscript{123} In 2014, “more than 26,000 gathered for” protests “against what [protestors] say is a covert Russian war in eastern

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{119} Almond and Verba, \textit{Civic Culture}, 17.
\textsuperscript{121} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{122} Almond and Verba, \textit{Civic Culture}, 17.
\end{flushleft}
Ukraine.”124 More recently, in 2018, “about 9,000 gathered about a mile and a half from the Kremlin . . . against government plans to raise the pension age.”125 These protests show Russian precedent for protests, and thus, an orientation to object objects, solidifying Russia’s political culture as a predominately subject system.

However, the subject system also expects its citizens to not be oriented to the input objects or to the view of oneself as an object, as opposed to a participant system wherein citizens are oriented to all objects in the system. These input objects are the “structures and roles, the various political elites, and the policy proposals that are involved in the upward flow of policy making” and the view of oneself as an object is an individual’s belief of “himself as a member of his political system” and his knowledge of “his rights, powers, obligations, and of strategies of access to influence.”126 Whereas in France, failure to achieve orientation to these objects came from the sharp decline in longstanding parties, Russia’s issue instead comes from the widespread corruption in the state that prevents citizens from orientating themselves appropriately.

This is evident through research done by Freedom House, an organization that produces data and analyses of countries around the world based upon their level of freedom in a variety of issues. Under the topic of whether the “current national legislative representatives [were] elected through free and fair elections,” Freedom House states “numerous violations, including ballot stuffing, pressure on voters, and illegal

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126 Almond and Verba, Civic Culture, 17.
campaigning” resulting in a score of 0/4 in this area for Russia.\textsuperscript{127} Furthermore, on the issue of political party involvement, Freedom House states that “the multiparty system is carefully managed by the Kremlin, which tolerates only superficial competition against the dominant United Russia party.”\textsuperscript{128} Russian politics are far from free and orientation to input objects is hindered by state intervention that prohibits free political parties and free elections. Therefore, I claim that Russia fits into the model of a subject system - having no orientation to input objects nor the view of oneself as an object – because citizens are unable to truly participate freely in politics, thus keeping them from seeing themselves as a true member of the political system.

\textit{How Russian Fits the Socialization of Hypothesis 1.4:}

Hypothesis 1.4 expects Russia to have precedent for low levels of political violence in past protests. Looking at protests in 2014, which criticized “President Vladimir V. Putin for what [protestors] saw as his warmongering in Ukraine,” we see protesting with “26,100 attendees” yet violence was limited to the “several scuffles [that] broke out.”\textsuperscript{129} In 2019, “Moscow police set an ominous record . . . by arbitrarily detaining at least 1,373 people, including about 25 children, during peaceful protests.”\textsuperscript{130} These protests, which arose after “the Moscow district election commission refused to include viable opposition candidates on the ballot,” were peaceful and yet still were met with harsh government crackdown.\textsuperscript{131} These protests, coupled with the aforementioned 2008

\textsuperscript{128} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{131} Ibid.
Red Square protest, show various examples of political violence that fits my definition of low violence. All these protests are either void of violence or resemble low violence with occasional fights erupting amidst the protesting. Therefore, I feel validated in affirming that Russia experiences low violence in past protests and thus fits Hypothesis 1.4’s first aspect of socialization.

The next aspect of socialization, being the state’s response to the wants of the protestors, expects a weak response in this model. Speaking to the response to the anti-war protests of 2014, which again called for an end to Russian intervention in Ukraine, we can see through Russian annexation of Crimea that these protests were unsuccessful. Another protest, in 2012, “just days ahead of . . . [a] planned rally against [Putin’s] 12-year rule,” “Putin signed into law . . . a bill that will dramatically increase fines for people who take part in protests that violate public order rules.”132 Those who participate in “protests where public order is violated could now face fines of 300,000 roubles [sic] – more than the average annual salary and up from 1,000 roubles [sic].”133 However, critics of this law state that defining what a violation of public order looks like ultimately comes down to a decision for the state. A state, which as seen through the Freedom House report, has a strong precedent for subduing party opposition leaders and controls the media. With this law, Putin makes it very difficult for protestors to be heard freely, making it abundantly clear that the Russian government under his rule has no wish to grant any concessions. Therefore, I affirm that Russia fits Model 1.4 for this aspect of socialization.

133 Ibid.
Finally, we must observe the aspect of socialization that determines whether Russian citizens have precedent or the propensity to view the state as illegitimate. Since 1991, following the collapse of the Soviet Union, there has not been a full-scale revolution or regime shift in Russia. Even as some scholars suggest that the collapse of the Soviet Union led to a series of “soft” revolutions, I contest that Russia represents a different entity than the Soviet Union for the purpose of my hypothesis. Therefore, while Russian citizens certainly have lived through the “soft” revolution that came with the fall of the Soviets in 1991, they lack the socialization that true revolution gives a society. The classification for this aspect of socialization may be built on narrow grounds, but I still feel it appropriate to view Russians as having not been socialized to view the state as illegitimate. This is the final aspect of socialization and with this result, Russia fully fits into the expected qualifications of Hypothesis 1.4.

**Expected Levels of Violence in Russia:**

Model 1.4 expects the level of political violence in Russia to remain at the precededented level of low violence. This may seem logically counter to the prior case study of France in which the expected level of violence was a tier lower than the precededented level, despite both states having a political culture dominated by a subject system. However, within France’s case study, the precedent for favorable government response to protestors was high, leading to my hypothesis concluding – falsely – that the level of expected political violence would be lower than historical precedent would suggest. Therefore, the same logic was used in producing Hypothesis 1.4, as precedent for favorable government response was weak in Russia. This leads me to state that Russia should expect similar levels of violence as is historically precededented. With the subject
system orienting people to a more apathetic view of politics and with no historically favorable state response found in a legitimate state, the expected level of political violence should remain constant with the precedent – low levels of violence.

Protest in Russia:

In 2019, Russia was gripped with protests throughout the summer, culminating in a series of protests in Moscow that were the “largest demonstrations since Vladimir Putin’s return to the presidency in 2012.”134 These protests were met with harsh government crackdown with “more than 1,000 people detained on consecutive weekends in July and August”; at the protest’s “height, more than 60,000 people joined.”135 While these “Muscovites have been peacefully protesting . . . the state… responded with unprecedented repression.”136 The protestors were met with “masked riot police . . . [who beat] them with rubber batons . . . summary arrests of opposition leaders . . . and courts [dispensed] harsh sentences for offences such as throwing an empty plastic bottle at police.”137 Despite these mass arrests, violence has been entirely disproportionate in Russia, with the Moscow protests being incredibly civil from the protestors side. The most extensive violence that my research was able to find states that “at least two members of the security forces reportedly received eye injuries from pepper spray.”138 In

135 Ibid.
137 Ibid.
the face of mass arrests and public beatings from police, this is a remarkably low level of retaliation that came from the Russian protestors.

These protests took place over months, involved thousands of protestors, were met with harsh government crackdown and yet the extent of the political violence experienced was protestors’ throwing bottles and using pepper spray. Under my definition for low violence, it is expected for a state to experience these types of events. It is obvious to me here that Russia accurately meets this definition, as these miniscule acts of violence keep this protest from being classified as peaceful yet cannot be fully classified as middling violence. Thus, Hypothesis 1.4 is affirmed through my Russia case study, as the level of violence I predicted was found in the low levels of violence seen in the 2019 protests. However, with what I have learned through my previous case studies, I remain wary about the validity of my findings in the face of other external factors that could have warped my results. My research and findings here will be discussed more with the rest of my findings in the conclusion of my thesis.
Conclusion

Discussion of Research:

My research presented four hypotheses and models that would be tested using case studies of various states. These states were sorted into two sets of political cultures – participant systems being represented by Iran and the United States while subject systems were represented by France and Russia. The purpose of this distinction, and of my research overall, was to see if a correlation could be found between the political culture and socialization of a state and the level of political violence that a state experiences during times of political dissent. Using my literature review and the information I gleamed from prior scholars in this field, I created these four models to test this correlation using specific qualifications. Furthermore, the models I have created represent only four options out of dozens of actual possible models. Other models could be made using other unique combinations of socialization aspects that could be tested using other states in new case studies. Unfortunately, the results of the models I tested were often muddied by external factors and leave me wondering whether my research is truly conclusive.

Looking at Case Study One, we see that my expected level of violence was high, and I was able to show this level of violence was achieved in the Dey Protests my research analyzed. However, in my analysis I point out external aspects of the protests, those beyond the three socialization factors I test in my thesis, that seemingly had an impact on the political violence Iran experienced. These external aspects are the level of organization a protest may, or may not, have and the demographic the issue causing the protest reaches. These factors are not socializing factors like those I am analyzing in my research, but they are certainly factors that affect violence and are applicable to most
protests, not just those in Iran. I experienced similar issues in Case Study Two, which also was able to accurately predict the level of violence in the United States, but still presented its own reservations. My issue in this case was identifying how to distinguish protests that occur closely together as either one event, or as multiple, an issue further complicated by disparate violence across these days as well. Furthermore, separating anarchists from “true” protestors and understanding disparate government response to protests based upon demographics presented a wrinkle in my research.

Fortunately, Case Study Three and Case Study Four were not discovered to be mired by external factors beyond those already discussed. However, Case Study Three was unable to accurately predict the level of violence that would be seen in France. My expectations for a more laid-back subject system with favorable state response to produce a lower level of violence than what precedent suggests being completely unfounded in this process. Perhaps, as subject systems are still strongly oriented to output objects like protesting, the level of violence is less affected by socialization of state response and more so by the socialization of violence in past protests. However, Case Study Four opposes this claim as similar rationale was used in designing the model for Russia, which experienced little to no violence both in historical precedent as well as in my research of current protesting. My model here was seemingly correct; I expected a subject system to lower its violence from what was preceded as a result of the laissez faire approach to politics but with the precedent for weak state response to protestors, I expected the violence to instead remain the same. This is what happened as Russia experienced the same level of violence as what was historically preceded, but the same rationale did not accurately portray the results found in France.
Looking at the results of my case studies, I can see the issues with my models that would need to be addressed in further research. The first two case studies identified five additional aspects that may impact the level of violence in a state beyond the socialization aspects I identified from Gurr’s text. These aspects are as follows: 1. Organization of the protest 2. Demographic involved with the protest 3. Distinguishing protests that occur closely together 4. Identifying external actors within protests 5. Understanding disparate government response to different demographic’s protests. These are all certainly applicable to most protests and I am certain that further research would reveal even more of these external actors that influenced my own research. As for the results of my last two case studies, my conflicting findings despite similar rationale muddies the results of my study and seemingly points to these external factors as the reasoning for this disparity. With my French model proving to be unfounded yet my Russian model seemingly being proven, I can only assume that while political culture and socialization was a factor, it was not the sole factor in determining the level of political violence these states experience. The same can be said to all my case studies, as my research suggests a plethora of factors that determine disparate levels of political violence - factors that exist beyond the reach of the research done in my thesis.

**Aim of My Thesis and Results:**
1. Does a correlation exist between the political culture of a state and the level of political violence found within said state?
2. Does socialization, as an extension of political culture, explain disparate levels of political violence?
3. Can the structure of a state (authoritarian, liberal democracy, etc.) be used to determine the level of violence said state can expect in a protest?
**Research Question 1:**
My research questions listed above highlight the scope of my research and help identify the role my research plays in comparative politics theory. The first of these, and the main goal of my research, pondered whether a correlation between political culture and political violence could be proven. My definitions of political culture were defined as being either a subject or participant system, with the United States and Iran being participant systems and France and Russia being subject systems. As evident through the case studies, disparities persisted between these states, regardless of their shared political culture. Iran and the United States experience drastically different levels of violence and the same can be said between France and Russia. Therefore, my research succeeds in disproving this correlation. *No explicit correlation exists between the political culture of a state and the level of political violence said state experiences during protest.*

**Research Question 2:**
My second research question asks if aspects of socialization, as an extension of the political culture of a state, could be used to determine the political violence of a state and explain the disparate levels of violence seen across states. To this question, I would say my research shows that while socialization cannot provide the whole picture, it most certainly plays a part in determining the political violence a protest will use. Evidence of this claim comes from examining the cases where the historical precedent was similar, which groups France and Iran as having precedent for high levels of violence and groups the United States and Russia as having precedent for little to no levels of violence. In each of these sets, the states were found to follow this precedent quite closely. These same groupings and findings can be attributed to the third aspect of socialization as the states viewed as legitimate had little to no violence and the illegitimate states had high
levels of violence. Therefore, I believe it can be stated that at least for the historical precedent and legitimacy aspects of socialization, a correlation can be seen. It is in the remaining aspect of socialization that my research is unfounded as no correlation is directly seen between the precedent of the state’s response and the level of political violence found in the state. Furthermore, the five external aspects discussed throughout my research shows that socialization is not the only factor in determining political violence. I conclude that although aspects of socialization have correlations to the level of political violence a state experiences, my research suggests that other factors also affect this result and that socialization is not the sole factor.

**Research Question 3:**

As mentioned in the introduction of this thesis, scholars in this field often look to the structure of the state to determine the level of political violence that state expects, often stating that liberal democracies share little violence while authoritarian states experience high levels of violence. My thesis worked adjacent to this claim, instead looking to political culture and socialization to explain these disparities. With the results of my case studies, which represent two liberal democracies (The United States and France) and two authoritarian states (Iran and Russia), I can strongly claim that this is untrue. The level of violence between the United States and France is not equal despite their structural similarities and this is even more apparent across a comparison of Iran and Russia, despite their similarities in regime structure. Thus, the crowning achievement of my research is the validation of my claim that factors outside of government structure impact the level of political violence a state experiences.
Significance of My Research:
As discussed above, the questions I sought to answer at the beginning of my research have been dissected, researched, and answered. Through my research, I am able to dismiss the dominant belief that government structure can be used to determine the level of political violence in a state. Furthermore, my expectations that political culture alone would be better suited to determine why these disparities exist amongst state political violence was equally unfounded. The importance of my research and this thesis comes from the understanding of political violence that my research gives to comparative political theory. The disparate level of violence that states experience cannot be boiled down to the structure of the state nor can it be seen as only being linked to the political culture that a state falls into or the socialization aspects its citizens are exposed to. Instead, the political violence of a state is seemingly a mix of these elements. Socialization, political culture, demographics of a protest, government structure, and much more all impact the level of violence that we see across these protests. Whilst correlations can be observed in some of these aspects more clearly, it is obvious to me that no true causation can be stated. Fortunately, this will likely not be the last piece of political research ever written and the basis I have built in this research can be expounded upon to better flesh out what I have learned here about the causes of disparity in political violence.

Future Research:
In my research, I came across a variety of issues that the planning stages of my research could not have anticipated and that which present an interesting field of study for future scholars. The aforementioned external aspects that affect political violence in protests are certainly not the only factors that exist. Exploration of these more nuanced
factors would further develop an understanding of political violence in comparative politics. Furthermore, my research was limited by time and by manpower. As discussed, a more fleshed out study would look at a more comprehensive group of cases, further expanding the list of models I have tested by altering the aspects of socialization within them. Doing this would test different countries, as matches would need to be found to accurately test these new models and would bring a stronger data pool than my research could provide. Finally, a deeper study might include patriotism as an aspect of socialization, a topic I considered heavily but was ultimately forced to drop from my own research. Our understanding of political violence and protest is very limited, but I hope that more studies like mine may provide a clearer image of these events and their origins.
Bibliography


