Secret Meetings and Suburban Operatives: A New Conservative Network and the Legacy of Goldwater’s Illinois Campaign

Jared Benjamin Applegate
Lake Forest College, applegatejb@lakeforest.edu

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Rudi Batzell

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D. L. LeMahieu

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Chad McCracken

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Secret Meetings and Suburban Operatives: A New Conservative Network and the Legacy of Goldwater’s Illinois Campaign

by

Jared Benjamin Applegate

April 27, 2020

The report of the investigation undertaken as a Senior Thesis, to carry two courses of credit in the Department of History

_______________________  _______________________
Davis Schneiderman      Rudi Batzell, Chairperson
Krebs Provost and Dean of the Faculty

_____________________
D. L. LeMahieu

_____________________
Chad McCracken

_____________________
Brian McCammack
Abstract:

This thesis uses primary sources pertaining to the 1964 Presidential Campaign in Illinois to demonstrate the importance of experienced political operatives and suburban professionals in Barry Goldwater’s successful primary campaign. In order to argue this viewpoint, this thesis first explores the creation of the Draft Goldwater movement. Following that, the major supporters of the Goldwater Campaign in Illinois are profiled and compared to previous unsuccessful conservative campaigns. The legacy of these suburban operatives is then chronicled in multiple tiers of government in the decades following the 1964 campaign to illustrate the long-term impact of their ideals.
DEDICATION

To

Kenneth and Jean Applegate
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Introduction:

All eyes were on Senator Barry Goldwater at the 1964 Republican National Convention in Daly City, California when he defiantly remarked “I would remind you that extremism in the defense of liberty is no vice! And let me remind you also that moderation in the pursuit of justice is no virtue!”¹ This quote became a rallying cry for a Presidential campaign that unexpectedly captured the Republican Presidential nomination and redefined American politics in the process. Although many popular media narratives of the Goldwater Campaign often dismissed his candidacy due to his eventual landslide loss to President Lyndon Johnson, academic research into the election has found a larger legacy of the campaign. Historians Lisa McGirr and Kim Phillips-Fein challenge the idea that Goldwater’s candidacy was simply a fluke in the history of Presidential politics. Various conservative leaders across the late twentieth century credit the Goldwater campaign for giving them ideological grounding and for shifting the entire Republican party to more conservative values. Although many popular media accounts have framed the campaign as being a purely grassroots endeavor, recent research suggests that the campaign’s success was built upon experienced political operatives. This thesis will argue that the watershed moment that made the Goldwater campaign successful was the conversion of mid-level Republican party insiders to conservative ideology. Using a local case study of state-level politics, I argue that the campaign’s success in the Illinois primary relied on politically experienced upper middle-class campaign workers in the suburbs. I will then go on to show the lasting impact from this suburban dominance of the campaign was felt at many levels of government ranging from local to federal. Based on

extensive research in the Goldwater collection in Arizona as well as political coverage in fourteen newspapers, this thesis shows that the Goldwater campaign relied on covert networks of experienced conservatives and suburban operatives to build a campaign that influenced local and federal politics for the next fifty years.

This work contributes to an ongoing conversation among scholars on the origins of a new conservative politics. Research into this subject is rich and filled with many authors who have differing perspectives. Two noteworthy academic sources in particular give context to the current research pertaining to changes in the conservative movement in the 1964 Presidential Election: *Suburban Warriors* by Lisa McGirr and *Invisible Hands* by Kim Philips-Fein. *Suburban Warriors* by Lisa McGirr views the origins of the Goldwater campaign through the perspective of conservatives in suburban Orange County. McGirr argues that the failures of conservatives in the previous decades prompted a backlash among these grassroots activists that reshaped the Republican party and gave Barry Goldwater the Republican Presidential nomination. She uses local issues, like the fear of communists infiltrating the public schools, as the driving mechanisms that mobilized local conservatives through already existing institutions like church groups and the PTA.\(^2\) McGirr summarizes her scholarship by saying “In short, then, this book explores the right as a social movement, distinguishing the distinct but intersecting levels at which right-wing mobilization occurred.”\(^3\) This book provides a valuable argument that the transformation of American conservatives began from the ground-up in the early 1960s. My work has some similarities with the arguments that McGirr makes. Much like


\(^3\) Ibid., 12.
McGirr, I also emphasize the importance of suburban activists and women in the process of Goldwater’s campaign and the ultimate changes on the Republican Party.

*Ivisible Hands* by Kim Philips-Fein offers a differing perspective. Philips-Fein argues that the conservative movement found in the 1960s and beyond started with various elite libertarian groups that arose to combat the New Deal. Philips-Fein states that it was large scale political issues that drove the creation of the modern conservative movement over time. Philips-Fein specifically states that this movement was created quietly by businessmen such as W.C. Mullendore and the du Pont brothers to fight unions and large government.4 She summarizes her argument by stating “If we shift focus from cultural to economic issues, it becomes clear that the origins of modern conservative politics and ideology predates the 1960s”5 This study stands in sharp contrast to the arguments provided in *Suburban Warriors*. Much like Phillips-Fein, I also highlight experienced high-level campaign operatives. Although I do not attribute the changes explored in this thesis to peak level elites, I do explore the importance of agenda driven party insiders who had a long history of political engagement. My argument in this thesis falls somewhere between the arguments made by McGirr and Phillips-Fein. I argue that conservative activists were important in the creation of the Goldwater campaign in 1964, but previous history shows that these activists could not do that without the help of Republican Party insiders who also backed Goldwater. This thesis is an exploration of the suburban insiders, rather than the grassroots organizers.

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5 Ibid., p.xii.
At moments of conservative resurgence there has been a popular appetite for books about Goldwater. Various accounts of the Goldwater campaign have been published in the last 30 years that have also recognized the importance of conservatives in the 1964 election. *Goldwater: The Man Who Made the Revolution*, written by Lee Edwards in 1994, focuses on how the Republican Party changed following the 1964 election as well as being a biography on Goldwater himself. Edwards is a conservative activist who was involved in the Heritage Foundation and other political organizations. Edwards claims that Goldwater founded the modern conservative political movement. Another account of the campaign is *Before the Storm* by Rick Pearlstein. Pearlstein’s main purpose for writing this book is to challenge the popular media notion that the Goldwater Campaign was irrelevant. Pearlstein issues the challenge that Barry Goldwater was just as much an essential part of 1960s politics as President Johnson or Martin Luther King Junior. Pearlstein relies on a variety of sources to show evidence for this, but he leans new media and interviews from the time to gauge public perception of the campaign. It is important to note that both *Goldwater: The Man Who Made the Revolution* and *Before the Storm* were both written just before the large conservative electoral victories in 1994 and 2010 respectively. This provides context into each of the author’s inspirations in attempting to create an account for origins of the conservative movement.

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7 Ibid., 35.
This thesis is divided into three chapters. In Chapter 1, I will first explore the history of the Draft Goldwater organization. This chapter will chronicle the careers of Draft Goldwater founders Clif White, John Ashbrook, and Bill Rusher prior to the 1964 campaign. The first chapter illustrates the means by which this group was able to create their conservative network and persuade Barry Goldwater to run for the Presidency. In Chapter 2, I will focus the early primary contests of New Hampshire and Illinois. I will contrast the differences between these two primary campaigns to illustrate the importance of state party insiders and suburban activists in Illinois primary. I will then explore the backgrounds of various suburban Goldwater delegates to illustrate the depth of their experience and their motivations for supporting the Goldwater campaign. In Chapter 3, I will explore the lasting influence of the suburban Goldwater campaign from three different perspectives. The first part of this chapter will focus on the changes in local politics that were carried out by politicians Lucinda Wanner and Lucinda Kasper, activist politicians who were inspired by the campaign. I will then move on to examine the career of William Rentschler. Rentschler was a former Goldwater delegate who leaned on inspiration from Goldwater to fight the established Republican party from a centrist position for the next four decades after the campaign. Finally, this chapter will examine the career of Representative Phil Crane, who was a conservative leader from a western suburban congressional district. Although Crane mischaracterized himself as an outsider in politics, I will argue that he had wide-ranging campaign experience that he leveraged to push the Republican party to more conservative positions throughout his career.
In order to build this perspective, I draw on many sources. The accounts of the campaign by Pearlstein and Edwards provide valuable details and narratives that I draw on to create context for my arguments. Additionally, I travelled to Tempe, Arizona to draw on primary documents from the Illinois Goldwater campaign found at the Personal and Political Papers Paper of Senator Barry M. Goldwater collection at Arizona State University. This collection featured many valuable resources including personal correspondence, delegate vetting documents, and internal campaign files. Additionally, this collection also included an oral history document that records an interview done with F. Clifton White, one of the chief organizers of Draft Goldwater. This oral history account has only been used extensively by one other author, Kim Phillips-Fein. I draw on various books that are first-hand accounts of the campaign, such as those by Theodore White and Bill Rusher. I also did extensive research into news coverage on this topic, and I draw upon over a dozen newspapers to support my arguments.

The study of the Goldwater candidacy provides valuable insight into how conservative resurgences can happen. This campaign changed the course of the Republican Party and altered the American political spectrum. Academic research into the campaign has done much to explore how and why this change happened. This thesis contributes the existing pool of knowledge by being the most extensive source to document the Goldwater campaign in Illinois thus far published, and by investigating the changes implemented by the suburban members of that campaign. This thesis also contributes to the body of existing research by exploring careers of the operatives who started the campaign and explaining why they were successful. In short, this thesis
explores the careers of conservative insiders at varying levels of government to argue how the conservative change that defined the Republican Party after 1964 occurred.
Chapter 1: Launching a Campaign: Young Radicals, Secrecy and the Consolidation of a Conservative Network

Firebrand leaders in grassroots movements often use the example of “smoke-filled rooms" populated by elites to illustrate their dissatisfaction with establishment politics. However, Barry Goldwater’s 1964 insurgent candidacy for the Presidency of the United States began in such a room. On October 8, 1961, a group of twenty-seven men met at the Avenue Motel in Chicago for a single purpose: to change the course of American politics.1 Among those in the room were J. Clifton White, John Ashbrook, and Bill Rusher.2 The men who filled this room were far from being novices to party politics. Their occupations included standard oil executives, National Young Republican officers, and even members of Congress. Their mission was to elevate a right-wing republican to the party's nomination for the Presidency of the United States. They would use their extensive knowledge of party politics to enact this mission. Most popular narratives of the Goldwater campaign illustrate the campaign as being started by grassroots outsiders who rashly took over the GOP. However, the sources documenting to the very origins of the campaign reveal that it was quite the opposite. Using various accounts of the Draft Goldwater movement, I will argue that campaign was formulated by Republican Party insiders that had the experience necessary to both convince Goldwater to get in the race and capture the GOP nomination for him. In order to support this argument, I will review the previous careers of the main organizers of Draft Goldwater movement. I will then move on to review the history of conflict within the Republican Party between

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1 Rick Perlstein, Before the Storm: Barry Goldwater and the Unmaking of the American Consensus (New York: Nation Books, 2009), 300.
2 Ibid., 320.
conservatives and the so-called Eastern Establishment. I will chronicle conservative attempts to take control the party, including a short-lived attempt to win the nomination for Goldwater in 1960 and why they failed. Finally, I will illustrate the importance of the experience that the organizers of Draft Goldwater had, and how the official Goldwater campaign came into being. This shows that the typical popular media narrative of the Goldwater candidacy being born of fast-acting political novices is entirely untrue and unrealistic.

Three principal men organized this meeting in Chicago: J. Clifton White, John Ashbrook, and Bill Rusher. Even though these men were not the elites of the Republican Party, they were still experienced. F. Clifton White had the experience necessary to create a conservative movement. After serving in World War II and teaching political science, Clif White entered the world of politics. He became involved in the Young Republican organization and county-level party organizing in New York state. This involvement culminated with White becoming national chairman of the Young Republicans in 1956. As Clif White became more involved in party leadership, he began to realize that he could apply organizing tactics traditionally employed by unions for conservative causes. His recognizable tall profile and colorful attire made him hard to miss at the organizing meetings and conventions that he faithfully led and attended. White was a dutiful operative of the party and worked on both the campaigns of Thomas Dewey and Dwight D. Eisenhower. Describing these earlier years, White stated that “I was at that juncture

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3 Ibid., 12.
4 Ibid.
concerned with politics as technique. I had very little philosophical concern at the particular point… politics in of itself was enough.”

**The Young Republican’s Revolt:**

Beginning in 1958, Clif White became more ideologically self-aware. He began to question what the impact of his political activity was, and this caused him to explore what his ideology was. White decided that both social and economic conservatism were the cornerstones of a prosperous country and that he needed to use his political acumen to advance these values.\(^6\) By 1960, he stated that he was disenchanted with the Eisenhower GOP platform, and found that he was not in agreement with the national leaders of the Republican Party. In the summer of 1961, White began to set his sights on larger goals than just working to win campaigns for the GOP. Clif White felt that it was no longer necessary to merely be a foot soldier for more liberal republicans with whom he disagreed. He reached out to two of his friends from the Young Republicans, Bill Rusher, and John Ashbrook, to ask them their opinions on the state of the party and how it could be won back for conservatives.\(^8\) The trio decided to meet for lunch at a small restaurant in New York in the summer of 1961 to discuss the state of the party.

William A. Rusher was born in Chicago but raised in New York City like Clif White. Rusher also served in World War II and practiced law after the war. Although raised in a moderate republican household, Bill Rusher would slowly begin to adopt an ideology of limited government as he continued his political involvement.\(^9\) He eventually

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6 Ibid., 15.
7 Ibid., 12.
8 Ibid., 14.
9 Perlstein, 43.
joined the New York Young Republicans, which would bring him into contact with Clif White. As the two became more and more experienced, they gained much more attention from various other Republican leaders, both supportive and hostile to their cause. Attention from William F. Buckley would land Rusher a position at the National Review. At this influential conservative magazine, Rusher became a key leader who was just as influential in the messaging of the magazine as Buckley himself. Rusher and Buckley created a unified national voice for conservative intellectuals through the magazine. Attention to these articles from other Republicans, such as Nelson Rockefeller and his allies, who were hostile to his hardline conservative positions, would get Rusher removed from his leadership positions in the Young Republicans. However, this did not remove the political acumen he gained from his extensive work in party politics, nor did it take away his influence through the National Review. By 1961, he became fixated on the idea of taking back the Republican Party for conservatives.

John M. Ashbrook was also deeply involved in Republican politics by 1961. Ashbrook was elected as the United States Representative for Ohio’s 17th district in 1960. Ashbrook was born and raised in Ohio. His father was a Republican newspaper editor and a former member of Congress. Even though Mr. Ashbrook came from a different region and background than White and Rusher, he shared their conservative beliefs. Ashbrook was also a prominent member of the Young Republicans organization. Although he joined the organization a little later than White and Rusher, the trio quickly became close friends. Ashbrook was especially interested in taking on the old liberal establishment of the Republican party. He explained to Rusher and White that he believed these moderate Republicans were influential but extraordinarily vulnerable and
unaware of how wide-reaching the conservative elements within the party were.\textsuperscript{10} Ashbrook’s ties with other republicans in Congress would prove to be extremely valuable as the organizers looked for names to add to their list of potential dissenters to the moderate leaders of the Republican Party.\textsuperscript{11}

The shared experiences of these men show that internal Republican organizations were becoming breeding grounds for a new generation of conservative operatives. The Young Republicans provided vital support for the party as a whole and were a training ground for operatives. The organization was so large that Rusher remarked to Ashbrook during the lunch meeting that “if we held a meeting of our old YR crowd today, I’ll bet it would be about the third largest faction in the Republican party.”\textsuperscript{12} White, Ashbrook, and Rusher were not the only former members of the Young Republicans who developed became deeply in the Draft Goldwater movement. R. L. Herman and G. R. Herberger were both midwestern businessmen who became closely tied to GOP financial operations after their time in the Young Republicans. William R. Spear and Roger Milliken became state chairman of Nebraska and South Carolina, respectively, after being active in the Young Republicans. Their prior experience in the Young Republicans was not the only thing these men had in common. Each one of them had recently become a member of the conservative wing of the party and was on White’s invitation list for the meeting in Chicago.\textsuperscript{13} The Young Republicans seeded a new generation of conservative operatives who were much more experienced and capable than their predecessors.

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\textsuperscript{10} White, 50.  \\
\textsuperscript{11} White, 65.  \\
\end{flushright}
Conservative Dissent in the Republican Party Before 1961

Despite their collective experience, the men who were present at the October 8, 1961 meeting in Chicago were not recognized by the public as the Republican Party leaders. When many in the public named key figures of Republican Party Presidential politics in the early years of the 1960s, they likely would have first said former President Dwight D. Eisenhower, New York Governor Nelson Rockefeller, Vice President Richard Nixon, or even Pennsylvania Governor William Scranton. All of these men held prominent places in the public leadership of the Republican Party and were either previous GOP Nominees or presumed future nominees. President Eisenhower was still popular with the general public and used his influence to exert some of his preferences on the party. Meanwhile, his former Vice President, Richard Nixon, was freshly defeated in back to back elections for the Presidency and the Governorship of California but still retained his place in the public eye and planning a political comeback. Scranton and Rockefeller were not only both popular and influential in the states that they governed but kept latching on to higher roles in the GOP with the hopes that it would soon make them the front runner for the nomination. Governor Rockefeller, in particular, had come quite close to winning the nomination for himself at the 1960 GOP convention, in defiance of both Eisenhower and Nixon. However, these public leaders of the Republican Party had more in common than just their leadership positions and competitiveness. Conservatives viewed every one of these men as allies of the “Eastern Establishment.”

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15 Ibid.
16 Perlstein, 319.
The term “Eastern Establishment” was a very general term used by conservative activists as a moniker to fight anyone liberal in the Republican Party. However, the term spread throughout the public due to some elements of truth about it. The Eastern Establishment did not just include Nixon, Scranton, and Rockefeller, but it also referred to the political and financial heavyweights who exerted their influence on the party. Some of the fundraising kingmakers of the GOP included George Champion of Chase Manhattan Bank, David Rockefeller, George S. Moore of First National City Bank, Harold Helm of Chemical Bank, and R.E. McNeill Jr. of Hanover trust.\(^{17}\) Although each of these men, save for Rockefeller, was originally from the south or Midwest of the country, they represented the epitome of east coast power and dominance in the GOP. These men, among other major donors and senior party leaders, had selected the winner of every Republican nominating convention for twenty years.\(^{18}\) Every GOP nominee since Wendell Wilke in 1940 had been the preferred candidate of this so-called Eastern Establishment. When a very conservative Midwesterner, Senator Bob Taft, looked likely to get the Republican nomination in 1952, it was these same powerbrokers that recruited Dwight D. Eisenhower to capture the nomination from him.\(^{19}\)

By 1964, many of the midwestern and southern members of the Republican Party felt ignored. Their voices were ignored at conventions, and their influence on the national Republican Party appeared to only be at a support level. Even the leading national presidential contender from the Midwest, Michigan governor George Romney, seemed to act like he was much closer with the Eastern Establishment than Midwestern

\(^{17}\) Theodore White, 72.
\(^{18}\) Ibid., 11.
\(^{19}\) Ibid., 324.
conservatives.\textsuperscript{20} However, it is essential to note that the divide in the Republican Party was not just a product of regional factionalism. There was a sizeable ideological divide in the Republican Party by 1961. Wilkie and Dewey, two of the previous Republican presidential nominees, seemed to concede that it was necessary to keep some aspects of the New Deal. These concessions included approval of increased government and expansion of federal power over state power. These leaders became labeled as “Me Too Republicans” due to their tendency to follow the political lead of policy from the Democrats.\textsuperscript{21} Many conservative Republicans blamed these liberals within their party for their string of electoral defeats during the 1940s.

In 1952, when Republicans finally did win White House back, it was with Dwight D Eisenhower at the top of the ticket. Although they resented that Eisenhower "stole" the nominations from their favorite son, Bob Taft, many conservatives in the party gave him a chance due to his achievements and reputation. However, much to their dismay, Eisenhower took on polices that they thought made him just another Me Too Republican. His self-described “modern republicanism” attempted to occupy a middle ground between the Republican Party platform and popular New Deal policies.\textsuperscript{22} Eisenhower refused to entertain ideas from Republicans in Congress about cutting back the Tennessee Valley Authority or Social Security. These positions frustrated many right-wing members of the GOP.

Conservative Republicans attempted to fight progressive policies and win back control of their party several times but found little success. The frustration of

\textsuperscript{20} Ibid., p. 326.
\textsuperscript{21} Ibid., p. 6.
\textsuperscript{22} Ibid., p. 43.
conservative Republicans would turn into fury as the Democrats took back control of Congress in 1954, and President Eisenhower compromised with them. The Federal Highway Act appeared to be another significant spending expenditure. Eisenhower pushed for a nuclear test ban treaty with the Soviet Union, and he sent in the National Guard to Little Rock to enforce the Civil Rights Act. These actions trampled on the ideals of limited government and firm foreign policy in the eyes of many conservatives. Conservatives would become even more infuriated as President Eisenhower nominated Earl Warren as Chief Justice of the United States, who consistently made rulings that gave the federal government more power. Each of these moves inspired conservative Republicans to channel grassroots efforts in order to challenge the party at conventions and in primary elections. In the decade before the 1960 election, not one liberal GOP incumbent lost a primary re-election to Congress, and the Eastern Establishment still controlled party conventions. However, this string of losses would not stop conservatives from launching another grassroots attempt to challenge the liberal members of their party at the convention during the summer of 1960.

The last minute and ultimately unsuccessful attempt to win the Republican nomination for Goldwater in 1960 created valuable lessons for organizers present at the 1961 Chicago Meeting. Clarence Manion, a talk radio host, opened an Americans for Goldwater office three weeks before the 1960 Republican convention. Although Manion was a friend of Goldwater, the Senator was not directly involved in this movement. The

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23 Ibid.
24 Perlstein, 30.
26 Theodore White, 39.
summit between Rockefeller and Nixon inspired this small insurgency to take over the nominating process in 1960 before the nominating convention. This summit set the party platform so that right-wing conservatives would be shut out of the policy discussions.\textsuperscript{27} Goldwater pledged no official support to this movement but did give a rousing convention floor speech that stirred conservative delegates. Despite this surprise momentum, conservative activists who tried to compete at the convention were once again outsiders who did not know the rules or delegates to come close to winning. Party organizers were able to isolate Goldwater supporters and control the delegates to squash the convention rebellion before it even started.\textsuperscript{28} The Eastern Establishment was confident and proficient in their ability to put down these types of outsider insurgencies. However, they did not take into account that each of these failed insurgent conservative attempts were serving to inspire more experienced GOP operatives.

**The Secrets of Suite 3505: Recruiting Mid-Level Operatives**

The conversion of mid to high-level operatives into more conservative positions proved to be the watershed moment for change in the GOP. Midwestern party outsiders, such as Manion, were still firebrands combatting the party as they had been during the previous two decades. In the three years before the 1964 Presidential election, something entirely different was beginning to take shape. The early stages of the Draft Goldwater organization in 1961 bore little resemblance to the previous party takeover attempts by conservatives. This attempt to win the nomination for a conservative was led by experienced political professionals who became disillusioned with the GOP, instead of party outsiders. White, Rusher and Ashbrook knew they would have to learn from party

\textsuperscript{27} Perlstein, 145.

\textsuperscript{28} Ibid.
strategy that put down conservative revolts in the nominations of Richard Nixon and Dwight D. Eisenhower. It would turn out that these men knew liberal republican tactics quite well. After all, many of them learned these tactics when they worked for Nixon, Eisenhower, and Rockefeller themselves. They would have to strike early, fast, and they would need to do so quietly, unlike their predecessors.

A carefully thought-out list of other experienced, conservative Republicans would be the first step in creating a successful campaign. White, Rusher and Ashbrook settled on twenty-six names of individuals that they thought were both conservative enough and discreet enough to help them lay the groundwork to accomplish this goal. The list included businessmen, veterans of the Young Republicans organization, and members of Congress. Every man on the invite list had the means necessary to enact a campaign of conservative conviction. White systematically categorized and vetted every person for the meeting. When White contacted each of these men, he only told them that "we're going to have a little meeting in Chicago to discuss some politics, I'd like to have you come in." The men received no explanation, yet many of them felt the importance of the meeting. Discretion was important. If word got out that these men were going to a meeting to upend the party, they could very well lose their high-ranking party positions. One attendee, Frank Whetstone, even borrowed money in order to make the flight to Chicago. White, Rusher and Ashbrook turned an idea during lunches in New York into reality as these twenty-six men all approached Chicago to have a meeting with them, now they just had to complete the next steps.

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29 White, 67.
30 Ibid.
The meeting took place at the Avenue Motel in Chicago. Clif White presided over the nearly four-hour-long meeting. The meeting organizers revealed the plan of retaking the GOP for conservatives to the attendees. Many become enthralled with the idea. Enthusiasm was running high. White recalled that none of the participants even inquired about the score of the final World Series game taking place in New York at the same time. White was much more cautious. Although he was happy with the enthusiasm that he saw, he told the group to go back home and gauge whether or not such an operation was feasible. The group would meet again in two months to report back their findings.

Although meeting attendees included men from all over the country, some did not have to travel very far to get home. Such was the case for Charlie Barr, who was an attendee from Chicago. Mr. Barr was an executive assistant and Standard Oil, and one of the most respected GOP operatives in the state. In the last decade, Barr had hosted fundraisers and rallies for Nixon, Eisenhower, and other more liberal Republicans. However, by 1961 he also felt alienated by the state of the republican party. Other observers in the meeting noted that Barr seemed rather quiet. However, he quickly used the resources at his disposal to secure funding for their effort. Barr also maintained a close relationship with Senator Everett Dirksen, who was a prominent conservative and the incumbent Senate Minority Leader. Senator Dirksen had first convinced Goldwater to run for the Senate in 1952. As the movement became public, he would also be instrumental in helping him decide to run for president. However, at this stage, his

31 Ibid., 94.
32 Ibid.
33 Ibid.
35 Ibid., 77.
associate Mr. Barr was one of only a handful of men that knew the storm that was coming in the Republican Party.\textsuperscript{36} Although White believed that they should not officially have a candidate until they knew their team, all of the men at the meeting in Chicago had someone in mind: the very same man that Manion and his associates tried to lead the charge against the Eastern Establishment in the previous election.\textsuperscript{37}

**The Preferred Candidate: Goldwater’s Conservative Credentials**

Barry Goldwater’s background played on the ideals of rugged individualism, and it further deepened the contrast between him and members of the eastern establishment.\textsuperscript{38} Goldwater was born in Phoenix on January 2, 1909. His family founded Goldwater’s department store chain, which had been a retail juggernaut in Arizona for decades. Goldwater grew up in a business-centered household, and it would shape his views on the private sector during his formative years. Goldwater found escapes from helping with his family’s business, such as ham radio operation and rural photography. Goldwater’s love for photography would take him on many adventures through the Navajo and Hopi Nations. Barry Goldwater became close with many members of these Native American tribes on these trips in northern Arizona. These friendships would evolve into fierce advocacy and support of Native American rights in Arizona. However, Barry Goldwater’s business career and hobbies got put on hold as the country entered World War II and served as a pitot. After the war, he stayed in the air force reserve and continued to pursue flying both on and off duty.\textsuperscript{39}

\textsuperscript{36} Ibid., 103.  
\textsuperscript{37} Ibid.  
\textsuperscript{38} Edwards, 117.  
\textsuperscript{39} Ibid., 16.
In 1949, Goldwater ran for the city council in Phoenix to clean up corruption in the city. After he won the seat on the city council, he took on this mission wholeheartedly. During his tenure, he fought for better gambling regulation and started investigations into corruption within the city. His reputation as a crusader against corruption would make him famous throughout the state, paving his way to a successful Senate bid in 1952. Everything from Barry Goldwater’s military career to his rural photography seemed to encompass the glorification of western ruggedness.

Barry Goldwater’s career in the Senate would prove that he was not afraid to attack his party when he felt that it was wrong. In 1951, Barry Goldwater declared his candidacy for the United States Senate. His friend and strategist, Stephen Shadegg, served as his campaign manager. He won an upset victory against the incumbent in 1952. From that moment onward, Goldwater became a national voice for conservatives. In his speeches, votes, and legislative proposals, he consistently advocated for reducing the size of the federal government. However, there was something different about him than other Republicans in the Senate who avowed to have the same principles. Goldwater consistently challenged his party. This attitude even extended to the leader of the Republican Party, President Eisenhower. Goldwater publicly fought with the Eisenhower administration on budgets, the use of federal troops, and even referred to the president as a “dime store new dealer.”

When Goldwater was not fighting his party, he was attacking the pillars of the Democratic Party. He was known as a fierce opponent of the New Deal vision that had

40 Ibid., 18.
41 Ibid., 35.
42 Ibid., 43.
43 Perlstein, 273.
become more accepted by the 1950s. Goldwater was even willing to attack the more popular elements of the program, such as the Tennessee Valley Authority. Goldwater strongly believed that it was anti-competitive for the Federal Government to engage in corporate ownership. In 1957, Goldwater found another target that he believed needed to be reformed: organized labor. After a Senate investigation into organized labor, Goldwater attacked the UAW and its leader, Walter Reuther. Goldwater went further than just labeling the unions as communists. He stated that they were much worse and much more dangerous than any communist threat in the United States. Senator Goldwater’s willingness to bluntly take on those whom he believed to be engaged in federal overreach or corruption, no matter how unpopular it was, made him a hero of the rank and file conservative members of the Republican Party.

**Secrecy to Draft Goldwater: Convincing a Reluctant Candidate to Run**

It would take experience and skill to convince Goldwater to run for the Presidency. It was widely known in 1961 that Goldwater would be a reluctant candidate for Presidency. Goldwater never gave his official consent to Manion’s attempt to elevate him the nomination in 1960. After the failed convention coup, Goldwater told his supporters to "grow up" after they lost on the convention floor. This was one of the many reasons that White, Rusher, and Ashbrook decided not to even officially mention his name when recruiting participants for the meeting in Chicago. All three men knew that the events of the previous convention proved Goldwater was unwilling to risk

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44 Ibid.
45 White, 28.
46 Edwards, 154.
signing on to a haphazard anti-establishment campaign. If they were going to get him to run, they would already need to have the organization in place to prove to him that they could win the nomination. Their strategy was simple: run a successful campaign for a right-wing conservative to win the Republican Nomination for President in 1964 and use the new standard-bearer to reshape the party.\textsuperscript{47} However, this seemingly simple strategy had many complexities.

After two months of work, the group met again at the Avenue Motel on December 10. Although there some new people at the meeting, the secretive group mostly remained the same. The attendees reported back that they found the operation feasible, and White now possessed a $65,000 budget, most of which was raised by Barr from other executives. Most of this money was intended for White to attend Republican Committee meetings across the country and build a national organization.\textsuperscript{48} Under the guise of being in town for business trips, White was able to attend every national committee meeting and many regional committee meetings over the next year. As he kept attending these meetings, he was rapidly building his multi-regional network that was becoming known as the "Clif White Group."\textsuperscript{49} This discrete network began to contain many current and former state party chairmen from across the country. Each of these state contacts was experienced and had control over large amounts of county-level organizing resources within their states.

In the spring of 1962, White called another meeting at the Three M Lodge in Minnesota of the men who met at the Avenue Motel just several months prior. The newly

\textsuperscript{47} White, 100.
\textsuperscript{48} Ibid., 103.
\textsuperscript{49} Ibid., 104
expanded network began an expanded meeting, as now they met for two days rather than just four hours. White shared his number one priority with the group: to exert as much influence as they could over who became precinct committeemen in 1962. Clif White explained that these committeemen would serve terms through 1964, and the GOP eastern establishment overlooked the influence that they would hold over primaries and delegate section.\(^50\)

By this point, White started to become more convinced that his ideas would come to fruition. After the meeting in Minnesota, he had even more faith in the men that he had recruited in the previous year along with Rusher and Ashbrook. He now thought each of them was sold enough and willing to execute the campaign pragmatically, that he could hand off more responsibilities to them as he built the organization. White also channeled his inner political organizer and realized that even if he came up short on delegates, he could still accomplish his goal. He stated that at this point, he realized that “we had distilled the techniques of this sort of thing, and all we needed to do was get into the god-darned convention with a halfway decent break.\(^51\) We didn't even need a majority. If we went within range of a majority, I felt that we had the techniques down and the operatives that we could put on the floor that we could take on anybody else” Things were beginning to look up for Clif White and his fellow conservatives. They only had one real problem; they still needed a candidate.

Senator Goldwater was in the process of telling his campaign team in Arizona to get ready to run for reelection when Clif White and Bill Rusher approached him in February of 1962 to informally probe him about running. Goldwater immediately shot the

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\(^50\) Ibid., 120.
\(^51\) Ibid., 130.
proposal down but wanted to keep in contact with the two to pledge his support to whomever they may choose. When White’s network found out about this decision, they made the call to stay out of the business of picking a candidate until after the upcoming midterm elections in 1962.\(^{52}\) During this waiting period, they would continue to pick more people to run for precinct chairman of various areas across the country and attempt to raise more money. White and Rusher collected enough money to rent a two-room suite at the Chanin Building in downtown New York. The name of the room, Suite 3505, would go on to inspire the name of their organization, which they named the Suite 3505 committee. The Suite 3505 Committee attempted to stay covert through their meetings in 1962, but someone leaked their organization and their purpose to the press. Fortunately for the organizers, establishment party figures who read about their organization did not take their tactics or cause seriously, since other conservative insurgencies had ended so quickly.\(^{53}\) In late 1962, the midterm elections were finished, and it was time for the Suite 3505 committee to select their candidate.

In December of 1962, they Suite 3505 Committee officially reorganized at the “Draft Goldwater Committee” headed by Texas Republican Party Chairman Peter O’Donnell, who was a close friend of Goldwater.\(^{54}\) Now with their candidate and purpose defined, the organization was ready to make headway. However, they still needed to convince one more supporter to achieve their purpose, and that was Senator Goldwater himself. From the moment of the leak that exposed all of the purposes of the Suite 3505 committee to the public, Goldwater had grown distrustful of Clif White. One of his

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\(^{52}\) White, 9.

\(^{53}\) Ibid., 93.

\(^{54}\) Edwards, 132.
advisors from his Senate staff had told Goldwater that the committee was likely a ploy to 
fundraise off of his name and provide salaries for those involved.\textsuperscript{55} This idea infuriated 
Goldwater, and he immediately cut off contact with White. He publicly asked the group 
not to use his name in late 1962, right before they chose to rename themselves after him. 
Luckily for White and the Draft Goldwater Committee, O'Donnell and Rusher were still 
able to keep contact with the Senator due to their prior relationships with him. 
Throughout 1963, the mass media speculated about a potential presidential run by 
Goldwater. The Senator still traveled across the country but began to notice something 
different. Larger and larger crowds became drawn to his rallies. On July 4, 1963, this was 
more obvious than ever as over 8,000 people attended Goldwater's speech held in 
Washington DC.\textsuperscript{56}

Goldwater identified the Washington DC speech as a turning point in his attitude 
about the election.\textsuperscript{57} Later in the summer and throughout Autumn, Goldwater began to 
answer that he was considering pursuing the Presidency, rather than just outright denying the notion. Goldwater then put his senate campaign manager, Denny Kitchell, in contact with the Committee. Additionally, Goldwater told his longtime manager Stephen 
Shadegg to put a hold off on the senate reelection campaign and begin to recruit staff.\textsuperscript{58} 
Goldwater became more and more personally enthusiastic about seeking the Presidency. 
However, the momentum of both Goldwater's attitude at the campaign would change 
following November 22, 1963.

\textsuperscript{55} Ibid., 136. 
\textsuperscript{56} Ibid., 141. 
\textsuperscript{57} Ibid. 
\textsuperscript{58} White, 158.
The assassination of President John F. Kennedy hit Barry Goldwater harder than most elected Republicans. Goldwater and Kennedy became fast friends in the Senate, although they rarely agreed on policy. Kennedy even consulted Goldwater in the oval office to gain his opinion on various foreign policy decisions.\textsuperscript{59} Even though Goldwater personally wrote that he found these sessions to give his advice on forgiven policy a "lost cause," he was more than happy to serve at the pleasure of the president.\textsuperscript{60} Goldwater told his inner circle that he felt Kennedy was one of the few men in the democratic party that he could run in a campaign of ideas against and not one based on attacks. Goldwater stated that even if he lost, he felt it would advance the cause of the Republican party to provide a true alternative to the democrats, without conservatives getting viscously attacked. After the assassination, Goldwater confided in his wife that he no longer wanted to run for president but felt as though he had to for the conservatives who had put their faith in him.\textsuperscript{61}

Conclusion

Ultimately, Barry Goldwater would decide to run for president. His campaign was already provided the best delegate winning system designed to date by the Draft Goldwater Committee. Members of the Rockefeller campaign, which was set to be the chief nomination rival to Goldwater's Campaign, were completely unaware of their disadvantage from the start due to the efforts of White, Rusher, and Ashbrook. White could rest easy now knowing that his candidate was in the race but felt as though his real

\textsuperscript{59} Edwards, 132.
\textsuperscript{60} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{61} Ibid., 140.
job had just begun as he geared up to work on the campaign. However, White would be surprised to find out that he was not offered a senior position on the Goldwater for President Campaign. The man who had secured an early path to victory for Goldwater would not be part of the inner circle of the campaign as the Senator formally announced his intentions to run for president in February of 1964. The lack of experienced operatives in the early official Goldwater Campaign would prove to be a mistake that further illustrated the importance of these operatives.
Chapter 2: Winning Illinois: Experience, Class and Gender in the Suburban Goldwater Coalition

Experienced campaign operatives built the Draft Goldwater organization and convinced Barry Goldwater to run for the Presidency. By April of 1964, it was time for another group of experienced campaigners in Illinois to save the Goldwater Campaign from prematurely ending. Why was Illinois so important? The answer lies in the timeline of the primary. Illinois was positioned directly after a disappointing Goldwater performance in New Hampshire and just before the crucial winner-take-all primary in California. Simply put, Goldwater did not only need to win in Illinois, but he needed to win in a landslide. Who made this victory possible, and why was Illinois so suited for a Goldwater victory? In this chapter, I will illustrate that Barry Goldwater’s campaign in Illinois was filled with longtime Republican operatives and well connected to the party establishment in the state. The experience of these operatives stands in direct contrast to popular narratives that promote a purely anti-establishment nature of the Goldwater primary campaign. I will also illustrate that Barry Goldwater’s most loyal supporters were white professionals, suburban women, and small-town business owners. I believe that these findings reveal the political realities of changing GOP demographics and the competition between different elements of the party the establishment in Illinois. In order to support this argument, I will first examine the structure of Goldwater’s campaign structure in New Hampshire and explore why that campaign failed. I will then compare this to the highly organized structure of the Illinois campaign and examine the success that the campaign found in Illinois. Finally, this chapter will examine the background of individual Goldwater delegates to reveal that essential elements of the Illinois campaign
included suburban insiders, white professionals, and women. I will conclude that it was this experienced coalition that ultimately delivered a landslide victory for Goldwater in the 1964 Illinois primary.

**Failures in New Hampshire**

The Goldwater campaign lacked the professional staff and discipline to run a good campaign in the first three months of 1964. This fact made the first several months of Senator Goldwater's bid for President very difficult. Various obstacles met the campaign since Senator Goldwater first declared his candidacy. Announcing his candidacy in his home city, a place that did not award him any extra political momentum in the fight for the nomination, frustrated some of his advisors.¹ This first primary campaign misstep would certainly not be the last. Goldwater's candidacy stumbled out of the announcement in Phoenix and went headfirst into the fight to win the New Hampshire primary. Goldwater's novice campaign staff proved to be unprepared for the national spotlight. They lacked the skill to establish a campaign in New Hampshire that extended beyond what the Draft Goldwater Committee had already set up.² Issues with the campaign ranged from the staff to Goldwater himself. Goldwater was suffering from both physical pains following recent back surgery and mental pain concerning his anguish about running in the wake of the assassination of President Kennedy.³ These factors combined with Goldwater's already unrefined campaign style to create a month filled with gaffes leading up to the New Hampshire Primary. The senator created plenty of material for his opponents concerning the issues of nuclear weapons, civil rights, and

² Ibid., 212.
³ Ibid., 314.
social security. Some of these moments were willingly misinterpreted by opponents, while others were positions held by Goldwater that were not mainstream. Regardless of the interpretation of these quotes, they all did damage to a Goldwater Campaign that simply did not have staff experienced enough to respond to opposition appropriately.  

The combination of Arizona operatives and unexperienced New Hampshire workers became deadly for the campaign. The internal polls of the Goldwater campaign showed trouble in late January. The numbers showed the senator leading the field by a diminishing amount. Despite these warning signs, Goldwater refused any advice to stop speaking on controversial issues. The New Hampshire Citizens for Goldwater organization was led by Robert and Rachel Robins, a working class couple from Nashua. Although they were able to build some grass roots enthusiasm, both of them lacked any significant prior campaign experience. The leadership in the official campaign was more qualified, as Goldwater’s state campaign director was New Hampshire Speaker of the House Stewart Lamprey. However, campaign advisors such as Lamprey were not part of Goldwater’s inner circle. Goldwater let his inner circle, often dubbed the “Arizona Mafia”, override local politicians in the New Hampshire campaign. The Goldwater campaign gained credence by the fact that their chief rival, Nelson Rockefeller, was doing just as poorly in the state as they were. Rockefeller's policies were simply just too

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5 Ibid., 398.
6 Edwards, 200.
9 "Granite State's Presidential Primary Preference may get over hall," The Portsmouth Herald, March 31, 1964.
10 Theodore White, 52.
liberal for most New Hampshire voters.\textsuperscript{11} His recent divorce and remarriage was also extremely controversial and garnered plenty of media attention.\textsuperscript{12}

Being the better of the two dysfunctional campaigns in New Hampshire would not be a workable model as a new contender entered the race: Vietnam Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge Jr. The Draft Lodge campaign quickly opened offices in New Hampshire weeks before the primary date. Robert Mullen, a former New Hampshire Eisenhower campaign operative, ran the Lodge campaign. Mullen used a small but highly organized campaign team to create a formidable write-in campaign for Lodge.\textsuperscript{13} Mullen’s team consisted almost entirely of experienced local operatives, which drew a sharp contrast to the Goldwater campaign.\textsuperscript{14} This last-minute insurgent campaign was even able to escape substantial media attention.\textsuperscript{15} On March 10, 1964, it was the Lodge campaign that proved victorious with a first-place finish. Goldwater and Rockefeller placed a distant second and third, respectively.\textsuperscript{16} This loss was not a mortal blow to the Goldwater's bid, but it was one that required serious attention.

The failures of the New Hampshire campaign illustrated the importance of skilled and experienced campaign organizers. A poll commissioned one year before the primary had shown Goldwater leading all other candidates in New Hampshire by 38 percent.\textsuperscript{17} However, this early momentum was lost quickly. The results of the New Hampshire Primary made it clear to the campaign that grassroots enthusiasm could not alone be directly translated to primary victories. April of 1964 was a critical time for the

\textsuperscript{11} Ibid., 392.
\textsuperscript{12} Perlstein, 352.
\textsuperscript{13} Theodore White, 70.
\textsuperscript{15} Ibid., 71.
\textsuperscript{16} Edwards, 170.
\textsuperscript{17} Lee Edwards, 209.
Goldwater campaign. The day after the New Hampshire Primary results were announced, Goldwater vowed not to repeat the mistakes of New Hampshire on national television. The campaign was reorganized to establish a more succinct command structure. Richard Kleindienst, a veteran of the Arizona Republican Party with connections to the national party, would assume control of the states that used a primary system to select delegates. Clif White, founder of the draft Goldwater movement was elevated into the campaign to oversee operations in states that used a convention process to assign delegates. These two shared the position of “Co-Directors of Field Operations.” White felt that he should have received a position in the campaign earlier, but was enthusiastic about his fight to win delegates for the campaign. The new promotions showed that Goldwater was finally ready to expand the management of the campaign and bring on more experienced operatives. Goldwater's new team would need to change the momentum of the race. Goldwater's demoralizing second-place finish in New Hampshire was rapidly spreading through the media.

**Second Chance in Illinois**

The Goldwater campaign was in desperate need of a momentum shift after New Hampshire, and Illinois would prove to be the best place to do this. The path forward was clear: win the confidence of delegates and finish first in the winner-take-all California Primary to reestablish Goldwater as the frontrunner for the nomination. There was one more electoral contest before that path to redemption could begin. This crucial contest

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18 Ibid., 200.
19 Perlstein, 302.
20 White, 43.
was the Illinois Primary. The stakes were so critical that White and Kleindienst would both assume control of the local campaign operation in the state.\textsuperscript{21} The campaign simply could not afford another loss akin to what they suffered in New Hampshire. The approach that the campaign took in Illinois bore little resemblance to that taken in New Hampshire.

In sharp contrast to their efforts in New Hampshire, the Goldwater campaign benefited from an extensive campaign staffed by experienced operatives in Illinois. Congressman Ed Derwinski was the chairman of the Volunteers for Goldwater organization.\textsuperscript{22} Derwinski represented Illinois' fourth congressional district. The fourth district covered much of the western and southwestern suburbs of Chicago, including Derwinski's hometown of Glen Ellyn. Derwinski's own suburban district would be critical to delivering a victory for the Goldwater campaign. Derwinski was a conservative army veteran and had a reputation for his conservative stances in congress. Charlie Barr, an assistant to the executive at the Standard Oil Company and a very early Goldwater supporter, was also part of Volunteers for Goldwater.\textsuperscript{23} Barr was considered "[t]he most knowledgeable Republican in the Midwest," according to Stephen Shadegg of the Goldwater Campaign.\textsuperscript{24} The co-chairman of the Volunteers for Goldwater Organization was Patricia Hutar. Hutar was Vice President of the Republican Citizens League in Illinois, worked for the Nixon campaign, and was a strategist for President Eisenhower’s Illinois campaigns.\textsuperscript{25} Much like White, Ashbrook, and Rusher, Hutar had become more conservative in recent years and now brought credibility and experience to the Volunteers

\begin{itemize}
\item[\textsuperscript{21}] Ibid.
\item[\textsuperscript{22}] Edwards, 236.
\item[\textsuperscript{24}] Ibid., 38.
\end{itemize}
for Goldwater. The broad-ranging influence of Barr, Derwinski, and Hutar made the Volunteers for Goldwater Organization an experienced and capable political force.

Illinois Volunteers for Goldwater was extraordinarily active and organizing in Illinois months before the primary was even held. They held several fundraisers and campaign events starting in January. The events included a welcoming reception for Goldwater at O’Hare airport in February and a rally in March, with approximately 8,000 people in attendance.26 The campaign opened up more headquarters across the state, eventually opening one in each of the state’s 24 congressional districts save for three in heavily democratic areas of Chicago. Even more district headquarters for the Illinois campaign opened on March 15 in the Chicago suburbs of Arlington Heights and Mount Prospect, demonstrating the strong suburban presence of the campaign.27 Candidates for various state offices aligned themselves with the Goldwater Campaign. Charles Percy, a moderate to liberal Republican running for Goldwater, traveled to both headquarters openings to rally supporters.28 The momentum of the Illinois campaign was strong enough that even many liberal Republicans, like Percy, were rushing to support the campaign.29 The Strength of the Goldwater Campaign in Illinois was so immense that many members of the GOP field decided to sit out the primary contest. Rockefeller, Lodge, and others simply passed over the contest for fear of looking weak and losing to Goldwater there.30

28 Ibid.
29 Edwards, 170.
30 Theodore White, p 73.
Goldwater did not merely need a victory in Illinois; he needed a landslide. One candidate remained to campaign against Goldwater, and that was Senator Margaret Chase Smith. Smith came close to last in the New Hampshire primary.\textsuperscript{31} The Illinois primary offered her the chance to be a viable alternative to Goldwater and boost her little-known campaign. The image of a massive win for Goldwater mattered a great deal in this contest if California and convention delegations were to be won. The large Goldwater organization in Illinois had not gone unnoticed, and the lack of competition significantly increased expectations for Goldwater in the contest.\textsuperscript{32} Goldwater's substantial investment in Illinois set the expectation for a massive win in the state. More events were held to rally support, including fundraisers, community dinners, and rallies.\textsuperscript{33} On April 10, Goldwater arrived in Chicago and gave a significant speech sponsored by the Youth for Goldwater Committee and the Illinois campaign.\textsuperscript{34} The evening rally with over 8,000 participants was carried live six local television stations. Derwinski, Hutar, and all of the leading members of the Illinois campaign, along with state politicians such as Charles Percy and Sheriff Richard Ogilvie, were in attendance.\textsuperscript{35} The massive rally energized supporters, but also served to raise the already high expectations for Goldwater's performance.

The Illinois primary results delivered the victory that the Goldwater Campaign desperately needed. When the primary vote took place on April 14, Goldwater won with about 63 percent of the vote to Senator Smith’s 27 percent.\textsuperscript{36} Although some political

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\textsuperscript{32} Edwards, 170.
\textsuperscript{33} “Goldwater Rally Held on Tuesday,” \textit{Chicago Tribune}, March 14, 1964.
\textsuperscript{34} “Expect 8,000 Here for Talk By Goldwater,” \textit{Chicago Tribune}, April 10, 1964.
\textsuperscript{35} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{36} Edwards, 237.
\end{flushleft}
pundits and editorialists labeled the success as relatively "weak" compared to the expectations that were set for victory, most agreed that this showing reestablished momentum for the campaign. The statewide vote was an important symbol of who would be able to turn out Republican voters and be a capable nominee.

**Goldwater Delegates: Geography, Class, and Gender**

However, the statewide preference ballot mattered very little in the battle at the convention to elect a nominee. The election of state convention delegates on that same day was much more critical for the campaign. In each of the state's 24 congressional districts, two delegates and two alternate delegates were selected to represent Illinois at the GOP convention in San Francisco. Some delegate candidates chose to pledge themselves to the candidate they supported. In contrast, others ran as un-pledged delegates vowing to either side with the majority of other delegates at the convention or use their judgment for who would be the best nominee. Thirty-one out of Illinois’ forty-eight elected delegates who were chosen on April 14 were pledged to Goldwater. The remaining 17 were un-pledged delegates, and no delegate pledged to another candidate managed to win a seat. This resounding victory in winning the state's delegation pushed the Goldwater campaign forward. To win these delegates, Cliff White created a very intricate selection process.

Many factors about the Goldwater Campaign and politics in the state of Illinois in 1964 can be discovered by examining this delegate campaign process. Each of the state’s 24 congressional districts held elections for four representatives to the national

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convention from Illinois. These representatives included two delegates and two alternate
delegates who were only to go in the case that the elected initially representatives could
not make it to the convention. Forty-eight of the state’s fifty-eight delegates attending the
GOP convention would be selected in this manner, so it was exceedingly crucial for the
Goldwater campaign to be judicious in whom they chose as their supported candidates.
The campaign engaged in large amounts of correspondence to obtain the potential
delegates' professional, personal, and financial information. Heading up this process was
Lombard, Illinois resident Douglas Gunkel, the Chief Coordinator for Illinois Volunteers
for Goldwater.39 Gunkel was a coordinator in a successful state treasurer campaign just
four years prior and was a runner up for The Most Outstanding Member of the Year in
the National Young Republicans organization.40 While Clif White oversaw the general
delegate selection process, it was Douglas Gunkel who vetted and assessed the potential
candidates. Each of these candidates ran under their own names on the ballot. No
information on that ballot told of their presidential candidate preferences. The ballot
situation made Gunkel's job not only to determine who would be loyal to Goldwater in
the campaign but also to determine which delegate candidates could win the contest in
their own right. This process left behind many pages of documentation. These documents
create valuable insight into who composed Goldwater's campaign in the 1964 Illinois
primary, and where they were successful.

39 Ed Gunkel to Clifton White, February 10, 1964. The Personal and Political Paper of Barry M.
Goldwater Series II “1964 Campaign,” Box 122 “Republican National Committee Material, Folder 50.
Hayden Library, Arizona State University Archives, Tempe, Arizona, United States.
40 “Lombard Local Coordinating Goldwater Volunteer Effort,” Chicago Daily Herald, February
10, 1964.
There was a bright contrast in the geographic support of Barry Goldwater in the primary. Goldwater's main opposition in the delegate races came from Chicago. Of the forty-eight delegates that Illinois sent to the GOP convention in 1964, only eleven of them were not wholeheartedly committed to voting for Barry Goldwater. Nine of these delegates were from Chicago, and two were from southern Illinois. From Chicago, Genoa S. Washington and Euclid Taylor of the First District were the only two African American members of the Illinois delegation.\(^1\) They both firmly stated that they would not support Goldwater, and Douglas Gunkel put them in a category of delegates that would safely win their election, but that could not be convinced to support Goldwater.\(^2\)

Even among delegates who did not directly oppose Senator Goldwater from Chicago, there was still a distinct lack of enthusiasm. Delegates like Allen Freeman voiced their support of Goldwater simply because he had the support of the majority of Illinois delegates.\(^3\)

This lack of enthusiasm in parts of Chicago could not be more sharply contrasted by the support that Goldwater received in Chicago’s suburbs. On November 19, 1963, William H. “Bill” Rentschler of Lake Forest Illinois wrote Barry Goldwater to inform him of his decision to run as an “all the way” Goldwater delegate in the 1964 Illinois Primary.\(^4\) Goldwater had not publicly announced yet, but Bill Rentschler wanted to let

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\(^1\) “Negro Delegates United Against Goldwater,” *Chicago Tribune*, April 20, 1964


him know that he had already been laying the groundwork for a possible campaign. This sort of letter from Bill Rentschler was not a small matter. Rentschler was the former head of the Illinois United Republican Fund, making him the highest-ranking GOP fundraiser in the state.\textsuperscript{45} Rentschler was an alumnus of Princeton University and President and Chairman of Stevens Candy Company in Chicago.\textsuperscript{46} Rentschler traveled the state in early 1964 to host fundraisers for candidates seeking a variety of offices. During these events, Rentschler tabled himself as a "citizen politician," and he gained a reputation as an extremely conservative member of the party.\textsuperscript{47} Rentschler had put his ideology aside and often helped more moderate members of the party. He served as a member of platform committees for President Eisenhower and supported the moderate Charles Percy for governor. However, in 1964 he stated that it was time to support a presidential candidate who could stand by their convictions and combat the "unsound, outmoded, and often irresponsible policies of every Democratic President since the advent of the New Deal."\textsuperscript{48}

Rentschler was joined by many other politically connected suburban businessmen and professionals who felt the need to run as delegates to support Senator Goldwater.

The class background of Mr. Rentschler was typical of Goldwater supporting delegates. In the suburbs, every delegate pledged to Goldwater came from an upper middle-class household. Relatively young, white, business professionals appeared to make up the base of Goldwater's support in these areas. Guy Hughes, a real estate executive from Joliet, was a staunch supporter of Goldwater, and Clifford Carlson, a corporate lawyer from Geneva and a member of Clif White’s Young Republicans

\textsuperscript{45} “Rentschler Pledges Support to Goldwater,” \textit{Chicago Tribune}, April 20, 1964
\textsuperscript{46} "Alumni Review," \textit{Princeton Newsletter},
\textsuperscript{47} “William Rentschler to Barry Goldwater," Box 139.
\textsuperscript{48} Ibid.
organization, was also firmly in the Goldwater camp. In more rural areas, the trends of politically connected business owners and professional supporting Goldwater still held in place. William Booth, from Decatur Illinois, a town in the central portion of the state, was a bearing company director and machine company owner. Mr. Booth was involved in party politics before at the county and precinct level. Gunkel marked Booth as being heavily favored to win the election in his district. Dr. Clifford Cryer, a surgeon from El Paso, Illinois, had been very active in county politics and had been a country chairman for the party. Both Mr. Booth and Dr. Cryer represent the professional background of Goldwater's rural supporting delegates. The only Goldwater supporting delegates who do not fit this profile were female candidates.

The highest-profile female delegate candidate in Illinois was the nationally known activist Phyllis Schlafly of Alton, a suburb just east of St Louis. She began her political experience in 1946 as a member of the American Enterprise Institute. During her time at AEI, she was a high profile advocate for conservative Republicans. Her weekly radio program and civic involvement in the St. Louis area provided a way for her to spread her conservative ideology. Nationally, she was a major figure of dissent at both the 1952 and 1960 GOP conventions, and not let the convention become “stolen” by the part establishment again in 1964. Gunkel had no doubt that Schlafly would be able to win her seat and marked her down as a possible leader to keep other delegates focused on voting for Goldwater in the convention. Gunkel also noted the fact that Schlafly was so

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49 “Delegate profiles, Box 139.
well known and such a good speaker that the campaign would not even have to spend money in her race.\(^{53}\) Schlafly's position as the President of the Illinois Federation of Republican Women, an organization that had wide-ranging capabilities across the whole state, also allowed her to exert influence on delegate races other than her own.

Many other suburban female candidates who enthusiastically supported Barry Goldwater were running in Illinois. One such candidate was Lucinda O. Wanner of the 14th congressional district. Wanner was a resident of Glen Ellyn, Illinois, a town in the western suburbs of Chicago. Like Schlafly, Wanner was also involved in the Illinois Federation of Republican Women as their director of campaign operations.\(^{54}\) She also extended her involvement to the national level as a member of the National Federation of Republican Women. Beyond women's organizations, she was the chair of the DuPage County Republican Party and authored pamphlets on how to increase GOP voter turnout. Very conservative positions left little room for doubt that she would be a Goldwater supporter. Gunkel marked her down as being a lock on winning the seat and stated: "She'll be with us to the bitter end."\(^{55}\) Dorothy L. Murphy, a candidate to become an alternate delegate in the same district, was also marked down as a solid Goldwater supporter.\(^{56}\) She was actively involved in the Will Country Republican Party and Republican Women's clubs. However, Murphy's involvement was not purely political and was involved in the PTA, Joliet Women's Club, and Sunday School Teaching.\(^{57}\) All of these women represented a rising force that was beginning to show itself in this contest.

\(^{53}\) Ibid.
\(^{54}\) "Delegate Profiles," Box 139.
\(^{56}\) Ibid.
\(^{57}\) Ibid.
Many of these women who supported Goldwater were married to husbands who fit the class profile of many Illinois Goldwater activists. Lucinda Wanner’s husband, Arthur Wanner, was an executive of the Beldon Corporation, member of the Church Board, and a GOP donor.\(^{58}\) John Schlafly, Phyllis Schlafly’s husband, was a corporate attorney from a wealthy suburban St. Louis family.\(^{59}\) Dorthey Murphy’s husband was a business executive and involved in various local clubs, such as the Elk Lodge.\(^{60}\) The careers of these women, the careers of their husbands, and where they lived all demonstrate that they were members of the upper-middle class and lived in business and professional households. However, while their husband’s occupations provide context, it should not be implied that these women were working on behalf of their husbands in their political activism. Goldwater delegate paperwork and newspaper reports make minimal mention of them. They exerted much less poetical influence than their wives.

The selection of female candidates was entirely supportive of Goldwater. Of these nine women, five of them won seats in the delegation. All of these women were connected to Schlafly's Illinois Federation of Republican Women, and they all supported Barry Goldwater. None of the women running for the delegate or alternate positions were committed to anyone else besides Barry Goldwater. Two women who were elected, Phyllis Schlafly and Marguerite Church, were tapped to be leaders of the delegation to ensure loyalty to Senator Goldwater. Much like the men, geographically, four of these five women were from suburbs. The sole woman in the delegation from the city of Chicago, Marie Suthers, lived only blocks away from the border of the Oak Lawn and

\(^{60}\) “Delegate Profiles,” Box 139.
was involved in activities in that suburb. This roster of female delegates was more extensive than any other previous Illinois GOP convention delegation.

Conclusion

The winning coalition of business professionals, female activists, and established Illinois politicians delivered the Illinois Republican Primary victory to Goldwater. This state campaign marked a departure from the attempts to run a purely grassroots campaign in New Hampshire and gave much better results. Middle and high-level GOP operatives were able to galvanize the conservative base with a highly organized campaign and succeed where previous conservative efforts had failed. The story of Illinois primary and Draft Goldwater movement both illustrate that the early successes of the Goldwater Campaign can be attributed to these experienced operatives.

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Chapter 3: Suburban Legacy: Veterans of the Illinois Goldwater Campaign

“An entire generation of conservatives owes you its deepest thanks”: this was Phil Crane’s closing statement in a letter to Barry Goldwater in 1977. This statement from Crane, at that point a nationally known conservative himself, was not made as merely a courteous remark. Crane attributed the foundation of his political career, which would go on to span many decades, to his time in the Goldwater campaign. Many individuals who supported Goldwater’s campaign for the Presidency would go on to serve various influential roles for many years after the end of the campaign. In this chapter, I will argue that the conservative legacy of the Goldwater campaign took various forms ranging from very conservative legislation and activism to anti-establishment fervor that was not bound to a specific ideology. I will also argue that the suburban legacy of the Illinois campaign can range from local legislation to national implications for the Republican Party. I will examine four individuals who can be traced back to the 1964 campaign in order to support this argument. The first two individuals are Lucinda O. Wanner and her daughter, Lucinda Wanner Kasperson, who were both suburban Republican activists and local politicians. I will then examine William Rentschler, a businessman, and author who despised establishment politics, attacked the New Right, and claimed to be carrying on the legacy of Goldwater. Finally, I will explore the career of Phil Crane, the longtime US Representative from the western suburbs of Chicago, who gained national notoriety for his conservative stances in Congress.

1 “Phil Crane to Barry Goldwater,” June 7, 1977. The Personal and Political Paper of Barry M. Goldwater Series VI “Personal,” Box 4 “Correspondence C-D,” Folder 23. Hayden Library, Arizona State University Archives, Tempe, Arizona, United States
A Family Affair: Conservative Women in the Suburbs

Lucinda O. Wanner was one of the most loyal Goldwater supporters within the Illinois delegation at the 1964 Republican Convention. As a delegate for her western suburban 13th district, the Goldwater campaign designated Wanner as a leader to ensure other delegates stayed loyal to Goldwater at the convention. However, her involvement in local GOP politics did not end after the 1964 election. By 1968, Wanner had won the position of chairwoman of the DuPage County Republican Central Committee. Wanner used her position to promote the involvement of women in GOP politics. Wanner held multiple women's luncheons, both inside and outside of the county, that acted as workshops on voter registration, precinct canvassing, and campaign fundraising. During her time in county politics, Wanner was not shy about her conservative beliefs. She openly accused other Republicans of “me-tooism” regarding following liberal democratic policies. Wanner went on to serve as a delegate for the 13th congressional district again in 1968, where she was a supporter of Ronald Reagan for the presidential nomination. In 1970, Wanner was able to successfully work with her successor, DuPage County District Chairman James Phillip, to abolish the personal property tax in the county. Wanner also voiced her opposition to the Equal Rights Amendment and Women’s Liberation Movement. Wanner stated that the nomination of Barry Goldwater made her more comfortable with the party, and emboldened her conservative beliefs. Lucinda Wanner’s record shows that she continued to use the experience that she gained before the 1964

4 “Dinning Table at Wanner’s’ Commandeered for Politics,” Daily Herald, July 9, 1964.
5 "GOP Action Finds Mirror Lake at Park," The Roselle Register, March 13, 1968.
6 “County GOP Views Told,” The Bensenville Register, October 23, 1970.
7 “They’re Going to Miami, but Not to Vacation,” Chicago Tribune, August 19, 1972.
8 “Dinning Table at Wanner’s’ Commandeered for Politics,“ Daily Herald, July 9, 1964.
election, and applied it to conservative politics in DuPage County for several years after. However, the political involvement of the Wanner Family did not end with Lucinda O. Wanner’s retirement from politics.

Lucinda Wanner Kasperson continued the legacy of her mother’s career conservative politics for decades following the 1964 election. Born Lucinda Wanner in 1928, Kasperson grew up in a political household. She became the first female Ph.D. graduate in economics at the University of Pennsylvania and taught the subject at Loyola University in Chicago. She and her husband moved to the northern Chicago suburb of Northbrook in the mid-1960s. It was in Northbrook where Kasperson, much like her mother, would become involved in local politics. By 1967, Kasperson had already won a seat on the Northbrook Village Board. Her skill allowed her to rise through the ranks of local politics. In 1972, Kasperson was elected as an alternate delegate to the Republican National Convention, and in 1980, she became the village president of Northbrook.

Lucinda Kasperson used her platform in local politics to promote conservative ideas for many decades. As Village President, Kasperson only signed on to public projects as long as there was not a tax increase associated with it for residents. She described herself as a “conservative republican” and made it a point to attend party conventions and the inaugurations of Republican Presidents. Even after her tenure as village president ended, Kasperson’s passion for limited government remained. In 2014, when a debate arose about whether the city of Northbrook should use taxpayer funds to

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12 “Northbrook OKs Cable TV Pact,” October 8, 1982.
construct business development, Kasperson re-entered politics to become one of the leading advocates against the measure. Kasperson felt the proposal ignored the free market and stated, "I'm deeply troubled. Commercial development is not appropriate for government funding." Nearly fifty years after Lucina Wanner became emboldened to fight for conservative causes by Goldwater’s 1964 campaign, her daughter was continuing to fight for those same causes at the municipal level.

**The Anti-Establishment Moderate**

William Rentschler was a staunch public supporter of Barry Goldwater and a well-connected Republican in Illinois during the presidential campaign. Rentschler was one of the first would-be delegates to pledge his support for Barry Goldwater in 1964 GOP Primary. He used his connections to continue traveling across the state and campaign for Goldwater and gave fundraising speeches at Republican party events across the state. Rentschler was chosen by the Illinois GOP leadership to head a citizen’s committee that proposed qualified candidates to run for various state offices. Rentschler described the 1964 election as a “once in a lifetime opportunity” in which the citizens of the state could kick off a revolution in good government by voting republican for all state and federal offices. Many of these candidates were well connected to the establishment of the state party, and Rentschler seemed to have no problem with that. His public rhetoric during this election was much like it had been for his entire political career:

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18 Ibid.
conservative and not any type of challenge to Republicans running in the state. However, his tone would change after the election.

The 1964 election brought out anti-establishment ideology in Rentschler. During the primary election, he was careful not to attack other Republicans as so many other Goldwater surrogates did, and instead shifted his attacks on to Democrats. He was most comfortable picking apart democratic programs and supporting the GOP ticket. Despite the massive GOP loss, both in Illinois and nationally, Rentschler continued his practices of speaking to GOP groups across the state and promoting party causes. However, after the elections 1964, his tone on other Republicans harshened. In 1968, Rentschler stated that Republicans had grown complacent and needed to police themselves if they wished to maintain the party, and he helped author a book that attacked members of the state GOP. His rhetoric stayed relatively conservative but became increasingly critical of the Illinois Republican Party. His criticism of the party would come to a head in 1970 US Senate Election.

William Rentschler’s 1970 primary challenge against an incumbent Republican senator solidified his opposition to the establishment Republican Party. Ralph Tyler Smith was appointed to the US Senate seat by Republican Governor Richard Ogilvie upon the death of Everett Dirksen. The state party, both liberals and conservatives for the most part, lined up behind Smith as their candidate. Rentschler felt that Smith was a weak candidate, not that conservative, and as an appointed senator had no right to the

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19“William Rentschler to Barry GoldwaterBox 139.
20 “Rentschler speaks to Young Republicans,” Chicago Tribune, October 1, 1967.
22 Ibid.
in sharp contrast to his belief that the GOP was fundamentally the better party six years earlier, Rentschler stated that in this election, the state GOP effort to elect Smith was no better than the democratic machine. Rentschler considered his campaign to be "grassroots", and modeled it after the Goldwater campaign that he previously supported. He did not just model his campaign after Goldwater in anti-establishment messaging, but also geography. Rentschler made a play to win the western suburbs in DuPage County by capitalizing off of the conservatives there that Goldwater had won in a landslide and by capturing anti-Ogolvie sentiment. Rentschler campaigned heavily in the county. However, unlike Goldwater, his campaign was not built on a conservative ideological challenge to the party. This campaign, although still influenced by Goldwater, was built on pure anti-establishment sentiment. Rentschler only attacked Smith for his "bossism" and connections to a corrupt system but did not claim to be to the incumbent's ideological right. This strategy would not win DuPage County or the state for Rentschler.

Following his failed Senate bid, Rentschler gained more prominence as a voice against the Republican establishment. He voiced his concerns for Ogilvie’s re-election bid for governor and attempted to become involved in the 1972 elections, but the state GOP cut him out of the process.

In 1976, he was convicted of bank fraud for making false statements when applying for business loans. Rentschler claimed that the prosecutor, a well-connected Republican named Jim Thomson, was leading an effort to

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24 Ibid.
25 Ibid.
27 Ibid.
punish him for his past political activities. Following his short imprisonment, Rentschler once again gained popularity as an editorial writer. His pieces revealed that his political views had moved to the center, but his dislike for the establishment of the Republican Party held steadfast. Now, his criticism grew beyond the Illinois state GOP and expanded to the party as a whole. He penned articles advocating for prison reform, elimination of the death penalty, advocating for gun control, and more, all while chastising the GOP for not doing more in these areas. By the early 1990s he claimed that racism, talk radio divisiveness, and lack of concern for violence made him ashamed to call himself a Republican.

Rentschler considered himself one of the last true Goldwater Republicans. He stated that he had not become more liberal, but rather that he still opposed the GOP party establishment which now claimed to be more conservative on social issues. Rentschler seemed to consider himself an heir to the senator's legacy and mentioned him in columns. Rentschler reminisced, saying that "I do consider Barry A true heroic figure," and that he was "above the fray." Rentschler went on to write an entire book dedicated to the legacy of Barry Goldwater. From his influence in the 1964 campaign, Rentschler had gained an anti-establishment sentiment that caused him to distrust elected officials and become more moderate over time in comparison to the rest of the party. This could not be more different than the path taken by another Illinoisan who was also a self-proclaimed heir to Goldwater’s legacy, Phil Crane.

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32 Ibid.
33 Ibid.
Rightward Shift: Phil Crane and Changing the Republican Party

Phil Crane was raised in a conservative background and immersed himself in the ideals of the Goldwater Campaign. Crane came from an upper-middle-class family in Chicago. Crane's father, George Crane, was a physician and noted psychological columnist.\footnote{“George W. Crane Dead at 94,” \textit{New York Times}, July 18, 1995.} After getting his graduate degree in history, Crane moved to the central Illinois city of Peoria to teach at Bradley University. Eventually, he would leave this job to work for the Goldwater Campaign. Crane described his childhood as being raised in a family with conservative "firm values," so the campaign appealed to him.\footnote{Ibid.} He served as director of research and a messaging director for the Illinois operations in the campaign.\footnote{“Phil Crane, a positive force of modern conservatism,” \textit{Washington Times}, November 10, 2015.} Crane would later credit the campaign, and Barry Goldwater specifically, for providing him with his ideological foundations.\footnote{“Phil Crane to Barry Goldwater,” Box 4.} Crane also authored a pamphlet for the national Goldwater campaign entitled “The Big Lie!.”\footnote{“The Big Lie!” June 7, 1977. The Personal and Political Paper of Barry M. Goldwater Series II “1964 Campaign,” Box 4 “Literature,” Folder 09. Hayden Library, Arizona State University Archives, Tempe, Arizona, United States.} This publication was an inspiring firebrand essay to encourage other conservatives to help the campaign.\footnote{Ibid.} After the election, Crane decided to move to the western suburbs of Chicago. Crane would continue to build the rest of his career in the suburbs.

Phil Crane ran as a conservative Republican for the open US House seat in the western suburban congressional district that Goldwater had won four years earlier. Goldwater carried DuPage country, which encompassed the entire district, with over 60
percent of the vote. The conventional wisdom was that Phil Crane was clearly the most conservative option in the ten candidate field seeking the GOP nomination in the district. Crane was an underdog as the campaign started. Crane was running against state representatives and well-connected businessmen. As the primary campaign drew on, though, the field narrowed down to Crane and State Senator John Nimrod. Nimrod was a self-described “Regular Republican” and ran a much more moderate campaign than Crane. Crane bolstered his campaign by connecting himself to Goldwater, and by touting himself as an academic and not a politician. Crane described himself to the media as just a professor who wanted to make a difference in government. He made arguments against several welfare programs and attacked social security in the campaign as well. He also claimed his status as a conservative intellectual, picking up endorsements from Charles Buckley and the National Review. These controversial positions and endorsements earned Crane various enemies in the primary. Columnist Rick Friedman, along with many liberal republicans, attacked Crane throughout the election. Friedman finished an article on the 13th district special election with the remarks, "Phil Crane scares the hell out of me. Vote for Phil Crane at your own peril."

The suburban 13th congressional district would continue its contribution to the conservative movement with the election of Phil Crane to the US House of Representatives in 1969. Crane won the primary by a much larger margin than expected by local Republicans that left his opponents stunned. Crane’s victory was described as a

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43 Phil Crane: College Prof Turned Politician” Chicago Tribune, November 23, 1969.
44 Ibid.
45 "That is an Endorsement?" Bensenville Register, October 3, 1969.
“grassroots victory of the people” by supporter Robert Bergman.\(^{46}\) His opponents decried it as elevating a radical with no qualifications to a seat in Congress. However, the newly elected Republican congressman had more political experience than either side would have liked to admit in the election. In the years since the Goldwater campaign, Crane had traveled the country as a campaign strategist, gave lectures on how to win elections, and worked as a researcher for the 1968 Nixon presidential campaign.\(^{47}\) Upon Crane's arrival in Congress, the Republican Party immediately put him to work assisting the campaigns of incumbent members of Congress.\(^{48}\) Despite his own misleading rhetoric, Crane was not purely a grassroots politician, but was a conservative insider.

Crane would use his experience and skills to promote his conservative ideals in the Republican Party. One such way he would do this was with the founding of The Republican Study Committee in Congress. Crane and Paul Weyrich, another veteran of both the Young Republicans and Goldwater's 1964 campaign, founded the Republican Study Committee as a way to put pressure on the moderate house GOP leadership. The Republican Study Committee was able to bring conservative positions to prominence in the house GOP by threatening any leader with its bloc of votes and campaign finance connections. The Republican Study Committee pushed the house leadership to eliminate 34 billion dollars from the budget that it considered to be waste and fraud, all while receiving favorable reports for doing so in the press.\(^{49}\) In 1979, the Republican Study Committee was able to block the adoption of suggestions from the United Nations

\(^{48}\) Ibid.  

regarding child safety and arms reduction. The Republican Study Committee was also able to successfully target some liberal incumbents in Congress for re-election, such as New York Senator Jacob Javits, who lost to a conservative challenge backed by the committee. Through pressure he applied as chairman of the committee both inside Congress and in campaigns, Crane was helping to move the GOP to the right. Outside of the Study Committee, he personally crusaded against government waste and began audits of the United Stated Military during his first several years in office. Crane also ran the Illinois Campaign for Ronald Reagan in 1976, headed up the American Conservative Union, and became a prominent critic of President Jimmy Carter. Crane even launched a brief Presidential bid himself in 1980, although he would drop out in favor of Ronald Reagan. Crane’s success in moving the House GOP to his positions would also be his undoing, as he would begin to lose his popularity due to, in part, no longer being any more conservative than his colleagues.

Phil Crane's most significant legislative impact would come about in the 1990s. Crane no longer felt the need to fight with house leadership. Leaders who were just as conservative as he now led the party, such as Newt Gingrich. Crane became vice-chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee. He became specialized in trade policy during his time in the Republican majority, which allowed him to implement many of the free trade policies that the Goldwater campaign advocated for so many years prior. Crane’s legislative accomplishments continued to further the agenda set forward by the Goldwater campaign that was deemed radical in the decades before. The lack of

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controversy in Crane’s positions in the house or in his legislation at the time illustrates how successful the conservative wing of the party had been since such things would have been unthinkable twenty years prior when Crane founded the Study Committee.

**Conclusion:**

The trajectories of conservative leadership after 1964 listed above illustrate the diversity of the Goldwater Campaign's suburban legacy. The career of Lucinda Wanner illustrates a relatively experienced insider at the county level who felt emboldened to take more conservative stands after the campaign. Her daughter, Lucinda Kasperson, illustrates how long conservative ideology was able to prevail in the suburbs and how it applied to local issues. William Rentschler’s career reveals the complex nature of the campaign that touched on anti-establishment politics more than ideology. Rentschler fell out of the graces of the Illinois GOP establishment and began to see himself as a fighter who carried Goldwater's anti-establishment legacy. He continued to fight the Republican Party establishment even as they became ideologically closer to the platforms of the 1964 Goldwater campaign that he supported. Phil Crane's election to the House of Representatives reveals that the suburbs of Chicago were still a foundation for conservative insiders after the 1964 campaign. Even though Crane portrayed himself as a grassroots candidate, he had extensive campaign experience. He used that experience to rally other conservatives together after his election to the house, and further demonstrate the lasting impact of conservative suburban insiders from the Goldwater campaign on a national level. These three stories reveal that the suburban Goldwater campaign was able to change personal ideology, local politics, and national party platforms.
**Thesis Conclusion:**

All three of the chapters in this thesis contribute to a larger argument: The Goldwater primary campaign was created and supported by experienced operatives who left a complicated legacy at multiple levels of government. The first chapter explores the careers of White, Ashbrook, and Rusher, among others, and compares the reasons for their success to the failures of conservative insurgencies before them. Their ability to create an experienced, conservative network of campaign operatives was the watershed moment that gave conservatives more influence in the 1964 Republican Primary. In the rest of the thesis, I chose to narrow that argument by exploring the history of Goldwater campaign operatives through the lens of suburban Illinois. Chapter 2 was a case study on the operatives and delegates who composed the leadership of the campaign and why they were successful in winning the Illinois primary. This led to the conclusion that the campaign was spearheaded by a coalition of suburban professionals and upper-middle-class women who all shared extensive political experience. The contrast between the results of the Illinois and New Hampshire campaigns showed that experienced in-state operatives were crucial to the victory of the Illinois Goldwater campaign, which previously had failed in their reliance on purely grassroots campaigners in New Hampshire. The third chapter continues the study of the suburban campaign but shifts subject to the legacy of that campaign. Lucinda Wanner and her daughter, Lucinda Kasperson, illustrate the lasting municipal level legacy in suburban DuPage and Lake Counties. The career of William Rentschler provides insight into the differing types of ideology that the campaign left behind. Rentschler considered himself to carrying on the work of the Goldwater campaign by attacking the leadership of the Republican Party. His
attacks became increasingly liberal as the party moved further to the right. Fighting machine-style politics was the value that Rentschler found in the Goldwater campaign, rather than any specific ideology. Finally, Phil Crane's career demonstrates the lasting national influence of the campaign and the transformation of conservative operatives. Crane began his career as a self-described outsider from a suburban congressional district whose campaign experience ran much deeper than he let on. By being a founder of the Republican Study Committee, Crane pushed the party to more conservative stances for two decades. By the 1990s, Crane himself was no longer prominent in conservative leadership, as he became established and mainstream by the new ideological standards of the party.

This thesis adds a new perspective to the historical analysis previously done on the Goldwater Campaign. By traveling to the Goldwater archives at Arizona State University and consulting over a dozen newspapers, I was able to create the most detailed analysis of the Illinois Goldwater primary campaign to date. I used various sources that were either rarely used or never used before, such as the Clif White oral history, the Doug Gunkel delegate profiles, small suburban newspaper articles, and various other primary documents. The use of these documents led to the conclusion that experienced suburban operatives were critical to the creation, success, and legacy of the Goldwater primary campaign in Illinois. This research fits within the scope of current academic work by Lisa McGirr and Kim Phillips-Fein by acknowledging both the importance of the suburban campaigns and of experienced operatives in the 1964 election. This thesis can be used for future research into the topic, and hopefully will serve as an inspiration for case studies into similar primary campaigns in different states. Future research should find more cases
of municipal and national conservative politicians that were inspired by the various suburban campaigns in 1964.
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